Highlander (@KeepKeyDevs) header
Highlander (@KeepKeyDevs) profile picture

Lead at https://xitter.gq/t.co/dBJA7vtlao

Joined January 2022
Photo by Highlander (@KeepKeyDevs)Photo by Highlander (@KeepKeyDevs)Photo by Highlander (@KeepKeyDevs)Photo by Highlander (@KeepKeyDevs)Photo by Highlander (@KeepKeyDevs)Photo by Highlander (@KeepKeyDevs)Photo by Highlander (@KeepKeyDevs)Photo by Highlander (@KeepKeyDevs)Photo by Highlander (@KeepKeyDevs)Photo by Highlander (@KeepKeyDevs)
⚠️ If you have WhatsApp on the same computer you use for crypto, read this. A trader just lost nearly everything to a WhatsApp attack. The hackers got into his PC, watched his Hyperliquid short positions for 5 days, then closed them and moved the funds out through Tornado Cash. The way in? WhatsApp Desktop's auto-download setting. It's on by default, so the malicious payload landed on his PC by itself. He never clicked a thing. This is why your crypto should live on a dedicated device with nothing else installed. If that's not an option, turn on Strict Account: Settings > Privacy > Advanced > Strict account settings > ON It locks your account down so: - Only contacts can add you to groups - Calls from unknown numbers are silenced - Link previews are off, so your IP stays hidden - Attachments and media from unknown senders get blocked And if you don't trade often, keep your keys on an air-gapped signing device like Keystone 3 Pro. They never touch the internet, so malware has nothing to grab. Stay safe out there.
Last night I was hacked. The hack was delivered via WhatsApp payload. Downloaded automatically and gave access and or computer use to the attacker. They waited 5 days, following my tweets on X of short positions and closed everything and withdrew directly in one transaction from Hyperliquid > Metamask > Tornado Cash. The attacker waited patiently and closed shorts as the market got to 68k and withdrew everything. Clearly a crypto native attacker. They also gained access to my metamask, email, websites, and all of my passwords including X. It’s the most brutal thing as I kept everything over the past few days in crypto and on-chain off Coinbase/Kraken. I was planning to move funds back to my Revolut before Christmas time. Every single penny in dollars was taken, apart from $800. It’s gone, and in the process of being washed. Truly the most devastating day I’ve had in my life. Completely shocked by it all to be honest. I will recover, but this was very sophisticated tech, it caught me completely off guard. The timing was impeccable and it’s obviously been planned for a while. Stay safe everyone, will keep you updated. I fear the worst is to come and this incident has set me back many years of savings, time and hard work. Brutal.
36
120
33
546
104,353
Highlander retweeted
Your computer screen can lie. Malware swaps the address you copied, and the screen shows it with full confidence. A KeepKey's own screen shows the address it's actually signing for. Check every character there. Keep your keys on a KeepKey. #StopUsingSoftwareWallets
1
1
7
312
Highlander retweeted
🚨Over $5.6B stolen from Binance, biggest hack in crypto history Seems ~2B of USDC/USDT were frozen by Tether & Circle, it's highly likely the other Binance listed tokens will be dumped
28
39
20
386
30,512
Highlander retweeted
Only hold bitcoin? Run firmware that only knows bitcoin. KeepKey's Bitcoin-only build leaves the code for every other chain off the device entirely. Less code on the device means less to attack. Get it in KeepKey Desktop.
1
2
101
676
Highlander retweeted
What KeepKey Desktop does, in two minutes: one portfolio across your chains, Receive with Verify on Device, send, swap across six routes, an address book that labels who you pay, and firmware updates. Every send and swap is confirmed on the device.
1
2
5
251
Highlander retweeted
A passphrase is never stored on your KeepKey. That's the point: someone holding the device still can't open the hidden wallet. It's also the cost. Lose the exact passphrase and your recovery words alone won't bring those funds back. Who needs one, and how to test it first.
1
2
1
4
458
Highlander retweeted
Swap without opening an exchange account. KeepKey Desktop asks six providers for quotes (THORChain, Mayachain, Relay, 0x, ChainFlip, ShapeShift) and you sign from your own wallet. The quote shows the rate, fees, route and time. Read it, then confirm the amount on your KeepKey.
2
2
5
453
Highlander retweeted
A hardware wallet does one job well: your keys stay on the device, and nothing is signed until you press its button. It can't read a request for you. And it can't protect a recovery phrase once it leaves the paper. Start here: the habits that matter, in 2 minutes.
3
1
12
964
The amount of funds lost to software wallets is starting to go exponential. The diligence needed to maintain crypto in the space is accelerating faster then I fear we are ready for. People need to realize, its not only your funds that are lost, your funds are being used to attack others.
3
132
Impressive find. 👀 the diligence needed to keep up in this space is seriously increasing fast. Will be releasing a hardened BEX update for KeepKey soon.
Stick around on our web page for 10 minutes and all your funds are gone. Just connect your wallet to the dApp and enjoy some Temple Run. Unlock your wallet again and it’s empty 😇. A silent signature extraction in @Rabby_io, leading to a full wallet drain. 🧵
4
380
No—nothing in the Coldcard issue indicates OG KeepKeys are at risk. But the answer shouldn’t be “trust us.” We’re staying diligent and bringing more validation to users. We believe simple, well-understood systems—not more complicated hardware—are the solution. More soon.
1
2
2
54
Replying to @_I_D_W__ @TVJHTV
Yes if you actually read the article I detailed the exact code that broke in coldcard, And how KeepKey differs and exactly and how you the end user can validate.
45
Replying to @TVJHTV
Yes the article talks about keepkeys hardware entropy generation and how its differnt. We internally audit this. and will be releasing tools to let users perform these entropy/birthday/collision tests as a end users.
2
59
Yes @SparrowWallet is high quality and the best when it comes to multi vendor bitcoin only multisig.
134
Replying to @w_s_bitcoin
Entropy isn’t blind trust. Anyone can generate large seed sets and audit an RNG with NIST SP 800-90B entropy tests (including collision analysis). Dice still rely on hardware for BIP39’s SHA-256 checksum anyway. I’d rather build hardware people can understand and verify than regress to Stone Age workflows.
1
102
Been getting a lot of questions about the coldcard seed bug, so — short version. It wasn't a hack. Nobody broke a PIN, opened a device, or installed malicious firmware. A build flag meant affected devices picked their secret from a far smaller set than they should have. Those coins were guessable from the day the wallet was made. Some of them, five years ago. Here's my breakdown of what to know.
1
2
2
14
1,886
JUST IN: A second Coldcard hack has been reported. A total of 1,158.81 BTC has been stolen from 2,673 addresses so far, according to Galaxy Research. Users are urged to review the company's official security guidance as soon as possible‼
229
461
136
2,190
351,579
Highlander retweeted
If you have a Bitcoin multisig that can be fully spent using compromised seeds (for example, a 2-of-3 multisig where two Coldcard seeds are vulnerable), you are in a critical situation. The good news is that if the multisig uses P2WSH or P2SH-P2WSH, the spending script is not revealed on-chain until the first spend. This provides some protection because an attacker with only the compromised keys may still not have the script required to construct a valid transaction. However, the script was never designed to be secret. From a cryptographic perspective, it is public information. In practice, copies may already exist in your wallet provider's database, backups, logs, or other systems. You should therefore migrate these funds to a new and secure setup as soon as possible. The catch is that your migration transaction will reveal the spending script in the mempool. If an attacker already has enough compromised keys and the script, they can create a conflicting transaction spending the same UTXO to themselves and try to get it confirmed instead. To reduce this risk, avoid broadcasting the migration transaction through the public mempool. Use a trusted private transaction relay that can submit the transaction directly to miners. MARA's Slipstream is one example.
6
15
3
107
14,018
1
5
260