Escalation in Tensions Between Hezbollah and Lebanon's Security Forces INSS Senior Researcher Orna Mizrahi writes: Tensions between Hezbollah and Lebanon’s security forces have recently escalated following steps by the Lebanese establishment to limit the organization’s activities. These steps have been taken partly in response to U.S. pressure, and depart from the government’s familiar policy of avoiding violent confrontation with Hezbollah. Following Hezbollah’s entry into the campaign alongside Iran, the Lebanese government made a dramatic decision in March 2026 banning the organization from engaging in military and security activities. So far, however, the authorities have refrained from firmly enforcing the decision, fearing Hezbollah’s threats that such moves would plunge the country into civil war. The main incident behind the escalation was the seizure, on October 5, by Lebanese security forces of several hundred kilograms of high-grade explosives. The explosives had been smuggled from the Beqaa Valley toward Beirut in a truck carrying two Hezbollah operatives. The incident sparked public outrage in Lebanon over fears that moving the explosives to Beirut was intended for assassination attempts against the organization’s opponents. Hezbollah admitted that the explosives belonged to it, but denied any intention to use them inside Lebanon, and asked for them to be returned so it could use them against Israel. So far, its request has not been met. Following President Joseph Aoun’s demand to expand the investigation into the matter, an arrest warrant was issued for a senior Hezbollah official—the head of the organization’s Coordination and Liaison Committee—and his assistant, both suspected of involvement in the smuggling. Hezbollah responded with an implicit threat, saying it would consider changing the "boundaries of internal confrontation" and promoted displays of force and protests across Beirut. Several other incidents have also contributed to tensions. On October 16, Hezbollah gunmen tried to prevent a court-ordered search of a warehouse in Beirut’s Dahiya district where medicines from Iran were being stored. They left after additional Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) troops arrived at the location. In another unusual incident, a tunnel was discovered by chance east of Beirut. It was a small tunnel whose excavation had only just begun, and no weapons were found there. Still, its location far from the border with Israel raises questions about the organization’s intentions. Meanwhile, reports said that the LAF and Internal Security Forces had reinforced their presence and set up checkpoints throughout Beirut’s southern suburbs and on roads leading to them, in an effort to prevent an escalation into armed clashes. In response, Hezbollah reinforced the presence of its operatives in the Beirut area, and its mouthpieces accused the Lebanese leadership of acceding to U.S. and Israeli dictations. Hezbollah member of parliament Ibrahim al-Moussawi warned on October 19 that Lebanon’s streets were on the brink of an explosion. On October 20, Al Jadeed TV station reported that Hezbollah had raised its alert level amid fears of escalation, both within Lebanon and vis-à-vis Israel. The recent events are a test of strength for both sides. For the Lebanese leadership, the question is how far it is willing to go, and what risks it is willing to take in a possible internal confrontation, in order to advance implementation of the framework agreement. For Hezbollah, the question is how much it will tolerate in light of the threat of a change in the balance of power in Lebanon to its detriment. For now, despite its threats, which are intended to deter Lebanon’s leaders, Hezbollah still appears to hope to avoid a violent internal conflict, given its current weakness and the possibility of renewed fighting with Iran, in which it may be forced to take part. At the same time, it is laying the groundwork and preparing for the possibility that it will have to act if Lebanon’s leadership further restricts its freedom of action and turns to using force against it.

Is China aiding the military build-up of Iran and the Houthis? Yuval Less, Researcher at the INSS Israel-China Policy Center – The Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation, writes: In September, the Wall Street Journal reported that approximately 1,300 shipments of dual-use components were sent from China to Iran during the first half of the year. These included GPS-based tracking and positioning devices, electric motors, and aircraft engine parts that could be used in UAV propulsion and flight-control systems, as well as missile navigation and guidance systems. These components also have civilian uses. China also supplies Iran with chemicals, including sodium perchlorate and ammonium perchlorate, which are used in the production of solid fuel for ballistic missiles. U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran's missile industry have heightened the importance of Chinese supplies for its rehabilitation. Following the U.S. naval blockade, Tehran expanded its air freight from China. In the first week of September 2026, the number of weekly flights between the two countries doubled compared to the period before the war, and many may have been dedicated solely to cargo transport. At the same time, China is assisting Iran's proxies. In October, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Houthis are developing a medium-range ballistic missile using Chinese components, based on Iran’s "Kheiber Shekan" missile. The Yemeni government expressed concern to Beijing over the supply of weapons-manufacturing components to the Houthis, and a senior Saudi official claimed that actors in China and Russia are contributing to Iran's and the Houthis' capabilities. China rejected these allegations, emphasizing that it regulates defense and dual-use exports in accordance with its laws and international commitments. For Israel, the supply of dual-use components from China to Iran and the Houthis poses a potential threat, as it aids in the production of missiles and UAVs, as well as the replenishment of stockpiles. The expansion of air freight in response to shipping restrictions highlights the flexibility of supply networks and the need to counter them across all channels. Israel should make full use of intelligence coordination with the United States, regional partners, and European countries—which are also confronting Chinese supplies to Russia’s defense industry—and leverage Operation Economic Outcast to increase pressure on Iranian procurement and financing networks. Concurrently, Israel should enlist Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in a joint approach to Beijing, make clear the diplomatic and economic costs of continuing these supplies, and encourage China to use the oversight tools at its disposal. Given statements by the U.S. administration and President Trump that he does not believe China is aiding Tehran, Israel and its partners must continue to monitor shipments and procurement networks, and assess whether these statements translate into the actual cessation of aid.

Beyond the Mecca Alliance: Why Pakistan Will Come to Saudi Arabia’s Aid INSS senior researcher Yoel Guzansky writes: Pressure on Pakistan to assist Saudi Arabia is mounting as the campaign against Iran and its proxies continues. Islamabad seeks to avoid entanglement in a regional war and to preserve its relations with Tehran, but finds it increasingly difficult to ignore the expectations of Riyadh, its longstanding ally and one of its most important sources of economic support. Recent discussions have focused on the Mecca Alliance between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey, but focusing solely on the new agreement misses the main point. Pakistan's commitment to the kingdom rests on a security and economic relationship spanning decades. Over the years, Pakistan has provided military personnel, training, and security assistance, while Saudi Arabia has extended loans, deposits, and financial assistance during times of crisis. For Pakistan, which continues to grapple with ongoing economic difficulties, Saudi support is vital and difficult to replace. The war has already demonstrated the depth of these ties. In April 2026, Pakistan deployed additional forces to Saudi Arabia, including fighter jets and air defense systems. According to reports, the deployment reached approximately 8,000 troops. This coincided with a Saudi pledge of some $3 billion in aid, illustrating the close intertwining of security and economics in relations between the two countries. So far, Pakistan has refrained from direct participation in the fighting, similar to its refusal to join the Saudi war in Yemen in 2015. However, circumstances have changed: Saudi Arabia is now facing direct attacks on its territory and infrastructure. As pressure on the kingdom mounts, Pakistan will find it increasingly difficult to limit its response to statements of support. Additional assistance could include air defense, intelligence, and further troop deployments, even without direct participation in offensive operations. Pakistan has no interest in war, but neither can it afford a crisis in its relations with Saudi Arabia. If it expands its involvement, this should not necessarily be seen as an achievement of the Mecca Alliance, but rather as a reflection of a longstanding strategic commitment and deep economic dependence. The Mecca Alliance may provide the headline, but it is the Saudi-Pakistani relationship that explains the action on the ground.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is taking a growing toll on diaspora Jews. From growing antisemitism and divisions within Jewish communities to declining political influence and changing attitudes toward Israel, diaspora Jews are increasingly experiencing the consequences of the conflict in their own communities. A new INSS report by Theodore Sasson and Avishay Ben Sasson-Gordis examines what has changed — and what it means for Israel’s relationship with diaspora Jews >>> inss.org.il/publication/isra…

Could data poisoning turn AI into a tool for influencing elections? Influence operations are already flooding the internet with vast amounts of manipulative content that can make its way into AI-generated answers. With Israel’s elections approaching, data poisoning is becoming a threat that requires attention and preparation. How does it work, what has already been uncovered around the world, and what should Israel do to prepare? Read the new special publication by INSS researcher Shay Hershkovitz >>> inss.org.il/publication/data…

Stop treating the world as one monolithic bloc. Not everyone who criticizes Israel is an enemy, not everyone who has distanced themselves from Israel is a lost cause - and not everyone who supports Israel will continue to do so under all circumstances. In a new study, Pnina Sharvit Baruch maps the different audiences in the international arena, examines where Israel can still make an impact - and how >>> inss.org.il/publication/isra…

What if the rules Tehran has been playing by no longer work? A discussion among Iranian experts revisits the lessons of the Iran-Iraq War and challenges some of the assumptions that continue to shape Tehran’s strategy today - from how it defines victory and assesses its own power to deterrence, compromise, and ending a war. INSS researcher Raz Zimmt examines the discussion and its relevance to the current conflict >>> inss.org.il/publication/iran…

The War Comes Home: Is Saudi Trust Eroding? INSS senior researcher Yoel Guzansky writes: The war with Iran and the Houthis presents Saudi Arabia with another challenge, one that is harder to measure than the damage to infrastructure and the economy: a potential erosion in the public's sense of security and confidence in the leadership's ability to ensure normal, routine life. Initial signs of this are emerging from reports within the kingdom and social media discourse. The recent attacks on Riyadh, particularly the strike on the international airport, have made the war tangible and personal. The casualties, the shift to remote learning, and disruptions to daily life are sparking fear and uncertainty. Various reports describe a shift in public sentiment: while confidence in the leadership remains high, some are already talking about leaving the kingdom, a possibility that until recently was considered almost unthinkable. Social media also paints a complex picture. Hashtags such as "Saudi Arabia is a Red Line" and "God Protect Saudi Arabia" reflect national solidarity, grief over the casualties, and calls for revenge against the Houthis. Yet patriotism and anxiety are not mutually exclusive, and in a country where freedom of expression is restricted, it is difficult to assess the extent to which public discourse truly reflects the population's views. It is important to remember that Mohammed bin Salman has built his legitimacy in part on the promise of a more prosperous, open, and secure country. The question is whether the kingdom can continue to convince its residents and the world that it is a safe place to live and invest in. The conflict with the Houthis is particularly complex: after more than a decade of fighting, it remains unclear what would constitute victory or how the campaign can be brought to an end. Uncertainty about how long the conflict will last may be no less threatening than the strikes themselves. There is currently no solid evidence of a crisis of confidence in the regime, and the war may even strengthen national unity. The danger, however, is not necessarily an outbreak of protest, but rather the normalization of insecurity. The Houthis do not need to defeat Saudi Arabia militarily to inflict strategic damage. It is enough for them to succeed in disrupting life in the capital and undermining the public's sense of security. Bin Salman's test is not only to defend the kingdom, but also to preserve the public's faith in the future he has promised.

The Threat That Remains in the Field: What You Need to Know About Cluster Munitions INSS senior researcher Yehoshua Kalisky writes: The explosion of a cluster munition during a high school hiking trip along a trail on the Ramim Ridge, allegedly approved by the authorities, had tragic consequences: the death of 14-year-old Elazar Yair Wilensky, and injuries to several other students. What exactly are cluster munitions, and what makes them so deadly? The explosion was caused by an unexploded cluster submunition launched from Lebanon by Hezbollah during the war. Throughout the war against Iran and Hezbollah, Israel came under attack from a wide range of ballistic missiles and rockets. Iran and Hezbollah used two types of ballistic missiles. The first carries a warhead containing hundreds of kilograms of explosives. When the missile strikes its intended target, the explosion, the resulting blast waves, and the kinetic impact cause concentrated damage to the target and its immediate surroundings. The second type is equipped with a warhead containing a canister filled with dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of small explosive devices known as submunitions or bomblets. Each is roughly the size of a tin can and contains 2–2.5 kilograms of explosives. When the missile reaches a certain altitude, between 7–10 kilometers above the target, its warhead opens, dispersing the submunitions randomly over a wide area. The impact radius can range from several hundred meters to as much as 10 kilometers—depending on atmospheric winds and turbulence, the altitude at which the munitions are released, and the speed of the missile carrying them—and they can cause significant damage to buildings, infrastructure, and people. Detonation occurs when the fuze mechanism is activated upon impact with a target or the ground, triggering the explosive charge. Importantly, a certain percentage of these submunitions fail to detonate upon impact and remain on the ground as unexploded ordnance. Like landmines, they can be triggered by human contact, causing severe injuries or even death, as tragically occurred in this case. What can be done to prevent similar incidents from recurring? First, safety guidelines must be strictly followed, and extensive areas must be thoroughly surveyed for unexploded ordnance, particularly in densely vegetated terrain such as the Ramim Ridge and the Manara region, or in populated areas such as Kiryat Shmona. Because these locations have been active combat zones, unexploded munitions may still be present. In addition, suspected hazardous areas must be clearly marked with warning signs and fenced off. These measures should be accompanied by public awareness efforts emphasizing that hikers and passersby should report and strictly avoid contact with any suspicious objects.

Between the Principle of Secularism and the Hijab: Protests in Azerbaijan INSS senior researcher Gallia Lindenstrauss writes: Since early October, protests have been taking place in Azerbaijan over regulations regarding the enforcement of school uniforms, which prohibit symbols deemed to undermine the principle of secularism. The regulations, introduced in late September, have been interpreted as a tightening of the ban on wearing the hijab, which had effectively already been in place. Following the initial protests, the ban was extended from female students to teachers as well. The question of how countries emphasizing their secular character should address religious symbols in the public sphere is complex and by no means unique to Azerbaijan. Opposition to the wearing of the hijab in public schools, and its de facto prohibition, is not new; protests over the issue took place as early as 2010. This time, while the protests do not appear to be larger in terms of participation, a broader group of influencers, and not just religious figures, are speaking out against the regulations. Images circulating on social media, particularly in Turkey but also elsewhere, show young girls crying after being denied entry to their schools, as well as children crying around a teacher wearing a hijab who was barred from entering the school. In response to the protests, access to social media in Azerbaijan has been partially restricted, and several dozen people have been arrested. The Azerbaijani authorities claim that Iranian actors are fueling the protests. There is also resentment and criticism that the protests are being used to drive a wedge between Turkey and Azerbaijan, given the close ties between the two countries and Turkey's growing departure from the secular model. Baku has expressed anger over a speech delivered by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the UN General Assembly on September 22, in which he stated, without referring to any specific country, that restrictions on wearing the hijab in schools constitute an attack on women's fundamental rights, linking the issue to Islamophobia and xenophobia. Thus, the gap is widening between Erdoğan's ambition to raise a "pious generation" and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's desire—and need—to adhere to the principle of secularism, partly to preserve his own rule. Although this is a domestic issue, some are exploiting the events to point to Israel-Azerbaijan relations as part of the problem. While such accusations can easily be dismissed as conspiratorial and antisemitic, Israel should nevertheless monitor these developments. The close relations between Israel and Azerbaijan, a predominantly Shiite Muslim country, depend to a large extent on the continued rule of the Aliyev dynasty, which has held power since 1993. If external Iranian efforts to destabilize Azerbaijan are indeed involved, it is clear that part of the intention is also to undermine relations between Israel and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, it is important to recognize the complexity of the issue, and to remember that the prohibition on displaying religious symbols also extends to wearing a kippah.

How is it possible that countries that invest heavily in security still struggle to protect themselves? INSS Senior Researcher Yoel Guzansky on the Gulf states’ “paradox of wealth” >>> inss.org.il/publication/weal…

From Containment and De-escalation to Overthrowing the Regime: What Is Happening in the Saudi Discourse on Iran? INSS researcher Orit Perlov writes: Monitoring social media discourse among mouthpieces of the Saudi regime reveals three major trends reflecting a significant shift in how Iran, the threat it poses to the Gulf states, and ways of addressing it are portrayed. 1.Iran’s real enemy is not Israel, but Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states One of the prominent messages in Saudi discourse seeks to challenge the perception that Israel and the United States are Iran’s main enemies. According to Saudi regime mouthpieces, recent developments have exposed Tehran's true priorities: the Iranian regime’s primary enemy is not Israel, but Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states. To support this claim, they point out that Iran and its proxies repeatedly attack targets in the Gulf states, while refraining from launching missiles at Israel. Hence, they argue, Iranian rhetoric regarding the struggle against Israel does not reflect the regime's actual priorities. In practice, Iranian hostility is directed first and foremost at the Gulf states, and particularly Saudi Arabia. 2.Attacks on the Gulf states stem from Iranian envy of their success A second trend concerns how Iranian attacks on civilian and economic infrastructure in the Gulf states—including airports, oil and gas facilities, energy infrastructure, and commercial and tourism hubs—are explained. Saudi discourse shows a concerted effort to frame these attacks not as a sign of weakness or vulnerability on the part of the Gulf states (and Saudi Arabia in particular), but rather as a direct consequence of their economic and developmental success. According to this narrative, the Iranian regime struggles to accept the widening gap between the prosperity, stability, and progress of the Gulf states and Iran's own economic crisis, international isolation, and failures of governance. Accordingly, strikes on civilian infrastructure, commerce, and tourism are presented as a deliberate Iranian attempt to undermine the Gulf model of success. In other words, the attacks are portrayed not as a demonstration of Iranian strength or an identification of Gulf weakness, but as evidence of Iran's envy toward its neighbors' success and a desire to undermine it. 3. A shift in how to address Iran: From de-escalation and containment to overthrowing the regime The third trend, and perhaps the most significant, is a sharp shift in messaging regarding how to address the Iranian threat. While over the past year Saudi Arabia appeared primarily intent on minimizing friction with Iran and its proxies through dialogue, arrangements, compromises, and economic incentives, current discourse signals a fundamentally different approach. The recurring message among Saudi regime mouthpieces is that no stable arrangement can be reached with the Houthis in Yemen or with Iran’s other proxies in the region as long as the regime in Tehran remains in power. According to this view, confronting the militias, including military strikes against them, amounts to treating the symptoms of the problem rather than its root cause. The conclusion presented in Saudi discourse is that, as long as the Iranian regime remains in power, the Gulf states will continue to face security threats, attacks on their infrastructure, and efforts to destabilize the region—potentially threatening the stability of the regimes themselves. Therefore, they argue, the solution is no longer to seek understandings with Tehran or its proxies, but to overthrow the Iranian regime itself. At least in the discourse, the Saudi message appears to have shifted from "How can we live alongside the Iranian regime?" to "As long as the Iranian regime exists, the security and stability of the Gulf states cannot be guaranteed."

Can a national security doctrine be changed without debating it? Since October 7, a new doctrine - never formally approved - has effectively been guiding Israel’s security policy, raising fundamental questions about the principles behind it and their implications. Read the full article by INSS Director Maj. Gen. (res.) Tamir Hayman >>> inss.org.il/publication/new-…

On one thing, Iranians Agree: The Next Round Is Still Ahead INSS researcher Orit Perlov writes: Supporters and opponents of the Iranian regime disagree on almost everything. But when it comes to the possibility of another round of military confrontation, the discourse on social media reveals a shared working assumption across both camps. A sample of social media discourse points to three main assessments: 1. A third round of military confrontation with Iran is inevitable: Both camps expect the military confrontation between Israel/the United States and Iran to resume. 2. The next round will come before the elections: The shared assessment is that the confrontation will take place before the elections in Israel and before the midterm elections in the United States. 3. Israel will be the one to initiate: The prevailing assumption is that Israel will initiate and lead the military operation, as it did at the start of Operation "Rising Lion," with the possibility that the United States will join later. It is important to emphasize: This is not an intelligence assessment or a forecast of the likelihood of war, but rather an analysis of trends in social media discourse alone. The main point is the existence of a shared perception among regime supporters and opponents regarding whether another round will take place, when it will occur, and who will initiate it.

Throughout three years of war, the IDF has demonstrated unprecedented capabilities and a clear advantage over its adversaries. But military power is measured by more than achievements on the battlefield. Explore Israel’s 2026 military balance in the INSS National Security Balance >>> inss.org.il/publication/nati…

How can Israel break the deadlock in Gaza? The “Traffic Light Plan” offers a practical framework for turning the current situation on the ground into a path forward. INSS Executive Director Maj. Gen. (res.) Tamir Hayman explains to INSS Researcher Dr. Jesse Weinberg how the plan works on Brief. IL >>>

Hezbollah has been weakened, pushed back from the border, and lost much of its strength - but the gains in the Lebanese arena could still be reversed. Can Israel seize this rare window of opportunity and turn the changes on the ground into a long lasting reality? Read the INSS National Security Balance >>> inss.org.il/publication/nati…

Bypassing the Risk Premium, Not the Strait of Hormuz INSS Senior Researcher Yoel Guzansky writes: The growing use of Ship-to-Ship (STS) oil transfers in the Gulf of Oman is attracting significant interest, but also generating quite a few misunderstandings. Some view this mechanism as a new way to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and reduce reliance on it. However, this is a flawed interpretation. STS transfers do not bypass Hormuz, nor do they solve the problem of a blockade. They are primarily designed to address the sharp rise in insurance and shipping costs, as well as the reluctance of shipping companies to enter the high-risk zone. Under normal circumstances, a tanker can load oil at a Saudi terminal, pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and proceed directly to India, China, or another destination. Under current wartime conditions, however, many shipping companies are unwilling to send their tankers into the Gulf, while others demand exceptionally high risk premiums. Insurers, too, are limiting coverage or raising its cost substantially. This is where the STS transfers come in. Instead of having a single tanker make the entire journey, a tanker willing to take the risk crosses Hormuz, enters the Gulf of Oman, and transfers its cargo to another tanker waiting outside the risk zone. The first tanker can then return to the Gulf to load another shipment, while the second proceeds to its final destination without ever needing to cross the strait. The advantage is not necessarily fewer crossings through Hormuz. It is the separation of the dangerous, costly leg from the rest of the standard international voyage. Gulf states pay a high premium to operators willing to risk the passage, but they do not have to find a single tanker whose owners and crew are willing to sail the entire route through the conflict zone. This expands the pool of tankers available to carry oil to market and concentrates the risk within a defined segment of the supply chain. It does not mean the risk disappears or that costs necessarily go down. STS transfers themselves are expensive, require complex logistical coordination, and carry additional risks. Furthermore, a tanker making repeated trips through Hormuz also faces repeated exposure to threats. This is therefore a partial solution whose economic viability depends on freight rates, insurance premiums, and vessel availability. Strategically, this phenomenon highlights a critical point: Iran does not need to execute a hermetic shutdown of Hormuz to disrupt Gulf oil exports. Merely generating a military threat sufficient to deter a large share of shipping companies and insurers is enough, making passage exceptionally dangerous and costly. Gulf states, for their part, are trying to maintain exports through logistical adjustments and by absorbing a larger share of the costs associated with the risk. This mechanism does not eliminate dependence on the strait; rather, it demonstrates just how deep that dependency remains, even as the global oil market finds ways to adapt to the disruptions.

Russia's Threats: Pressure Mounts, Credibility Erodes INSS Senior Researcher Arkady Mil-Man writes: On September 29, Russia warned NATO that any attempt to isolate the Kaliningrad Oblast (a Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea bordering Poland and Lithuania) could result in the deployment of its full arsenal of weapons, including nuclear arms. Russian embassies in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Belgium issued similar statements. The warnings also included the possibility of strikes on decision-making centers in NATO member states. This move is reminiscent of December 2021, when Moscow demanded that the United States and NATO halt the alliance's expansion, rule out Ukraine's accession, and restore military deployments to their May 27, 1997, positions. This would have meant withdrawing allied forces and removing weapons systems deployed in Eastern European countries since then. Russia sought to force a change in Europe’s security order while denying that it was preparing for an invasion. On February 18, 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov described reports of an impending attack as "propaganda, fakes, and fabrications." Six days later, Russia launched a full-scale war against Ukraine. This precedent undermines the credibility of Russian statements. However, threat assessment must be based first and foremost on capabilities, posture, and actions. In mid-September, Belarus held exercises involving armored and mechanized units near Poland and Lithuania, including close to the Suwałki Gap, the stretch of the Polish-Lithuanian border that provides a land connection between the Baltic NATO members and the rest of the alliance. Belarus and Russia are allied within the framework of the "Union State," and Russian military facilities and personnel are stationed in Belarus. In February 2022, Russian forces also invaded Ukraine from Belarusian territory. This context gives the exercises additional significance, but they do not, in themselves, constitute proof of preparations for an attack. On October 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin added his voice to the warnings at the Valdai Forum, stating that an attack on Kaliningrad could lead Russia to use all the weapons at its disposal. At the same time, he denied any intention of attacking Europe. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte expressed skepticism regarding the threats: "Putin knows that he will never be able to defeat NATO, so I don't take it too seriously." The more Moscow issues threats without carrying them out, the greater the skepticism toward its warnings. Ukraine has received tanks, fighter jets, and long-range missiles. Strikes inside Russian territory and Operation "Spiderweb," which targeted its strategic bombers, did not trigger a nuclear response. Repeated threats become familiar background noise, eroding the Kremlin’s ability to influence Western governments’ decisions. Moscow’s main constraint is resources. The war in Ukraine requires significant investment in personnel, equipment, and funding. Waging this war alongside a large-scale conventional war against NATO appears to exceed Russia’s current capabilities. The Kremlin therefore places particular value on pressure tactics that make life difficult for the adversary without opening a full-fledged second front. Russia is already conducting a hybrid campaign against the West. European authorities point to acts and attempted acts of sabotage, cyberattacks, drone incursions into airspace, and damage to critical infrastructure. The Council of the European Union links the Russian campaign to an effort to undermine support for Ukraine. These actions test the allies’ willingness to respond and make it harder to attribute responsibility. They are also intended to reduce financial and military aid to Kyiv by stoking public fear in Europe that the war could expand. On October 4, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, extended this logic of threats into space. He threatened space warfare and actions against Starlink in the event of any disruption to Russia's "Rassvet" satellite network. The broadband communication system, based on low Earth orbit satellites, is intended to serve as a Russian alternative to Starlink. Its potential military value in the war against Ukraine lies in ensuring communication between units, transmitting intelligence, and controlling unmanned vehicles, even in areas without ground-based network coverage. Ukrainians had asked the U.S. to impose sanctions on companies connected to the venture. Medvedev thus shifted the debate from economic restrictions to the threat of military escalation. Assessments of Moscow’s intentions should prioritize changes in force posture, mobilization decisions, logistical preparations, and infrastructure development. The most likely pattern of conflict is a combination of hybrid operations, displays of force, and threats. The European response should raise the costs of these actions, strengthen infrastructure defense, and ensure continued aid to Ukraine. Skepticism toward Russian warnings is justified; ignoring concrete signs of preparations for an attack is not.

More freedom of action for the IDF, less room for Israel to maneuver. The military situation in the Palestinian arena has improved significantly, while the strategic and diplomatic pressure on Israel continues to grow. What does the full picture look like? Read the INSS National Security Balance >>> inss.org.il/publication/nati…