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Every privacy protocol says "private."
But the question is: private from whom?
We just shipped a new feature on L2BEAT that answers that for every protocol we track, against 5 different adversaries.
We've reviewed 16 privacy protocols to understand what they actually hide, who they hide it from, and what's still visible.
How do we assess them? We've published our full methodology, and we'd love your feedback π
But a good privacy rating doesn't mean much if you're the only one using a pool, for example.
That's why we also look at anonymity sets: how many unique users have deposited into a pool over the last 30 days. Some pools have 1,000+ depositors, others have barely any.
We also track trusted setup, exit windows, and reproducibility.
This is our approach so far, but it's not set in stone. Think we've missed something or should assess a threat differently?
Join the discussion on the forum π
forum.l2beat.com/t/privacy-aβ¦
What if @ethereum could verify ZK proofs itself, so rollups and apps wouldn't need to run their own verifiers?
This could be achieved through native proof verification.
And we've made some progress there over the past month: the draft for EIP-8357 was merged, and a native rollup is now running on a devnet π
There's still work to do before native rollups can run on Ethereum.
L1 needs leanVM, frame transactions, EIP-8288 and EIP-8357 included in a fork.
But with the first pieces coming together and a working devnet to experiment with, we're getting closer.
Want to dig deeper? We've put everything in one place: l2beat.com/native-rollups/
Replying to @SuccinctLabs
@SuccinctLabs disclosed an SP1 bug, but onchain Groth16 and Plonk verification through Solidity verifiers was unaffected by this issue.
The bug affected native Rust verification. Hereβs how our ZK Catalog helps you tell the paths apart π
Succinct patched its Prover Network, with no integration changes needed from requesters for that update.
Teams separately running the affected native Rust verifier need to upgrade to v6.8.1.
When checking a vulnerability, follow the applicationβs verification setup and compare it with the disclosureβs scope.
Our ZK Catalog gives you places to start:
l2beat.com/zk-catalog
Most DAO voting happens in public - you can look up a wallet and see exactly how it voted, which allows for bribery and voter pressure. In real-world elections, the secret ballot is an internationally recognised standard that exists to prevent exactly that.
@theInterfold CRISP tries to solve this for onchain voting by keeping individual votes private while making the final results public.
We've added it to the L2BEAT Privacy dashboard. Here's how it works and who you need to trust π
Hereβs the summary:
Individual votes are hidden from public and network observers.
A chain analyst may still be able to infer some votes, and a future adversary could potentially reveal them. Privileged insiders have a more direct path.
@theInterfold CRISP is live on mainnet, although it's still early. The operator set is in its initial stage, and there have only been a handful of votes so far.
Full breakdown: l2beat.com/privacy/projects/β¦




