Edward Lucas

Russia has achieved a significant political success. The Russian demand—made in the context of resolving the conflict with Ukraine—to address the European security architecture (effectively seeking its revision) and to provide security guarantees to Russia has been taken up by American negotiators and the President. Of the five areas of discussion, all but one—crisis communications (i.e., permanent security consultations, greater military transparency, reciprocal measures to reduce escalation risk, and enduring framework for security and stability)—contain potential pitfalls and risks. The list of topics was clearly inspired by Russian demands, which had already been articulated in the ultimatum Russia issued to the U.S. and NATO in December 2021, prior to the start of its aggression against Ukraine. We discussed this in a piece for @OSW_eng osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ana… The core of this proposal was the creation of a de facto buffer zone—a partially demilitarized area along NATO’s eastern flank—and the reversal of most of the military consequences resulting from NATO’s enlargement in 1999 and 2004. Moscow is now likely to push for similar concessions, including: 1. Guarantees that post-Soviet states will not be admitted to NATO, and an end to military cooperation with them. 2. A ban on the deployment in Europe of weapons systems (particularly missiles) capable of striking targets deep within Russian territory. 3. The withdrawal of Allied forces from NATO’s eastern flank states. ... 4. A prohibition on the deployment of nuclear weapons outside the territories of the states that possess them (the U.S., the United Kingdom, and France). 5. Refraining from military activities (exercises, patrols, etc.) in the vicinity of Russia’s land and maritime borders, as well as its airspace (within zones to be defined by Russia itself). Clearly, given the existing strategic imbalance in Russia’s favor—with its deployment of nuclear weapons and intermediate-range missiles in the immediate vicinity of NATO, and its capacity for the rapid redeployment of forces from its Asian territory—any notion of symmetrical restrictions would be purely illusory. Russia is well aware that its demands are unacceptable to European nations, particularly those on NATO’s northeastern flank. It is banking on an increase in internal tensions within the Alliance, a halt to the redeployment of U.S. forces to the eastern flank, and the shifting of blame onto the Europeans for the lack of progress in the peace process.