It’s happening, JEFF MODE: “The Hyper Foundation is proposing a validator vote to formally recognize the Assistance Fund HYPE as burned, removing the tokens permanently from the circulating and total supply. For context, the Assistance Fund converts trading fees to HYPE in a fully automated manner as part of the L1 execution. The Assistance Fund uses the system address 0xfefefefefefefefefefefefefefefefefefefefe. Similar to the zero address, the Assistance Fund system address has never had a private key with control over its funds. Funds are mathematically irretrievable without a hard fork. By voting “Yes,” validators agree to treat the Assistance Fund HYPE as burned. No onchain action is required, as the tokens are already in a system address with no private key. This vote is binding social consensus to never authorize a protocol upgrade to access this address. Voting process: Validators should signal their intent in the governance forum by December 21 at 04:00 UTC (i.e., reply with Yes or No) Users can stake to a validator who matches their view by December 24 at 04:00 UTC The result will be based on stake-weighted consensus as of December 24 at 04:00 UTC”

Few comments about the HIP-5 proposal and the feedback we received 1/ This proposal is simply a continuation of Points Season 2. I’ve seen many people strongly disagree with HIP-5 even though they agreed with or had no objections to Season 2. If you weren’t around then, Season 2 was mainly launched to help bootstrap HIP-2, as it incentivized spot volume with points much more than perps. That brought a lot of USDC and volume to the spot order books (but also many pumps, dumps and grifters) ultimately drying up the market once the season ended. Can a continuous approach like the one we’re suggesting, based on transparent voting by HYPE stakers, be better than Season 2 in achieving this goal? Our thesis is that yes, it can, but of course, we might be wrong. That’s why our approach allows users to still vote for HYPE if they think the revenue isn’t being spent efficiently. 2/ Buybacks should be executed with setting bids instead of TWAPs 100% agree, bad wording on our side, that’s how we wanted to propose the buybacks. 3/ DAO Governance sucks I agree that, historically, DAO governance has been a clown show with zero real user impact. There are several reasons for this: VCs owning most of the votes, foundations voting however they please to cash out, inefficient use of funds, proposals written in overly complex language that no one understands, etc. So yeah, I can’t blame you for thinking the same would happen in Hyperliquid. But I see it differently: Hyperliquid didn’t raise private rounds (so no private investors with 20% voting power) and the foundation actually has a strong ethos. This could get people more involved since they’ll genuinely have a say here unlike in most governance disasters. Also, what we’re proposing isn’t a full governance framework where people must vote on everything or spend hours reading endless proposals. It would only take a few minutes to understand how it works and click a few buttons. 4/ USDH vote Some people claim that since the USDH vote was terrible (?), corrupt (??) and led by the NM cabal (???), something similar would happen again with this approach. I’m not going to dive into why I think it actually went well and achieved its goal (which was reaffirmed when the HL Foundation later proposed benefits for aligned and native stablecoins). I’ll just point out one major difference: in our approach, HYPE stakers vote, not validators. The main issue with USDH was that validators might vote for proposals aligned with their own interests or backroom deals, instead of what’s best for Hyperliquid. In our model, your voting power = your HYPE holdings, meaning you’re incentivized to vote in the way you believe benefits Hyperliquid long-term. 5/ “You’re just using this proposal to find exit liquidity for your bags” First of all, it’s true that I (we) have direct (tokens/seeds) or indirect (points) exposure to almost every project in the ecosystem (that’s what it means to actually be active here). If you’ve been around for a while, I’m sure you do too (especially through points). If you want to believe this is just us looking for exit liquidity, fine, but the same logic applies to every HYPE holder who supports AF1 buying HYPE with 99% of the revenue instead of spending that revenue to grow Hyperliquid. What’s the goal here? To have a higher HYPE price or to maximize volumes and revenue? If it’s the former and you sold HYPE, then yeah, you used AF1 as exit liquidity you damn sinner; if it’s the latter, then why not spend more of the revenue on rebates and growth to bring in more volume? Pumpamentals matter and having “up-only” charts is good marketing (even if we hate to admit it). It brings more users, more volume and more revenue. Ultimately, even if people might use AF2 as exit liquidity, we think it’s still more EV+ for Hyperliquid to redirect 0–5% to AF2 rather than AF1. 5% of Spot Native Token Buybacks >>> 5% of HYPE Buybacks 6/ “Hyperliquid isn’t mature enough” I kinda agree with this one. It’s true that, right now, redirecting revenue to spot native tokens would mostly go toward memes and projects without clear PMF; that’s inefficient. But that’s exactly why we’re proposing this now: because it takes time to discuss and implement. In the coming months, most tier-1 ecosystem projects will launch their tokens. That would be a great time to deploy our mechanism or another that allows EVM projects to capture part of protocol revenue. 7/ “Only projects with PMF and revenue should launch a token” I completely agree, but the harsh truth is that very few projects (fewer than 10?) currently fit that category. HyperCore offers plenty of opportunities to generate revenue (see Hyperunit), but HyperEVM doesn’t. Another harsh truth: to launch a successful project, you either need VC funding, personal wealth to bootstrap or just plain luck. If we don’t want VCs and we don’t want ecosystem tokens to capture protocol revenue, then how do we attract more builders? By only allowing already-rich founders to participate? 8/ “Grants suck” Totally agree. Most grants are one-time payouts with no accountability, or milestone-based programs that rarely align with the protocol’s success (like paying influencers thousands just for hitting X views). And those grants usually end up being dumped on the market, creating negative feedback loops. While our approach could be seen in a similar light (money leaving the native token), we think a continuous, vote-based fee redirection could mitigate those issues. Even with its flaws, we think it’s still EV+ for Hyperliquid. 9/“HIP-5 could drain HYPE from HyperEVM” Totally agree, similar to how BNB flows to Binance Launchpads and Launchpools. But is that really a problem? Our goal should be to fill HyperEVM with diverse tier-1 assets (BTC, ETH, SOL, stablecoins, etc.), not just HYPE. While it might seem like an issue now, it shouldn’t be one in the long run. Final words I want to thank everyone who gave honest and respectful feedback. To those who just insulted or were just disrespectful, I know most of you are bots or people who enjoy creating bad vibes in the HL community probably to pump competitors bags. But for the real HL ecosystem members who acted like that, let me say this: people like you are one of the main reasons others stop building and proposing new ideas. Albert Is Great Hyperliquid