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Joined April 2024
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NDA0E retweeted
In an international law enforcement operation 👮, the US Department of Justice 🇺🇸, in cooperation with private sector partners, have taken down notorious bulletproof hosting provider Virtualine 💥 ➡️ justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/bul… Operating as AS202412 (Omegatech LTD), Virtualine received upstream connectivity from German 🇩🇪 providers aurologic GmbH (AS30823) and Pfcloud UG (AS51396), as well as French 🇫🇷 PEERXY NETWORKS SAS (AS213382), as bgp .tools shows. This network connectivity is now gone, currently making it impossible for Omegatech to operate 🛑 Omegatech announced 24x /24 IPv4 CIDRs, totaling 6,144 IPs. Out of these, hundreds were seen daily participating in spamming, internet-wide scanning, and botnet C2 hosting ⤵️ 🌐 URLhaus tracked over 10,000 malware distribution sites at Omegatech: urlhaus.abuse.ch/asn/202412 📡 ThreatFox logged 2,000+ community-shared IOCs tied directly to Omegatech: threatfox.abuse.ch/asn/20241… The hoster primarily served malicious infrastructure associated with RATs 🖥️ (e.g., PureRAT and OverlordRAT), rogue ScreenConnect servers 🔌, and social engineering malware campaigns like ClickFix and ErrTraffic 🖱️. While internet abuse for sure can happen, Virtualine was not reacting on abuse reports at all and advertised their "bulletproof hosting services" on the darkweb, as investigation shows 🕵️‍♀️ The takedown of Omegatech is welcome news. However, its long-term impact remains uncertain. Bulletproof hosters commonly re-brand and resume operations under new ASNs quickly 🔃 Furthermore, Omegatech is just the tip of the iceberg. Other active bulletproof hosters include: ➡️ AS219502 (STORMCLOUD) ➡️ AS207043 (DEDIK-IO) ➡️ AS214351 (FEMOIT) What do they all have in common? According to bgp .tools, they all receive upstream connectivity from German provider aurologic GmbH (AS30823) as well 🔍👀 If you don't want to worry about the threats posed by bulletproof hosters, just block any CIDRs and ASNs listed on @spamhaus 's Don't Router Or Peer List (DROP): 🛑 spamhaus.org/blocklists/do-n…
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NDA0E retweeted
It's here!! The @abuse_ch #CommunityHub is LIVE 🔥🔥🔥 Every day, this community shares data that helps take down malicious infrastructure and now you can see the scale of it, all in one place. The Hub gives you a live view of: ➡️ Total community contributions ➡️ Top 10 Leaderboards ➡️ Monthly contribution trends across the community ....and a place to track your own impact! Our community is bigger than any one platform. It's a global network of researchers working together to disrupt malware, botnets, and cybercrime. And every contributor deserves recognition 💛 Head to the Community and claim your profile 👉 abuse.ch/community #LaunchDay #Leaderboards #SharingIsCaring #CommunityHub #ThreatIntel
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On the 1st of December, the notorious Socks5Systemz payload server hosted at AS57678 (Cat Technologies 🇭🇰) that is already active for several months started to serve a new version of Socks5Systemz ⤵️ 🌐 urlhaus.abuse.ch/url/3189430… This is the first major change since 2023 in Socks5Systemz and includes: 🔑 New RC4 key used during C2 communication: hi_few5i6ab&7#d3 👋 Direct IP communication through HTTP(s) for botnet command and control instead of the usage of a DGA and a custom DNS server 🔙 Backconnect TCP port changed from 2023 to 2024 Current botnet C2 servers: 188.119.66.185:443 CHANGWAY 🇭🇰 45.155.249.212:443 RACKPLACE 🇩🇪 91.211.249.30:443 PODAON 🇱🇻 Malware sample:📄 bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/52833… Socks5Systemz IOCs: 🦊 threatfox.abuse.ch/browse/ma…
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#AsyncRat #Malware 💣holder-apartments-face-matthew[.]trycloudflare[.]com/uline/Nr-2005-028763-2024-PDF[.]lnk💣 lnk->vbs->bat (checks if Avast exists) -> zip -> python scripts (injects shellcode) -> AsyncRat app.any.run/tasks/0a336523-d… app.any.run/tasks/13911dd7-e…
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🚨 Attackers use public open directories for hosting #malicious scripts disguised as .txt and .jpg files These are utilized in multi-stage #AsyncRAT #infections See technical breakdown of the tactics from @RacWatchin8872 👇 any.run/cybersecurity-blog/a…
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NDA0E retweeted
Big news! ICANN issued a Notice of Breach against @DNSPod in response to my complaint. PDF: icann.org/uploads/compliance… CC: @banthisguy9349
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Its been a while for me to check up on this issue! 96 ips are currently found to be uses for controlling botnets to perform attacks through API. Is it not funny that the Usual ASN's are on the top? @OVHcloud_US @AezaGroup @ ponynet @ limenet
We have discovered that botnets are controlled through SSH. we have written a query that detects the ips that basically control the botnets. The asn's come up are the typical ASN's that hosting botnet infrastructure. cc: @500mk500 @abuse_ch @tolisec
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One more sample of #spearphishing gz attachment reaching #Lokibot C2 104.248.205.66:80 DHL Shipment DOC_643040277.gz >DHL Shipment DOC_643040277.exe > PowerShell > schtasks.exe > yPSkSzOrArThBa.exe The new #IOCs below. Ref: threatfox-api.abuse.ch/ioc/1… @NDA0E
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#Mirai #C2 domains are using Round-Robin DNS to resolve to multiple hosts Using "Resolve-DnsName" in PowerShell we can resolve the domains to their corresponding IPs. Ports used for Mirai connection: 1337, 2222, 2474, 5555, 6969, 8745, 8932, 12381 IOCs: threatfox.abuse.ch/browse/ta…
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Distribution domain queries for #RobotDropper on @ValidinLLC and @censysio Validin: RapidShare - Fast & Secure File Transfer for Free Censys: services.http.response.html_title="RapidShare - Fast & Secure File Transfer for Free" IOCs shared on ThreatFox: threatfox.abuse.ch/browse/ta…
💢 Low-Detection MSI Dropper Delivers #Malware – #ExploreWithANYRUN ⚠️ A recently developed #dropper is an #MSI file containing a #password-protected RAR archive 📌 Both the sample and #C2 domains have a very low detection rate on #VirusTotal 🔗 virustotal.com/gui/domain/ge… 📤 The dropper sends requests to the get-license4[.]com and get-license2[.]com resources, with the example of the following content: IsICS=0&LangCode=5875&AwaitTmp=17&Kiid=81257 ⚙️ After execution, it asks the user to confirm that they are not a robot by clicking the "OK" button. It then displays the 'Sending collected data' message 📝 Now the server’s returning only the '0a' string. It may be intended to return the password for its content 🤖 We named it #RobotDropper because it requires the user to confirm that they are human 👉 app.any.run/tasks/9e428266-9… We've observed it dropping #Lumma and #Stealc: 👉 app.any.run/tasks/185bc3b0-1… Find more samples by these #TILookup requests: 👉 intelligence.any.run/analysi… 👉 intelligence.any.run/analysi… 🐼 Special thanks to @RussianPanda9xx for providing the initial sample in her tweet! Analyze and investigate the latest #malware and #phishing threats with #ANYRUN 🛡️
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are they even trying to hide it @NDA0E ? 😆 http://154.216.18.175/ #opendir Bulletproof ASN: AS215240 NETRESEARCH
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#Censys query to find #GossRAT #C2 servers: services.http.response.body_hash="sha1:b7c4a3bf814a5aaf96e208f47a17066c32ac0ad0" The URL path used for C2 communication is the same across all domains > /rat/apps/mellat/notify.php IOCs: threatfox.abuse.ch/browse/ta… #IOC #IRATA #GossRAT
Iranian threat actors are using phishing sites that impersonate @mellatbankiran to distribute #GossRAT through a download page claiming to be the bank's mobile app. Using @censysio DNS records i found over 100 domains to have been involved, most of them using .buzz as their TLD.
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Welcome to EVILEMPIRE v2 Previous threat actors using #Amadey have already moved their infrastructure to #AS51381 ELITETEAM-PEERING-AZ1 urlhaus.abuse.ch/asn/51381/
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As for now, the 10 active domains are delivering the same #GossRAT payload. URLhaus: urlhaus.abuse.ch/browse/tag/… Mellat.apk: bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/b97df…
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Iranian threat actors are using phishing sites that impersonate @mellatbankiran to distribute #GossRAT through a download page claiming to be the bank's mobile app. Using @censysio DNS records i found over 100 domains to have been involved, most of them using .buzz as their TLD.
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#Rhadamanthys #C2 at 91.92.242.245:443
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