
Data you wont get anywhere else. Built by @dRiskDave.
Joined March 2026
- Tweets66
- Following1
- Followers28
- Likes208
Elleo retweeted
$SPCX: Some really happy SpaceX engineers today. Cursor S-8: 44.6M options with an average strike of $1.65. The stock closed at $145.23 today.
Payday.
Elleo retweeted
The "Metaplanet heist" article, checked against the filings
An anonymous article calling Simon Gerovich (@gerovich) and Dylan LeClair (@DylanLeClair) "grifters" is circulating. The article is sourced almost entirely to press summaries, CoinDesk, Cointelegraph, COINOTAG, TipRanks, Cryptopolitan, Investing, and not one primary filing. That shows, and it matters, because several of its central claims are wrong in ways the original documents settle in a paragraph
Point by point
"the roughly $600M in option value that shareholders paid management along the way" and "Simon is charging shareholders 20% every time he issues new equity"
The 20% arithmetic is right, and I will not pretend otherwise. The adjustment clause held the pool at 20% of fully diluted capital, which means the pool grew by one share for every four issued to investors, or 20% of all new shares created counting both
You can watch it happen in the company's own share-count table. Over the third quarter of 2025 issued shares rose by 486,260,000, and the gap between issued and diluted shares widened by 121,565,000 [1]. That is exactly 25% of the new issuance, which is the clause working precisely as written. The international offering of 385,000,000 shares at ¥553, ¥212.9 billion raised, was the bulk of that quarter [2]; its share of the ratchet is 96,250,000 shares. The mechanism was indefensible and the company deleted it for that reason
But here is what the article never checks, and it reverses the story
Bitcoin per share went up 63% over the same period the stock fell 86%
This is not my estimate. It is in the same 18 August notice the article cites for the pool size. BTC per 1,000 fully diluted shares was 0.016151 at the end of June 2025 and 0.026355 at the end of June 2026 [1], a rise of 63.2%. The company puts the whole series in one table, every quarter since the strategy began, and notes that on this basis bitcoin per share has risen roughly 43-fold since June 2024 [1]. Shareholders ended the period owning substantially more bitcoin per share than they started with, not less
The share price fell anyway because two other things moved: bitcoin itself dropped roughly 40%, to the ¥9,523,104 the company marked at 30 June [3], and the premium to net asset value collapsed from roughly 3x to below 1x. Dilution was the one factor working in shareholders' favour. Reading an 86% price decline as evidence of what the option pool did is reading the wrong variable
The ratchet's real cost is measurable and much smaller: the 96,250,000 shares attributable to the September offering were 6.7% of the 1,434,392,925 diluted shares outstanding at that quarter end [1]. Everyone's bitcoin per share is 6.7% lower than it would otherwise have been. That is a genuine grievance. It is not an 86% one
"Dylan LeClair used his influence and affinity with bitcoiners to help sell the Metaplanet dream... He was paid millions in compensation for his efforts"
The article asserts this. It does not evidence it, the author concedes the figure is his own estimate, and he says he tweeted at LeClair and got no reply. Here is what the filings establish and what they genuinely leave open, because the distinction matters when you are naming someone
Start with what is open, since I got this wrong myself at first. The 18 August notice says the rights were originally allotted to seven people, two directors and five employees; that those five employees later departed; and that their units were reallocated with board approval "in their entirety to the other three SAR holders (the current one executive officer and two employees)" [1]. Seven minus five is two, but the notice then lists five current holders. The company's own account does not close, which means at least three of the five present holders came into the plan after December 2022. So the roster is not a closed set, and nobody can point to that notice and prove LeClair is absent from it. The names of the four holders who are not Gerovich have never been published. I cannot exclude him and I am not going to pretend I can
What I can do is check the scale being claimed, and that is where it fails. LeClair is not a director or an auditor, so the officer remuneration table does not cover him. The right one is the employee disclosure in the same annual report: at 31 December 2025 Metaplanet the parent employed 16 people at an average annual salary of ¥16 million [4]. That puts the entire parent-company payroll, every employee including him, at roughly ¥256 million, about $1.7 million. Across the whole consolidated group there were 35 employees [4]
So "paid millions of dollars" is arithmetically impossible if he is on the parent payroll, unless he was taking most of it. Subsidiary salaries are not broken out, so there is a door left open there, and I will say so rather than overstate. What there is no version of is the picture the article paints, of a marketing hire quietly extracting a fortune, sitting inside a company whose entire disclosed officer remuneration for FY2025 was ¥67 million across a board of nine directors and three auditors, with the stock-option column blank in every row [4]
"Eric Trump... was granted stock acquisition rights covering a reported 3.3 million shares"
He did not receive them. He bought them
The 19th Series was resolved on 9 May 2025 and allotted on 26 May to Eric Trump (33,000 units) and David Bailey (3,000 units), at an issue price of ¥255 per right set by an independent valuation from Tokyo Financial Advisors using a Monte Carlo model [6]. Trump paid ¥8,415,000, roughly $58,000 at the time, for rights over 3,300,000 shares, and the notice states the exercise price was set partly in consideration of the fact that he takes no compensation for the advisory seat [6]. You can argue the price was too low, but "granted" is simply the wrong word
And the article places this immediately after its discussion of the 10th Series, as though one explains the other. They are separate instruments issued more than two years apart, to different people, on different terms, at different strike prices. Eric Trump has nothing to do with the 10th Series and no filing connects him to it
"Simon and management held roughly $600M in option value"
The magnitude is in the right area, so I am not going to quibble with it. The pool is 319,464,000 shares at a ¥10 exercise price [1]. At ¥271 that is worth about ¥83.4 billion once you subtract the strike the holders have to pay, roughly $540 million at ¥155 to the dollar. But two things about the number are wrong as the article uses it
It is not one person's. Gerovich holds 276,000 of the 459,000 units, 60.1% of the pool [1]; after the 28 August exercise that is 184,000 unexercised units plus 64,032,000 locked shares. His economic share is about $323M. The other $214M belongs to four people whose names have never been published
The article says "Simon and management" once and then attributes the whole figure to Simon for the rest of the piece, including in the LeBron James and Jensen Huang comparisons. Those comparisons are totally wrong
And it was not "paid" by shareholders in any sense that matches the word. Nothing left the company. It is dilution, it is unrealised, it moves with the share price by tens of millions of dollars a week, and following the August amendment every share arising from it is, in the filing's own words, in principle unsaleable until 17 August 2031 [1][7]. A number that changes when bitcoin moves is not a fee anyone was charged
"they are rare because they are an extreme form of executive compensation"
Paid stock options, are a standard and widespread instrument in Japan. Employees subscribe at an appraised fair value with their own money; the structure is used across the listed market. Gerovich paid ¥54,950,000 for his February 2023 package, declared in his own large-holding report as own funds with no borrowings [8], and the 18 August notice states that all the recipients subscribed at a third-party-appraised fair value with their own funds [1]
What was unusual was the adjustment clause attached to it, not the vehicle. The distinction matters because the article uses "rare options" to imply something furtive was constructed for this purpose, when the actual position is more mundane and more damning: an ordinary Japanese instrument carrying one extraordinary term that nobody re-explained at any subsequent raise
"has lost most investors most of their capital to date, some as much as 80%"
That depends entirely on when you bought, and the company publishes the number that settles it. Metaplanet's own April 2025 filing states the full-year 2024 average share price as ¥1,026, equal to ¥102.6 in current terms after the April 2025 split [5]. Against ¥271 today, anyone who bought at the average price across the whole of 2024 is up about 164%
The 86% decline is equally real, and it is measured from the June 2025 peak of ¥1,930, a figure that appears in the annual report's own high/low share price table [4]. Both facts are true. Only one appears in the article
"while what Madoff did was clearly illegal, the results, in practice, are almost the same"
They are not almost the same. Madoff's investors held claims against fabricated returns backed by nothing
Metaplanet's shareholders hold a company with 43,000 verifiable bitcoin, the third largest holding of any listed company in the world and the largest in Asia, on the company's cited source [3], and, as above, 63% more bitcoin per share than a year ago
A treasury company whose stock falls because bitcoin fell and its premium normalised is not a Ponzi
Reaching for Madoff is the point at which an argument stops being analysis
"Ten days later, on August 28, 2026, Gerovich exercised 92,000 units of the rights, converting them into 64,032,000 shares... So, roughly $600M and huge losses for common shareholders later, Simon is willing to... not do that anymore, but keep the $600M"
This is the sharpest line in the article and it is the one that falls apart fastest, because the sentence immediately before it does the refuting
The author correctly lists what the 18 August amendment did: fixed the pool at 319,464,000 shares, scrapped the 20% adjustment mechanism, added a five-year lock-up through August 2031
Read those three again
Fixing the pool means every share Metaplanet issues from here dilutes the holders alongside everyone else
Scrapping the adjustment removes the only term that made the pool grow
The lock-up attaches five years of illiquidity to shares that previously had none [1]
All three take value away from the people holding the rights, and the article states all three accurately before concluding that the beneficiary got to "keep the $600M"
The exercise runs the same direction. The rights run to 7 February 2033 [4]. Exercising in August 2026 surrendered 6.5 years of remaining option life, converted an option into stock, put ¥640,320,000 into the company (64,032,000 shares at the ¥10 exercise price), and took delivery of shares that in principle cannot be sold until 17 August 2031 [7]
Somebody keeping $600M does not pay the strike on 64 million shares and then hand himself a 5 year prohibition on selling them
And "keep the $600M" misdescribes what the number is. It is not cash and never has been. It is the market value of unexercised rights and locked stock, it moves with the share price, and 40% of it belongs to four people who are not Gerovich [1]. Between the article being written and today it has moved by tens of millions of dollars without anyone doing anything
What he did gain is voting stock, roughly 5% of the register, and that is worth naming rather than glossing over. It is a governance question. It is not a looting one, and it is a strange foundation for a Madoff comparison
Where the article is right, and I will say it plainly, is the first half of that same sentence: it took weeks of shareholder criticism to produce the amendment. It should not have. The pressure worked, and the fact that pressure was needed is the real indictment
What the article gets right, and it is not nothing
The mechanism was wrong. It paid for issuance rather than performance, it had no ceiling, and the people it paid controlled the lever. The company effectively conceded it on 18 August when it deleted the clause, stating in its own notice that the provision "amplifies the dilution borne by existing shareholders" and had made it difficult for investors to ascertain the fully diluted share count [1]
The disclosure was poor, though I want to be precise about how, because the article is not precise at all
The clause was not buried. It was in the December 2022 allotment notice, approved by special resolution at the extraordinary general meeting of 7 February 2023, and set out in every annual securities report since, formula included: adjusted number of shares = new fully diluted shares outstanding × 0.2 [4]. What was never done was explaining, at any individual capital raise, that the raise itself would enlarge the pool. That is the real gap. It is narrower than "hidden"
But an argument this serious deserved primary sources. Every correction above comes from a document that was publicly available while the article was being written. When you accuse named people of running something comparable to a Ponzi, the minimum standard is opening the filings
Sources
[1] TDnet, 18 August 2026, "Notice Regarding Partial Amendment to the Terms of Issuance of the 10th Series Stock Acquisition Rights (Paid Stock Options) (Fixing of the Number of Potential Shares), Execution of Lock-Up Agreements and Policy for Partial Transfer to a Long-Term Officer and Employee Incentive Plan". Issue price ¥18 per unit, exercise price ¥10 per share, approved by the extraordinary general meeting of 7 February 2023, subscribed at third-party-appraised fair value with the recipients' own funds. Originally allotted to seven officers and employees (two directors and five employees); on the departure of those five employees their units were reallocated with board approval "in their entirety to the other three SAR holders (the current one executive officer and two employees)"; 1,000 units exercised April 2026; unexercised balance at 30 June 2026 of 459,000 units held by five people, Gerovich 276,000, two executive officers 141,000, two employees 42,000. Adjustment provision deleted, potential shares fixed at 319,464,000, five-year lock-up. Reason given: the provision "amplifies the dilution borne by existing shareholders". Contains the quarterly table of issued shares, fully diluted shares and BTC per 1,000 fully diluted shares from June 2024 to June 2026, including 826,567,925 diluted and 0.016151 at June 2025, 1,434,392,925 and 0.021489 at September 2025, and 1,631,543,380 and 0.026355 at June 2026. contents.xj-storage.jp/xcont…
[2] TDnet, 10 September 2025, "Notice Regarding Determination of Issue Price and Other Matters": international offering of 385,000,000 shares at an offer price of ¥553, aggregate ¥212,905,000,000, payment date 16 September 2025.
[3] Metaplanet consolidated interim results for the six months ended 30 June 2026, and Q2 2026 earnings presentation, 13 August 2026: 43,000 BTC held at 30 June 2026, ranking third globally and first in Asia among publicly listed companies (company's cited source: BitcoinTreasuries.net); BTC reference price ¥9,523,104. metaplanet.jp/en/ir-library
[4] Metaplanet annual securities report for FY2025, filed 26 March 2026 (EDINET S100XTWY). Officer remuneration: ¥57M to two inside directors and ¥10M to three outside officers, ¥67M in total, stock-option column blank in every row, with nine directors and three auditors in office at year end. Employees: 16 at the parent company at 31 December 2025, average annual salary ¥16 million, 35 across the consolidated group. Share price table showing the ¥1,930 high. 10th Series stock acquisition rights table: board resolution 28 December 2022, extraordinary general meeting approval 7 February 2023, exercise period 8 February 2026 to 7 February 2033, exercise price ¥10, and the adjustment formula written out as 調整後株式数=新完全希薄化後発行済株式総数×0.2. disclosure2dl.edinet-fsa.go.…
[5] TDnet, 11 April 2025, "Notice Regarding the Issuance of the 18th Series of Stock Acquisition Rights (Paid Stock Options)": named allocations to nine directors (Gerovich 5,000 units, Abe 5,000, Edwards, Yusko, Kuwajima, Evans, Tsai, Eto and Kincaid 1,500 each) and three auditors 1,500 each, plus 20,750 units to 22 employees of the company and its subsidiaries as a group; exercise price ¥105 against a ¥348 close, set by reference to "the average share price for the full year of 2024 of ¥1,026 (¥102.6 after the share split)".
[6] TDnet, 9 May 2025, "Notice Regarding Issuance of Paid Stock Options (19th Series of New Share Subscription Rights) to External Collaborators and Conclusion of Paid Stock Option Purchase Agreement": Eric Trump 33,000 units, David Bailey 3,000 units, 36,000 units in total over 3,600,000 shares; issue price ¥255 per unit, ¥9,180,000 in total; allotment and payment date 26 May 2025; valuation by Tokyo Financial Advisors by Monte Carlo simulation; exercise price ¥105, set in part in consideration of the allottees taking no compensation for the Strategic Board of Advisors.
[7] TDnet, 31 August 2026, "Notice Regarding the Partial Exercise of the 10th Series of Stock Acquisition Rights": 92,000 units exercised into 64,032,000 shares, exercise date 28 August 2026, shares subject to the lock-up and in principle not saleable or transferable until 17 August 2031; personal holding 15,555,500 before and 79,587,500 after. contents.xj-storage.jp/xcont…
[8] Simon Gerovich initial large-holding report, obligation date 8 February 2023 (EDINET S100VL2I): total position 30,000,000 securities all acquired on 8 February 2023; acquisition funds ¥54,950,000, own funds, no borrowings. disclosure2dl.edinet-fsa.go.…
Elleo retweeted
I'm sharing my thoughts on the 10th Series situation
I've tried to analyze the whole process as thoroughly as I can, within the limits of my knowledge and abilities. I hope it helps clarify the issue and shows that things aren't necessarily as bad as they're being portrayed
And, ultimately, why in my view, nobody robbed anybody
The 10th Series: They may have earned it, but the mechanism didn't make them
The debate has been stuck on the wrong question. Almost everyone is arguing about the amount. Was ~$500M too much for the team? I went through the filings and the math, and I came out somewhere different: the amount was plausibly deserved. What was indefensible wasn't the size of the reward; it was the mechanism that delivered it. Management reached a figure they might well have earned automatically, by issuing shares, instead of earning it through measurable value creation. That distinction is the whole story
A note on the numbers: throughout, I use Metaplanet's own "Effective Diluted" share basis, the one it uses for BTC Yield, which excludes warrants whose cash hasn't been paid in. It's the honest measure of the pool's real claim on today's treasury, and it's the one that cuts against the company (it makes the pool's claim larger, not smaller). All per-quarter figures come from the company's own BTC-per-diluted-share table in its Q1 2026 earnings materials, plus Q2 2026 disclosures. More on the share basis at the end
Part 1: The team genuinely deserved a large, growing stake
The starting point (2022): Metaplanet wasn't Metaplanet. It was Red Planet Japan, a hotel chain gutted by the pandemic, carrying a going-concern warning (the accountant's flag that the company might not survive)
That's when the 10th Series was created
These weren't free grants: the team bought the options with their own money (¥18 per unit plus a ¥10 strike), with a three-year waiting period before they could exercise. The expected outcome wasn't a multi-hundred-percent return; it was liquidation
They risked cash and three years of their careers reviving a corpse
A 20% stake for the management team taking on a turnaround like that is textbook, and it should have been allowed to grow as they succeeded. Here's why freezing it would have been wrong:
The lemonade example. You start a lemonade chain and own 20%. But the business plan is to keep bringing in new investors to open more stands: that's the strategy, not an accident. Every new investor shrinks your percentage. You execute perfectly, grow the stands ~8x, and your 20% has become ~2.5%. You did everything right and your stake nearly vanished
Nobody signs that on day one, and it creates a perverse incentive: stop opening stands to protect your slice, the opposite of what the company needs
That's the position of a founder in a Bitcoin Treasury Company: the strategy IS to issue shares relentlessly to buy BTC. So a growing, meaningful stake for the team is legitimate; they should not be written out of the value they're building
In other words: the team could well have deserved a stake worth several hundred million
That premise, I accept
The fight isn't over whether they deserved a lot. It's over how that stake was allowed to grow
Part 2: The mechanism was the sin: automatic, not earned
There are two ways a stake can grow. It can grow because you create value, meaning you earn more. Or it can grow automatically, mechanically, regardless of whether you created anything. The 10th Series used the second, and that is the entire problem. Three flaws, each pointing at the same thing:
Paid for issuing, not for performing. The pool grew every time shares were issued, regardless of who created the value. It's like paying a fund manager a bonus every time a new client's money walks in the door, whether or not he invests it well. He's paid for gathering assets, not for generating returns. That is the core defect: the reward tracked the size of the denominator, not the creation of value
The chef version. A chef owns 20% of a restaurant and grows by franchising. It's fair his stake grows as the chain grows, but it should grow because the new franchises make money, because he's creating value
The 10th Series grew his slice with every new location regardless of whether it was profitable. Growing with value creation: legitimate. Growing automatically with expansion: not
No fixed ceiling. It targeted 20% of the fully-diluted company and recalculated upward with every new issuance, with no absolute cap on the share count that anyone had agreed to up front. There was no fixed, absolute worst-case number a shareholder could point to
A compensation scheme with no defined worst case has the same defect the whole story is about: the outcome is set by mechanics, not by earning
Management controls the tap. And it's the chef himself who decides when to open new restaurants; he decides the very action that enlarges his slice. The ordinary shareholder gets no vote and gets diluted; management decides and doesn't. When the party being paid controls the lever that pays them, "automatic" becomes a conflict of interest
The clearest single case: the September 2025 international offering (IO)
What it was (official figures): 385M new shares at ¥553. Gross offer price ¥212.9bn (~$1.44bn); amount paid in ¥205.4bn; net proceeds ~¥204bn. Per the company, ¥183.7bn went to buy BTC (the treasury rose from 20,136 to 30,823 BTC, +53%) and ¥20.4bn to the options-income business
It was upsized from 180M to 385M on strong demand. The 9.93% discount (¥553 vs the ¥614 close) is a normal mechanism for placing a very large block quickly with institutions, not a giveaway, and the price was still above the implied BTC-per-share value, so the raise was accretive
Here is the mechanism laid bare. The offering issued shares to investors, and the ratchet automatically minted 96.25M additional shares for the pool: zero additional BTC, zero additional value created
That is a pure dilution of 96.25M / 1,434.4M ≈ 6.7% of BTC-per-share: every existing shareholder's Bitcoin-per-share ended ~6.7% lower than it would have been without the ratchet, whatever the treasury balance
This number needs no assumptions; it's exact
And there's a second way to see the same wound, one we'll use again later: measure how many times its own BTC-NAV the machine captured per new share it issued that quarter. Without the ratchet shares, the answer is about 2.1x. With them, 1.78x. The ratchet took one of the least efficient issuance quarters of the whole bitcoin era and made it materially worse, while paying management for it. That's "paid for issuing, not performing" in one number
Part 3: What "earning it" would have looked like
If the team could have deserved a lot, the right structure is one that makes them earn a lot, with a defined ceiling. There's no need to invent this; it's how the financial industry aligns managers with investors: a fixed component for taking the risk, plus a performance component tied to value created, with mechanisms that stop managers being paid merely for gathering capital (hedge funds: incentive fee with a high-water mark; private equity: carry above a hurdle)
Applied here, a defensible design has three layers:
Layer 1: Turnaround award (fixed, hard-capped)
A fixed grant for the 2022 risk, capped in absolute shares: say 3x the original pool (138M), reached regardless of how much capital the company later raises. This pays for the bet they took when the company might have died
Layer 2: Performance pool (earned, not automatic)
Paid on growth in BTC-per-share above a hurdle, with a high-water mark and, crucially, a benchmark on the mNAV premium. Not on BTC's price: BTC-per-share is a quantity metric, independent of price
What you strip out is the "easy" accretion a high premium hands you, the part of the yield that any issuer would have harvested mechanically just by selling stock above NAV. That isolates skill from a favorable environment
Layer 3: An absolute lifetime cap
A hard ceiling on the total pool, with no automatic increase merely because shares are issued. This is the single most important fix, because the ratchet's fundamental defect was precisely that shareholders had no fixed upper bound
And this is exactly what the amendment did: it fixed the pool at 319,464,000 shares and killed the auto-increase. The company's remedy converges on the key protection a proper design needs. Plus long deferral (e.g., half locked three years, half five)
Part 4: Pricing the earned designs, from strictest to most generous
Now the numbers, all on the Effective Diluted basis. Their job is to locate the ratchet's outcome on the map of what legitimate designs would have paid
A pool's claim on the treasury = (pool shares ÷ total shares) × 43,000 BTC (the balance at 30 June 2026). Non-pool shares: 1,311.5M
First, the value actually created. The base is Metaplanet's own metric, "BTC Gain": the extra BTC the strategy generated for shareholders after stripping out dilution. Summing every quarter from the pivot through 30 June 2026, using the company's own table
- 2024's two quarters at +41.7% and +309.8% on tiny beginning balances
- 2025's four at +95.6%, +129.4%, +33.0%, +11.9%
- In the first half of 2026, +2.84% and +6.6%
About 19,900 BTC of value created, net of dilution (19,940 summing the table without rounding)
Second, the tool Layer 2 demands
Every quarter's BTC Yield decomposes exactly (it's an identity, not a model) into (dilution taken) × (accretion multiple − 1), where the accretion multiple is the BTC added per new diluted share divided by the BTC-NAV per share already there
It answers: how many times its own NAV did the machine capture for each share of dilution it imposed?
Computed straight from the company's table, the bitcoin era splits cleanly in two. The quarters that made this company:
- Q4 2024, +309.8% yield on just 7.2% dilution, a 44x multiple driven by debt, income and small amounts of very expensive stock
- Q1 and Q2 2025 at 7.5x and 5.2x; Q4 2025 at 7.9x
- Q2 2026 at 17.7x, almost no dilution at all
And the quarters that merely got bigger:
- Q3 2024 at 1.84x
- The IO quarter at 1.78x
- Q1 2026 at just 1.28x, where nearly every satoshi of the yield was mechanical
The benchmark then asks one question per quarter:
How much yield would a no-skill issuer have handed shareholders by placing the same shares at a normal premium, call it 2x NAV? Only the gain above that line is earned. Under that test, three quarters of the bitcoin era earn zero performance credit: Q3 2024, Q1 2026, and the IO quarter itself, ratchet and all
The creditable base falls from ~19,900 to ~12,260 BTC. (Move the line and the base moves with it: above a soft 1.5x line, ~14,970 BTC survives; above a strict 3x line, ~10,050)
Now the ladder. Each case is a design someone could actually have signed in 2024, and each is priced with the same two formulas
A share-based award converts to BTC as: pool shares ÷ (1,311.5M non-pool shares + pool shares) × 43,000 BTC. A performance carry is paid directly in BTC: carry rate × creditable BTC Gain. Dollars at ~$80k/BTC
Case 0: the freeze
The team keeps its original 46M shares, period. 46M ÷ 1,357.5M = 3.39% of the treasury; × 43,000 = ~1,457 BTC, ~$117M
This is the floor and, as the lemonade example showed, the deal nobody signs. It's in the ladder only because the popular "$557M extracted" number is measured against it
Case 1: turnaround grant only
The fixed 3x award (138M shares) with no performance component at all. 138M ÷ 1,449.5M = 9.52%; × 43,000 = ~4,094 BTC, ~$328M
This is what "we pay you for 2022 and nothing else" looks like. Every case below starts from this same 4,094 and adds a performance carry on top
Case 2: the strict earned design
Turnaround grant plus a 20% carry on gains above the 3x benchmark, crediting only quarters where the machine beat even a very favorable environment
4,094 + (20% × 10,050) = 4,094 + 2,010 = ~6,100 BTC, ~$488M
Case 3: the central earned design
Turnaround grant plus a 20% to 25% carry above the 2x benchmark. Why 2x? It sits above the ~1.5x the IO itself cleared at (the purest evidence of what merely selling stock captures at scale), around the top of Strategy's era-average premium, and far below the 5x to 44x quarters that made this company. It still credits 62% of everything the machine ever produced as earned
4,094 + (20% to 25% × 12,260) = 4,094 + 2,450 to 3,065 = ~6,550 to ~7,160 BTC, ~$524M to $573M.
Case 4: the light-touch earned design
Turnaround grant plus a 25% to 30% carry above the soft 1.5x benchmark
4,094 + (25% to 30% × 14,970) = 4,094 + 3,740 to 4,490 = ~7,840 to ~8,590 BTC, ~$627M to $687M
Case 5: the most generous conventional design
Turnaround grant plus a flat 20% private-equity carry on every BTC of gain, no benchmark at all, paying full price even for the mechanical part
4,094 + (20% × 19,940) = 4,094 + 3,990 = ~8,080 BTC, ~$646M. (At a flat 25% carry: 4,094 + 4,980 = ~9,080 BTC, more than the ratchet ever took)
Case R: what the ratchet delivered. The amended pool is 319.464M shares
319.464M ÷ 1,630.96M = 19.59% of the treasury; x 43,000 = ~8,420 BTC, ~$674M
Read the ladder and the ratchet's position is precise: above every benchmarked design, essentially on top of the most generous unbenchmarked one, and below only the aggressive flat-25% calibration. The amount sits inside the range a legitimate structure could have paid, at the very top of it
Part 5: Why the "hundreds of millions extracted" framing misses the target
That framing comes from comparing the ratchet to the freeze: 8,420 − 1,457 = ~6,963 BTC ≈ ~$557M. But the freeze is the deal nobody would ever sign (Part 1), so that comparison inflates the "damage" and aims at the wrong target
The honest comparison is against what the team could have earned anyway, and now we can state it with calibration, not with a single flattering number
- Against the most generous conventional design (Case 5), the ratchet overshoots by ~340 BTC, about $27M, or 4%
- Against the central earned design (Case 3), the overshoot is ~$100M to $150M, roughly 20% to 30%
- Against the strict version (Case 2), ~$185M
Notice the direction: the more strictly you define "earned," the worse "automatic" looks. That is not the thesis failing; that is the thesis doing its work. A mechanism that pays for issuance will, by construction, look worst against the yardstick that pays only for skill
But even the strictest conventional calibration puts the excess at ~$185M, and the central one at ~$100M to $150M, not ~$557M
The scandal-sized number only exists relative to a freeze nobody would sign. The real indictment was never the distance between what they took and what they could have earned. It's that nothing in the mechanism made them earn it
Part 6: Why the narrow basis (and what the other one would do)
Every figure above divides by Metaplanet's Effective Diluted count (non-pool 1,311.5M), which excludes ~380M warrants whose cash hasn't been paid in
That's the honest measure of the pool's claim on today's treasury: those warrants haven't bought a single satoshi, so counting them in the denominator would spread today's 43,000 BTC across phantom shares and understate the pool's real claim. It's also the harsher choice: it makes the pool's claim larger (8,420, versus ~6,830 if you counted the warrants)
I use it precisely because it's the number that cuts against the company, not the one that flatters it. On the wider basis every figure here shrinks proportionally, including every overshoot
Conclusion
The team genuinely deserved a large, growing stake. The turnaround risk was real, they paid for the options, and freezing their percentage would have been unfair and counterproductive. They may well have deserved compensation worth several hundred million dollars
The indefensible part was never the amount; it was the mechanism. It paid them for issuing shares rather than for creating value; it had no fixed ceiling; and the people it paid controlled the lever that paid them. The quarter-by-quarter record makes it concrete: the machine's great quarters created BTC at 5x, 8x, even 44x its own NAV per share of dilution (genuine, extraordinary execution), and the mechanism paid exactly the same way in the quarters that ran at 1.3x, where the yield was mechanical. It even paid for the ratchet's own dilution in the IO quarter, one of the least efficient of the era
And here is the tell that matters most, stated honestly in both directions. The mechanism was uncapped: an unbounded, unchecked claim, and nothing stopped them from pushing it far past fair. With that licence in hand, they could have ended up anywhere
Where did they actually end up?
Go back to the ladder
The ratchet paid ~$674M. That is more than Case 3, the design I'd defend (~$524M to $573M); they took roughly $100M to $150M above it. But it is only ~$27M above Case 5, the most generous structure the industry would recognize (~$646M), and below the flat-25% calibration (~$726M)
In plain terms: the ratchet landed at the top of the fair range, not outside it. They never used the licence to reach multiples of fair; they also didn't land in the middle of fair. Pushed to the edge of defensible, never beyond it; that is the record. The real danger was always what the mechanism could have done, not what it did
And the fix is exactly the lesson. The company removed the ratchet, fixed the pool at an absolute number with no auto-increase, locked the shares for five years, and is moving ~20% into a KPI-based plan
That absolute cap and the shift to earned, performance-linked comp is precisely the design the ratchet lacked
The open question, the one that decides whether this is remembered as a governance stumble that got fixed or as a pattern, is whether the KPI plan comes with the rest of Layer 2: a hurdle, a high-water mark, and a benchmark that refuses to pay for the easy part
Why I'm still bullish, still a shareholder, and still trust this team
After 4,000 words of prosecution, this may sound strange. It shouldn't. Everything above was an argument about a mechanism, and the mechanism is dead. Score what replaced it against the fair designs we just built, and the honest conclusion is that the remedy lands inside the system this post says they should have had all along. Let me walk through it, because each fix maps onto one of the layers from Part 3
The absolute cap is Layer 3, adopted in full. The pool is now 319,464,000 shares: a fixed, absolute number, with the auto-increase abolished. Yes, it was frozen at the top of the fair range, not the middle; nothing was handed back, and I won't pretend otherwise. But recall what the original sin was: shareholders had no worst-case number. Now they have one, forever. The single most important defect in the whole story is the one that got fixed first
More interesting is what the cap does to the future, because it inverts the machine. A fixed share count in a company whose strategy is relentless issuance means the pool now dilutes with every raise. It's the lemonade problem from Part 1, now applied to management itself, after locking in ~19.6%. Under the ratchet, their slice grew automatically; under the amendment, it shrinks automatically
And the shrinking has already begun: just the ~380M warrants outstanding today, once exercised, take the pool from 19.6% to ~15.9% before a single new share is even authorized. If the diluted count doubles from here, their claim falls toward ~10%
Note that this is actually harsher than the earned designs in the ladder: Cases 2 through 5 would have kept paying the team new carry on new value created. The frozen pool earns nothing ever again. From here on, the only way management makes more is the KPI plan; that is, by earning it
The five-year lockup is stricter than what I proposed
My Layer 3 suggested half locked three years, half five; they locked everything for five. Two consequences
The behavioral one: the alignment problem this post documented (a mechanism that rewarded issuance in the very quarters where issuance was mechanical) is replaced by five years of eating exactly the same BTC-per-share as every other shareholder, with no ability to monetize a premium spike
And the economic one, which almost nobody is pricing: locked shares are not worth liquid-share value. Any comp consultant valuing this grant would apply a discount for illiquidity; for a five-year restriction on a stock this volatile, standard discounts run 20% to 30% or more. Apply just 20% to 25% to the ratchet's ~$674M and the package's effective value is ~$505M to $540M
Look back at the ladder: Case 3, the design I said I'd defend, pays $524M to $573M. In economic substance, the lockup did the work the clawback didn't: it converted a top-of-range nominal award into a center-of-range effective one. They took the ceiling, then locked themselves out of it for five years
The 1.01x mNAV floor closes the perversity loophole. Under the old mechanism, issuing below NAV, destroying BTC-per-share, would still have grown the pool. That is no longer possible twice over: the pool can't grow, and the current issuance programs suspend below 1.01x mNAV. I'll be precise about what this is and isn't: 1.01x is a do-no-harm floor written into the instruments, not the 2x earn-it benchmark, and it lives in the securities rather than the articles. A 1.3x quarter is still possible and still wouldn't impress anyone. But the worst case, being paid to dilute you at a discount, is structurally gone
Then there's the evidence of behavior, which for me weighs as much as the structure. The ratchet was an unbounded licence, and the record shows it was never pushed past the edge of the defensible range; the overshoot against the most generous conventional design was ~4%. And when the pressure came, this team's response was not to defend the mechanism. It was to kill it: cap the pool, lock the shares, floor the issuance, move future comp toward KPIs. Compare that to the standard corporate playbook, a comms offensive defending the plan, and the difference is the tell. People who intended to abuse an unbounded claim do not voluntarily convert it into a fixed, frozen, five-year-locked one
And beneath all of it sits the machine itself, which this whole controversy never touched. The quarter-by-quarter record in Part 4 is the bull case: a team that created ~19,900 BTC of value net of dilution in eight quarters, that in its best stretches captured 5x, 8x, even 44x NAV per share of dilution, that built the premium everyone else merely harvested. My criticism was that the compensation didn't distinguish their brilliant quarters from their mechanical ones; it was never that the brilliant quarters weren't real. The governance failed; the execution didn't. You sell a stock when the execution fails
So my position is trust, but verified and priced. The remedy converges, piece by piece, on the fair system this post defined: the cap is Layer 3, the lockup exceeds my deferral, the floor kills the perverse case, and the effective value after illiquidity sits in the range I called defensible
What remains open is Layer 2: whether the KPI plan arrives with a hurdle, a high-water mark, and a benchmark that refuses to pay for the easy part. That's my line in the sand, stated in advance. If it arrives intact, this episode goes down as the moment Metaplanet's governance caught up with its execution, and I'll still be here. If another uncapped, automatic claim ever appears, you'll read a very different post
Until then: still bullish and still a shareholder
Elleo retweeted
Shorts increasing on Metaplanet while BTC pumping.
We know how this ended up last time this happened in May '25: +200% in 2 days.
Metaplanet ($MPJPY) Short Update (27 August 2026):
I reprocessed the latest JPX short-selling reports. Since July, reported short positions have increased slightly.








