James Rice retweeted
Our European allies are doing more to help Ukraine. Together, we can increase the pressure on Putin and bring a faster, more just end to this war.
The President wants peace. I want peace. And no one wants peace more than the Ukrainian people. Putin, the war criminal, wants territory. He wants conquest. The world will be safer—and Americans will be safer—if we help Ukraine win their victory.
James Rice retweeted
If these are Russia’s hard line demands talks should end apple.news/AJqiDE9TjTImrW2il…
James Rice retweeted
The Baltic States lead the way. They embraced the free market system when they gained their independence from USSR and they’re flourishing. I’ve enjoyed being the Chair of the Baltic Security Caucus for the last 8 years and working with these great people.
🌎 The most competitive tax codes in the OECD:
1. 🇪🇪 Estonia
2. 🇱🇻 Latvia
3. 🇳🇿 New Zealand
4. 🇨🇭 Switzerland
5. 🇱🇹 Lithuania
6. 🇱🇺 Luxembourg
7. 🇨🇿 Czech Republic
8. 🇦🇺 Australia
9. 🇹🇷 Turkey
10. 🇭🇺 Hungary
See full rankings: hubs.ly/Q04F9Wms0
James Rice retweeted
NATO nations withdrawing from *their own* borders is a preposterous demand by Russia. Putin has proved once again that he’s not serious about a negotiated peace. Further talks are a farce at this point. Putin will only agree to stop the war when he knows he can’t win. We need to help Ukraine prove that point. nytimes.com/2026/11/13/us/po…
James Rice retweeted
📝 NEW | @leslieshedd says that the likely chairs of national security committees "will be powerful allies for Ukraine in the new Congress, as Kyiv fights for access to much-needed weapons."
More on how the midterms could impact US policy on Ukraine ⤵️
atlanticcouncil.org/dispatch…
James Rice retweeted
#UkraineAlert | "A clearer understanding of Putin's imperial agenda is particularly important amid US-led efforts to revive stalled peace talks between Russia and Ukraine," writes @Biz_Ukraine_Mag.
Read more ⤵️
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk…
James Rice retweeted
This is not the time to whine, complain, or point fingers. We need to take our medicine, focus on what the American people want, and get back to work.
James Rice retweeted
The Baltic states see things we don’t see, understand things we don’t understand and do things we don’t do.
James Rice retweeted
Estonia’s Internal Security Service (KaPo) deported Russian national Leonid Karabeshkin and imposed a Schengen entry ban on him. KaPo said he maintains extensive links to Russian intelligence and is “linked to influence networks such as CIRP, RuBaltic and Regnum,” plus sanctioned individuals. More here: news.err.ee/1610183218/russi…
It is cheaper to keep US troops in Europe than to bring them back to the US - some useful data from @BreakingDefense. Pentagon’s 1,5 trillion dollar military budget looks unlikely to materialize, this is another good reason among many to keep US troops in Europe.
The fiscal risks of bringing US troops out of Europe breakingdefense.com/2026/11/…
James Rice retweeted
I am raising funds for a truck for Ukrainian defenders. Please help if you can-help99.co/patches/corn-batta…
I am raising funds for a truck for Ukrainian defenders. Please help if you can-help99.co/patches/corn-batta…
James Rice retweeted
📺 WATCH | Speaking from Lviv, @JohnEdHerbst tells @NewsNation that "Putin is trying to conquer Ukraine."
"He's unable to do it just using his military to attack Ukrainian forces and as a consequence he's resorted to terrorizing the population of Ukraine."
More 👇
James Rice retweeted
As discussions about a possible Trump–Putin–Xi summit resurface, it is worth revisiting a memorandum prepared by Professor Richard Pipes for President Ronald Reagan in May 1982.
Pipes explained what Soviet leaders sought to achieve through summits with American presidents - and under what conditions Washington should agree to such meetings.
A remarkably relevant and timeless lesson in how to deal with Putin's Russia. Diplomacy requires more than a willingness to talk. It requires a clear understanding of what the other side hopes to gain.
👇
"Washington, May 14, 1982
Summits with Soviet Leaders
Soviet leaders are keen on summits with U.S. Presidents and for good reason. They feel confident they will come out ahead in such encounters because:
- their government has greater continuity than ours and therefore greater store of expertise in international affairs;
- well-publicized summits arouse expectations in free societies which enable Moscow, by manipulating Western opinion, to exert pressure on their opposite numbers for unreciprocated concessions.
They further favor summits because they afford them the opportunity to size up the President as a person and as a statesman.
Experience indicates that U.S.-Soviet summits, from Roosevelt’s Yalta to Nixon’s Moscow, have generally turned out to the disadvantage of the United States. Still, inasmuch as every U.S. President since 1933 has personally met with his Soviet counterpart, it will be difficult for you to reject a summit altogether. A full-fledged summit, however, should take place only if the following conditions are met:
- Moscow demonstrates by deeds rather than words that it is prepared to negotiate seriously.
- The groundwork is well prepared beforehand so that you discuss concrete agenda items and do not become embroiled in longwinded ideological disputes of the kind that Khruschev lured Kennedy into in Vienna in 1961 and which invariably end in the hardening of respective positions.
A good model to follow in this matter is President Eisenhower who had given it much thought. In 1953, after Stalin’s death President Eisenhower came under great pressure from our Allies (especially Britain) and the State Department to hold a summit with G. Malenkov, Stalin’s immediate successor.
In his memoirs, Eisenhower tells why he resisted these pressures. He reviews the disappointing experiences of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt with summit meetings and says: “I was . . . not willing to meet with Communist leaders unless there was some likelihood that the confrontation would produce results acceptable to the peoples of the West”. I developed a stock answer to any question about a possible Summit. I would not go to a Summit merely because of friendly words and plausible promises by the men in the Kremlin; actual deeds giving some indication of a Communist readiness to negotiate constructively will have to be produced before I would agree to such a meeting.”
He was rewarded for his firm stand with a Soviet troop withdrawal from Austria. This is a good principle to keep in mind as the Russians increase their pressure for a summit. It would be best to have no summit this year: but if one is to be held the Russians should be required to demonstrate their good will by such actions as acceptance of our “zero option”, withdrawal from Afghanistan or lifting of the martial law in Poland."
FRUS, 1981–1988, t. III, dok. 170, „Summits with Soviet Leaders".

























