In November 2001 eleven American Green Berets, one Air Force combat controller and a few dozen untrained Afghan fighters stood between the town of Tarin Kowt and a Taliban column of something like a hundred vehicles.
They had no artillery and no armor. What they had was a radio and the sky full of Navy jets.
The American war in Afghanistan began on 7 October 2001, less than a month after the September 11 attacks. The plan was to send small Special Forces teams to Afghans already fighting the Taliban and to put American air power behind them.
In the north that meant the Northern Alliance. The south was harder.
It was Pashtun country, the Taliban's home ground, and there was no army there to work with. Kandahar, the movement's spiritual and political center, was the prize, and American planners feared it might take months to capture.
Two exiled Pashtun leaders said they could raise the south. One of them, Abdul Haq, was captured and killed by the Taliban a few days after he went back in.
The other was Hamid Karzai. He'd also gone back into Afghanistan, been surrounded, and only narrowly got out to Pakistan.
On 5 November, at an air base in Pakistan, Karzai met the team that would go in with him. It was Operational Detachment Alpha 574, an A-team from the Army's 5th Special Forces Group, commanded by Captain Jason Amerine. Karzai told him the first objective should be Tarin Kowt, the capital of Uruzgan province.
He called it the heart of the Taliban movement. Many of the Taliban's leaders had families in and around the town.
On the night of 14 November the team, its Air Force combat controller, Technical Sergeant Alex Yoshimoto, and Karzai's small group flew into Uruzgan. Friendly Afghans drove them to a village about 30 miles from Tarin Kowt. The next day supply drops came in and the Americans began handing out weapons to anyone Karzai vouched for.
The plan was slow and careful. They would recruit about 300 men, seal the mountain passes and lay siege to the town.
Then, on 16 November, word came that the people of Tarin Kowt had done it themselves. They had risen against their Taliban administrators and driven them out.
Nobody had ordered it, and it caught the Americans by surprise. Karzai wanted to go in at once.
Amerine knew his force was far too weak to hold a town, but the town couldn't be left alone. At sunset fewer than a hundred men crowded into about ten vehicles, pickups and flatbeds and old United Nations trucks among them, and drove for Tarin Kowt with two Navy F/A-18s overhead.
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They got in after dark.
Karzai went to the governor's house to meet the tribal and religious leaders who'd led the uprising. Within the hour Amerine was called up to join him.
The news there was bad. A Taliban column was coming north from Kandahar to take the town back. Estimates ran from 300 to 1,000 men in about a hundred vehicles, and it would arrive in a day or so.
It was the first night of Ramadan, and as a guest Amerine couldn't leave before the meal that broke the fast. He stayed about ten minutes more, asked what else they knew, and hurried back to his men.
His sums were simple. He had eleven Special Forces soldiers and his combat controller. Karzai could find perhaps 30 to 60 armed men, keen but untrained.
If the Taliban reached the streets, the bombers would be useless, because the team couldn't bomb the town it was trying to save. The fight had to happen out in the open.
The team worked through the night. The weapons sergeants studied the maps and found two passes the column could come through.
Yoshimoto called for aircraft. At about 1:30 in the morning Navy jets spotted a group of eight or ten vehicles on the road from the south.
It was the first shot of the war for the team. Amerine later said he'd hoped to say something more eloquent. What he said was, "Well, smoke 'em."
Karzai could raise only about 30 fighters, and they didn't arrive until about 4 in the morning. None of them spoke English. With too few men to cover both passes, Amerine bet on the bigger one and drove out.
At first light the convoy topped a plateau and stopped. Below lay a desert valley about seven miles wide, with the pass on the far side.
Any vehicle coming through would have to cross open ground under the jets and then climb a steep road toward them. Amerine couldn't have asked for better ground.
Then light glinted off metal at the mouth of the pass, and vehicles began pouring out into the valley. The handful bombed in the night had been the tail of the Taliban column, not its head.
Yoshimoto cleared the jets to drop. The first bomb missed.
The second was right on target, and the Americans cheered. They were the only ones cheering.
The Afghan fighters had never seen an air strike called in and didn't know what was coming. To them a dozen men on a rock facing a column of trucks looked mad, and they ran for their vehicles to get back to town.
The Americans couldn't stop them without a common language. They couldn't stay either, because they had no transport of their own, so they jumped in.
"It really felt like we were seizing defeat from the jaws of victory at that point," Amerine said. On the way back Yoshimoto got off the call that pulls in every aircraft in reach: troops in contact.
In Tarin Kowt Amerine found Karzai out front, organizing people, and told him what had happened. Then he took the vehicles.
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He asked one of his men, "Do you want to drive?"
The man said, "Hell, yes," and they drove back out to the edge of town.
By then the jets reported that the Taliban had already taken the first lookout spot. The team stopped where it could see best and set up its radios there.
Amerine treated it as a line nobody could cross. If the column got past them into the streets, the town was lost and the only job left was getting Karzai out alive.
People poured out of the town to watch. Old men came with rifles, and children laughed and pointed and tried to dig into the Americans' packs. The weapons sergeants pushed the crowd back and set the armed men into some kind of a line.
The column had split into three and was coming over three roads through the hills. Yoshimoto put the jets on the biggest, the middle one.
More aircraft arrived. The team worked the bombs onto the front of each column first and then back down the road behind it.
At some point the reports changed. The trucks were turning around. The pilots kept hunting them as they tried to get away.
One Taliban group did reach the edge of town by a back road, and Karzai's men drove it off. By about 10:30 in the morning it was over.
Nobody has a firm count of the dead. One later account put Taliban losses at 300 or more killed and more than 30 vehicles destroyed. Amerine said he never much cared about the number.
The date is not firm either. The Army's official history puts the fight on 16 November, two days after the team landed.
A PBS Frontline chronology gives 18 November. In Amerine's own account, word of the uprising came on the 16th and the fight came the morning after they reached the town.
Karzai told Amerine that the fight broke the Taliban's back. Amerine thought that was true mostly in the mind.
The Taliban never again sent a force north after them in that strength. Villages began changing sides, and men came in to join Karzai.
On 30 November his growing force, eventually close to 800 men, set out for Kandahar. In early December it fought for a bridge over a dry riverbed at Sayd Alim Kalay. On 5 December a 2,000-pound American bomb fell short onto the team's own position.
It killed three of Amerine's men, Master Sergeant Jefferson Davis, Sergeant First Class Daniel Petithory and Staff Sergeant Brian Prosser, along with many of the Afghans. Karzai was wounded.
That same day Karzai learned he'd been chosen at the Bonn talks to lead Afghanistan's interim government. Karzai's negotiators arranged the surrender of Kandahar.
Mullah Omar slipped away, and by 7 December the city was in the hands of Karzai's men and the Americans. On 22 December Karzai was sworn in in Kabul.
Twenty years later, in August 2021, the Taliban took Kabul again.
A handful of men with a radio turned a town's uprising into a turning point, because they made the fight happen out in the open, where the jets could see.
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Every child in Newfoundland once learned that a big black dog swam a rope through the surf and saved 92 people from a wreck. The people who were on that beach said it never happened. The collar is real, though.
On the evening of 10 December 1919 the coastal steamer Ethie headed south from Cow Head on Newfoundland's west coast, bound for Bonne Bay with Christmas cargo. The barometer was falling fast. The storm turned out worse than anyone expected, and ice built up on the decks until the ship rode dangerously top-heavy.
By the morning of 11 December she was about a mile off the coast and being blown steadily toward it. The purser, Walter Young, knew the coast and suggested Martin's Point. Captain Edward English agreed and put her on the rocks there.
A line reached the shore, and everyone aboard came off in a bosun's chair, one at a time. An 18-month-old girl named Hilda Batten made the trip in a mailbag. Captain English and First Officer John Gullage came last, in the afternoon, on a rope that was starting to fray. All 92 lived.
Then came the dog. The first wire story, from an Associated Press stringer, put in the baby and a hero dog that brought in the line. A humane society in Philadelphia raised money for a collar with a silver plate that read HERO. A 1930s school book co-written by Joey Smallwood said a Newfoundland dog swam out and took the line to waiting hands. A 1967 account named the dog Tang and made him the ship's own Newfoundland, sent overboard with the rope.
What the record shows is smaller. A man named Reuben Decker was hauling firewood near the beach that morning with his dog, Wisher, a collie mix. By author Bruce Ricketts's account, Wisher bit at the rope a few times and didn't haul it anywhere. Gullage insisted for the rest of his life that there was no dog. The Evening Herald's report of 17 December 1919 doesn't mention one. Even the play local people put on about the wreck has the line "There was no dog!"
But the collar went where the legend sent it. Decker sold Wisher, and later the collar, to William Orum of Saint John, New Brunswick, who hoped to show the hero dog for money. The collar passed to a laborer named Dennis "Dinty" Kane, who turned up in Wrangell, Alaska, in the 1920s with a big dark dog wearing it. Kane died there in 1931. The collar ended up in a trunk, then above the bar of Dottie Olson's Roadhouse Lodge.
On 20 October 2000 it came back to Newfoundland on loan to the Newfoundland Museum. Hilda Menchions, then in her 80s, was at the handover. She was the baby in the mailbag.
The rescue was real. The hero dog was a story people needed, and the collar was made for a dog who didn't do it.
57
On 25 November 1960, three sisters and their driver were stopped on a mountain road in the Dominican Republic on their way home from visiting two of their husbands in prison.
Men from the dictator's secret police beat them to death and pushed their jeep off the road to make it look like an accident. Nobody believed it, and six months later the dictator was dead too.
Rafael Trujillo ruled the Dominican Republic from 1930. For long stretches someone else held the title of president, but Trujillo held the country.
His secret police, the SIM, watched everyone. It was the custom to hang his picture in every home.
The Mirabal family's house never had one. They were landowners in the Cibao, the farming country of the north, from the village of Ojo de Agua near Salcedo.
There were four daughters: Patria, Dedé, Minerva and María Teresa. Under Trujillo the family lost nearly all its money, and the regime marked them as dissidents.
Minerva was the political one. In 1949, at a party for the local elite, she caught Trujillo's eye.
At a second party, given by Trujillo himself, she turned down his advances. Her parents then kept her out of law school for six years, afraid that politics would get her killed.
When she finally went, to the University of Santo Domingo, she became the first woman to graduate in law in the Dominican Republic, summa cum laude. Her diploma was stripped of its honors, and she was refused a license to practice. At university she met her husband, Manolo Tavárez Justo.
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On 14 June 1959 a small force of exiles, flown and shipped in from Cuba, landed to overthrow Trujillo.
The army killed almost all of them. A resistance movement formed in their name, the 14 June Movement, and the husbands of three of the sisters were among its leaders.
Minerva's code name was Mariposa, the Butterfly. Inside the movement the sisters were called Las Mariposas.
María Teresa, the youngest, had studied mathematics. Before her future husband, Leandro Guzmán, was allowed to hold her hand, she asked how his family felt about Trujillo. He told her the first thing he'd learned at home was to hate him.
Patria, the oldest, joined after she saw Trujillo's men carry out a massacre during a religious retreat. She let the group meet in her house and hide weapons there. Dedé stayed out of it, partly because her husband didn't want her in.
The movement was discovered soon after it began. Patria's house was burned to the ground. In January 1960 hundreds of its members were rounded up and tortured.
Minerva and María Teresa were jailed from 22 January to 7 February, and again from 18 May to 9 August. The husbands stayed in prison. "Perhaps what we have most near is death," María Teresa said, "but that idea does not frighten me."
That year the Organization of American States condemned Trujillo and sent observers. The sisters were released. Their husbands weren't.
In November 1960 the husbands of Minerva and María Teresa were moved to the prison at Puerto Plata, on the north coast. To visit, the sisters had to cross the mountains.
On 25 November, Patria, Minerva and María Teresa made the trip together, driven by Rufino de la Cruz. Patria went along to support her sisters.
On the way home, the SIM stopped them. The three women and de la Cruz were separated, then strangled and clubbed to death. Their bodies were put back in the jeep, and the jeep was pushed off the mountain road into a ravine.
The story was that it was an accident. Nobody believed it.
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The killings hit the country harder than almost anything Trujillo had done.
The historian Bernard Diederich wrote that they "did something to their machismo," and that they helped clear the way for what came next.
On 30 May 1961 a group of conspirators ambushed Trujillo's car on a highway outside the capital and shot him dead.
Afterward, General José René Román, called Pupo, said he knew who'd killed the Mirabals: SIM men working under Víctor Alicinio Peña Rivera, the head of SIM operations in the Cibao. One of the killers, Ciriaco de la Rosa, later said he'd tried to stop it, but that Trujillo would have killed them all. One historian wrote that no order of that kind could have come from anyone lower than Trujillo himself.
In June 1962 five men went on trial as the killers: Ciriaco de la Rosa, Alfonso Cruz Valerio, Emilio Estrada Malleta, Ramón Emilio Rojas Lora and Néstor Antonio Pérez Terrero. Peña Rivera and others were tried as accomplices.
The court gave the main defendants the maximum, 30 years. De la Rosa got 20, reportedly because he'd helped explain how the crime was done.
They didn't serve it. When civil war broke out in April 1965, the men were taken out of the Ozama fortress in Santo Domingo, and they were never arrested again. According to Dominican accounts, some later lived abroad, and some lived quietly at home.
Dedé raised her sisters' six children. For decades the government handled the killings gingerly. Joaquín Balaguer, Trujillo's protégé, had been president at the time of the murders, and he led the country for more than twenty years after.
Only after Balaguer left office in 1996 did the country fully honor the sisters. In 1997 the schools began teaching them as national martyrs. In 1992 Dedé had started the Mirabal Sisters Foundation, and in 1994 she opened a museum in the house in Salcedo where her sisters spent their last months.
Minerva's daughter, Minou Tavárez Mirabal, went into politics and was elected to Congress. Dedé spent her life telling their story, and she died in 2014 at 88.
On 17 December 1999 the United Nations General Assembly made 25 November the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, in the sisters' honor. Each year it opens 16 days of activism that end on Human Rights Day, 10 December.
In 1994 Julia Alvarez told their story in her novel In the Time of the Butterflies. Their faces are on the 200-peso note.
Five men were convicted of killing the Mirabal sisters and Rufino de la Cruz. None of them served the sentence.
Killing to trial: 1 year, 7 months.
The dictator had them killed on a mountain road, and the world named a day for them.
39
On the night of 27 November 1950, in cold that fell to perhaps 36 below zero, Chinese armies that American intelligence didn't know were there came down out of the mountains around the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea.
About 30,000 UN troops were cut off by a force several times their size. Over the next 17 days they fought their way 78 miles to the sea.
By the autumn of 1950 the Korean War looked nearly over. After the landing at Inchon in September, UN forces had broken the North Korean army and pushed north toward the Chinese border. The plan was to reunite Korea before the end of the year.
North Korea is split down the middle by the Taebaek Mountains. The US Eighth Army went up the west side. On the east side went the US X Corps, under Major General Edward Almond, with the 1st Marine Division under Major General Oliver P. Smith.
China had warned that it would not stand by. On 19 October large Chinese formations, called the People's Volunteer Army, began crossing secretly into North Korea.
Mao Zedong ordered the 9th Corps, under Song Shilun, to destroy the Americans in the northeast. It entered the reservoir area undetected on 17 November.
General Douglas MacArthur, in Tokyo, launched what became known as the Home-by-Christmas Offensive. X Corps was to push west from the reservoir. Almond's men were stretched along a front of 400 miles.
Almond and Smith loathed each other. Smith believed there were large numbers of Chinese in North Korea, whatever headquarters in Tokyo said. Almond thought he was too cautious.
So Smith slowed his advance against Almond's instructions. He built supply dumps along the way, at Hagaru-ri at the south end of the reservoir and at Koto-ri farther down the road, and he started an airfield at Hagaru-ri. That caution is the reason so many of his men lived.
The only road out was 78 miles of gravel and ice from the reservoir down to the port of Hungnam, through high passes and in some places only one lane wide. On 14 November a cold front came down from Siberia.
Rifles jammed because the oil in them gelled. Medics thawed morphine syrettes in their mouths before they could inject them, and blood plasma froze solid.
The Chinese suffered worse. The 9th Corps had been rushed into Korea before it could be issued winter clothing.
It had little food and had left its heavy guns behind. On the day it crossed the border, frostbite alone put 700 of its men out of action.
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The Chinese believed only small American forces were at the reservoir.
They were wrong. Smith's slow advance had gathered most of his division at Yudam-ni on the west shore.
That night the Chinese attacked everywhere at once: at Yudam-ni, at the American Army positions east of the reservoir, at Hagaru-ri, and around Koto-ri. By the next day every UN garrison along the road was cut off from the others.
At Yudam-ni the 5th and 7th Marines held the ridges in close fighting through the night. On a hill over the Toktong Pass, Fox Company of the 7th Marines, under Captain William Barber, was isolated with the Chinese all around. Fox Company held the pass for five days.
Hagaru-ri, with its supply dump and half-built airfield, was defended by only two battalions and anyone else who could hold a rifle. The Chinese division sent to take it got lost because of outdated maps and didn't attack until the next night. When its men broke through, many stopped to loot food and warm clothing, and the Americans closed the gaps.
East of the reservoir, about 2,500 American soldiers of Regimental Combat Team 31, from the Army's 7th Infantry Division, were spread thin along the shore. Their commander, Colonel Allan Maclean, was lost on 29 November when he walked out onto the ice toward soldiers he thought were his own. They were Chinese.
Lieutenant Colonel Don Faith took command. On 1 December he led a breakout, with about 500 wounded loaded on trucks. A napalm strike called in to clear the way fell short and hit his own men as well as the Chinese.
At a roadblock Faith was hit by a grenade and died of his wounds. The column fell apart.
About 1,050 of the 2,500 reached Hagaru-ri, many of them walking miles south across the frozen reservoir. Only 385 were judged able to fight.
For years their stand was treated as a disgrace. Later studies found they'd held off a much larger force for five days and helped save the Marines, and in 1999 the unit was given the Presidential Unit Citation.
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By the end of November the Eighth Army in the west was in full retreat, and MacArthur ordered X Corps back to Hungnam.
On 1 December the Marines began fighting their way out of Yudam-ni toward Hagaru-ri, with the wounded riding in the trucks and the able men on foot on the ridges above the road. They reached Hagaru-ri on 3 and 4 December.
Smith gave the breakout one of the most famous lines of the war. "Retreat, hell!" he said.
"We're just attacking in another direction." It's usually remembered as "advancing in a different direction."
Planes landed on the new Hagaru-ri airfield from 1 December, carrying out the wounded and bringing in replacements. On 6 December the whole column moved south toward Koto-ri, with Navy and Marine planes overhead and the Chinese attacking it at night.
Below Koto-ri the road ran through Funchilin Pass, and the Chinese blew up the bridge there three times. Without it the trucks, tanks and guns couldn't get through.
So the Air Force dropped a new one. Eight C-119 Flying Boxcars dropped eight steel bridge pieces, each about 18 feet long and 2,900 pounds, one at a time under huge parachutes. Marine and Army engineers put a new bridge together from four of them and some timber, and on 9 December the column started across.
The last UN troops were through the pass by 11 December, and reached the Hungnam perimeter that night.
From Hungnam the Navy took them away. In what American historians called the greatest evacuation by sea in US military history, about 193 ships took off roughly 105,000 soldiers and 98,000 Korean civilians, with 17,500 vehicles.
One freighter, the SS Meredith Victory, built to carry 12 passengers, carried about 14,000 refugees. The last UN unit left on the afternoon of 24 December, and engineers blew up the port behind them.
The US X Corps and the South Korean I Corps reported 10,495 battle casualties, and the 1st Marine Division counted another 7,338 men lost to the cold. Official Chinese figures published in 1988 put the 9th Corps' battle losses at 21,366, with 7,304 dead, and another 30,732 to cold and hunger. The 9th Corps was out of action for three months.
Both sides call it a win. China held the battlefield and drove the UN out of North Korea.
The Americans got out with their units whole and broke the Chinese corps sent to destroy them. Fourteen Marines, two soldiers and a Navy pilot received the Medal of Honor.
The men who were there are known as the Chosin Few.
The Chosin Few came down the mountain in the cold, and they brought their wounded with them.
37
A black Alsatian from Liverpool spent the last winter of the war climbing over bombed London buildings, and he found people the rescue crews had given up on.
Jet was born in Liverpool on 21 July 1942, in the Iada kennel of Mrs Babcock Cleaver, which is why his pedigree name was Jet of Iada. At nine months old he was lent to the War Dogs School in Gloucester. He spent his first year and a half guarding airfields against saboteurs.
Then the school brought him back and taught him something new. He was trained to find people buried alive, and he was partnered with an RAF corporal named Wardle. They were sent to London. Corporal Wardle and Jet were the first handler and dog ever used in an official capacity on Civil Defence rescue work.
German flying bombs and rockets were still falling on the city. Jet was called out every night until the attacks ended. He worked through smashed houses and through the ruins of factories full of chemicals and poisonous smoke, and his nose still picked out the living.
The story people remember came from a bombed hotel in Chelsea. Rescuers had searched it and dug through it several times. Jet wouldn't leave. He kept going back to a huge piece of wall that leaned over but hadn't fallen, and by one account he stayed at the spot for 12 hours. At last a man climbed carefully to the top. He found an elderly woman trapped on a brick ledge.
On 12 January 1945 Jet was given the Dickin Medal, the animals' Victoria Cross, "for being responsible for the rescue of persons trapped under blitzed buildings while serving with the Civil Defence Services of London." Sources credit him and Wardle with anywhere from more than fifty lives to 150.
After the war he went home to Liverpool. In August 1947 an explosion in the William Pit at Whitehaven, Cumbria, killed 104 men. The rescuers needed dogs, and Jet was picked up from his owner on the way north. The RSPCA gave him its Medallion for Valour for his work there.
Jet died in October 1949, aged seven. He's buried in Calderstones Park in Liverpool, where he used to go for his walks, and a memorial stands in the flower garden near his grave. His collar and medals are at the Imperial War Museum.
The rescue crews dug where Jet told them to dig.
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On the evening of 22 November 2000, two cars boxed in Mozambique's best-known journalist on a Maputo avenue, and gunmen with assault rifles shot him dead.
He'd been following fourteen million dollars stolen from the country's biggest bank. The men who paid for his killing were put on trial on live television, and the country stopped to watch.
Beira, 1951: Carlos Cardoso started life as the son of Portuguese settlers in colonial Mozambique, and he went to school and university in South Africa. At Witwatersrand he became an activist against apartheid. In 1975 South Africa threw him out, and he made his way back to Mozambique just as it won its independence from Portugal.
Most white Mozambicans left. Cardoso stayed. He went to work for the new government's press agency, AIM, and became its editor in 1980.
He sympathized with the ruling party, Frelimo, and still attacked the government in print. In 1989 he quit and spent a while painting.
He came back in 1992 as a co-founder of Mediacoop, Mozambique's first independent press cooperative. Late in the 1990s he started Metical, a business daily he sent out by fax.
It became the most popular daily in the country. In 1998 he was also elected to the Maputo city council.
The Banco Comercial de Moçambique was the country's largest bank. In 1996, as it was being privatized, about fourteen million dollars disappeared from it. It was the biggest financial scandal since independence.
Metical went after it day after day. Cardoso named names in print, among them two businessmen, the brothers Momade Assif Abdul Satar, known as Nini, and Ayob Abdul Satar, and a bank manager, Vicente Ramaya. A week before he died he began a campaign against what he called the "gangster faction" inside Frelimo.
He'd had death threats for years. Not long before, he'd said he felt safe, because nobody had ever tried to carry one out.
On 22 November 2000 Cardoso left the Metical office in his car with his driver, Carlos Manjate, at the wheel. On the Avenida Mártires da Machava, two vehicles cut them off. Two men got out and opened fire with AK-47s.
Cardoso was killed instantly. Manjate was badly wounded and survived.
The government condemned the killing and promised a full investigation. Two days later about 500 journalists and citizens marched from the journalists' union to the spot where he died.
Six men were charged. Before the trial began, the man accused of leading the gunmen, Aníbal António dos Santos Júnior, known as Anibalzinho, walked out of Maputo's top-security prison on the night of 1 September 2002.
His lawyer said he might have been killed inside. The escape deepened suspicion of a cover-up.
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The trial opened on 18 November 2002, in a courtroom built inside the same prison for fear of trouble in the streets.
More than 300 people came on the first day. Every hearing went out live on national television and radio, and Mozambicans called it the trial of the century.
It turned on a name nobody had expected to hear in court. Several of the accused said the man behind the killing was Nyimpine Chissano, the eldest son of the president. They showed the court a cheque they said he'd signed to pay for it.
He came to court on 5 December and denied any part in it. His father, President Joaquim Chissano, said in public that the trial should go on.
Judge Augusto Paulino gave his verdict on 31 January 2003. The streets of the capital were empty as people listened. He called it the worst crime in the history of Mozambique.
Nini Satar got 24 years. His brother Ayob Satar, Vicente Ramaya, the gunman Carlos Rachid Cassamo and the lookout Manuel Fernandes got 23 and a half years each.
Anibalzinho, tried in his absence, got 28 and a half. The court ordered them to pay Cardoso's family four billion meticais, about $175,000.
His widow, Nina Berg, said she was happy with the sentences.
South African police had arrested Anibalzinho outside Pretoria the day before. He arrived back in Maputo just hours after the sentences were read.
In May 2004 he got out of the top-security prison again. Later that month he was caught at Toronto's Pearson airport and asked Canada for refugee status. Canada turned him down and deported him in January 2005.
Mozambique's Supreme Court ruled that a man convicted in his absence had the right to a new trial. At that retrial, in January 2006, he was sentenced to nearly 30 years.
In May 2006 prosecutors charged Nyimpine Chissano as the "moral author" of the killing, along with economic crimes. He always denied it.
On 19 November 2007 he was found dead at his home in Maputo, at 37, of what was reported as a suspected heart attack. He was never tried.
Press freedom groups watched the Cardoso trial closely. Reporters Without Borders said it showed that impunity for the killers of journalists in Africa wasn't inevitable. It came down, the group said, to political will and an independent court.
Metical didn't outlive its editor for long. It stopped publishing in December 2001.
But Mozambican journalists say his death didn't stop investigative reporting in the country, and that it pulled many of them into the work. On the twentieth anniversary, in 2020, people held a vigil at the place where he was shot, under a line that's become his motto: it's forbidden to put handcuffs on words.
Six men were convicted of the murder of Carlos Cardoso and sentenced to between 23 and 28 and a half years.
Killing to verdict: 2 years, 2 months.
He followed the money to a bank, and the court followed it to his killers.
36
At dawn on 20 November 1917, more than four hundred British tanks rolled out of the mist toward the Hindenburg Line outside Cambrai, and by afternoon the British had gone farther in six hours than they'd gone in three months at Passchendaele.
Church bells rang in Britain for the victory. Ten days later the Germans struck back and took most of it away.
By the autumn of 1917 the British army had spent months drowning in the mud of Flanders. The fighting at Passchendaele had cost a terrible number of men and gained little ground.
Farther south, near the French town of Cambrai, things were quiet. Cambrai was a supply center for the Siegfriedstellung, the great German defense line the British called the Hindenburg Line.
The Germans had built it carefully, in depth, with belts of barbed wire so thick they believed nobody could get through. If the British could take the town and Bourlon Ridge beside it, they would threaten the rear of the German line to the north.
Two ideas came together there. Brigadier Hugh Elles of the new Tank Corps, and his staff officer J. F. C. Fuller, wanted a place to use tanks in large numbers on firm, dry ground. Henry Hugh Tudor, who commanded the artillery of the 9th (Scottish) Division, wanted to try a surprise attack with no long warning bombardment.
His guns would be brought up in secret and aimed by mathematics and sound ranging instead of by firing test shots. General Julian Byng, commander of the Third Army, put both plans together.
The tank was the Mark IV, a rhomboid box of steel with tracks running all the way around it. It was slow, hot and loud inside, and it broke down often.
The Germans had dug their trenches too wide for it to cross, so each tank carried a fascine on its roof, a bundle of brushwood bound with chains, about ten feet long. At a wide trench the tank would drop the bundle in and climb across on it.
The plan was simple to say. The tanks would go first and crush lanes through the wire.
The infantry would follow close behind them through the gaps. Behind the infantry the cavalry would wait to ride through the hole.
Pilots of the Royal Flying Corps spent two weeks practicing low-level attacks on trenches and gun positions. The Germans had picked up enough to expect an attack near Havrincourt, and they knew tanks might be used. They didn't know how many.
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At about 6:30 on the morning of 20 November, 1,003 British guns opened fire all at once on the German defenses.
There'd been no warning barrage.
Smoke and a creeping barrage moved ahead of the attackers. Six infantry divisions went forward with about 437 tanks.
The wire that was supposed to be impossible went down under the tracks. The Hindenburg Line was broken in places to a depth of five miles. On the right, the 20th (Light) Division pushed through La Vacquerie and took a bridge over the Canal de Saint-Quentin at Masnières, and then the bridge collapsed under the weight of a tank.
In the center the 6th Division took Ribécourt and Marcoing. The 62nd (West Riding) Division swept through Havrincourt and Graincourt to the edge of the woods on Bourlon Ridge.
The British took about 4,200 prisoners that day and lost about 4,000 men. It was half the rate of loss at Passchendaele.
One village didn't fall. Flesquières sat on a low ridge in the middle of the attack.
It was one of the strongest points in the German line, held by men who'd learned how to fight tanks against the French earlier that year. Their field guns knocked out almost forty British tanks around the village.
One of them was a female Mark IV named Deborah, of D Battalion. Her commander, Second Lieutenant Frank Heap, took her through the village toward the guns.
His Military Cross citation said the tank took "five direct hits, killing four of his crew." Heap got the survivors back to the British lines under machine-gun and sniper fire.
A story grew up afterward about a lone German gunner at Flesquières who stopped the tanks by himself. The record shows a whole anti-tank unit doing it.
The Germans left Flesquières during the night. But the hold-up there had left the divisions on either side exposed, and of all the tanks that went in on the first day, 179 were out of action by nightfall.
Only 65 had been knocked out by the enemy. Most of the rest had simply broken down or got stuck.
At home the news looked like the victory everyone had waited three years for. Church bells rang across Britain.
On 21 November the advance slowed to a crawl. About half the tanks were still working. The Germans rushed in reinforcements, and the fight turned into a struggle for Bourlon Ridge and the woods on top of it.
The 40th Division attacked into the woods on 23 November with almost a hundred tanks and lost more than 4,000 men in three days. The British reached the crest and couldn't get beyond it.
On 27 November one more attack failed. The next day the offensive was stopped.
The British were left holding a bulge in the line about seven miles by six, with the Germans on three sides. On 28 November the Germans fired more than 16,000 shells into Bourlon Wood.
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The Germans had gathered twenty divisions.
At 7:00 on the morning of 30 November they hit the British salient with a short, savage bombardment. Then came new tactics: small groups of infantry moving fast, slipping past strong points instead of stopping to take them.
In the south they broke through so quickly that two British division commanders were nearly captured. Brigadier-General Berkeley Vincent had to fight his way out of his own headquarters and grab men from the retreating units to make a stand. At Bourlon, the British held.
One group of eight British machine guns fired more than 70,000 rounds into the German advance. Only counterattacks by the Guards Division, the arrival of tanks and the coming of night kept the line together.
On 3 December Field Marshal Haig ordered a partial withdrawal. By 7 December the British had given back most of what they'd taken, except for a stretch of the old Hindenburg Line around Havrincourt, Ribécourt and Flesquières. In the south the Germans held a smaller piece of ground they'd won.
The British official historian put British losses from 20 November to 8 December at about 44,000. The Germans later counted about 54,700.
The British had taken about 11,000 prisoners and 138 guns. The army held a court of enquiry into what had gone wrong.
Both sides learned from Cambrai. The British had shown that surprise, guns aimed without warning, and tanks, infantry and aircraft working together could break the strongest defenses in France.
They'd use those methods again in the last hundred days of the war, with better tanks. The Germans had shown what fast-moving storm troops could do, and they'd bring that to the great spring offensive of 1918.
Deborah didn't stay where she was knocked out. She was towed about 900 yards and buried in a hole the Germans had dug, and over the years the village forgot her. One woman, Marthe Bouleux, who'd been a teenager during the war, remembered seeing a tank buried and roughly where.
A local historian, Philippe Gorczynski, searched for years. He found Deborah near the spot Madame Bouleux had described.
The tank was dug out in November 1998 and was fully uncovered by 20 November, the 81st anniversary of the battle. Today she stands, preserved as she was found, in a museum at Flesquières.
The British Army's Royal Tank Regiment still marks Cambrai Day every year.
The bells rang too soon, but the tanks had shown the way through the wire.
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