Fedaykin Cmdr

I fear that Ukraine doesn't have the organic capacity to achieve military victory against an adapting Russia, a Russia that is willing to engage in an indefinite war of attrition. I fear that providing Ukraine with the materiel and force generation capacity required to win military victory over Russia at best poses extreme risk to NATO strategic reserves, US war stocks, and the global economy, and at worst poses moderate to high risk of unprecedented escalation, mission creep, and weakened national security posture towards other adversaries (DPRK, Iran, China). This is not to say the US and NATO should or shouldn't train and arm Ukraine. It means the west should be wary of committing the same mistakes in Ukraine as it did during the GWOT. Mission creep, undefined end-state, and unconditional commitment to a conflict without end are not ingredients for victory. At this juncture, the best achievable* outcome I can see is a negotiated peace. Support for a war without end cannot be unconditional, as admirable as it may seem. Future aid packages should be measured against Ukraine's ability to account for the aid that is received, protect it from corruption, and provided on the (public or privately communicated) condition that Kyiv is prepared to sue for peace. Military aid should be used to apply pressure that makes peace the best alternative to conflict.