CNAS

1️⃣ Russia and China do not need to coordinate to cause significant strain on U.S. forces. In the tabletop exercise conducted, without joint planning or shared intelligence, they overstretched the U.S. military. Strategists should plan for this scenario. 2️⃣ A crisis of this magnitude will likely be protracted instead of fast and decisive. The U.S. should test its ability to have forces operate in two theaters with logistics and comms challenges, instead of "optimal conditions" 3️⃣ The exercise calculated U.S. forces were stretched thin between conventional strikes and nuclear signaling duties. The Joint Force should rebuild our nuclear signaling practices through senior-leader exercises. 4️⃣ Homeland defense and nuclear deterrence compete for similar assets, so deployment in one theater weakens the other. We should evaluate whether the Joint Force's high-demand assets can meet simultaneous defense and warfighting demands and identify their shortfalls. 5️⃣ It is unclear what stances NATO and Pacific allies would take if we prioritized one theater over the other. Starting conversations with allies now on capabilities assurances and expectations and bringing them into future exercises is key.