Mimi

ለማንኛው የአሜሪካ ምርጫ ለኢትዮጵያ መልካም ነገር ይዞ አይመጣም:: የኢልሃን እና አብዱል መመረጥ ችግሩን ያብሰዋል:: ኢልሃን በኢትዮጵያ ላይ ያላትን አቋም እናውቃለን:: አብዱል ዘር ግንዱ ከወደ ግብፅ ይመዘዛል:: የአባይ ጉዳይ ላይ በሙሉ አቅሙ ሊሰራ ይችላል🤭 እህታችን ሜላት ኪሮስ ግን እንኳን ደስ አለሽ ለማለት ያስፈልጋል🥳

We speak to Congressmember-elect Melat Kiros, who's just won her election to represent Denver, Colorado, as a member of the Democratic Socialists of America.

It made sense👉🏿"Apparently, tribalism comes in every color, shape, and personality. Perhaps it needs its own grand theory, like Marxism. Our tribalist elites have turned ethnic grievance into ideology, victimhood into a profession, and hypocrisy into an intellectual discipline.”

Just read a quote on the back of a taxi "ሞትህን ሞተህ አትጠብቀው" Dang

Missing the elephant in the room, is that an attempt to conceal who the perpetrators are? I listened the full interview; an attempt to paint this as a conflict is disingenuous. This is neither a conflict nor an event happened after locals trying to defend themselves. It has been going for long and unabated! The pattern of these heinous attacks were mostly targeted on the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Christians, their homes and their churches! The reports from the victims and the survivors of these attacks indicate it’s a coordinated attack to cleanse and terrorize Christians from that area! This is dangerous and it’s better to name the real perpetrators and seek justice. ይህ የህዝብን አብሮ የመኖር እሴት የሚድን እና የከፋ ውጤት ይዞ የሚመጣ ነገር ነው። እንደመፍትሄ የሰጠኸው የፌዴራል የጥበቃ ኃይሎችን የማሰማራት ነገር ጊዜያዊ መፍትሄ ሊሆን ይችላል። በዋነኝነት ግን በብሄርተኝነት ስም የነዛችሁት የጥላቻ ትርክት ህዝባችንን ዋጋ እያስከፈለ ነውና ትርክታችሁን አክሙ። ፖለቲካችሁን ማንነት ላይ ካተኮረ አውሬአዊ እሣቤ ፈውሱ። ስለ ጅምላ ገዳዮችም ከመሸፋፈን እውነቱን አፍረጥርጦ ተናግሮ ማጋለጥ እና ፍርድ እንዲቀርቡ ተገቢውን ቅጣት እንዲያገኙ ማድረግ ያስፈልጋል። #OrthodoxUnderAttack

#Ethiopia was made landlocked, stripped of it's coastline, port infrastructure, Navy, Ships and it's oil refinery by an illegitimate transitional government formed by separatist rebel group that had no mandate from the people of #Ethiopia. @DropSiteNews

Ethiopia’s capital market regulator has restricted participation in Dangote Petroleum and Petrochemicals’ proposed securities offering to qualified investors, effectively excluding the general public from the investment opportunity. Full story: birrmetrics.com/ethiopia-bar…

Shabiya, TPLF and OLF did this on Ethiopians. We are living the aftermath. History is not perfect but belittling, judging out of context, outright fabrication of stories & hating our forefathers instead of forging a better future on their accomplishments is futile. #Ethiopia

The Federal Government Cannot Repeat Its Political Failures in Tigray In my recent analyses of the renewed war, I have examined the changing military balance, what lies behind the territorial losses in Tigray, and whether the TPLF could sustain another insurgency after a conventional military setback. But battlefield developments also create political choices, and if the federal government again emerges with decisive influence over what happens in Tigray, an equally important question is what it should do differently this time. My position on this question has been consistent across different stages of the crisis. Before the 2020 war, I warned about the deteriorating relationship between the federal government and Tigray and the danger of allowing political confrontation to move toward war. After the Pretoria Agreement, I continued to argue for the genuine reintegration of Tigray into the Ethiopian federation, a functional relationship between the regional and federal governments, and meaningful regional self-government rather than political subordination. The experience since 2020 makes those concerns difficult to ignore. After federal forces took Mekelle, the federal government attempted to translate military victory into a new political order through an interim administration established under its authority. It failed to build sufficient legitimacy while the war continued, civilians suffered, displacement expanded, and the conduct of forces fighting alongside the federal government deepened grievances. The problem went beyond the performance of the interim administration itself because the conditions surrounding the war were undermining acceptance of the political authority the federal government was trying to establish. Pretoria gave the federal government another opportunity to rebuild that relationship through negotiation. The agreement ended large-scale hostilities, restored essential services and established a framework for political normalisation, but the federal government also bears responsibility for important parts of the transition remaining unfinished. DDR moved slowly, displacement and territorial disputes persisted, and the wider political and constitutional relationship was not fully normalised. Pretoria achieved something enormously important by stopping large-scale war, but the opportunity it created for a deeper political settlement was not carried far enough. Drawing on these two experiences, I would suggest six priorities for the federal government: 1. Do not confuse military control with political legitimacy. Taking territory may give the federal government authority and leverage, but it does not provide a mandate to choose Tigray’s political leadership. Another administration constructed primarily around actors acceptable to the federal government could reproduce one of the central problems of 2020. 2. Make civilian protection part of the political transition. How federal forces and forces operating alongside them treat civilians will shape the political environment that follows. Protecting people and property, preventing revenge, looting, and collective punishment, and rapidly restoring essential services must therefore be integral to the transition. 3. Allow Tigrayans to build a genuinely inclusive interim arrangement. Avoiding federal selection should not mean replacing it with another political monopoly inside Tigray. Political parties, civil society, professionals, women, youth, displaced communities and other constituencies need meaningful space in determining the region’s political future. 4. Reintegrate Tigray without politically subordinating it. Federal institutions and constitutional authority must function, but normalisation should also restore Tigray’s representation in national institutions, participation in federal decision-making and meaningful regional self-government. The objective should not simply be to restore federal authority in Tigray, but to restore Tigray to federal political life. 5. Treat reconstruction as part of the transition. Restoring hospitals, universities, schools, banks, communications, businesses and livelihoods should proceed alongside political negotiations. For communities emerging from repeated war, functioning civilian institutions are among the clearest signs that ordinary life is returning. 6. Keep the interim administration genuinely interim. Its mandate should focus on stabilisation, reconstruction, return and political opening while preparing a credible path toward representative institutions, political competition and elections rather than becoming another indefinite political arrangement. If the federal government gets this transition wrong again, the consequences could go far beyond another failed interim administration. Political exclusion, civilian abuses or an arrangement perceived as imposed by the federal government could deepen alienation, weaken the new political order and preserve incentives for armed mobilisation. Instead of closing the cycle of conflict, another failed transition could help reproduce the conditions for the next one. The real test for the federal government is therefore not simply whether federal authority is restored or whether a cooperative administration emerges in Mekelle. It is whether this moment creates the conditions in which Tigrayans can eventually decide who governs them through civilian political competition rather than through war, federal appointment, or another political monopoly.