Fantasy

im waiting for the craziest new iteration of click fix to pop up based on this

Does @ProtonMail have an unpatchable email spam filter bypass by using an account's public PGP key? Every account has a public PGP key that can be used to encrypt emails. This prevents the service provider from reading the content, straight forward. But, this also means that spammers can use the same encryption to bypass content-based spam filters. I've never considered weaponizing PGP like this before. Am I missing something? - proton[.]me/support/download-public-private-key#how-to-download-your-public-key - proton[.]me/mail/privacy-policy#:~:text=We%20do%20NOT,Services%20and%20users

I never really thought about it, but 3DNS isn’t its own registrar, it *partners* with Namesilo for registrations All the multisig and tokenization is just fancy account controls for what is a normal domain reseller. All the “security controls” can be bypassed since Namesilo actually controls everything under the hood Can high value projects use actual corporate domain registrars (Markmonitor, CSC) instead of whatever this is?

█████ █ discord bot ███ dashboard ████ ██████ ██ total fucking armageddon ██ ███ ███ $100,000

he put his profits into sDAI and pax gold??? whose grandfather got the alpha???

PSA: Don't use fundamental personal cybersecurity tools to protect yourself.

Happy to announce that I've joined @FairsideNetwork as their lead investigator! I'll be building out the investigations department to prevent fraud and provide accessible and equitable crypto insurance for all 🫡

I would like to build on top of this as I haven't seen any other posts go further. Just FYI I don't have experience reversing normal malware, but here's my stab at it. Using the HA report were able to quickly get around the obfuscated cmd file: hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e… Then after a little bit of manual cleaning, we end up with some normal powershell that base64 decodes, decrypts using AES, and g-un-zips a comment from the original cmd file into two assembly payloads then executes them. Well, what exactly are these assembly payloads? Using CyberChef (see Gist), we can quickly put together a pipeline to get the hash of the file and stick it into VirusTotal. It drops "BStub_Onimai" and "irFKI" which apparently are a RAT (info stealer) and ransomware respectively. Gist: gist.github.com/vile/2e82610… virustotal.com/gui/file/ff6b…

The following analysis of wallets associated with H*mas and the PIJ, named in Israeli Administrative Seizure Orders (ASOs), referenced by Elliptic, Chainalysis, and in Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s letter to the US Treasury, will contain minimal on-chain analysis for the following reasons - The $93 million inflow of USDT, USDC, and TRX to ASO 34/23 wallets posted by Elliptic is (mostly) an undisputed figure - The $41 million inflow of USDT and TRX to ASO 15/22 and ASO 19/23 wallets posted by BitOK is an undisputed figure - The context and methodology used by the Israeli Ministry of Defense to determine the ownership of ASO-associated wallets is unknown and not public Specific inflow volume to ASO-associated wallets are not disputed and have been independently verified by multiple parties. The issue lies within how these figures are represented and portrayed in the WSJ’s article and Sen. Warren’s letter. xitter.gq/sem1d5/status/17… To quote Elliptic, “it is not clear exactly how much of these funds belong directly to [terrorist organizations].” As such, it is impossible to definitively say that the cumulative $130 million volume, stated in Sen. Warren’s letter, belongs solely to H*mas and the PIJ. This is a blatant misrepresentation of the data and is fear mongering. xitter.gq/NeerajKA/status/… Furthermore, it possible, not definitive, to cast doubt by the consistent language across all three ASOs of interest. Stated, “[We have] been convinced that the cryptocurrency wallets… are the property of designated terrorist organization[s]…” Concurrent with Elliptic and Chainalysis’s articles, the wallets present in the ASOs are most likely brokers or OTC traders. While Chainalysis’s example only showcases a single wallet, it highlights how terror financing makes up a comparatively small amount of transactional volume. Actively choosing to blindly assume all volume is terror-related, while only a small portion actually is, is a faulty line of reason and quickly falls apart when applied to other means of financial exchange, outside of crypto. In this case, it is apparent that cryptocurrency is simply a means to an end, and funds eventually re-enter the TradeFi banking system. Of direct volume processed by ASO 34/23 wallets, $37.46 million is immediately deposited into exchanges. That's 40%. Even accounting for one degree of separation, the percentage increases dramatically. platform.arkhamintelligence.… The same applies to withdrawals. $35.23 million has been withdrawn from various exchanges directly to ASO 34/23 wallets, most likely originating from the TradeFi system. It is highly unlikely that rockets and arms were purchased with Tether, but with TradeFi dollars. Scapegoating crypto for terror financing due to its properties as a public ledger does not hold up. It is serving its purpose. The public visibility provided by the ledger actually helps in detecting such cases of financing, regardless of the monetary volume or the percentage of funds truly related to terror. This is evident in cases such as the shutdown of the crypto donation program by the military wing of H*mas. chainalysis.com/blog/hamas-a… Lastly, it is important to consider the articles (and letter) by Elliptic, Chainalysis, and Sen. Warren may be opportunistic in nature. xitter.gq/spreekaway/statu…