Badhaatuu Ayyalaa

Will Abiy Stop at the Eritrean Border? In my recent analyses, I argued that the northern war was moving steadily toward the Eritrean frontier and that Isaias’s intervention would eventually force Abiy to make a much bigger decision. That moment is now approaching, and the question is no longer only whether the ENDF can reach the border, but whether Abiy should stop there when the security threat he identifies lies beyond it. The ENDF and the Tigray Peace Force have reversed the TPLF offensive, recovered major towns and regained Adigrat, giving the federal side both the initiative and a level of military confidence it did not have when the fighting began. Ethiopia therefore approaches the Eritrean frontier from a position of momentum rather than retreat. That military advantage is reinforced by a stronger diplomatic position. Ethiopia has formally invoked its right to self-defence and accused Eritrean forces of entering Ethiopian territory and supporting armed groups fighting the federal government. Eritrea rejects those accusations, but reports of Eritrean forces operating inside northern Tigray have strengthened Ethiopia’s argument that the confrontation can no longer be treated simply as an internal conflict. The harder question is what Ethiopia should do if it concludes that the threat does not end at the border. Restoring the frontier without addressing what the government sees as the source of that threat could simply postpone another confrontation. Eritrean forces could regroup, armed Ethiopian opponents could continue to find support across the frontier, and Ethiopia could again face the same security architecture after paying heavily to regain control of Tigray. From that perspective, a deeper move into Eritrea could be framed not as territorial expansion, but as an attempt to remove a threat that the Abiy government believes has already crossed into Ethiopia. This concern is no longer limited to Eritrea or the TPLF. Ethiopia increasingly sees a wider regional proxy architecture involving Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopian armed groups. Egypt has developed closer military and strategic relations with Eritrea while its disputes with Ethiopia over the Nile and Red Sea remain unresolved. Eritrea, in turn, has developed ties with the TPLF and other Ethiopian armed groups, while Sudan has also been accused of providing rear space and support to forces fighting the federal government. Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan reject or dispute these accusations, but from Ethiopia’s security perspective the larger concern is the possibility of Eritrea becoming a forward platform through which competing regional powers can sustain pressure on Ethiopia. Abiy also has a domestic political reason to avoid allowing this confrontation to become another long war. Prolonged fighting would consume resources, deepen economic pressure, create public fatigue and give his political opponents more space to organise around the costs of another northern conflict. The current military momentum gives him an opportunity, but that advantage may not remain indefinitely. A war that drags on could gradually turn battlefield success into a political liability for Abiy himself. His close relationship with the UAE may strengthen his confidence in considering a harder course. Abu Dhabi has maintained close strategic relations with his government and has publicly supported Ethiopia’s sovereignty during the current confrontation. Saudi Arabia remains more cautious, given its major Red Sea interests and its previous investment in the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement, but the Gulf picture itself is changing. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have begun repairing the rift that had widened between them as renewed Houthi attacks place greater pressure on Saudi security and the wider Red Sea environment. The growing need for coordination around Bab el-Mandeb is bringing Riyadh and Abu Dhabi closer again. That re-alignment could matter for Abiy, whose close relationship with the UAE may give him greater confidence that Ethiopian security concerns will receive a serious hearing in Saudi Arabia as well. This does not mean Saudi Arabia would support an Ethiopian war inside Eritrea. Abiy would still have to judge whether the UAE remains politically supportive, whether Saudi Arabia can be kept from openly opposing Ethiopia, and whether any cross-border campaign can continue to be presented as addressing an existing national-security threat rather than seeking Eritrean territory. For that reason, I think automatically stopping at the border deserves serious reconsideration. If the threat ends there, Ethiopia has every reason to stop. If Eritrea remains the military rear of a wider proxy system directed against Ethiopia, however, restoring the old frontier may leave the underlying security problem untouched. Under those conditions, the strategic case for carrying the campaign inside Eritrea becomes considerably stronger. Abiy therefore enters the next phase with military momentum, a stronger self-defence argument, unusually favourable relations with the UAE and a changing Gulf environment. At the same time, he knows that another prolonged war could gradually weaken his own political position at home. The calculation may consequently be moving in one direction. If Ethiopia concludes that Isaias and the regional architecture around him remain an immediate national-security threat, the government may have strong reasons to push beyond the border rather than restore the old line and wait for the same threat to reorganise. The decisive question is whether Abiy believes he can do this without surrendering the diplomatic advantage Ethiopia currently holds.

I welcome this important humanitarian intervention by the ICRC and the Ethiopian Red Cross Society. Medical supplies reaching hospitals in Mekelle, Shire, Alamata, Maychew, Mehoni and other conflict-affected areas will save lives at a moment when civilians are again carrying the heaviest burden of war. Whatever our political differences, the wounded must be treated, hospitals must function, and humanitarian organisations must have safe and unhindered access to all communities affected by the conflict. I encourage the government to continue supporting humanitarian organisations and facilitating their work. Doing so is not only essential for saving lives, but also for rebuilding citizens’ trust in public institutions and in the state’s responsibility to protect all its people. I hope this convoy is followed by sustained humanitarian access and much broader assistance wherever it is needed. Protecting civilian life must remain above political and military calculations.

Some of the people who once helped lead Tigray’s war effort are now giving Abiy a significant advantage against the TPLF. The defection of military commanders and intelligence officers to the federal government is one of the clearest differences between the renewed confrontation and the 2020–2022 war. During the previous war, much of the Tigrayan military and intelligence leadership rallied behind the TPLF, effectively denying the federal government reliable access to information from inside those networks. Abiy was, in many respects, fighting blind. This time, he has access to seasoned Tigrayan military and intelligence figures who possess intimate knowledge of the TPLF’s structures, personnel, networks, and operational methods. Their expertise and connections are providing the federal government with valuable insider intelligence that it simply did not have during the previous war. The impact of these defections goes well beyond the information individual officers bring with them. Every senior defection undermines trust within the organization. Commanders must increasingly question the loyalty of colleagues, subordinates, and even those entrusted with sensitive operational information. The result is a double advantage for Abiy: greater access to insider intelligence on one side and growing suspicion and weakened cohesion within the TPLF on the other. The reported destruction of a major ammunition convoy near Shire few months back, the loss of TPLF-held positions in Shererina, and the reported surrender of hundreds of Tigrayan fighters last week are consistent with this changing intelligence environment. They cannot be explained by battlefield pressure alone. Improved intelligence access, insider networks, surveillance capabilities, and weakening internal cohesion are all likely contributing factors. The fundamental difference between the two wars is therefore becoming increasingly clear: in 2020–2022, the TPLF largely controlled the information environment inside Tigray. Today, the federal government has people inside that environment who understand its military structures, know its personnel, and can provide Abiy with information from within. That is a strategic advantage the federal government did not possess during the previous war.

መሳይ መኮንን እራሱን ለፋኖ እንደ ግንባር ቀደም ቃል አቀባይ (ልሳን) እያደረገ ስለሆነ፣ ድርጅቱን ወክሎ ለሚከተለው ጥያቄ መልስ እንደሚሰጥ ተስፋ አደርጋለሁ። ትናንት በጉራጌ ዞን አበሽጌ ወረዳ በሲቪሎች ላይ ስለተፈጸመው ጥቃት በፌስቡክ ገጹ በለጠፈው ጽሁፍ "በየት አድርጎ ጉራጌ ዞን የደረሰ ፋኖ ነው" ብሎ ነበር። አክሎም “የአከባቢው ባለስልጣናት የአበሸጌውን ጥቃት የሚፈጽሙት መነሻቸው ከኦሮሚያ ክልል የሆኑ ኦሮምኛ ተናጋሪ ታጣቂዎች ናቸው።" የሚል አንድምታ ቃል በቃል አስፍሯል። ነገር ግን የድርጊቱ ባለቤት እና በስፍራው ላይ ታጥቀው የሚንቀሳቀሱት እራሳቸውን “ፋኖ” በማለት እንደሚጠሩ እና ለሶስት አመት ያህል በጫካዎች ሲንቀሳቀሱ እንዳሉ የታጣቂዎቹ አዛዥ በግልጽ እየተናገረ ነው። (በዛሬው ዕለት Addis standard እና አዲስ አድማስ የመንግስት አመራሮችን እና የጥቃቱ ሰለባዎችን በማነጋገር ባገኙት ምላሽ ጥቃት አድራሾቹ እራሳቸውን “ፋኖ” በማለት የሚጠሩ ስለመሆናቸው የአዛዦቹን ስም ጭምር ጠቅሰው ዘግበዋል። የኔ ጥያቄ የነበረው፣ ይህ በዚያ አከባቢ ሲቪሎችን በጅምላ የሚገድለው እና አፍኖ ገንዘብ የሚያስከፍል ታጣቂ ቡድን፣ የአማራ ፋኖ ብሔራዊ ንቅናቄ አደረጃጀት አካል ነው ወይስ መሳይ እንደሚለው መንግስት አመሳስሎ ሰርቶ ያሰማራው ሽፍታ? (ይህ በምስል ላይ የሚታየው ሰው ተሺ በላይ የሚባል ሲሆን፣ ላለፉት ሶስት አመታት በጉራጌ ዞን አበሽጌ ወረዳ ውስጥ የሚንቀሳቀሰው "ፋኖ" የተባለው ስብስብ አዛዥ እንደሆነ የሚገልጽ ነው።)

Gaafii:- Hoggantoota Warraaqsa Faannoo Amaaraatif Dhiheenya kana gareen hidhattootaa maqaa Faannootiin gurmaa’eefi mootummaan deeggaramee Wallaggaa keessatti lammiilee qulqulluu ajjeesaa akka jiru erga ifa godhee booda dubbi himaan keessan Asras Maaree gareen kun qaama AFABN akka ta’e dubbataniiru. Kana jechuun, dhaabbanni keessan gaaga'ama maqaa Faanootiin Wallaggatti raawwatamaa jiruuf itti gaafatamummaa fudhatee jira jechuudha. Yakka humnoota hidhataniin naannoo biraatti raawwatamaniif qaamni itti gaafatammaa fudhatu akka jiraatus hojjechaa jirra. Godina Oromiyaa Zoonii Lixaa fi Kibba Lixaa Shawaa, Aanaalee Zoonii Guraagee waliin wal daangessan keessatti gareen hidhattootaa maqaa Faano jedhuun socho'aa jiru kan ummata nagaa ajjeeseefi ukkaamsee butaa akka jiru hubanneerra. Gareen hidhattootaa kun keessumaa Aanaalee Sayyoo, Jibaat, Noonnoo/Silka Ambaa, Abashagee, Ammayaa fi Gooroo keessatti yakka fokkisaa qonnaan bulaa fi daldaltoota irratti raawwachaa jira! Mee ajjeechaa jumlaa gareen hidhate kun raawwate keessaa lama qofa haa kaasu! • Bara 2016 Zoonii Shawaa Lixaa Aanaa Noonnoo Ganda Qondaalaatti qonnaan bultoota cidha irratti argaman irratti haleellaa raawwateen lubbuu namoota 31 galaafate! • Adoolessa 3, 2017 Aanaa Ammayyaa Ganda Abbuyyee Jabilaa keessatti nama 11, Ganda Noonnoo Qondalaa, keessatti namoota 14 hobbaase! • Bara 2018 Aanaa Noonnoo, Ganda Haloo Dinqii keessatti namoota 22 ajjeese! *Guyyaa kaleessaa Fulbaana 4, 2018 Zoonii Guraagee, Aanaa Abbaashaggee iddoo Waalgaa jedhamutti haleellaa raawwateen lubbuu namoota 14 galaafate. Ajjeechaan jumlaa kunniim sadarkaa olaanaa kanneen qaban yoo ta’u, ajjeechaa darbee darbee namoota lamaa fi sadiin raawwatamu, akkasumas butamuu fi saamicha irra deddeebi’amee raawwatamu hin dabalatu. Gareen maqaa Faannootiin hidhatee ummata nagaa shororkeessaa jiru kuni qaama jaarmiyaa AFABN ta’uufi ta’uu dhabuusaa hatattamaan ummataaf akka ifa gootan cimsinee hubachiifna!