Cyba Blockchain Security

Last week in web3 security we saw several exploits. Two of them, plus two from a few days earlier, came down to a check nobody made. Here is where each one broke and what we'd change: 🔹 Third-party MakerDAO ETH-A liquidation keeper: $538K loss (on @ethereum) This third-party keeper, a dormant 2020 proxy, never settled four auctions it had won, and its drain function had no auth, so anyone could take the 200 WETH. The bug was not in MakerDAO core. The lesson for anyone running a liquidation keeper is to put auth on every function that moves funds, even on a retired bot. 🔹 Third-party FlashLoopAdapter Safe module: $305K loss (on @ethereum) On Oct 1, this third-party Aave v3 loop module trusted any caller claiming it was enabled, then called a router the caller chose, so a fake Safe drained two real ones. If you're building a Safe module, you should check callers against Safes you track and never call addresses they supply. 🔹 GoldPesa: $114.9K loss (on @base) On Oct 2, GoldPesa's own Uniswap v4 hook rebalanced inside the attacker's unlock without checking deltas were settled, so its burn credit paid off the attacker's unpaid mint. Teams shipping a Uniswap v4 hook should require settled deltas before moving liquidity inside a caller's unlock. 🔹 Set Protocol: $13.7K loss (on @ethereum) An old v1 contract, still holding collateral after the team deprecated V2 and TokenSets, let anyone call actualizeFee(), which rounded unitShares up with no fee taken, so issuing before and redeeming after paid out extra. When building a rebalancing DeFi mechanism, make sure to round collateral per share in the protocol's favor. All of them mentioned hacks were the result of misplaced trust and unbacked assumptions. The protocols never actually checked: - who was calling - whether the books were settled - which way a number rounded If you're building or running contracts like these, from Safe modules to Uniswap v4 hooks, we at Cyba can review them for you. More on each hack in the reply below 👇

1/2 Back with another security review for @GraniteBTC. This engagement focused on liquidation improvements and protocol hardening, covering changes to liquidation flows, bad debt handling, staking mechanics, and related core functionality. Granite continues to build Bitcoin-backed liquidity infrastructure on Stacks through sBTC, while iterating on the protocol's security and robustness. Always a pleasure working with teams that treat security as an ongoing process rather than a checkbox.

Happy to be among the Romanian teams featured. Romania has a strong builder base across Ethereum and blockchain in general, with a lot of solid work happening quietly in the background. It's good to see more visibility on what's being built locally and how the ecosystem is taking shape. Well worth a read for anyone looking to understand the space better. open.substack.com/pub/locale…

We've completed our security audit for @AccountableData, reviewing an extension to their DeFi credit vault infrastructure. Accountable is a key player operating at the intersection of DeFi and TradFi. Their vault-based credit layer programmatically allocates capital across lending strategies, with over $160M deployed to generate risk-adjusted yield. They are also building the Data Verification Network (DVN), a privacy-preserving infrastructure that verifies financial data directly at the source. It already secures $1B+ in assets across partners like Galaxy, Amber Group, and K3 Capital, positioning Accountable at the intersection of onchain finance and institutional reporting. Security at this scale is never a one-off.