Anne Drif retweeted
đ„ Scoop â After the arrest of Ex-#BND Chief August #Hanning, US #intelligence services told their German counterparts: Future intelligence cooperation will be under review. This warning sounded the alarm, as the US is still BNDÂŽs key ally. Our report: tagesschau.de/investigativ/nâŠ
Attaque de Binance : en dix ans, la Corée du Nord a volé l'équivalent de la moitié de son PIB annuel en cryptos pour financer ses programmes d'armement
lesechos.fr/tech-medias/highâŠ
Anne Drif retweeted
Very interesting focus groups with Russians on their view of the war.
âA striking feature across all groups is a lack of compassion for others, be it towards Ukrainians or fellow Russians sent to fight. And, although some express worries about family members getting conscripted, this does not translate into sympathy for those at the front now. In fact, people dread the return of veterans, fearing new violence at home. (âŠ)
When asked if Ukraine is a sovereign country, very few reply with a firm âYesâ. Most say it is not sovereign, or not fully soâif Ukraine is mentioned among the adversaries, it is usually the âUkrainian regimeâ, not the country. There is a recognition that Ukraine became a full-fledged, independent state in 1991; but, after that, people believe something happened that caused it to lose sovereignty. They struggle to explain what precisely this was.
(âŠ.)
If the list of Russiaâs allies is quite short, the list of unfriendly states is long. âWellâeveryone elseâ, is often the first reply. The bigger European countriesâBritain, France and Germanyâare usually named first, followed by the Baltic states, Finland and Poland; sometimes also countries like India and Turkey. NATO is an enemy too, for most respondentsâone explains that it is because âNATO keeps encroaching on other countries to bring about so-called democracy with bombs.â Ukraine is mentioned, but not as a first choice and somewhat hesitantlyânot because it is not seen as an enemy, but because, as explored above, Russians might not regard it as a proper country. And even where it is mentioned, few participants connect its âenemyâ status to Russiaâs own invasion of Ukraine.
(âŠ)
Europeâs image seems in many ways in sync with the Kremlinâs own rhetoric. People criticise it for âgay paradesâ, for âwomen at the helmâ, for didactic lecturing. In some groups, people get into exchanges about Europeâs decline: some maintain Europe is withering away, pointing to pride marches and migrants as proof. Others point out that many states want to join the EU just to benefit from Germanyâs or Franceâs economic might, or because they would otherwise be weaker on their own.
(âŠ)
Almost no one connects the perceived European âantagonismâ to Russia with Europeâs reaction to Putinâs invasion of Ukraine or any other actions by Russia. âI donât know why the Finns are so antagonistic to us. Maybe they never got over the fact that we took over Karelia in 1940â, opines one respondent. Others complain about their positive attitude towards the Baltic states and these statesâ negative attitude towards Russia: âI donât know why they [the Baltic states] are so adversarial, most probably they were ordered to be like thatâ, concludes another participant. Confusion, propaganda, wilful ignorance and lack of curiosity probably all play their role in shaping Russiansâ perceptions of their country and its external relations. And it also helps explain why the war in Ukraine still seems distant to many in Russiaâand why Europeâs own reaction to the war is overwhelmingly seen as negative, almost unfair. Â Â
This brings to mind a conversation held by one of the authors with a Moscow sociologist long before the war. Explaining how the Russian people form opinions about the West, the scholar noted that Russiaâs own role tends to get forgotten. âFor instance, Russia invades Georgiaâthere is some outcry, then the West imposes sanctions, and soon the population will have decided that the hostile West has attacked Russia with sanctions. That something happened that led to it, that Russia did somethingâthat is soon overlooked. People settle on the opinion that these small countries do not really matter, no one very much needs them, this is all about the Westâs competition with Russia.â Some participants in the focus groups echo this: âOn what basis is the US even imposing sanctions on us?!â asks one puzzled respondent.â
ecfr.eu/publication/bewitche⊠via @ecfr
Anne Drif retweeted
đ«đ·đšđŠ In a setback for Trump, Canada is turning to France to acquire new military defence capabilities.
lalettre.fr/fr/politique_exeâŠ
Anne Drif retweeted
đŻđ”đ”ïžââïž #Japan hat seine #Geheimdienste neu aufgestellt. Erstmals mit einem Auslandsgeheimdienst und einer gestĂ€rkten Spionageabwehr:
ojihad.wordpress.com/2026/06âŠ
Man hat sich dabei unter anderem Inspiration in Deutschland geholt und GesprĂ€che mit dem #BND gefĂŒhrt.
âWir sind weit entfernt, aber wir sind trotzdem Nachbarnâ, sagt Friedrich Merz beim Treffen mit Japans Premierministerin Sanae Takaichi in Tokio.
Deutschland und Japan leben âin zwei Teilen der Welt, die aber gleich Herausforderungenâ aufweisen, so der Kanzler mit Blick auf China und Russland. Zuvor sprach Takaichi von einer âPremium-Partnerschaftâ.
Anne Drif retweeted
đđ±đ§ Hier, jâai eu lâhonneur de recevoir le prix Albert Londres
Lâoccasion dâessayer, le temps dâun discours, de raconter pĂȘle-mĂȘle ce qui se cache derriĂšre ce que lâon lit : lâindigne prĂ©caritĂ© des correspondants ; le fascisme, la propagande et les impĂ©rialismes qui pĂšsent sur nos mĂ©tiers et nos vies. LâUkraine, le Liban, Gaza⊠de ces terrains martyrs de la barbarie au paradigme gĂ©nocidaire.
Aux survivants de lâunivers concentrationnaire syrien. Aux confrĂšres assassinĂ©s par lâarmĂ©e israĂ©lienne au sud du Liban, Ă Gaza, ou ailleurs encore.
Aux mots que lâon cherche Ă trouver, et Ă ces vies qui nous obligent.
Un immense merci au jury @albert_londres pour cette reconnaissance.
Anne Drif retweeted
Le drone de combat qui accompagnera le Rafale F5 ne sera peut-ĂȘtre pas de conception française opex360.com/2026/10/27/le-drâŠ
đ©đ°đșđŠ Face aux restrictions imposĂ©es Ă #Starlink et #Starshield il y a dix jours, qui ont entravĂ© les opĂ©rations de drones ukrainiens, Kyiv cherche Ă se doter de ses propres moyens de communication par satellite.
Le 1er octobre, dans le cadre de la mission Transporter-18 de SpaceX, l'entreprise ukrainienne Himera et le fabricant danois @GomSpaceGroup ont mis en orbite le satellite d'essai OBRIA NANO. Opéré par l'Ukraine à des fins de sécurité nationale, cet équipement constitue une premiÚre étape vers l'établissement d'un réseau de communication autonome.
Cet enjeu revĂȘt une dimension stratĂ©gique majeure. Depuis 2022, les forces armĂ©es ukrainiennes dĂ©pendent fortement des services de #SpaceX pour le commandement, le pilotage de drones et le maintien des liaisons dans les zones sinistrĂ©es.
Les contraintes observées à la mi-octobre ont mis en exergue la vulnérabilité liée à cette dépendance technologique. Himera privilégie désormais une stratégie de diversification des canaux de communication afin de renforcer la sécurité nationale.
Les perspectives du programme sont ambitieuses : les deux partenaires visent le déploiement d'une constellation couvrant l'intégralité du territoire, l'interopérabilité avec les systÚmes européens, ainsi que la production locale de satellites et de terminaux au sol.
« Les Etats-Unis sont engagés ailleurs » : comment les Français tentent de placer leurs logiciels de commandement au sein de l'Otan ebx.sh/L0vxJQ
« Nous sommes prĂȘts Ă coopĂ©rer avec Thales » : le champion danois des systĂšmes de commandement veut renforcer le front europĂ©en Ă l'Otan
lesechos.fr/industrie-servicâŠ
Anne Drif retweeted
Câest Ă©videmment le domaine naval sur lequel tout le monde a lâĆil en ce moment, du coup câest pas mal de se rappeler que ceux qui sont le plus en pointe sur le sujet ne sont pas exactement des acteurs trĂšs amicaux.
#LeCollimateur se penche aujourd'hui sur la conflictualité qui se déploie dans le fond des mers, avec le contre-amiral Cédric Chetaille, ancien coordinateur de la stratégie pour les fonds marins et auteur de « Abysses. La guerre qui vient » (@AllaryEditions).
lerubicon.org/collimateur-27âŠ
Anne Drif retweeted
In today's Russian papers, surprise at the the defeat of Moscow ally Aleksander VuÄiÄ in Serbia. One paper: âRussia can expect nothing good from this.â Another: âThe results benefit the EU.â But several point out: âThe Serbs are dependant on Russian gas.â #ReadingRussia
« Il va falloir que je tranche assez vite » : comment les industriels français qui arment l'Ukraine se protÚgent des menaces russes ebx.sh/770jY9
Anne Drif retweeted
Scoop đŽ German Federal intelligence services are about to establish their first "intelligence cloud", enabling them to share secret information much quicker. According to our information this system will be bases on an air-gapped version of #Google Cloud: tagesschau.de/investigativ/nâŠ
Anne Drif retweeted
âïž [ đșđž ĂTATS-UNIS | đ·đș RUSSIE | đșđŠ UKRAINE ]
đž Une enquĂȘte du Financial Times rĂ©vĂšle lâexistence dâun canal de communication secret et non officiel avec Vladimir Poutine, mis en place en 2022 alors que les Ătats-Unis redoutaient une escalade nuclĂ©aire russe.
Lâavocat amĂ©ricain Richard Conn et le banquier Bob Foresman auraient utilisĂ© leurs liens avec Matthias Warnig, ancien officier de la Stasi et proche de longue date de Vladimir Poutine, pour transmettre Ă Moscou des assurances selon lesquelles Washington ne cherchait ni Ă renverser le rĂ©gime russe ni Ă dĂ©truire la Russie.
Ces Ă©changes auraient ensuite dĂ©bouchĂ© sur une proposition dâaccord de paix en Ukraine, prĂ©voyant des concessions territoriales et des garanties de sĂ©curitĂ©. Selon les participants, Vladimir Poutine aurait envisagĂ© cette proposition, mais Kyiv aurait refusĂ© les compromis territoriaux.
Lâinitiative aurait finalement Ă©chouĂ© dĂ©but 2023, sur fond dâinterrogations concernant son Ă©ventuelle autorisation par Washington. Dâanciens responsables amĂ©ricains contestent toutefois le sĂ©rieux des intentions de nĂ©gociation de Moscou.
Anne Drif retweeted
« Heureusement que la France et le Royaume-Uni ont un droit de veto » : les Ătats-Unis pensent Ă Orban comme SecrĂ©taire GĂ©nĂ©ral de lâONU l.leparisien.fr/Wdki
« Ce n'est pas aux industriels de la défense de payer pour leur sécurité » : le torchon brûle entre l'Etat et les fabricants d'armement sur l'addition de la lutte antidrones
lesechos.fr/industrie-servicâŠ
Anne Drif retweeted
đ·đșđâąïžThree weeks after France and three and a half months after China, it is now the Russian Navy's turn to demonstrate the operational and technological credibility of its sea-based nuclear component, with a BULAVA ballistic missile (SLBM) launch expected from a BOREI(-A)-class SSBN, from the Sea of Okhotsk to the Chizha impact area in northeastern Russia.
This launch is very interesting and eagerly awaited for at least two reasons:
- Russian strategic forces usually conduct a major exercise every October. However, a surprise exercise already took place in May this year. The question was (and still is) whether it would replace the October one. This launch could indicate that it did not. That said, we will have to wait to know whether other strategic weapons launches (YARS ICBMs, Kh-102 cruise missiles, etc.) take place over the same period. For now, it's only one launch;
- The BULAVA is the Russian Navy's most recent SLBM and is the delivery vehicle that carries the largest number of operational nuclear warheads in the country's arsenal. Yet it has not been launched since October 2024, while its predecessor, the SINEVA, has been launched several times since then, including last May. Moreover, the latest BOREI-A-class SSBN was commissioned without the usual qualification launch. It is therefore possible that the weapon system (the missile or the submarine) is experiencing technical problems. If successful, the launch planned for next week would therefore reaffirm the technological and operational credibility of this system, which is critical to Russian deterrence.
Wait and see now âČïž
Navigational Warnings have appeared for what could be a #Russian #Bulava #SLBM test launch, Oct 25-31, from a submarine in the Sea of Ochotsk to Chizha, Kanin Peninsula.
(HT @russianforces, @Etienne_Marcuz )
@planet4589 @nukestrat @wslafoy
L'Ukraine indique avoir retrouvĂ© une « connexion stable » au systĂšme Starlink, crucial pour son armĂ©e lesechos.fr/monde/europe/lukâŠ



















