Its Not Serious

U.S. is nearing a go/no-go decision on returning to war with Iran: 1. The military buildup is large. Two carrier strike groups in the Arabian Sea, with a third reportedly en route. Dozens of aerial refueling tankers. Missile defenses. In other words, the U.S. is assembling the force necessary for a major strike. 2. POTUS today said an attack is “highly unlikely” after saying for weeks that he’d strike Iran after the midterms. As with the war’s objectives and status, it’s public cacophony from the administration.  3. The region is on edge. I was in the Gulf last week and officials worry about a disproportionate Iranian response - on them - to a U.S. strike. They fear attacks on energy infrastructure, desalinization plants, subsea cables, and civilian sites. 4. No one there thinks that more strikes will topple the regime, as Netanyahu suggests, and most doubt that Iran will be quickly bombed back to the negotiating table. “Finishing the job” is easier said than done. 5. Some newly elected members of Congress want to defund the war and end it immediately. That, however, would leave Iran emboldened, in control of the Strait, and threatening the region. 6. In the meantime, with Iran shooting at ships and the Houthis attacking Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. unable or unwilling to completely stop either, the incentive for countries to cut deals with Iran is growing. 7. The chances are that another round of sustained strikes will be regionally ruinous rather than the path toward enduring peace, especially if Tehran survives them defiantly. 8. Perhaps the best case at this point is to sustain the embargo, which is creating real and significant economic pressure on Tehran. If, in a few months, the government can’t pay the Basij or, eventually, other IRGC elements, it may be more willing to deal. 9. That’s a suboptimal approach, to be sure, but the options - attack, sustain, or walk away - are all bad. It’s a question of the least disadvantageous choice.  10. The U.S. at this point can’t “win” the war, at least by its original terms. But unless it emerges with an agreement to reopen the Strait and secures guarantees on Iran’s nuclear program, this will be an unambiguous defeat. Hopefully there is still time to avoid that outcome.