Amr Shatlaa

Over 1,000 Iranians died in the 12-day war. This most recent Mossad operation produced over 3,000 Iranian casualties. The U.S. and Israel do not need to openly declare war on Iran to destroy the country or kill its people—and I would actually argue that this is the war. The 12-day war didn’t end. It transitioned into another form of warfare, and that transition was always part of the plan. Last year, Ken Klippenstein reported on leaked Pentagon papers involving subcontractors that outlined a wide range of war plans. These included covert operations, sanctions, assassinations, engineered riots, cyber warfare, infrastructure attacks, overt warfare, and even the possibility of a nuclear strike. Everything except a nuclear strike has already taken place—and will continue to take place. So while some people are waiting for the “war” to begin, others understand that it already has—and that it will continue until the U.S. and Israel get what they want: total government collapse. In some ways, the 12-day war was actually better for Iran, because they could respond directly with missiles. But in its current form—crippling sanctions and covert Mossad-backed riots—Iran cannot respond in kind. So while Iran continues to threaten a devastating response if it is ever openly attacked, the U.S. and Israel continue to attack it anyway. The 12-day war struck energy infrastructure, worsening winter blackouts and adding yet another layer of pressure onto an already exhausted society—conditions that helped instigate protests for Mossad-backed rioters to hijack. During these riots, even more infrastructure was targeted and destroyed: banks, hospitals, markets, and mosques. One friend in Iran—an actual friend, not the imaginary ones monarchists and Zionists hallucinate—told me that January 8th and 9th were worse than anything they experienced during the 12-day war. That aligns with the casualty figures from the riots compared to the war itself. So it’s clear the war isn’t coming—it’s already here. And the objective is to hollow Iran out from the inside, like termites in a tree, before one decisive blow finally knocks it over. Iran has arguably done a decent job responding so far, but it is constantly on the defensive, reacting to the enemy’s pace—placing it at a major disadvantage. They are stuck in a catch-22: damned if they launch a preemptive war, and damned if they sit back and absorb blow after blow. While it may seem positive that Gulf countries claim they won’t allow attacks on Iran from their territory, what they are actually doing—intentionally or not—is attempting to strip Iran of its deterrent power. Iran’s real leverage lies in its ability to strike Gulf energy infrastructure and drag the global economy into crisis along with it. But if the Gulf “plays nice,” and the attacks come from elsewhere, how does Iran justify their retaliation? At the same time, the aggressors constantly rotate roles—Israel strikes, the U.S. enables, and Gulf states host U.S. bases and weapons while insisting their territory won’t be used—creating a deliberately shifting target that leaves Iran strategically paralyzed, forced to ask an impossible question: Who do you strike, when do you strike them, and how hard do you hit? But this goes beyond diplomacy aimed at disarming Iran’s deterrence. The U.S. understands Iran’s capabilities very well. So even if Israel is desperate to destroy Iran, would the U.S. really play into Iran’s strategic strengths—or would it instead keep shifting tactics, slowly strangling Iran with sanctions while occasionally shanking it with riots, assassinations, and limited strikes that collectively degrade and hollow out the state from within? So far, it’s clear the U.S. has chosen the latter. I don’t know what Iran should do. There is obviously a lot I don’t see, and I could be wrong in my reading of the situation. But this is clear: This is the war—and Iran has not responded decisively enough to stop it.