Damotyayanapo (@DGotamo) profile picture
USA
Joined February 2021
Photo by Damotyayanapo (@DGotamo)
አሸባሪው አህመዲን ጀበል በቁጥጥር ስር ይዋል! የህግ አካላት አህመዲን ጀበል ላይ ምርመራ ሊጀመሩ ይገባል። ይህ ግለሰብ ከኢህአዴግ ጊዜ ጀምሮ ከአሸባሪዎች ጋር ግንኙነት የነበረው ሰው ነው። መንግስት ከዚህ በላይ ምን እስኪያደርግ ነው የሚጠብቀው?!
42
57
3
139
26,804
Damotyayanapo retweeted
Thank you for sharing Neamin,Unity with Andy is vital for 🇪🇹’ns for lasting peace &reginal progress towards future honesty & out spoken not for personal gain but for future generations& good Neighbourhood. True leadership comes out of misery from Abiy Ahmed🇪🇹 AFS will win surely
2
3
99
Damotyayanapo retweeted
ሰላም ወገኖች፥ - በ #ትግራይ የሚገኘው አሁናዊ ሁኔታ ። "ጦርነት አሸንፈናል" በሚል ጥሩንባውን ሲለቅ የነብረው የ #አብይአህመድ የ #ኦሄድድ አገዛዝ እና የአብይ አህመድ ተጋሩዎች የሚመሩት #ቲፕፍ በልዩ ልዩ ግንባሮች በተደርጉ የፊት ለፊትና የደፈጣ ውጊያዎች በ #ትብብር ለህልውና አባል በሆነው #ቲዲፍ ከፍተኛ ወታደራዊ ሽንፈቶችና ኪሳራዎች እንደደረሱበት ባለፉት ጥቂት ቀናት የወጡ ልዩ ልዩ መረጃዎች በማመሳከር ለመረዳት ይቻላል። በትላንት እለት ደግሞ ፥ 1-በመቐለ ከተማ ከጥቅምት 27/2019 ዓም ጀምሮ ከምሽቱ 2:00 እስከ ጠዋት 12:00 ሰአት ድረስ ላልተወሰነ ግዜ ተሽከርካሪዎች እንዳይንቀሳቀሱ እገዳ ተጥሏል። 2-የቤት ለቤት ፍተሻ፤ ህጋዊ የፍተሻ ትዕዛዝ የያዘ ማንኛውም የጸጥታ አካል፣ ከሌሊቱ 12፡00 ሰዓት (እኩለ ሌሊት) እስከ ቀኑ 12፡00 ሰዓት (ቀትር) ባለው ጊዜ ውስጥ የቤት ለቤት ፍተሻ ያካሂዳል። አስመራ ልትሄድ - ዘመድ ተሰናብታ፣ መቀሌ ላይ ቀረች-መውጫ መንገድ አጥታ። Dereje Habtewold @miraf2008
ሰላም ወገኖች ፥- በ #ትግራይ የሚገኘው አሁናዊ ወታደራዊ ሁኔታ (ክፍል 2) ገለልተኛ እና የአሜሪካ ኢንተርፕራይዝ እንስቲቱት አካል የሆነው ክሪቲካል ትሬትስ ፕሮጄክት/CTP ያወጣቸውን ወታደራዊ መረጃዎች ተመልከቱ። - የ #ትብብርለህልውና አባል ድርጅት የሆነው ቲዲፍ/TDF መልሶ ማጥቃት በማዕከላዊ ትግራይ በብዙ ቦታዎች ተዘግቧል - የፌዴራል ስራዊት አቅርቦት መስመሮች ተጋላጭነት የኮንቮይ ጥቃቶችና የመንገድ ውጊያዎች ተዘግበዋል - የፌዴራል ስራዊት ከኤርትራ ድንበር ወደ ኋላ መመለስ - የTDF አመራርና የውጊያ አቅም መቀጠል - ተከታታይ ውጊያዎች መኖራቸው ያመለክታል፤ - CTP በ #ኦሮሚያና በ #ቤንሻንጉል ጉሙዝ የተዘገቡ አዳዲስ የታጠቁ ኃይሎች ጥቃቶችን ጠቅሷል። የኦሮሞ ነፃነት ሠራዊት በባቱ አካባቢ ጥቃት እንዳደረሰና የፌዴራል ኃይሎች በድሮኖች እንደመለሱት ተዘግቧል። 1ኛ፣ 2026 - ከሶስት ሳምንት በፊት የኦህዴድ ብልጽግና አገዛዝ ብዛት ያላቸው እዞች ፣ የእገረኛ እና የሜካናያዝድ ክፍለ ጦሮችን፣ በድሮን፣ በተዋጊ ጄቶች እጅቦ የአብይ አህመድ ተጋሩ ከሆኑት ቲፒፍ/TPF ከፊት ለፊት አሰልፎ #አማራ ክልል ላይ እንዳደረገው በትግራይ ላይ ወረራ ፈጸመ ። አላማጣን ፣ መቀሌን ፣ አድዋን፣ አክሱምን ፣ አዲግራትን፣ ራማን ፣ ሌሎች ዋና ዋና የትግራይ አካባቢዎችን ተቆጣጥረናል ብለውም አወጁ። የቀድሞው ኤታ ማጆች ሹም ሳሞራ ይኑንስ በመንግስት ቴሌቪዥን“ እጅ ስጡ” የሚለውን ደገመው። በነገራችን ላይ አብዛኛው የትግራይ አካባቢዎች ቲፕፌን “እንደ መንገድ መሪ ባንዳ፣ ገዳይ አስገዳይ፡ የአብይ ተጋሩዎች ፡ የኦህዴድ ብልጽግና ተላላኪዎች” ተደርገው እንደሚታዪ አሁን ላይ ብዙ አይነት መገለጫዎች እና መረጃዎች አየወጡ ነው። ከሁለት ሳምንት በፊት ፣ ይህ ፈንጠዝያ ወደ ዋይታና ለቅሶ ይለወጣል ብለን ነበር። ከሰሞኑ የትግራይ የሚወጡ ዜናዎች ይህንን ያመላክታሉ። ብዙም ሳይርቅ ካለፈው ሳምንት ጀምሮ የ #ትብብርለህልውና አባል የሆነው ቲዲፍ/TDF ቀደም ሲል ባወጣም መግለጫ የአገዛዙን “ድል አድረግናል፣ ትግራይን ተቆጣጥረናል” ባዶ ፉከራ ፣ “ጦርነት ሳይደረግ እንዴት ድል አደረግን ይባላል?። እኛ በመረጠነው ግዜና ቦታ ለመዋጋት ለቀንን ነው የወጣነው፣ የብልጽግና መቀበሪያ ትግራይ ላይ እንደሚሆን እርግጠኛ ነን” ወዘተ የሚል ይዘት ያለው ተከታታይ መግለጫ ማውጣቱ ይታወሳል። ቃል በተግባር እየተመነዘረ መሆኑን ከስሞኑ በትግራይ ልዩ ልዩ አካባቢዎች በአብይ አህመድ ስራዊት ላይ እየደርሱ የሚገኙ በርካታ ወታደራዊ ምቶች፣ ከባባድ ኪሳራዎች በልዩ ልዩ የኢትዮጵያውያን ሚዲያዎች ሲዘገብ ቆይቶአል። የክሪቲካል ትሬት ፕሮጀክት/CTP የዛሬው ዘገባ እነዚያን ያጠናክራል። 2ኛ። 2021 - ትግራይ - መቀሌ በሶስት ሳምንት ይዘናል ካሉበት ቀናት ጀምሮ ሰኔ/June 2021 “ እንደ ዱቄት በአየር ላይ ተበትኖአል” ፡ “በዘራችሁ እይድረስ፣ መለቃቀም ነው የቀረን፣ እነ ጌታቸው አሰፋና ጌታችው ረዳ ብቻ ናቸው የቀሩት፣ “አንድም ጋንታ የላቸውም… “ እነዚህ አብይ እህመድ፣ አስር አለቃ ብርሃኑ ጁላ፣ በብሄር ኮታ ለጀነራልነት የደረሰው የዛሬው ፊልድ ማርሻል፣ እንድሁም ሃምሳ አልቃ ባጫ፣ እነድ ብርሃኑ ጅሎ በብሄር ኮታ ፣ ሜጀር ጀነራል ማእረግ ያገኘው፣ አብይ አህመድ ሙሉ ጀነራል ያደገው የተናገሯቸው ነበሩ። በየግዜው በመንግስት ሚዲያ አየቀረቡ ለኢትዮጳይ ህዝብ በወቅቱና በተደጋጋሚ ትግራይ የነበረውን እውነታ በመሸፈን ይሰሩት የነብረው ሽፍጥ እንደነበር አይዘነጋም። እውነታው ግን ሌላ እንደነበር በኋላ ነው የታወቀው። ከዚያ ቀጥሎ የሆነው ምን ነበር?፣ የህወሃት ሃይሎች ትግራይ የነበረውን ስራዊት በየከተማው በየመንገዱ መቱት። ሙሉ በሙሉ ሽንፈትና ውርደት ከመድረሱ በፊት በቅጽበት፣ ስራዊቱ ከትግራይ ለቆ እንዲወጣም አስገደዱት ፣ ከ 4 ክፍለ ጦር በላይ የመከላከያ ስራዊት ተደመሰስበት፣ 8 ሺ የመከላከያ ስራዊት አባላት በምርኮ ተያዙበ። ባጫ ደበሌ በመንግስት ሚዲያና ጋዜጠኞችን ጠርቶ ፣ “ታላቁ ሩጫ ፎቶ ሾፕ ሰርተው ነው “ በማለት እውነታውን ካደ። የትግራይ ህይሎች ጎንደር፣ ወልዲያን፣ ኮምቦልቻን፣ ደሴን አልፈ፣ ቆርጠው ደብረ ሲና ደረሱ። ፣ መከላከያ ስራዊቱ በሁልም ግንባሮች ሲሸነፍና ወደ መሃል አገር ሲሸሽ እንደነበር ይታወሳል። የትግራይ ሃይሎች ወደ አዲስ አበባ እንዳይገሰግሱ ምን አቆማቸው? የአማራ ሃይሎች (ፋኖ፣ ልዪ ሃይል)፣ የአፋር ሃይሎች፣ መላው የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ፣ መላው ዲያስፓራ ፣ ኤርትራ ተረባርበው ፣ ከአገዛዙ ጎን በመስለፋቸውና መስውእትነት በመክፈላቸው ነበር። አሁን ያ ሁኔታ የለም፣ የአብይ እህመድ ስራዊት ደጀን የለውም፣ በበስተጀርባውም፣ ከፊት ለፊቱም ረመጥ ሆኖበታል፣ 3ኛ። February 1989 ሽሬ እንዳስላሴ- ትግራይ የነበረው ሁኔታ " ትግራይን አጽድተናል፣ ትግራይን ተገንጣይ አስገንጣይ ደምስሰናል" ሻምበል ለገሰ አስፋው ፣ የደርግ/ኢሰፓ ስ/አ ኮሜቴ አባል እና በትግራይ የነበረው ጦር የበላይ አዛዥ የበየእለቱ ለኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ሲናገርና ሲያስንገር የነበረው ፕሮፖጋንዳ። ከጥቅት ወራት በኋላ ፣ በአክሱም፣ በአድዋ ፣ ክፍለጦሮች መደመሰስ፣ በሽሬ እንዳስላሴ፣ የ604ኛ ኮር ሽንፈትን ውድቀት ደረስ። ቀጥሎም ትህነግ ሙሉ በሙሉ ትጋራይን የተቆጣጠረበት ሁኔታ ተፈጠረ፣ በመጨረሻም ለደርግ/ኢስፓ መንግስት ውድቀት አመላካች የነበረ፣ ህወሃት/ትህነግ የወታደራዊ፣ ፓለቲካዊና ፣ የፕሮፖጋንዳ የበላይነት ያገኘበት፣ የስርአቱ እንዳበቃለት እንዱ ትልቅ መገለጫ ነበር። "ከታሪክ የማይማሩ፣ ጥፋቱን በመድገም ይረገማሉ" ጆርጅ ሳንታያና "ታሪክ ራሱን አይደግምም፣ ነገር ግን እንደ ግጥም ቤት ይመታል" ማርክ ትዊን criticalthreats.org/briefs/e…
6
50
81
11,318
Damotyayanapo retweeted
#Ethiopia — Free Press Under Siege: From Reform to Repression Under #AbiyAhmed The indefinite suspension of The Reporter (@TheReporterET), Ethiopia's oldest privately owned independent newspaper, deserves unequivocal condemnation. The November 2, 2026 decision by the Ethiopian Media Authority is yet another serious assault on freedom of expression, independent journalism, and the public's fundamental right to information. Founded in 1995, The Reporter has served the Ethiopian public for more than three decades under the motto “Free Press, Free Speech, Free Spirit.” Silencing such an institution is not merely an attack on a newspaper. It undermines independent scrutiny, informed public debate, transparency, and the accountability essential to democratic governance. As Addis Standard (@addisstandard) rightly argued in defense of press freedom: “Informing the public is not a privilege granted by discretion, but a public service protected by law.” The suspension of The Reporter is not an isolated incident. It must be understood within the broader, well-documented pattern of repression and the systematic shrinking of media and civic space under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his ruling Prosperity Party. ‼️ The Documented Record Is Alarming: * 244 arrest incidents involving 201 journalists and media workers (2019–early 2024) — documented by Ethiopian Press Freedom Defenders. * At least 63 journalists detained during the 2020–2022 Tigray war — documented by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). * At least 54 journalists and media workers forced into exile since 2020 — identified by CPJ as of June 2024. * 2026 Press Freedom Ranking: 148th out of 180 countries — Ethiopia's position in the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) World Press Freedom Index, compared with 110th in 2019. * 2026 crackdown on independent media: Wazema Radio's license revoked in January, Addis Standard's registration revoked in February, and The Reporter's registration indefinitely suspended in November. These figures represent different measures and overlapping periods and should not be added together. From Hope to Repression In 2018, Ethiopia witnessed a promising opening. Imprisoned journalists were released, hundreds of previously blocked websites became accessible, and independent journalism briefly regained space to breathe. What followed was a disturbing and sustained reversal. Arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention without due process, newsroom raids, intimidation, enforced exile, restrictions on foreign correspondents, internet shutdowns, and the suspension of independent media outlets have progressively eroded the freedoms that the initial reforms appeared to promise. This is a profound crisis of democratic accountability, constitutional rights, institutional legitimacy, and the public's freedom to know. When independent journalists are intimidated, imprisoned, or silenced for investigating corruption, exposing human rights violations, questioning official narratives, or reporting on wars and economic hardship, the public loses one of its most essential instruments for holding those in power accountable. And when the state increasingly determines which voices may be heard, which facts may be reported, and which narratives may be challenged, the boundary between legitimate media regulation and political censorship becomes dangerously blurred. For a country already engulfed in multiple armed conflicts, mass displacement, multidimensional poverty, economic hardship, deep political divisions, and institutional fragility, the systematic restriction of independent journalism risks further aggravating an already devastating national polycrisis. #Ethiopia needs more independent journalism, not less. More transparency, not enforced silence. More accountability, not censorship. Silencing the press does not silence the truth. It merely makes the search for truth, the exposure of injustice, and the struggle for accountability more difficult. A nation cannot build a just, democratic, peaceful, and resilient future by suppressing the very freedoms that make such a future possible. @CPJAfrica @amnesty @hrw @UNHumanRights #PressFreedom #FreeSpeech #HumanRights #TheReporter #AddisStandard I kept the statement's central argument intact: the suspension of The Reporter is not just a media-freedom issue; it is part of Ethiopia's larger crisis of governance, accountability, institutional legitimacy, and democratic rights. The final two paragraphs now connect the condemnation directly to the broader framework of our Ethiopia Polycrisis Lab. #Ethiopia #TheReporter #AddisStandard #PressFreedom #FreeSpeech #HumanRights #AbiyAhmed
🤖 Made with AI
71
72
2,516
Damotyayanapo retweeted
Ethiopia needs to abolish the ethnic based federal system
53
17
7
248
12,123
Damotyayanapo retweeted
#AbiyAhmed’s #Assab Gamble: Imperial Ambition, Foreign Patrons, and the Perils of Maritime Conquest This is a two-part long-form article that I will be publishing online. It examines three central questions: why a war to seize Assab by force would be neither lawful, realistic, nor durable; why Abiy Ahmed cannot assume that military superiority will deliver his political objectives; and how a post-Abiy Ethiopia can instead secure reliable access to the sea through peaceful diplomacy, mutual respect and mutual interest, anchored in a sustainable bilateral and regional economic and political architecture. What follows is a substantial section of Part I, which examines the military assumptions behind the current debate—particularly the linear scenario advanced by some pundits: that superior firepower, drones, and an initial breakthrough against Eritrean defenses would automatically translate into strategic victory and political leverage. My argument is that this reasoning is dangerously incomplete and misleading. A breakthrough is not victory; operational penetration is not strategic control; and superiority in weapons does not eliminate terrain, logistics, morale, adaptation, multiple fronts, or the fact that—as Gen. James Mattis put it—“the enemy gets a vote.” Part II will examine the larger question: even if Abiy were to win major battles, would that actually secure Ethiopia the sea? THE MILITARY GAMBLE--The Linear Trap The linear scenario dominates the debate: the expectation, held by the regime and many pundits alike, that federal forces will break Eritrea’s defenses and convert the breakthrough into political leverage. Two questions come to mind first: what would legally or morally justify Abiy in ordering his forces to invade Eritrea in order to seize territory or impose regime change? Second, wouldn’t it be much less costly to pursue the same goal through peaceful and lawful means and proper international diplomacy rather than a devastating war? The logic is seductive: Ethiopia is vastly larger in geographic area and population size; its forces have more air power, drones, and firepower, which would enable it to achieve its goals through military victory. However, every arrow in that chain is an assumption. Wars do not become certain once they begin. They are often unpredictable, and their outcomes uncertain. As a result, if undertaken, a war to grab Assab could have devastating consequences for Ethiopia as well, not just for Eritrea and the region. It may also spell the downfall of the Abiy regime itself. Nearly a decade ago I argued that a military can look formidable on paper while morale, cohesion, legitimacy and internal fault lines tell a different story (Zeleke, 2016). Inventories show what an army owns, not what its soldiers believe they are fighting for. Gen. Mattis, reflecting on Iraq and Afghanistan, warned that lessons cannot simply be carried from one theater to another because the enemy, the terrain and the human environment differ (Muradian, 2010). The Prior Question: Aggression Is Not a Just War There is a legal and moral threshold that no comparison of forces can answer. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against another sovereign state’s territorial integrity or political independence. The General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression (Resolution 3314, 1974) identifies invasion, military occupation, and annexation by force as acts that may constitute aggression. A campaign ordered by Abiy to seize control of Assab or impose his rule would be a war of aggression, not a lawful means of settling Ethiopia’s maritime grievance. Economic necessity, historical entitlement, national pride, and superior firepower would not justify it. This does not deny Ethiopia’s right of self-defense if any neighboring state, including Eritrea, launches an armed attack. Article 51 may be invoked in that scenario, subject to verification. Obviously, Ethiopia has that right, as does Eritrea or any other UN member state. But it does not grant a blank check for Abiy’s territorial agenda or allow him to claim a defensive operation as a pretext to annex Assab. Eritrea and its Terrain: The Enemy Does Not Have to Fight the War Abiy Expects Eritrea’s geography would be part of the battle. Descriptions emphasize rugged central highlands rising to roughly 3,000 meters before dropping through escarpments to the Red Sea plain—terrain that channels movement, forces reliance on a few roads, and lets defenders disperse and conceal. In conversations over the years, former senior Ethiopian officers from the Derg era have described the Eritrean theater to me in strikingly similar language: at times, they said, it felt as if the terrain itself was fighting the attacking army. These are anecdotes, not operational data, but they capture an enduring truth: hard ground multiplies a competent defender. But Assab is not the highlands. Its coastal theater poses a different set of constraints: extreme heat, aridity, distance, and the burden of sustaining forces across exposed lines. Geography complicates the campaign. Abiy has repeatedly asserted that he has a better command of modern warfare technology, particularly while showing off his kamikaze drones, which he says Ethiopia is producing en masse. He has even told his generals that he is disappointed with the performance of their ground forces and that he will rely more on air-force drones and fighter jets. This looks like a stretch. According to the linear logic put forward by pundits, breakthrough scenarios reduce Eritrean defenses to trenches waiting to be cracked by drones, fighter jets, and artillery. However, a competent defender effectively mixes fortified positions with dispersion, deception, and tactical withdrawal, trading ground for time to preserve formations. The 1989 battle of Shire, where an entire corps of the Derg’s army collapsed, and the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF)’s Operation Alula in June 2021, which destroyed several divisions and forced a rapid federal-force withdrawal from Tigray, are possible warnings. CTP’s October 15 assessment describes Eritrea as seeking to offset technological and numerical disadvantages through an attritional, defense-in-depth approach (CTP, 2026). Armies Are More Than Materiel Comparative military graphics may count tanks, rockets, and aircraft. They say little about institutional memory, command judgment, morale, the willingness and determination to fight, the capacity to absorb losses, and the ability to learn from mistakes and rebound. These are among the factors that often decide the outcome of wars after the first plan is put into action. There is no doubt that Eritrea’s military was steeled by a thirty-year, arduous liberation struggle and the numerous battles it fought. Moreover, it fought a major conventional war soon after liberation (1998–2000) and again at scale in the Tigray war (2020–2022). It has developed substantial experience in battle tactics and military strategies involving offensive, defensive, and counteroffensive operations against Ethiopian forces. On the other hand, the Ethiopian military command structure has a different lineage. In 2009, I documented extreme TPLF concentration in senior command (Zeleke, 2009). However, since 2018, almost all Tigrayan officers from the middle to the highest ranks, including generals, were removed after Abiy Ahmed took power. The resulting vacancies were filled primarily by Oromo officers, with some presence of Amhara officers and Abiy affiliates (Clingendael Institute, 2022). Perceptions of favoritism corrode trust, morale, and cohesion among soldiers, particularly officers. Regardless, having a large population of more than 100 million does not necessarily translate into combat power. Soldiers must be recruited, well trained, properly led, and armed to increase combat capabilities and build a powerful military institution. The combat effectiveness of Abiy’s army has been greatly eroded and degraded by at least seven years of near-continuous warfare and battles against its own citizens across the country, including in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia. This has resulted in cumulative strain on personnel, morale, and readiness to fight. As a result, it has become common to see hundreds of federal soldiers captured and paraded by rebel forces. The Nationalism Factor: This may be the most underestimated variable of all. Anti-government politics and Eritrean nationalism are not opposites: an Eritrean can oppose the government in Asmara while regarding a campaign to seize Assab as an existential threat to his country’s independence. An Eritrean opposition activist in the United States, a professional with a doctorate and a long record against the government, recently told me that members of his movement were rallying behind Eritrea’s leaders to defend their country at any cost. Many consider Abiy’s rhetoric about Assab a threat to the very identity and existence of Eritrea. This is an anecdote, not a poll, but it shows how external pressure can convert government-versus-opposition politics into a common national cause. I opened my 2016 essay with the Napoleonic maxim that “the morale is to the material as three to one.” No inventory of drones or heavy weapons can measure what people believe they are defending. The Vulnerability Behind the Front Any military campaign Abiy launches against a neighboring country has the potential to expose his forces to an insecure strategic rear. For instance, the northern supply routes pass through Amhara. CTP reports that Fano attacks along the A2 and B30 corridors have disrupted federal communications into the north (CTP, 2026). None of these movements necessarily needs a unified command for its cumulative effect to matter. An Eritrean front, TDF counteroffensive activity in the rear, and Fano attacks on transport corridors leading to Tigray could pose serious challenges for Abiy, making it difficult to choose safe logistics routes, reinforce positions, and decide where to station troops, drones, and ammunition. Even if he breaks through and manages to advance far or reach his objectives, sustaining a large army is not easy. Every advance creates obligations: roads to secure, food and fuel to supply the troops, and the need to transport and evacuate the wounded while minimizing casualties. A retreating army often becomes even more vulnerable than an attacking one. In May 2000, after a prolonged stalemate, Ethiopian forces achieved major breakthroughs, at a cost that the Congressional Research Service put at 50,000–100,000 killed and close to one million displaced, while noting the absence of reliable figures (Dagne, 2000). Ethiopia still did not annex Assab, occupy Asmara, or dictate Eritrea’s future. Penetration can buy leverage without producing strategic control. Fog, Friction and the Problem of the First Two Weeks In this day and age, wars have become increasingly unpredictable, elusive, and complex. Rivals thought to be weaker can prove strong, while powerful actors are routinely challenged by relatively weaker adversaries. One major factor in this phenomenon is technology: the advent of new, cost-effective, and deadly weapons such as drones, which have changed the way wars are fought. Drones have significantly increased the importance of electronic warfare and surveillance. In addition, the prevalence of social media can make war look more like a child’s game or a computer game. Remote controls and electronic surveillance have become the norm. In practice, these new weapon systems, including cyberattacks, can be very challenging to detect and counter, partly because they enable deception, noise, and rapid adaptation. Clausewitz’s fog and friction, and the modern shorthand VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity), describe the same reality. The enemy observes. The enemy learns. An air-defense weakness produces dispersion. A destroyed position triggers withdrawal to stronger ground. A government thought brittle is hardened by foreign attack. A domestic insurgency assumed containable intensifies when forces are redeployed. A regional actor expected to stay neutral begins supplying intelligence, weapons or diplomatic cover. The claim that the first week or two will tell us whether the war is short should therefore be treated with caution. The opening phase may reveal which side had the better first plan. It cannot reveal what the other will learn, what pressures will accumulate, or which secondary front will become decisive. Recent wars illustrate the point: great powers in Afghanistan, Russia’s war in Ukraine and the widening conflicts of the Middle East all show how initial plans collide with adaptation, attrition and political surprise. Gen. Mattis’s warning belongs here: “The enemy gets a vote.” His larger point was that lessons cannot simply be transplanted from one theater to another; the enemy, terrain and human environment change the war. The Antithesis: An Aggressor Repelled, Then Defeated War is too complex for a single line of advance. The linear scenario is one sequence among several, and not the surest. Its antithesis follows from the impediments above: a war of aggression can be repelled, and the army that starts it can end defeated. Federal forces may breach forward Eritrean positions in the opening days; that cannot be excluded. But the breach is where the problems begin. Supply lines lengthen through hard terrain, over a few roads, under constant interdiction. Eritrean commanders, drawing on long experience in numerous battles, can trade ground, ambush convoys and rear echelons, and wear the attacker down by attrition. Fog and friction fall hardest on the attacker, and the known unknowns lie largely on the Eritrean side: Eritrea is presumed to lack drones and advanced systems, but a presumption is not an inventory. The result could be heavy ENDF losses, bleeding from a hundred cuts, and an offensive that stalls, is cut off and is driven back. Meanwhile the rear does not stay quiet. Seven armed movements, among them the TPLF, Amhara Fano, the Oromo Liberation Army and the Afar front, announced the Alliance for Survival (AFS) on September 20, pledging to overthrow Abiy’s government (Al Jazeera, 2026b). TDF forces are reportedly exacting a heavy toll on federal forces around Chila and Tembien and claim that entire regiments and convoys have been destroyed; those claims are not independently verified. The main supply line from Tigray through Wollo to Addis Ababa has reportedly been cut, supply to Tigray is said to move through Afar and by air to Mekelle, and the TDF has reportedly warned Ethiopian Airlines that it is being used for troop and logistics movements. An attack on Eritrea would also widen the war: Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea reportedly agreed at El Alamein to coordinate military and intelligence efforts if the Tigray war expands (Mathews, 2026). An army bleeding from a hundred cuts would struggle to recover, and the prospect of AFS forces marching toward Addis Ababa would become more real. There is precedent. In 2021 Tigrayan forces advanced to within roughly 200 kilometers of Addis Ababa, when Amhara and Afar forces and Eritrea stood with Abiy and much of the population and diaspora rallied behind him. Those conditions are now largely absent; in my assessment, most Ethiopians now reject the regime, though no reliable polling measures it. The serious question is therefore not whether Abiy’s forces can cross the border or win battles, but whether they can defeat an adaptive defense, protect an extended rear and contain several internal wars, all at once. That threshold is far higher than having more drones or more artillery.
🤖 Made with AI
11
97
6
131
13,282
Damotyayanapo retweeted
America rapper lil Wayne just touch down in the united state today meet the 3 years old boy who was sent away on a soccer field. To him continued his training in a better team. Congratulations in Swahili
61
622
7
5,656
196,669
Damotyayanapo retweeted
LESS THAN 12 HOURS AFTER NEVADA PIERRE WAS REPORTEDLY TAKEN OFF THE PITCH, FOUR BIG NAMES STEPPED UP TO SUPPORT HIM! 😳❤️⚽ The story of 3-year-old Nevada Pierre is touching hearts around the world, and several big names are reportedly stepping up to support the young football talent and his family. 🔥 Lamine Yamal reportedly offered support to help protect Nevada’s football dream. 💰 Cardi B reportedly gave the family $50,000 to support them during this difficult moment. ❤️ Ousmane Dembélé also reportedly showed support, although the amount he may have contributed remains unknown. 🌍 Vozinha, the Cape Verdean goalkeeper, reportedly promised to cover the expenses of any football academy willing to accept Nevada and give him the opportunity to develop his talent. Imagine a 3-year-old whose football talent has attracted attention from major names around the world! 🥹👏 Sometimes, what is meant to discourage a child can become the beginning of something extraordinary. Nevada’s story is becoming bigger than football! ❤️🌟
468
3,379
185
15,549
312,486
Damotyayanapo retweeted
Replying to @esegbonaluis
FC Barcelona academy is best suited for his development. No arguement.
6
4
253
8,771
Damotyayanapo retweeted
እዩዋቸው እነዚህ የ #አማራ ህዝብ መርገምቶች። የ #አማራን ህዝብ በ #ኦህዴድ ብልጽግና የዶርንና የጅምላ ጨረሽ መሳሪያዎ እሳት እለት በእለት እቃጠሉ፣ እያስቀጠቀጡ ራሳቸውንም በባርነት የገበሩ የምድር ቁሻሻ ጥርቃሞ።
21
46
1
97
6,276
Damotyayanapo retweeted
ወይዘሮ አምሳል ወረታ ከአሜሪካ ( @EthioAmsal )   የቦርከናን ስብስክሪፕሺን ባደሱ በሳምንት ግዜ ተጨማሪ የ $100 ድጋፍ አድርገዋል፡፡ ልባዊ ምስጋናችን ይድረስ፡፡  ቦርከናን መደገፍ የምትችሉ ድጋፍ እንድታደርጉ ልናስታውሳችሁ እንወዳለን፡፡  በወር $1.25 ድጋፍ ቢያደርጉ በዓመት አንድ ጊዜ $15 ብቻ ነው የሚከፍሉት፡፡ ድጋፍ ያላደረጉ ከሆነ ዛሬውኑ ከታች ባለው ሊንክ ባሉ አማራጮች ድጋፍ ያደርጉ፡፡ ካናዳ ከሆኑ እና በቀጥታ ወደ ቦርከና ባንክ አካውንት መላክ ከፈለጉም በ ኢትራንስፈር ለ [email protected] መላክ ይችላሉ፡፡ ቦርከና ተደራሽነት እና ይዘት የማሻሻል ከፍተኛ ፍላጎት ቢኖረው ተጨማሪ የሰው ኃይል ለመቅጠር ክፍተኛ የሆነ የአቅም ውስንነት አለበት፡፡ ይሄ ሚዲያ መንግስታዊ ከሆኑ ድርጂቶችም ይሁን ከንግድ ተቋማት የሚያገኘው ምንም አይነት ገቢ የለም፡፡    ከአክብሮት ምስጋና ጋር borkena.com/subscribe-borken… #Ethiopia #NewsUpdate #Media #support
3
3
4
886
Damotyayanapo retweeted
Jayden Daniels still my QB I’m winning & losing with him. Fuck these MF’s man..
30
220
9
1,508
28,571
🚨🗣️Rafael Leão on what he told Lamine Yamal during the game against Barcelona. 🗣️“He's my friend and a player I love watching. “I just wanted to taunt him a little, so I said to him, ‘Two dribbles against me and you'll win the Ballon d'Or.’ He looked at me and said, ‘I deserve it, and I'll show you.’ (laughs) “I guess he took it seriously, because, of course, he showed another great performance. “He deserves the Ballon d'Or consideration for everything he's achieved individually and with his team. I enjoy competing against him, but I also enjoy watching him grow. Football needs players like him.”
54
123
1
1,665
160,959