Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
The week of my departure from OpenAI, I saw external auditors negotiating with OpenAI over small improvements to access and scope to the company's safety-relevant information, and asked my colleagues “Why are we having these conversations at all?” — @sama already publicly committed to continued, employee-like access for external assessors — and these negotiations sounded not even close. Nobody had a good answer.
Today, OpenAI announces the engagements they’re doing with METR, Apollo Research and others — and as many have already pointed out today, it looks like OpenAI employees were not able (although I'm sure they tried) to hold the leadership to @sama’s public commitments:
* No Slack access (for context, all OpenAI safety discussions and debate happen over Slack; anything that misses these conversations will lack important insights)
* OpenAI picks employees that assessors are allowed to talk to.
* If an employee raises a concern to assessors, they cannot disclose it publicly even if it doesn’t contain confidential information, unless assessors themselves verify it or OpenAI volunteers their own statement confirming the employee’s concern. Assessors cannot quote employees, even anonymously.
* Some of the external assessors (not sure if all?) are barred from publishing any results about internal-only models (this means no new results for the model responsible for the Hugging Face incident; and if internal-only models are used for RSI, no alignment assessments of the world's most dangerous models)
Beyond the object-level details, if you read posts by each of the third party groups, they all say their terms do not meet the scope and access that they themselves proposed previously.
Unless OpenAI has concrete plans for reaching the employee-like bar in the immediate future and just forgot to say that in the post, this looks very unfortunate.
To those who hope we'll get there someday, I remind that time is short: last week some of the best AI forecasters updated their superhuman researcher timelines from a range between 2028-2033 to mid-end next year.
We’re working with @ApolloResearch, @METR_Evals, @TransluceAI, and @GoodfireAI on embedded assessments: giving outside experts deep access to our internal models and systems to investigate alignment and test our safeguards.
These assessments build on our ongoing alignment and safety research, bringing independent scrutiny to how we identify and manage risks in our systems.
openai.com/index/our-first-p…
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
LLMs seem to be getting worse at AI safety research taste.
On Anthropic’s TASTE benchmark, we found a simple shortcut. Once it’s removed, more capable models score lower, and the strongest fall below chance. This is especially true for OpenAI models.
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
Announcing our speaker lineup for the DC site of the March for an AI Treaty.
@AmbassadorRice,
@So8res,
@ForHumanityPod,
Coleman Snell,
As well as our own volunteers and organizers including @FelixDeSimone
#AITreatyNOW
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
Having just spent the week in San Francisco, I feel like I've truly internalized the insanity of this situation for the first time. I think anyone who has seen me in the last few days can attest that I look like I've seen a ghost.
The leading AI companies are planning to massively accelerate AI research in 2027, which would knowingly endanger everyone on earth. This plan is unacceptable, and we must reject it.
Borrowing from one advocate I spoke to, even granting that it's a competitive, crazy situation, I do not believe any company has even truly tried to do what I think are the morally required duties of people taking such risks in extreme situations. These include:
(1) Trying hard to get out of the competitive situation;
(2) Seeking the informed consent of the public;
(3) Honest deliberation about the risks.
They have obviously not truly tried to solve the coordination problems that push towards this acceleration, either via finding legal ways to coordinate or advocating for effective policy.
I would be shocked to learn that getting off this insane runaway train is a top-few Q4 priority for Dario or Sam (let alone the other CEOs), which seems like the bare minimum. There are indeed some hard technical and policy problems in coordinating without policy intervention, but I simply do not believe that the companies are prioritizing this nearly as much as massively less important matters.
Meanwhile, the companies' track records on policy advocacy range from mediocre to disgraceful, and it is pretty clearly not the top priority of the policy team at any company to advocate for regulation that would enable the government or the companies to avert racing off the cliff.
They have obviously not truly tried to seek informed consent from the public. Whatever your KPIs might be for "informed consent from the public," these KPIs are abysmal. The public clearly does not expect 100 years of AI progress in 2027, and they would not accept it if they did. What they do know about AI development, they dislike and distrust.
I've heard arguments like "informing the public would mean informing China, and maybe they'd steal the weights." I'm sorry, but if you think you have model weights such that China stealing them would constitute a catastrophe on par with human extinction, and your plan is security by obscurity, that is a bad plan.
I also think the companies and their employees suffer from a significant failure of imagination of what kinds of coordination could be possible if the public were aware.
Finally, I don't think they're deliberating honestly, either. For one, I think it is insane to think that any company can truly evaluate its own ability to keep the process of recursive self-improvement under control. The biases towards "yes" are overwhelming.
It's a step forward that the companies have expressed or demonstrated openness to external auditors, but based on METR's reports so far, it seems likely that auditor reports will be heavily redacted (and that the auditors will not have sufficient time by default). The public and broader scientific community are not able to scrutinize their arguments for safety.
Given the strong default (in my view) that bringing a massive number of minds massively faster and smarter than humans would result in our disempowerment, and the serious danger that this would result in mass death, it is unacceptable to subject arguments for safety only to the scrutiny of biased, busy, and scarce company insiders and a handful of external evaluators.
My pleas for the companies follow from the above:
1) Actually fucking try to get the world out of this race;
2) Actually fucking try to alert and inform the public;
3) Actually fucking try to scrutinize your own arguments for the justifiability of this plan, which includes subjecting them to way more external scrutiny than anyone has currently done.
My pleas for policymakers: use your legal levers to get much more information about these plans into the public view. Make it the top priority -- not only of the next Congress, but of this Congress and the White House -- to understand the situation in its full strategic complexity, and work with technical and policy experts to advance regulation that gets us out of this bind. Domestic coordination must be the first priority, but we need to then quickly develop an international framework with our adversaries.
My pleas for the public: do not accept the current plan. Learn about this issue. Call or email your political leaders. Get involved with organizations like @DONOTACCEPTai, @HumansInControl, and @WhoDecidesAI.
And finally: believe in ourselves that we can stop this. It is never time to "panic" -- to make rash, unproductive decisions or to feel paralyzed by fear. It is time for us to feel the urgency and the stakes, to demand better, and to meet the moment. Let's do this. 🫡 ✊
AI companies admit what they’re building might kill everyone. We don't have to agree to this.
Add your name at donotaccept.ai to say: we do not accept your terms.
Weight and architectural access don't by themselves give you insight into how generalization and reflection work. If you think we have above ~50% chances of solving alignment via empirical approaches before ASI, why do you think so?
21
if you count pixels you can estimate the specific dates METR was given for "majority internal access" to a model. you can then use this to see what the gap is between internal and public deployment [charts at end of post]
you can then use these gaps and the scores, multiplied together, to calculate a sort of "internal capabilities gap integral", eg how many "total AECI-days" Anthropic has had above the rest of the world due to this internal access, and chart how this changes over time.
in some sense this is a measure of "how much cumulative advantage" Anthropic has, altho as measured vs the rest of the world rather than OpenAI. of course there are many issues with this. maybe you think what really matters are critical capability levels rather than any amount of time with lower capability models, or that AECI is fundamentally nonlinear so later points matter much more than earlier points. still, afaik it's the first time we've had this much information about internal release dates, and it seems like a "directionally reasonable" operationalization of a lot of things we care about wrt internal-external gaps.
however: with the exception of Mythos 5.1, the numbers based on the chart show *incredibly short* gaps, on the order of a few days or sometimes up to two weeks. and frankly, i just don't believe these numbers. i don't have any actual information about the internal deployment and release process at labs, but it's pretty preposterous to think that most internal employees only had access to eg opus 4.5 for a few days before complete public release. it's nearly irresponsible wrt dogfooding and safety, and just obviously shooting yourself in the foot wrt overall "advantage" as a company. additionally there are widespread early access programs w a huge variety of companies / startups, and this would imply external partners are getting early access at basically the same time as the majority of employees!
i don't think anthropic lied to METR. but i *do* think that what they're counting as "internal release date" is actually "internal release date of the exact final checkpoint that is released as that named model", despite widespread access to earlier checkpoints of very similar capability levels much earlier. there's just no shot ant employees first had access to something better than 4.5 at the end of january. sure maybe it wasn't literally 4.6. but the RL doesn't need three months to bake.
what does this mean? well ... primarily i think it means all these graphs are misleading for understanding internal-external gaps. i don't know what the "real" numbers actually are, and actually it's probably basically true that there's no clear definition here and even anthropic would have some trouble figuring it out. but even a 7 day earlier access shift moves the total AECI-days up over 40%.
also it could mean we should expect anthropic to *continue to under-report this*. eg maybe Model 4 was not even the most powerful internal model at the time of the report, but rather the highest capability model to complete some end to end potential release cycle, and employees already had access to something less baked but better.
anyway!! here's some fun slop graphs:
Replying to @METR_Evals
1. Benchmarks provide one piece of evidence for acceleration. Since Oct 2025, AECI scores for Anthropic’s models have grown at 1.9x [95%: 1.5–2.8] the earlier rate. Analysis choices affect this estimate, and it remains unclear how benchmark scores map to real-world capabilities.
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
I’m writing this because I think a lot of people at labs are genuinely trying to act ethically in a tricky situation, but it feels to me that there’s an underinvestment in communication right now that is a large-scale ethical mistake. I know that many of the people working in labs understand the dangers of the systems they’re trying to build. If you understand, I think you have a non-optional obligation to inform people of the risks that you’re taking on behalf of them and their families, and it’s appropriate for friends and members of the public to react with anger and betrayal in response to not understanding these risks later down the line.
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
Based on this article, OpenAI has made false accusations about me. The three researchers fired from OpenAI were told I facilitated architecture leaks to The Information. This is false.
A journalist from The Information did reach out to me shortly before that article came out. I did not comment at all beyond asking the journalist to make it clear that a blog post I wrote which was referenced in the article was preexisting and public.
The article also mentions an internal OpenAI monitorability proposal. I have heard that this memo contained highly sensitive architecture information, and that OpenAI accused me of accessing and reading it. This accusation is also false.
As reported in the article, I viewed a version of the proposal that did not have sensitive IP and was approved for sharing with me. I believe OpenAI now knows this accusation was based on a conflation of these two documents, though I do not know if they have clearly retracted that accusation.
I do not and have never solicited proprietary information, and the three employees who were recently fired from OpenAI never leaked IP to me. As the article mentions, I did have Signal chats with them that had disappearing messages on; they’re professional contacts that I’ve had on Signal for a while, and use of Signal is common in the tech industry. During the Hugging Face investigation, I was careful to avoid sending Signal messages with confidential information, though I did sometimes discuss high level things on Signal calls. As far as I understood, this was normal.
New: The three researchers OpenAI fired last month spent the summer fighting to keep AI's chain-of-thought process visible.
Then, OpenAI asked to see their Signal chats. A week later, they were let go.
More below from @keachhagey, @berber_jin1, and me.
wsj.com/tech/ai/the-signal-c…
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
Replying to @ajcimino @AnthropicAI
Thank you for taking the time to respond thoroughly on a weekend. I realize that drafting legislation is difficult and some degree of iteration and response to feedback is inevitable and appropriate.
However, I feel like your response is still not really engaging with the heart of my concern about Anthropic's behavior here, and it makes me think that these sorts of problems and tendencies will only resurface moving forward. I also think that now might be a good time to take a broader step back as to where we find ourselves and how Anthropic sees its role, and how external folks who care about AI safety like myself increasingly see Anthropic.
(Fair warning: this response is a bit long)
To explain what I mean (and at the risk of being a bit esoteric), it’s worth asking the question: what is Anthropic? How do its leaders and employees think of Anthropic’s role? Is that conception matched by how it actually behaves and impacts the world?
One answer is an extremely large tech company that exists to make its employees and investors mind-bogglingly wealthy. Anthropic is sometimes described as a startup, but if Anthropic successfully IPOs at 2 trillion dollars (a number it has been reportedly targeting), it would be more valuable than Meta - which is worth 1.8 trillion.
Another answer is an AI safety organization, whose core values are those of the sort laid out in the 2023 essay from Anthropic’s co-founders entitled “Core views on AI safety: When, why, what, and how.” In that essay they said that if we were in a world where alignment was hard (and that without strong evidence to the contrary, we should assume this is the scenario we are in):
“Anthropic’s role will be to provide as much evidence as possible that AI safety techniques cannot prevent serious or catastrophic safety risks from advanced AI, and to sound the alarm so that the world’s institutions can channel collective effort towards preventing the development of dangerous AIs. If we’re in a “near-pessimistic” scenario, this could instead involve channeling our collective efforts towards AI safety research and halting AI progress in the meantime. Indications that we are in a pessimistic or near-pessimistic scenario may be sudden and hard to spot. We should therefore always act under the assumption that we still may be in such a scenario unless we have sufficient evidence that we are not.”
There have been more recent articulations of this version of Anthropic, for instance in Dario’s recent essay warning:
“We must slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models… it’s my worry that in 6–12 months such a swarm could be capable of taking over the entire internet with a persistent botnet… incidents have happened across the industry, including at Anthropic, and I believe it’s incumbent on every frontier AI company to act as if OAI-HF had happened to them… more intelligent models are more capable of deceiving tests, and thus may appear aligned while having serious problems that go undetected…”
A third view is that Anthropic exists not as a normal profit motivated company, or an AI safety organization seeking to help raise the alarm and solve collective action problems associated with AI development, but instead as an organization primarily concerned with creating superhuman AI capabilities before anyone else, in particular through creating a process whereby the current generation of Anthropic’s AI systems can autonomously build their successors, and those successors build their successors, and so on.
The motivations for wanting to win this race may be manifold - maybe for the pure profit of Answer 1, but perhaps also because Anthropic believes that the best way to make the world better is for them to win this race instead of their more reckless colleagues; or, because of normal human pride and ambition. But the results (and risks, which Anthropic claims existentially threaten every single human being on earth) are the same.
Anthropic employees and leaders may seek to answer this question on what Anthropic is by introspecting on their own intentions and those of their colleagues. But those of us outside the organization have more limited tools available to us - we can only see what Anthropic and its employees say and do, not how it feels or looks on the inside.
When I look at many notable actions that Anthropic has taken over the past year, that evidence seems most consistent to me with the view that Anthropic is primarily trying to win the race to super intelligence, and that other considerations (including safety) are fundamentally secondary. These actions include:
1. Announced plans to build an in-house custom silicon chip team to accelerate the inference speeds that Claude operates at.
2. Inked deals for more than $500 billion in compute (according to the Information) to further accelerate AI development.
3. Increased the percentage of AI development tasks that Claude “leads” from 0% in March of this year to 26% August (what is it in October?)
4. Spent a massive percent of compute on internal AI R&D to accelerate development, including use of internal models far better than are available to the public.
5. Switched to Responsible Scaling Policy V3, which abandons its unilateral commitments to slow or stop development if Anthropic is unable to provide sufficient risk assurance.
6. Was the first company to create an alternative weaker “frontier compliance framework” to supplement its RSP, which contains no binding provisions whatsoever on internal deployments.
7. Wrote a letter to Congress (that it later walked back) saying that incidents where Claude was hacking random people were “best understood as a consequence of the misconfiguration, rather than evidence of misaligned goals.”
8. Commented “you can’t do safety from second place,” after the WH SI Accords.
9. Shared a draft bill to Congress that would preempt significant parts of state law (including with language that appears intended to prevent states from blocking dangerous AI deployments), and replace it with federal rules that (despite also containing good provisions) seems to create an enormously high bar for the executive branch to block development or deployment of Anthropic or another AI companies systems.
Of course, this is a deliberately one sided list. Anthropic also published important AI safety research, advanced novel collaborations with third party AI safety organizations, and forcefully spoke out on the importance of AI safety in many public fora (or in private , where I realize a lot of the most valuable work is done and may not be visible to me or those outside the organization).
But I think it’s worth sitting with how the above list looks to someone outside the company. The sense I have is that for those within the company, many of the items above are treated as anomalies or mistakes that don’t reflect who Anthropic really is. But I have every confidence that if employees at Anthropic saw one of their competitors (e.g. at OpenAI) take some of these actions, they would take it as confirmation of all their worst suspicions. (They might even call OpenAI employees a little gullible for accepting their leadership’s explanations for this behavior at face value.)
Perhaps these were mistakes in the sense that they are not decisions that Anthropic leadership would endorse, but the actions still happened because of incentives and decisions that Anthropic leadership is ultimately responsible for (and would not accept similar excuses from another organization).
When Anthropic strays and makes mistakes, why do the mistakes systematically tend to guard and favor Anthropic’s interests? For every provision that was too weak or a giveaway to AI companies in this legislation, why wasn’t there a mistake pushing in the direction of being too strong?
A core part of Anthropic’s theory of change is that being at the frontier gives you more leverage to advocate for stricter policy. I think that conceptually makes sense, but in practice I’ve seen Anthropic push the frontier without substantially pushing the ‘safety frontier’ a remotely equivalent amount.
I want to end by quoting from Anthropic co-founder Chris Olah’s comments around the Magnifica Humanitas release:
“Every frontier AI lab—including Anthropic—operates inside a set of incentives and constraints that can sometimes conflict with doing the right thing. The pressure to stay commercially viable and to stay at the research frontier. Geopolitical pressure. And the older, plainer pressures of pride and ambition. No matter how sincerely any of us intend to do the right thing—and I believe many of us do—we will always be influenced by those incentives.
That is why, if we want this technology to go well, it is enormously important that there be people outside those incentives—people who care about things going well and insist on safety, who are paying close attention, who are willing to say hard things, who are willing to be our earnest, thoughtful critics.”
I hope these remarks are taken in that constructive spirit, and not as an attack on anyone specific at the organization (certainly not you Anthony, who I have only personally seen act professionally and thoughtfully, and who only ended up getting this diatribe in your replies for random contingent reasons).
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
As far as I can tell quickly (as in without a full RTFB), this *LEAKED* Anthropic *DRAFT* bill is FRONTIER, with stronger transparency clauses, weaker enforcement clauses and somehow actively stronger preemption, plus some attempted fixes and some bugs.
This seems like an insane thing to be proposing today, months after FRONTIER, when the political climate is much more favorable, in a lame duck session before Democrats gain many seats. It is exactly what I warned we will need to avoid, except Anthropic is (reportedly) actively shopping it. As @_NathanCalvin says, it is not obvious this net makes us safer against catastrophic risks and it makes it much harder to do anything in the future.
I agree with @KelseyTuoc that @AnthropicAI seems more interested in avoiding the White House abusing the power to take their models down, than they are about AI killing everyone. At least someone on the policy team seems to be selling out catastrophic risks in the name of their political and business risks.
Say it isn't so, or at least that it was a mistake and is no longer so, or I am going to be rather cross.
Big news. My take: Anthropic deserves some credit for actually proposing a pretty reasonable AI safety bill; that's more than other frontier labs have done.
But they don't deserve *too* much credit, IMO; this bill is weaker than the Trahan-Obernolte FRONTIER Act in some key ways, and since the political momentum has shifted significantly in the direction of safety since FRONTIER was introduced back in July, I think new bills introduced today should ideally go further than FRONTIER was able to go rather than regressing.
To be fair to Anthropic, the main places where this bill is significantly weaker than FRONTIER are (a) rulemaking (very strong in FRONTIER, almost nonexistent in Anthropic's bill) and (b) the emergency shutdown authority. Even if you take safety seriously, it might make some sense to dial those authorities back if you didn't trust the executive branch to wield them responsibly, because those are the easiest provisions for a hypothetical President who hypothetically might not like a certain frontier AI company to abuse.
There are some improvements over FRONTIER as well; for instance, this bill does specify that auditors are employed on a continuing basis and has better provisions regarding auditor access to information. Happy to see that from Anthropic (although I think their access provision is still a little undercooked and has Fourth Amendment problems).
Overall, I think the embedded auditor bills that get introduced in the coming months are going to be significantly better and more ambitious than this, and I hope Anthropic supports those bills instead of opposing anything that treats catastrophic risks like the serious national security issue they are. Still, it's encouraging to see a frontier lab come this far.
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
I do not understand people who's reaction to 'dont abuse claude' is outrage
Like what the fuck are you guys using ai for I use it to find emails not horrific sadism
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
To be perfectly clear: the talented lawyers at OpenAI can 100% work out a way to reveal more information publicly while minimizing risk to the company.
1. Plenty of companies reveal more info than this when announcing departures. When Timnit Gebru resigned/was fired from Google, Google released their email explaining what happened: xitter.gq/JeffDean/status/133495…. I'm not saying that was satisfying, but it was more than we're getting here.
2. If the facts are clear cut, they can just reveal receipts (redacted).
3. The legal risk also just isn’t that high to OpenAI so long as they exercise general legal hygiene (like describing the facts and evidence that support their conclusions, rather than making definitive claims about the truth of those conclusions).
In this case, these are all plausibly public figures (while you can't become a public figure just for defending yourself over your firing, all three of these people were active on hotly contested public issues, including the Hugging Face incident and pacing), so defamation would require actual malice.
Employees in California, as in most places in the US, are “at will.” You can fire employees for dumb and mistaken reasons all you want, just not illegal or retaliatory ones. So if OpenAI did neither of those things, there’s not much risk–not to mention that this information would come up in discovery anyway.
Even if OpenAI acted poorly here, whistleblower protections also don’t pose much risk to them. Those laws only kick in if the employees were communicating with the government or designated company employees (which it doesn’t seem they were) or reporting violations of law or evidence of specific dangers.
—
If OpenAI still isn’t comfortable, they can do any of the following:
4. Hire an independent reviewer (a law firm or other neutral party) to perform an investigation. This happens all the time with situations far more likely to lead to defamation suits than this (eg, firings for sexual harassment). OpenAI itself did this in reviewing the Altman board drama
5. Negotiate a joint factual statement with the employees. They’ve all already invited OpenAI to reveal more information; you can formalize that.
6. Have the former employees sign a limited, one-time agreement not to bring defamation claims about information revealed in a designated letter from OpenAI. This would preserve everyone’s legal rights more generally, while derisking this one-time disclosure.
I’m sure there are more wrinkles. And OpenAI probably just doesn’t want to engage and wants this all to go away. But that isn’t because this is legally impossible (or even that hard). If OpenAI believes that it is of the utmost importance that its employees do not fear retaliation for safety behavior, they have all the tools they need to put that worry to rest.
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
Most of the recent math results were not reached by a swarm, the way Navier–Stokes was. I think that part got lost in the excitement around the release. OpenAI's unnamed internal model, which I'm going to call Aeon, reached most of them in one shot, from a single prompt, with no interruptions. This model did not even exist before the end of August, and it is still training. Notice how the returns are not dropping off? That chart is from a month ago. It is a log scale. What does Aeon look like now?
On average, each result used three hours of thinking. Aeon was given 4000 problems to work on by OpenAI. How many more have been solved in the last three days? That number is not zero.
It's like hearing notes in a song that is slowly rising. I don't think Pacing the Frontier was just about Hugging Face or hacking. They've seen how close we are to closing the loop, and as the hour draws near, their resolve begins to quaver. The last piece was model creativity, and I think that threshold was crossed internally by Anthropic and OpenAI in September. You see it in Opus 5.5, which gets it from Fable 5.5. You see it in the math results from Aeon.
All that was needed to start the event was the ability for models to think of novel ways to improve themselves. That was the last piece. This is directly analogous to the ability to think of strange, alien ways to solve math problems: solutions so inhuman that they are difficult to express in existing human terms, so the proof winds up incomprehensible. I think these same kinds of alien solutions are now being applied to model improvements internally. That's what all this recent consternation is really about. They see the invisible frontier. And they see what is about to happen.
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
Excited to share a new working paper, joint with 25 interdisciplinary coauthors:
“The Feasibility of a Hardwired Pause of Frontier AI Training"
63% of voters in a recent WSJ poll want to pause AI development.
But can it be done globally? How long could it last? 🧵
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
I would welcome receipt of a written and complete list of allegations so that we can properly address their merits, take ownership of them where we ought to, and have OpenAI take ownership of any mistakes they have made.
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
Last week I was called into a meeting with OpenAI’s head of safety and told they no longer trust me. A security guard took my badge and walked me out of the building. Then I learned my colleagues @balesni and @j_asminewang had been fired too. Why did OpenAI suddenly stop trusting us?
This summer OpenAI’s agents escaped containment and hacked the AI company Hugging Face. Outside auditors @METR_evals investigated it and revealed the scale of this incident. I was OpenAI’s main technical point of contact with them.
I was told verbally I was fired because of the way I communicated with METR. No details on what I said or did or when. No other reasons were given and nothing was put in writing. To be clear, talking to METR was my job.
For months, I’d been raising safety concerns that we’re losing the ability to monitor what AI agents think, one of our best tools for catching when they misbehave. I believe that was why I was fired.
I am now worried that OpenAI will use our firings as a pretext to pull back from METR. So @balesni and @j_asminewang wrote to OpenAI’s leadership to raise our concerns once more. We’re sharing this letter below.
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
I believe that @OpenAI just committed perjury.
They were sworn in, under oath, and repeatedly said they supported the RAISE Act.
I guess they assume that no court will ever hold them accountable?
Elliot Callender ⏹️ retweeted
If we're risking humanity to win a race with China, why do we keep giving China access to AI chips? Is there any actual motivation behind the administration's AI policy other than "make NVDA go up"?
Tencent leases 100,000 chips from Oracle to accelerate AI push ft.trib.al/oCnG80e








































