
Head of Research @icmdotrun Crypto Class of 2021 | On-Chain Sleuth | $ICM $SOL $BNB https://xitter.cf/t.co/vxYY8MIptQ
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Joined August 2021
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For people who do not understand how bad the situation is, their most liquid pool is on ETH which has $2.8M. When this gets liquidated, selling this stake on that pool today gets you $2.8M (basically the whole pool).
@Dolomite_io has no way to liquidate this and come out as whole from this situation. The stablecoins that were borrowed belonged to people who people who deposited on Dolomite for earning yield. When they go to withdraw it, they will not be able to do so.
@CoreyCaplan3 is the founder of @Dolomite_io and the CTO of @worldlibertyfi. He has not commented so far but he seems to be in the right position to suggest this Dolomite rug. It is at the expense of depositors on Dolomite.
🚨 $WLFI Team has now borrowed $150M worth of USDC against 5% of $WLFI supply. $WLFI has less than $10M in core assets all their DeFi pools on all chains combined.
@Dolomite_io is rugging. Their founder is the CTO of @worldlibertyfi so you know he's aware of this. Despite several alarms raise, he hasn't said anything on this topic.
Dear Mr. Hacker,
It is with the deepest admiration that we write regarding your recent undertaking on-chain.
With a single valid signature, you relieved the EP vault of 612,506 EP and converted the whole of it into approximately 1,050 USDT. We observed, moreover, that you paid the full 10% sell tax without complaint, a portion of which was burned in the project’s honour. Such civic-mindedness is rarely seen in your line of work.
We must also apologise for the tone of certain correspondence sent to you on-chain. One party addressed you plainly and demanded the return of the funds. We were mortified. As a more refined correspondent has since reminded us, one should begin with “Mr. Hacker, can I have my money back?”
It is in that spirit that we most humbly ask whether you might see your way to returning some portion of the sum. We appreciate that it may already have departed for Monero, from which, we are told, few return.
Should you decline, please know that you remain in our most respectful thoughts.
We have the honour to be, Mr. Hacker, your most obedient and humble servants,
On-chain Participants
P.S. The gentleman who recommended the respectful tone has asked us to state, for the record, that he is not you.
🚨 @predictdotfun users got drained again today. It’s the second time in 5 days, and at least $390K is gone.
What happened:
• Today, 21 accounts lost their USDT. At least $265K. Most of it happened in 34 minutes, starting at 05:31 UTC.
• On Oct 22, the same setup hit 4 accounts for almost $125K.
• The money was moved to Ethereum and 115 ETH went into Tornado Cash, a mixer that hides where funds go.
I checked this on-chain. Every drained wallet is an account on the platform, and the attacker didn’t touch wallets from any other app, from my scan.
This wasn’t a hack of the platform’s smart contracts. It also wasn’t the usual “you signed a bad approval” scam.
Each withdrawal was signed with the victim’s own wallet key. It just wasn’t done through the app. Transactions from the app and from the attacker look completely different on-chain. Same keys, different door.
So someone was able to sign for these accounts. It could be leaked keys, a problem with how the keys are stored, or a hijacked login.
If you keep a large USDT balance sitting idle there, consider moving out what you’re not actively using until the team explains. So far only USDT balances have been taken, and open positions weren’t touched.
CC @dingalingts
Update: @predictdotfun has confirmed the incident. They put the losses at about 400,000 USDT, which is in line with what I found on-chain across both waves (at least $390K).
They say all affected users will be fully reimbursed.
Their early finding is that their API documentation site, which a third party hosts, may have been compromised. The site is offline until the investigation is done, and they’ve promised a full post-mortem.
On-chain, every theft was signed with the account’s own key. So the open question is how those keys were exposed.
xitter.cf/predictdotfun/status/2…
We are aware of a small number of users who have experienced unauthorized transfers of funds from their wallets, totaling approximately 400,000 USDT.
Our preliminary investigation suggests that our API documentation site, which is hosted by a third-party provider, may have been compromised, potentially affecting a small number of users over a short period of time. The API documentation site has been taken offline as a precaution and will remain offline until our investigation is complete.
At Predict.fun, we take the security of our users and their funds extremely seriously. As such, we will fully reimburse all affected users for any funds lost as a direct result of this incident.
Once our investigation is complete, we will publish a full post-mortem detailing what happened and the steps we're taking to prevent similar incidents in the future.
The details, for anyone who wants to check.
Where the money went today -
Each drained account sent its USDT to a brand-new wallet, and each of those wallets bridged it to Ethereum within seconds:
0x0299b21d5a285e3ee5505c12299b4e33d3bab102: 60,500 USDT (1 account)
0xcd34891c7fc9299f86da30e4797232ae6f4f685c: 53,700 USDT (1 account)
0xbe754caab768f114b1d610982dfe981e13fc83b8: 50,510 USDT (4 accounts)
0x002c755b902dfc0fff94bb5ba05789d8ead8a2e4: 41,000 USDT (1 account)
0x8b001d7378dbc19c1c62e39c0fc9ffad84182fba: 24,655 USDT (7 accounts)
0x435f8c80de1190a96adf625532faab76b24fb2d4: 23,815 USDT (3 accounts)
0x31383cec40efc929f293c4cf54e29219b70076e9: 7,415 USDT (2 accounts)
A 100 USDT drain at 5:10 UTC. One account was hit a second time at 06:18 UTC, for 3,538 USDT. A smaller ones followed (111 USDT). The last of those was at 08:49 UTC, after people had already started posting about it.
Into Tornado Cash -
On Ethereum, these 7 wallets put 115 ETH into Tornado Cash between 05:41 and 07:26 UTC. The first deposit landed 10 minutes after the first drain, while the drain was still going on:
0xd500a43442253a4b92a025f6604df2dd57d78e6f: 30 ETH
0x85cd3ee47307bcaf9e1ada4230cc7646e603d429: 22 ETH
0x5b51e000f08eeaf34484ea6b7e16f536773fe4ee: 20 ETH
0x93b94f8db5655064f35b2cbc5b8e37e34443747c: 20 ETH
0x3c9f6411cd1fbefaf33397145514ed2bf662eef9: 10 ETH
0x294dc89990f70ddb3067b0a8c917413a3e8d7c13: 10 ETH
0x44870558ef468eaf3caef7c802945a6697ec30a5: 3 ETH
The first wave, Oct 22 -
0xd14ca6d1173a710706149a222b7e20324003a660 lost 82,000 USDT to 0xeda13cffb9b1bb71b948c2b0132f04cf466de710, plus 27,000 USDT bridged to 0x177e67f11a0390edc735d220f4d553e1182ab5f3 on Ethereum.
0xa5162f5bb972a508dee6bb1092ceb22ebd1e4d40 lost 13,920 USDT to 0x420c85800903dc93424dde4ace10d0e229534a5b.
0x773b2b07f2c7fcb23ad72394e18bcb9eec618e4a lost 1,410 USDT and 0x8ae78a3d93cc30fc85dc2720f9ae5ee875c5c0d0 lost 535 USDT, both to 0xe5f3bcf5ae7818da8e0122352e1558b79c7fbff9.
How it worked -
For every drained account, the theft was the first transaction of this kind it had ever made. It took two steps. First, allow a gas service to charge the account in USDT and then send the whole balance out. Both steps were signed with the account’s own key, but in a format the app doesn’t use.
Of 9,568 normal predict.fun transactions over two days, only 3 used a gas service like this. All 80 accounts I checked sign in the app’s standard format. All 70 of the attacker’s transactions used the gas service and the other format.
Relayer: 0x3cfdc212769c890907bce93d3d8c2c53de6a7a89
Gas service (owned by that relayer): 0x8b1f6cb5d062aa2ce8d581942bbb960420d875ba
Example, @dethective’s account: bscscan.com/tx/0x5e5b9e4d888…
How I know these are predict.fun accounts
All 30 wallets the attacker touched run the wallet contract from predict.fun’s own code (0xbac849bb641841b44e965fb01a4bf5f074f84b4d). They use the same signer module (0x845adb2c711129d4f3966735ed98a9f09fc4ce57), and they have permissions set on predict.fun’s trading contracts, such as 0x8a289d458f5a134ba40015085a8f50ffb681b41d. Normal predict.fun users look exactly the same.
Running a CEX would not be easy as there are local guidelines for every country that are constantly changing to adopt to a new form of asset, a constant ecosystem of countries reacting to internal and external stimuli.
Given all that friction, I can see how this slips through the cracks but it'll be more important to understand that if CEXes are forced to comply to regulations, there needs to be someone amongst the lawyers who asks whether that is the right thing for an exchange to ask for.
the monero:native emails were us. they were wrong. here is what happened and what changed.
what happened
- clients who bought xmr with their own money and withdrew it got an email asking for employer, source of funds and what they planned to do with their coins
- no rule required it. someone saw a young client with a lot of money and called it a red flag. that is not a red flag. that is our customer and client
what changed
- those requests are withdrawn and the clients have been told nothing is required of them
- the "what will you do with your coins" question is gone and unacceptable. where your money came from is a fair question. what you do with it after it leaves is not
xmr stays listed. buy it here, take it home. that is the product..
we'll keep making it better. thx for the call out.
xitter.cf/i/trending/21137903135…
Have they considered selling only transparent case hardware wallet? I believe that solves this line of attack and looks cool 🥷
How a company behaves when it is attacked says more about it than any product launch. Here is where we stand on the hardware implant attack: what happened, how we responded, and what we are changing.
Read the blog here, and watch the keynote live at 2pm CET: ledger.com/blog-response-har…
Data manipulation efforts were observed for certain launchpads/tokens pumping in fake volume to rank higher.
The dashboard now takes care of volume washing instances.
Continued efforts to do so will result in their removal from the stats to maintain fairness for other everyone.
Thanks for the DMs telling me about the issue. Cheers!
After a long wait, @arc launched yesterday. After the success of Robinhood Chain, we saw a lot of launchpads and volume. There is one clear launchpad winner.
We'll see how this goes. Sharing the full dashboard for Arc chain below. Feedback is welcome.
After a long wait, @arc launched yesterday. After the success of Robinhood Chain, we saw a lot of launchpads and volume. There is one clear launchpad winner.
We'll see how this goes. Sharing the full dashboard for Arc chain below. Feedback is welcome.
If you're looking to get on to @arc chain, I've compiled all the info you need to be aware of. Presenting: The Unofficial Guide.
I got to the bottom of this issue. The problem is @Pumpfun allowing pairing against illiquid stock tokens. They should remove these illiquid pairing options and only allow liquid stocks to serve as the quote token.
HOLY SHIT!!! The @Pumpfun stock launch is even WORSE than we imagined
Some users are LOSING over 90% of their funds when they interact with pumpfun stock paired tokens, I wish I was joking
One of my boys sold a pump stock token for 2.5 SOL & he only received .12 SOL back, (he sold directly through the pumpfun website)
I started investigating what the fuck happened - there’s a MAJOR problem with the paired stocks they’re using
Check the proof here, I clicked on a random wallet from a low MC token, they sold for .6 SOL, but only received .09 SOL for their sell
Visually it shows they sold for .6 SOL, but solscan shows what actually happened
Did he just try to 'CEASE and DECIST' the @RobinhoodCrypto chain and cause an outage?
Seriously? What’s the concern you ask, @vladtenev? The list of concerns is almost existential.
U.S. securities laws are in place to protect investors. For good reason, we spend millions and millions of dollars every year to comply with U.S. securities laws. In good. conscience, how can Robinhood as a U.S. company set up an operation in far offshore Jersey, an island 3000 miles away, and market a security sort of posing as AMC in some shape or fashion, and not comply with U.S. securities laws. That is shocking and shameful.
Our past issuance of equity to strengthen our balance sheet was vital to our success. Your setting up some kind of fictitious synthetic equity market decouples stock token ownership from a company’s ability to control its own capital raising efforts.
Share ownership gives shareholders various rights, including the right to vote their shares. Your stock token pretend to be some form of stock ownership, but disclosures to the contrary notwithstanding, they are not ownership and they deprive investors of their rights.
This quasi-fake market you are creating on the island of Jersey sows distrust amongst the public about financial markets in general. There already is distrust in financial institutions, you are potentially making it far worse.
These are but a few of my concerns about your actions.
I hereby call on you and Robinhood to voluntarily CEASE AND DECIST the trading of AMC stock tokens. If you don’t, our high priced securities counsel has been asked to see whether we can force you to stop.
I also wonder how can the SEC possibly support your sham ignoring of U.S. securities laws. You can be sure we will be asking them.
Hype trumps Ethereum mainnet on gas volatility - 300x.
Lows of 0.11 GWEI to highs of 377 GWEI today (in the same day).
ETH gas spiked 30x during today's pump. Apparently this is just how Ethereum is supposed to work.
To give you an idea, a routine swap cost $5-$6. The volatility around transaction fees is a problem.
In 2021, there were times when we were paying $200 per transaction. The transaction costs have gone down but the volatility stayed.
Insider Trading?
Assets added to the roadmap today: Basecat (BASECAT), DebtReliefBot (DRB), Dolphin (POD), and Grass (GRASS)
coinbase.com/blog/increasing…
A request to all broke KOLs to stop promoting casinos and focus back on the Crypto bullrun. Thank you.
ETH gas spiked 30x during today's pump. Apparently this is just how Ethereum is supposed to work.
To give you an idea, a routine swap cost $5-$6. The volatility around transaction fees is a problem.
In 2021, there were times when we were paying $200 per transaction. The transaction costs have gone down but the volatility stayed.




























