Vaibhav Joshi (@InvestWithJoshi) header
Vaibhav Joshi (@InvestWithJoshi) profile picture

Growth at reasonable valuations | Investor Disc: Don't Buy or Sell based on my tweets. I'm biased.

Joined December 2018
Many retail investors try to study the real estate sector and give up because of the complex accounting followed by each player. Some just look at the Screener P/E and call it expensive. Others argue that property prices are already too high and there is little scope for further appreciation. But they often forget one thing. Real estate developers don't necessarily need property prices to keep rising to grow. They need to launch more projects, sell inventory and keep replenishing their pipeline. And honestly, the balance sheets of several listed developers have become quite impressive. Tbh, too impressive to ignore. I started looking at this sector after studying Raymond Realty and realised that many real estate developers are sitting on goldmines, both literally and in terms of future business opportunities. Look at the presales numbers. Across 12 major listed developers, annual presales grew from ₹73,679 Cr in FY23 to ₹1,61,800 Cr in FY26. That's a 30% CAGR over three years! Collections have grown from ₹67,062 Cr in FY24 to ₹1,07,117 Cr in FY26. Think about what this means. A significant amount of business is already getting booked, and the cash from these bookings flows in as construction progresses. These projects will eventually translate into recognized revenue and profits as they are completed. Of course, bookings aren't the same as revenue or profit. Execution, cancellations and project economics matter. But the visibility into future business is much better than a simple trailing P&L might suggest. Now let's talk about valuation. Before that, we need to understand how to actually value these businesses. Under Ind AS 115, many developers recognize residential revenue only when the project is completed and possession is handed over. Meanwhile, launch costs, marketing expenses and overheads are incurred much earlier. So a company can report strong presales but weak or even negative EBITDA today. And when handovers begin, reported revenue and profits can suddenly jump. Looking at trailing P/E or EV/EBITDA in isolation can therefore be misleading. I prefer looking at Core EV/Presales and Core EV/Embedded EBITDA, while also checking the land bank, sustainable project margins, debt and cash conversion. Embedded EBITDA is essentially current presales multiplied by a reasonable estimate of the margin the developer can retain over the project lifecycle. Now look at how valuations have changed. Before COVID, developers were often valued at 0.5 to 0.8 times NAV, with the market worried about debt, stalled projects and whether land would ever be monetised. Then came the post COVID re-rating. Investors began valuing these companies as growth franchises rather than just land banks. Some leading developers traded at 6 to 11.5 times Core EV/Presales and 20 to 35 times Core EV/Embedded EBITDA. Today, after the correction and a few years of strong growth, the 12 company cohort in my analysis trades at around 3.2 times FY26 Core EV/Presales and 11 times Core EV/Embedded EBITDA. Read that again. Presales have compounded at 30% while valuation multiples have compressed substantially from their peak. This is what makes the sector interesting to me. You don't necessarily need another massive expansion in property prices or valuation multiples. Continued growth in bookings, timely execution and conversion of the existing pipeline into cash can itself create value. The balance sheets have also improved significantly across several leading players. Customer advances help fund construction, while lower leverage reduces the risk that used to destroy shareholder value in the previous cycle. But this is not a blanket bullish call on every developer. A company with a valuable legacy land bank and high margins deserves to be valued differently from one that has to share most of its profits with landowners. A developer growing bookings rapidly but burning cash also deserves more scrutiny than one converting collections into free cash flow. This is why Raymond Realty caught my attention. Its legacy Thane land and JDA pipeline offer years of development potential, but the real test is how efficiently it can convert that potential into profits and cash. The opportunity, in my view, is to find companies where the market is still looking at today's reported earnings while the underlying business is building tomorrow's revenue. Everyone talks about expensive property prices. Far fewer seem to be talking about the growth in presales, the visibility of future deliveries and the valuation compression that has already happened.
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To everyone who says valuations don't matter: In trading, that might hold true. But if you're investing with a medium to long-term horizon, always remember one golden rule: Never overpay for growth. Even a great business can turn into a poor investment if you buy it at the wrong valuation.
What happened with V2 Retail is a classic example of when stocks are priced for perfect execution, they are one disappointment away from getting punished. Management reduced the SSG guidance and that was the main concern. SSG slowing down doesn’t mean revenue growth will immediately slow down, they may still do 50% revenue growth this year. But to keep opening new stores and sustain high growth, they need healthy SSG. If SSG remains weak, they will have to rely more on new store additions, making growth more capital intensive and eventually impacting returns. Always remember: Buy with a decent margin of safety.
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Budget could be positive for Microfinance sector 🤞. CGFMU scheme is already renewed and fees reduced is by 25 bps. hoping some more positive things from the budget.
📢 Budget Wishlist: Capital Market & BFSI Stakeholders Meet FM! 💰 🔹 LTCG Tax Cuts & Lower STT Rates Discussed 🔹 MFs Push For Tax Parity Between Debt & Equity Funds 🔹 Insurance Commission Reforms On The Table 🔹 Stakeholders Seek Dedicated Fund For Microfinance Sector 👀 What Could Make It To Budget 2027? #Budget2027 #Markets #BFSI #MutualFunds
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Vaibhav Joshi retweeted
RAYMODN REALTY : POST PREF PROMOTER HOLDING increased : infused 409 crore watchout : Mahim 3 Acres pre-launch converting into confirmed bookings : Nov–Dec 2026(expected time of booking)
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Another big positive for listed jewellery players. The unorganised sector still accounts for nearly ~60% of the market, and trust remains a major concern. BIS hallmarking alone doesn't eliminate the risk of malpractice. In contrast, listed organised players have their reputation, brand and long-term customer relationships at stake, giving them far stronger incentives to maintain transparency. Mis-selling and quality-related malpractices are not new in the unorganised segment. Some players have historically resorted to such practices to earn extra margins. The structural tailwinds for organised jewellery retailers remain very strong.
🚨 NEW GOLD SCAM IN INDIA👀 Jewellers mixed rhenium powder into gold to increase its weight. Testing machines failed to detect it, and the jewellery even received a 22K hallmark despite containing only around 20K gold.
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Get ready to see some inventory losses from unhedged gold players. Kalyan is 100% Hedged P N gadgil was 80% Hedged Senco , shringar mangalsutra , lalitha had significant inventory unhedged.
If you're buying smaller Gold Jewellery players, make sure to check how much of their profits in Q3 and Q4 last year came from inventory gains. Companies sitting on large unhedged gold inventory can surprise you, and not necessarily in a good way. Don't extrapolate those earnings blindly into your projections.
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Well, I definitely missed out on a few hot themes this year. But sometimes, focusing on finding good businesses at reasonable valuations can be just as rewarding, if not more. Not every opportunity needs to be part of the hottest theme.
1/ Ever heard of an NBFC that grew its loan book by 105% in a single year while keeping NPAs at literal ZERO? 🚀 Meet SG Finserve ($SGFIN). A hidden gem disrupting India's $530B MSME credit gap. Here is the deep-dive investment thesis. 🧵👇 #Investing #StockMarketIndia
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Am I the only one who thinks this news is intentionally planted, and I am wondering why?
FINANCE MINISTRY SOURCES TO REDBOX GLOBAL DENY BLOOMBERG REPORT ON PROPOSED DERIVATIVES TAX HIKE
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The Realty theme is looking pretty solid 🔥 Could be a good time to accumulate, with several players trading at historically low valuations. My preference is for developers with: • Strong pre-sales-to-collections conversion. • A proven track record of execution. • A habit of delivering projects ahead of RERA timelines. In real estate, execution matters as much as sales momentum.
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It will be interesting to watch the November data on net equity inflows into mutual funds. The chances of redemptions and retail selling increase when investors finally get back to their cost price. Many retail investors were feeling trapped during the correction. Now that their SIP investments have turned positive, some might be tempted to redeem and exit. Let's see how the November numbers shape up.
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I always thought that when FIIs eventually start buying, they’ll have to pay up for expensive stocks. After all, who else would be selling their shares to them? Turns out, retail investors will happily provide the supply. 😂
#FundFlow | FIIs Net Buy ₹4,195.38 Cr While DIIs Net Buy ₹196.93 Cr In Equities Today (Provisional)
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Whenever you get something at a bargain price, there is usually a reason behind it. The real skill is to tone down your biases and objectively assess two things: How much are you paying for the current state of the business? How does the future look from here? If you believe the future is significantly brighter than what the current valuation suggests, you might be looking at an interesting opportunity. The idea is simple: if you are right, the returns should be disproportionate. If you are wrong, the downside should ideally be limited. In the case of Sammaan Capital, I feel the things that can go wrong from here are relatively fewer than the things that are beginning to go right. And if the market is still offering you this transition at a bargain valuation, I don't see much harm in taking that calculated bet. Of course, the thesis still has to play out. But that's precisely where the opportunity lies.
From surviving India's NBFC crisis without defaulting, to cleaning up a battered balance sheet, bidding farewell to its old promoter and welcoming Abu Dhabi's IHC with fresh capital. Indiabulls Housing Finance has been through quite a journey.
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From surviving India's NBFC crisis without defaulting, to cleaning up a battered balance sheet, bidding farewell to its old promoter and welcoming Abu Dhabi's IHC with fresh capital. Indiabulls Housing Finance has been through quite a journey.
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SG finserve 🔥 Now more than 100% up from Avg buying levels.
In January 2026, management said they would hit ₹6,000 Cr AUM by March 2027. Six months later, they are already at ₹4,551 Cr. Growing 82% year-over-year. Running ahead of their own guidance. And they have done all of this while maintaining something that should be statistically impossible in MSME lending. Zero NPAs. Not 0.5%. Not 0.1%. Literally zero. Seven consecutive quarters. ₹60,000 Cr disbursed. Not a single rupee written off. The company is SG Finserve. And the reason it can pull this off while management keeps overdelivering on every metric is the most elegant financial mechanism I have come across in Indian NBFCs. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ In 2021, the promoter family behind APL Apollo Tubes (India's largest structural steel tube maker, 55% organised market share, 800+ distributors, 50,000 retailers) quietly acquired a dormant NBFC shell called Moongipa Securities. They renamed it SG Finserve. And turned it into a dedicated supply chain financing engine for the massive APL Apollo dealer network. The idea was simple. APL Apollo's dealers need working capital to buy steel tubes. Banks will not lend to them easily because they are small, asset-light MSMEs with no collateral. So SG Finserve steps in. But here is the twist that makes this different from every other MSME lender. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ When a dealer needs ₹50 lakh to buy inventory, SG Finserve does not send the money to the dealer's bank account. It pays APL Apollo directly. The dealer never touches the cash. This eliminates end-use risk completely. Now the killer part. If the dealer delays repayment to SG Finserve by even a day, APL Apollo immediately cuts off all future supply to that dealer. Think about what that means. A steel dealer who depends on daily inventory to survive. Whose entire livelihood flows through APL Apollo's products. The punishment for delayed repayment is not a phone call from a recovery agent. It is instant business death. So SG Finserve's dues sit at the very top of the dealer's payment priority. Above rent. Above statutory dues. Above everything. This is not traditional underwriting. This is financial engineering that converts business dependency into repayment certainty. The loan rotates every 45 days. In Q4 FY26 alone, they disbursed ₹7,700 Cr against a book of ₹3,936 Cr. The entire capital base churned twice in one quarter. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ The latest numbers tell the story. → AUM: ₹975 Cr (Mar 23) → ₹3,936 Cr (Mar 26) → ₹4,551 Cr (Jun 26) → Revenue: ₹41 Cr (FY23) → ₹334 Cr (FY26) → PAT: ₹18 Cr (FY23) → ₹128 Cr (FY26) → Q4 FY26 PAT: ₹42.27 Cr (+78% YoY) → Return on Assets: 4.8% → Return on Equity: 12% → Gross NPA: 0.0% → Gearing: 1.9x (conservative, ceiling is 3x) Per the Q4 FY26 results press release and management commentary on the April 2026 investor call. That 4.8% RoA is not a typo. For context, UGRO Capital does 1.9% RoA with 2.4% bad loans. Northern Arc does 2.9% with 0.9% bad loans. SG Finserve generates the best profitability in the space while spending nothing on credit costs. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ How does it borrow so cheaply? This is the second trick. SG Finserve on its own is rated CRISIL A+. Decent but nothing special. But its actual bank facilities carry a CRISIL AA rating with a Credit Enhancement tag. That CE comes from an irrevocable corporate guarantee by S Gupta Holding Private Limited, which owns roughly 27% of APL Apollo Tubes. That APL Apollo stake is worth ₹10,000 to ₹14,000 Cr depending on the market. It backstops a debt book of roughly ₹2,774 Cr. The cover ratio is 4 to 5 times. Result: SG Finserve borrows at 8.5%. In the MSME NBFC space. Where peers pay 10 to 11%. That 150 to 250 bps advantage drops straight to the bottom line. Every single quarter. It is a structural cost moat that competitors cannot replicate without their own billionaire promoter guaranteeing their debt. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ The January 2026 factoring license changed the growth trajectory entirely. Before that, SG Finserve could only do dealer finance downstream of anchor companies. After the license, it can now buy receivables from vendors, participate on RBI's TReDS platform, do invoice discounting on open accounts. The timing could not be better. Union Budget 2026-27 mandated all CPSEs to join TReDS. RBI's June 2026 Master Direction added credit guarantees and liberalised the framework. TReDS platform M1xchange crossed ₹1 trillion annual throughput this year. Management has 28+ anchor tie-ups now and guided that 75% of future growth will come from third-party non-APL Apollo anchors. The factoring arm was the primary driver behind that 82% AUM growth in Q1 FY27. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ The valuation math. At ₹674, market cap is roughly ₹4,440 Cr. → Trailing P/E: 34.7x → P/B: 3.0x → Book value per share: ₹225 Management target for FY30: ₹7,500 Cr AUM and ₹500 Cr PAT. If they hit ₹500 Cr PAT by FY30 (a 30-35% CAGR from here), the stock at today's price would be trading at roughly 9x forward earnings. That is Bajaj Finance territory growth priced at PSU bank multiples. Promoters hold 52.9%. Ashish Kacholia holds 1.14%. Madhusudan Kela acquired 9.5 lakh shares at ₹350 average in March 2025 (per BSE bulk deal data). These are not dumb money investors. No institutional analyst coverage exists today. TipRanks confirms zero ratings in the last 3 months. This stock has not been discovered by sell-side research yet. When it does get covered (likely as market cap scales past ₹5,000-6,000 Cr), that itself becomes a re-rating catalyst. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ Now the risks. And they are real. Eyes wide open. → APL Apollo just reported Q1 FY27 volumes DOWN 6% YoY to 745kt (missed 875kt guidance badly). Dealer destocking plus HRC price volatility. If dealers are sitting on unsold inventory, the stop-supply threat loses its coercive power → Extreme concentration. The company was literally built to finance APL Apollo's network. If steel or construction enters a severe downturn, anchor health and SG Finserve unwind simultaneously → The zero NPA record is only 3 years old. Never tested through a full credit cycle or systemic liquidity crunch → The 8.5% cost of funds depends entirely on the SGHPL guarantee. If APL Apollo's stock crashes 60-70%, the cover ratio collapses and a rating downgrade inflates borrowing costs overnight → Shares outstanding grew 17% last year via warrant conversions. EPS was flat from FY24 to FY25 despite PAT growth because dilution absorbed the gains → The ₹400 Cr subsidiary plan (ARC, AIF, insurance broking) is unproven diversification into intensely competitive segments with different operational DNA ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ But here is why I keep coming back to this. India has a ₹30 to 40 lakh crore MSME credit gap. SG Finserve's ₹4,551 Cr book is a rounding error in that market. The factoring license plus TReDS regulatory tailwinds just opened a massive new runway. The balance sheet has room to go from 1.9x to 3.0x gearing without any new equity raise, which alone supports 50%+ AUM growth. A 4.8% RoA company with zero credit costs and a structural borrowing advantage. Growing AUM at 75-82% annually. With smart money backing and zero institutional coverage. The risk is concentration. The reward is a potential compounder hiding inside a corporate supply chain that moves ₹25,000 Cr of invoices per year. I am watching APL Apollo's volumes closely. If the dealer network stays healthy through this soft patch, the thesis only strengthens. If it does not, I will reassess. Not advice. Do your own work on this. Save this. Come back after Q1 FY27 full financials are published.
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Being bearish and negative about everything is the new cool thing in the market. FII buying? Just a trap. GDP numbers? Fake. Corporate earnings? Just inflation-led growth. Credit growth? Means nothing. Crude will eventually shoot back to $120–150. So sell everything and sit on cash because FIIs are supposedly about to start selling again. Apparently, finding reasons to stay bearish is the new investment strategy.
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Funny thing is some retailers sold Indian stocks at bottom to buy US stocks at top.
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Vaibhav Joshi retweeted
💎 P N Gadgil Jewellers – Strategic Move Towards Backward Integration PNG Jewellers is entering Diamond & Gold Jewellery Manufacturing through a new subsidiary — a strategic step to strengthen its supply chain and expand manufacturing capabilities. 𝐃𝐞𝐚𝐥 𝐒𝐧𝐚𝐩𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐭 → Total Investment: Up to ₹10 Cr → Funding: Internal Accruals → PNG Jewellers Stake: 76% → Operational Partners: 24% → Expected Completion: On or before February 28, 2027 → Target PAT Margin: 6–8% after stabilisation 𝐖𝐡𝐲 𝐈𝐬 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐈𝐦𝐩𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭? 1. Backward Integration In-house diamond cutting, polishing and jewellery manufacturing can provide better control over the supply chain. 2. Experienced Partners Operational partners bring 27+ years of manufacturing experience, supporting execution. 3. Studded Jewellery Opportunity Greater focus on studded jewellery could support product mix improvement and profitability. 4. North India Expansion Manufacturing capabilities can complement PNG's expansion plans and strengthen its jewellery business. 𝐑𝐞𝐬𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐜𝐡 𝐕𝐢𝐞𝐰 A relatively small investment of up to ₹10 Cr for a 76% stake could strengthen PNG's manufacturing capabilities and create an opportunity for margin improvement. However, the key monitorables will be execution, capacity utilisation and achievement of the targeted 6–8% PAT margin. Capital investment is the beginning; execution will determine the outcome. #PNGJewellers #JewellerySector #EquityResearch #IndianStocks
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FIIs are the real bulls now 🐂😂
#FundFlow | FIIs Net Buy ₹4,864.68 Cr While DIIs Net Sell ₹3,519.05 Cr In Equities Today (Provisional)
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Well, the valuation gap between P N Gadgil and Kalyan looks quite unreasonable at this point. Kalyan has undoubtedly established itself as a PAN India player, but P N Gadgil's expansion strategy is looking increasingly promising. Having tracked the company over the last 3-4 quarters, I feel management is doing most of the right things. A few things worth highlighting: • Focus is shifting towards core jewellery sales rather than inflating revenue through bullion and coin sales. • North and Central India expansion is progressing well. • Light-weight jewellery and studded jewellery mix are moving in the right direction. • The company is now entering studded jewellery manufacturing, which could further strengthen its capabilities and margins over time. • By next year, the company expects its hedging coverage to reach 100%, bringing it at par with organised leaders like Kalyan and Titan. This is an important risk-management advantage that is still missing among several smaller jewellery players. Valuations remain relatively inexpensive compared to Kalyan. This is where I think the medium-term opportunity lies. The business is gradually building the right capabilities, expanding its footprint and improving its product mix, while the valuation gap remains significant.
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Decent volumes in UGRO capital today. Looks like some one big is bottom fishing here.
UGRO Capital Q2 FY27: Cheap valuations, but I would still prefer to wait. There are positives: • Disbursements up 77% YoY to ₹3,159 Cr. • AUM at ₹15,019 Cr, up 23%. • Operating expenses down from ₹205 Cr in Q4 FY26 to ₹127 Cr. • Emerging Market LAP and GROx now contribute 53% of AUM. But there are concerns too. Credit cost increased to ₹87 Cr from ₹66 Cr QoQ, while GNPA edged up to 2.7%. Finance costs are also growing faster than net total income. Asset quality needs to stabilise. The legacy co-lending model is another important issue. Between FY22 and FY26, UGRO reversed ₹318 Cr of previously recognised income, equivalent to 44% of cumulative PBT. Early loan repayments were resulting in reversals of upfront NPV income. The Profectus merger addresses this accounting issue by shifting spread recognition to expected behavioural loan tenure. For H1 FY27: • PAT increases from ₹118.6 Cr to ₹126.3 Cr on a pro forma basis. • Income reversals reduce from ₹120.5 Cr to approximately ₹58 Cr. • Adjusted net worth falls from ₹3,029 Cr to ₹2,454 Cr, or ₹158/share, after goodwill, acquisition costs and spread remeasurement. • Capital adequacy improves from 18.8% to approximately 22% on a pro forma basis. The merger is still awaiting final NCLT approval. The reported numbers will be restated after approval, so historical comparisons need caution. What is management guiding for? • Emerging Market LAP growth of 25–30%. • GROx growth of 35–40%. • Focus businesses to contribute 85–87% of AUM by FY29. • Annual operating costs of approximately ₹490 Cr in FY27, against ₹205 Cr quarterly in Q4 FY26. • ROA target of 3–3.5% by FY29, against 2.7% H1 pro forma ROA. • No fresh equity raise planned for the next 3 years. Management is also targeting 80–85 lakh monthly disbursements per branch as the existing LAP network matures. However, funding costs deserve monitoring. Around 50% of borrowings are floating-rate, and management expects a potential 15–20 bps impact from rate hikes. Valuations are undoubtedly super cheap after the brutal correction. But I don't see the need to rush. I would prefer either: The stock crosses its 200 DMA and consolidates for a while, indicating some stability. We see another brutal leg of correction, but accompanied by a meaningful improvement in business fundamentals. I want to see AUM growth accelerate, credit costs moderate, asset quality stabilise and the new business model deliver consistent returns. There is a potentially interesting business transition happening here, but execution still needs to be demonstrated. Cheap valuations are attractive. Confirmation in the numbers and price action matters more at this stage.
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