専門家じゃない人が書いちゃいけないような分析まで書いちゃってるから、参考程度に見てほしいです。
本文は12,000字程度です。
ロシア防空システムの大規模再配置 ―衛星画像から見るS-300/400の移動とドクトリンの変容― note.com/happy_lotus194/n/nc…
Asuw retweeted
From the waters of the Sea of Okhotsk, the crew of the Borei-A-class SSBN К-553 “Generalissimus Suvorov” conducted a test launch of the R-30 “Bulava” SLBM at the Chizha test range in the Arkhangelsk Region.
🎥MoD RF(Oct 27-28)
tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2826018…
僕も名前を連ねました。慎重にならねばならないことはそれとして、声はあげねばならないと思っています。
Replying to @MasaruSeo
駐日ロシア大使館にも送付しました。ご賛同いただける方はシェア、拡散をいただけるとありがたいです。
note.com/good_racoon2939/n/n…
Asuw retweeted
The Russians brought a US-made M1A1SA Abrams main battle tank captured from Ukraine to the Uralvagonzavod tank plant in Nizhny Tagil.
Asuw retweeted
Replying to @clement_molin
Hi there. Dima Treschanin of Mediazona here.
1. We don’t consider our 2022–2023 data to be “broadly complete.” We do have non-public data that would add several thousand more people, including about a thousand from Wagner PMC alone. But our methodology is fairly conservative, and we don’t want to change it midstream.
2. According to our data so far, 2025 has been the deadliest year of the war. Although we have identified more than 100,000 people killed with dates of death in 2024, we know for certain that losses in 2025 were significantly higher. Collecting that data will take considerable time, though; it’s simply an enormous amount of work.
3. Thanks to non-public sources, we can see how long it takes the state to register deaths. For example, we’re currently working through a list in which most of the people were likely killed in the summer or early fall of 2025. Today we learned the dates of death for nine of them, and roughly the same number last week. To be clear: these people died last summer. Their obituaries, if they appear at all, will be published some time from now.
4. As for 2026, the situation is even worse: even government agencies (outside the MoD) don’t know how many people have been killed this year. And let’s be real, the MoD itself may not have the full picture either.
5. The more “static” the front line, the harder it is to recover bodies. The harder it is to recover bodies, the larger the share of soldiers listed as missing in action, and the longer and more difficult the identification process becomes. This also leads to more errors in which living people are declared dead; such cases are very rare, but they do happen.
6. Barring any major changes at the front, we expect that for the rest of this year and most of next, the new data we add will mainly concern 2025.
7. For this reason, we can’t say whether 2026 will prove deadlier than 2025. But there is no reason to believe the situation has improved in any way for the Russian army: broadly, the same tactics and strategy are being used as in 2025. That said, any claim of rising losses requires evidence, and we don’t have that evidence yet.
Asuw retweeted
I disagree with this analysis, which contradicts me, so I think it’s necessary to come back to it. The author opens with “all evidence available point to the opposite”, yet he doesn’t cite a single piece of evidence.
🔶Saying that the drop in Russian armored vehicle losses proves Russia is losing fewer men is not only wrong, it’s actually a lie. First, armor has been sidelined since early 2024, which explains the drop. Second, Mediazona’s data (which is nearly complete up to early 2024) shows that losses are lower during periods of mechanized assaults (autumn 2023) than during periods of limited armor use (summer 2024).
Moreover, the author deliberately leaves out that while far fewer armored vehicles are being destroyed (because they’re used less), strikes on unarmored vehicles have exploded. We’re talking about 3,000 to 4,000 vehicles hit per week. These vehicles are barely counted, and they are struck daily 10, 20, 30 or even 50 km from the front. The human losses from these strikes are fairly high, since the vehicles are unprotected and can’t withstand drone attacks. To see this, you’d need to do a minimum of research and actually watch the videos. Strikes on unarmored vehicles also happen very far from the front: mid-range strikes alone have hit more than 2,000 confirmed vehicles since the start of the year, often more than 50 km from the front.
The author will probably bring out his usual line that these strikes have no impact and that vehicles can easily be replaced by buying them on the famous big used-car market in Central Asia. That’s one more thing he deliberately leaves out: the cost of the vehicles hit, the goods, ammunition and soldiers that never reach the front, the wounded and killed in these strikes (judging by the videos, this happens very regularly), and the knock-on effect on Russian logistics, which is far from negligible.
🔶Claiming that Mediazona proves there are fewer losses is also wrong. Mediazona takes time to update its list of losses and holds back part of its data, so as not to reveal weaknesses in the Russian government that would push it to shut down the information channels being used. Mediazona’s data is broadly complete up to the end of 2023, and as we’ve seen, entries are still regularly being added for 2024, two years ago. The chart showing the year each entry was added makes it very clear how much longer it now takes to record losses. As for the claim that no OSINT data shows any change in losses: well, that’s easy to say when you don’t do any OSINT yourself, have no contacts on the ground, and therefore bring no additional data.
🔶The 2026 attrition ratio is not more favorable than 2025’s. That’s false, and there is no “more balanced attrition approach.” This ignores Ukraine’s advantage in drone strikes (the kill zone is deeper) and Russia’s manpower problems, which force it to concentrate the offensive on certain areas. The infiltration strategy itself proves that attrition is not under Russian control. Does Russia have the advantage in artillery? No. It fires more, but at shorter range and with less accuracy, against Ukrainians who move less and stay camouflaged in their positions. Losses from artillery are minimal. The Ukrainians fire less, but further and more accurately, against a larger number of Russian troops. The Russians do have the advantage in airstrikes, but losses are mainly caused by drones, not KABs.
🔶The next point is less problematic. The rest is mostly a change of subject: why bring up deep strikes (which I never disputed) when the topic was first and foremost the front? Fine, it does tie back to attrition, but in doing so the author quietly admits that Russia is failing on the front and is focusing on a deep-strike campaign in the hope of making Ukraine give in.
I struggle to understand the author’s obsession with everything that’s negative for Ukraine and positive for Russia. For a “military theorist”, it’s a shame not to cover the whole picture, especially since he always finds a rational explanation for the Russian plan (“no, actually, if Russia isn’t advancing, it’s because it chose an attrition strategy”. Very funny 😊).
The “Russian losses increased” narrative is a fabrication, since all evidence available point to the opposite. Vehicle losses have decreased significantly compared to 2025, with armor down by a factor of 5 in average. (source: Oryx)
Mediazona’s in-year 2026 personnel-loss count remains 50% below 2025, without a valid explanation. The claim that bodies are harder to retrieve is insufficient: the battlefield and grey zone remain as dangerous as in 2025. Russian courts process MIA-to-KIA cases at high rates, and a body is not required to file for procedure. There has also been no specific additional documented enforcement of obituaries concealment which could explain such a sharp decrease.
Regardless, there are absolutely no OSINT data available supporting claims of increased total Russian (or Ukrainian) casualties in 2026. For all we know, it could be inferior, equivalent, higher...
The 2026 attrition ratio is more favorable for Russia than in 2025. Progress has slowed but stays within 2024 ranges once the AFU Kursk advances are factored in.
2025 was peculiar: the Kursk pocket collapse and rout destabilized Ukrainian forces and enabled rapid Russian advances front wide for 6 months.
All signs indicate that 2026 reflects a more balanced attrition approach after the extremely costly 2024 and the front-wide pressure of 2025 that leveraged the post-Kursk situation, but at high cost.
Another myth is: “if attrition worked Russian advances should accelerate”. In attrition warfare theories, the principle is to cause collapse of the adversary to enable decisive gains; not that advances will gradually increase in a linear way, which is subject to both side’s respective effort at a given time. For instance, the weaker side could expend massive resources in a surge attempt, stabilising in apparence the front but collapsing 6 months later.
In 2025, Ukrainian forces suffered a sector collapse in the Sudja pocket, which rendered an entire part of the army combat ineffective. Hence, advances ensued.
Nevertheless, Ukraine has accelerated mobilization (aggressively) and alternative means to recover, and is nowhere near a collapse of its ground military forces for the time being. Though, with a mobilization ratio currently standing at around 18-20% of the remaining military aged male population, it may be nearing sensitive levels.
The point is to separate military objectives: conquest of the 4 oblasts against which Moscow can measure military success, and political objectives: demilitarisation and neutrality of Ukraine, central to the strategic settlement Moscow continues to seek. (Ideally enforced by a favorable regime change)
This matters because to achieve its strategic political goal, Russia needs to continue investing in its expensive ballistic and drone programs to collapse the economy at the rear, and make rational choices for expenditures. Losing 4,000 armor a year is not an option anymore.
The ground offensive’s primary goal is therefore not military conquest but applying pressure on the entire Ukrainian economic and social apparatus, to support the achievement of the political ambition. Seizing Donbas is a secondary and corollary territorial objective, because the political goal naturally secures the territorial one.
Understanding this principle is the basis of analysing this war correctly.
Moscow’s objectives in this conflict have not changed, but the strategy adopted has been evolving regularly based on various factors, including setbacks. Kyiv has also been adapting continuously to prevent its success. In 2026, the military situation has somehow improved for Ukraine, but the social and economic ones deteriorated at an accelerated pace.
There is however no way to tell whether the Kremlin’s plan will ultimately succeed, even partially.
See an earlier analysis in reply to understand attrition warfare performance measurement methods.
#UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy #Attrition
Asuw retweeted
Diríais que el nuevo miniSAM estadounidense se parece un poco-bastante al MiniSAM de los Pantsir o simplemente es una coincidencia ?
Asuw retweeted
I am running the Oryx blog, which this troll references as one of the sources
He is deliberately manipulating the data to support his delusional conclusions
This is what happens when you start with the conclusion and only later try to fit the reality around it
The “Russian losses increased” narrative is a fabrication, since all evidence available point to the opposite. Vehicle losses have decreased significantly compared to 2025, with armor down by a factor of 5 in average. (source: Oryx)
Mediazona’s in-year 2026 personnel-loss count remains 50% below 2025, without a valid explanation. The claim that bodies are harder to retrieve is insufficient: the battlefield and grey zone remain as dangerous as in 2025. Russian courts process MIA-to-KIA cases at high rates, and a body is not required to file for procedure. There has also been no specific additional documented enforcement of obituaries concealment which could explain such a sharp decrease.
Regardless, there are absolutely no OSINT data available supporting claims of increased total Russian (or Ukrainian) casualties in 2026. For all we know, it could be inferior, equivalent, higher...
The 2026 attrition ratio is more favorable for Russia than in 2025. Progress has slowed but stays within 2024 ranges once the AFU Kursk advances are factored in.
2025 was peculiar: the Kursk pocket collapse and rout destabilized Ukrainian forces and enabled rapid Russian advances front wide for 6 months.
All signs indicate that 2026 reflects a more balanced attrition approach after the extremely costly 2024 and the front-wide pressure of 2025 that leveraged the post-Kursk situation, but at high cost.
Another myth is: “if attrition worked Russian advances should accelerate”. In attrition warfare theories, the principle is to cause collapse of the adversary to enable decisive gains; not that advances will gradually increase in a linear way, which is subject to both side’s respective effort at a given time. For instance, the weaker side could expend massive resources in a surge attempt, stabilising in apparence the front but collapsing 6 months later.
In 2025, Ukrainian forces suffered a sector collapse in the Sudja pocket, which rendered an entire part of the army combat ineffective. Hence, advances ensued.
Nevertheless, Ukraine has accelerated mobilization (aggressively) and alternative means to recover, and is nowhere near a collapse of its ground military forces for the time being. Though, with a mobilization ratio currently standing at around 18-20% of the remaining military aged male population, it may be nearing sensitive levels.
The point is to separate military objectives: conquest of the 4 oblasts against which Moscow can measure military success, and political objectives: demilitarisation and neutrality of Ukraine, central to the strategic settlement Moscow continues to seek. (Ideally enforced by a favorable regime change)
This matters because to achieve its strategic political goal, Russia needs to continue investing in its expensive ballistic and drone programs to collapse the economy at the rear, and make rational choices for expenditures. Losing 4,000 armor a year is not an option anymore.
The ground offensive’s primary goal is therefore not military conquest but applying pressure on the entire Ukrainian economic and social apparatus, to support the achievement of the political ambition. Seizing Donbas is a secondary and corollary territorial objective, because the political goal naturally secures the territorial one.
Understanding this principle is the basis of analysing this war correctly.
Moscow’s objectives in this conflict have not changed, but the strategy adopted has been evolving regularly based on various factors, including setbacks. Kyiv has also been adapting continuously to prevent its success. In 2026, the military situation has somehow improved for Ukraine, but the social and economic ones deteriorated at an accelerated pace.
There is however no way to tell whether the Kremlin’s plan will ultimately succeed, even partially.
See an earlier analysis in reply to understand attrition warfare performance measurement methods.
#UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy #Attrition
ペトロパブロフスク‐カムチャツキー1532th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regimentでデコイを観測。また、51P6Aが2台移動したようにも見える。
livingatlas.arcgis.com/wayba…
Asuw retweeted
❗️In 🇷🇺Moscow, they have begun installing towers with autonomous turrets to counter kamikaze drone attacks.
Asuw retweeted
EXCLUSIVE: In a joint investigation by @InsiderGeo × @SONARROW_OSINT , we identified a large-scale Russian military loading operation in Baltiysk. Between October 15 and 16, we observed the Russian cargo vessels ASCALON (IMO 9198226), LADY D (IMO 9349289) and ANASTASIIA (IMO 9349291) loading significant quantities of military equipment at the Kaliningrad naval base, including logistics vehicles, infantry vehicles, MRAPs and troop transports.
A rotation of other cargo vessels also appears to have taken place in the days before and after, although heavy cloud cover over the period makes this difficult to confirm.
One or more large convoys are likely already underway. Their destination(s) remain unknown at this time.
Asuw retweeted
UPDATE: 🇷🇺 Together with @SONARROW_OSINT, we have identified a FOURTH Russian cargo vessel, LADY R (IMO 9161003), loading new military equipment at the naval base in Baltiysk, Kaliningrad.
One of the largest Russian military convoys yet appears to be about to leave for an unknown destination.
EXCLUSIVE: In a joint investigation by @InsiderGeo × @SONARROW_OSINT , we identified a large-scale Russian military loading operation in Baltiysk. Between October 15 and 16, we observed the Russian cargo vessels ASCALON (IMO 9198226), LADY D (IMO 9349289) and ANASTASIIA (IMO 9349291) loading significant quantities of military equipment at the Kaliningrad naval base, including logistics vehicles, infantry vehicles, MRAPs and troop transports.
A rotation of other cargo vessels also appears to have taken place in the days before and after, although heavy cloud cover over the period makes this difficult to confirm.
One or more large convoys are likely already underway. Their destination(s) remain unknown at this time.
Asuw retweeted
Дрони стають мережею: як Росія збільшує дальність і точність ударів по Україні ebx.sh/WpyNTK
Asuw retweeted
Introducing: AD-1 Inferno and AD-2 Ambush, @HelsingAI’s new air defence interceptors.
Designed to outmatch and outrun even the fastest jet-powered drone and cruise missile threats. 1/4
Asuw retweeted
弾道ミサイルの撃墜は2発のみのようだが、相変わらず飛来数がない
推定では、少なくとも10発以上のイスカンデルM、S-400がキーウに飛来した
t.me/kpszsu/90827
Asuw retweeted
The TOS-3 heavy flamethrower system, equipped with additional protection against UAVs, and a mobile air defense fire group(BTR APC) providing cover for it.
🎥VGTRK(Oct. 2026)
Asuw retweeted
NOTAM-a-tron now increasingly ai-powered..
Now includes specialised map views documenting likely notices linked to launches, exercises and cable ops: notamatron.app/demo
Looks like a (Grom-related) east-west launch coming...
@The_Lookout_N @Etienne_Marcuz @russianforces







































