Oregon’s internal election-testing website showed up on Google. The state shut down public access and said the numbers were test data. That explains the numbers—not the exposure. Here’s my full eight-minute report: the backstory, the assurances, and the questions @ORSecretaryRead still needs to answer. We’ve heard “safe and secure.” Now show us the findings.

Oregon’s former Elections Director, Steve Trout, warned officials about serious election technology vulnerabilities SIX YEARS AGO. Days later, he was out of a job. Now, just days before the November 3 election, those warnings deserve renewed attention. In November 2020, Oregon Elections Director Steve Trout issued a blistering memorandum identifying serious problems within the Secretary of State’s office. Among his findings: • 12 requested technology improvements had gone unfunded. • Some election systems were running on Windows Server 2008, which Microsoft no longer supported. • Public-facing election websites depended on a single power supply and internet connection, without adequate redundancy. • Security upgrades and repairs to dozens of software bugs remained unfunded. Trout warned that the agency’s aging technology and lack of support made it nearly impossible to succeed. Days later, he was gone. Trout said then-Secretary of State Bev Clarno fired him by TEXT MESSAGE. Fast-forward six years. On October 23, 2026, an internal Oregon Secretary of State election-testing website was discovered accessible to the public internet, displaying simulated election results. According to the @Oregonian a system update allowed the staging website to become accessible outside its protective firewall. Of course, Oregon’s largest newspaper reported the breach as an innocent opsie. Here’s the question: Did Oregon ever fix the election technology problems Steve Trout warned them about in 2020? We don’t yet know whether Trout’s warnings have any direct connection to this latest security incident. But Secretary of State Tobias Read should be able to tell Oregonians exactly which of Trout’s 12 requested improvements were completed, which remain outstanding, and whether any unresolved vulnerabilities contributed to this exposure. Hey, @ORSecretaryRead, can you provide Oregonians this information, or not? Six years. Multiple secretaries of state. One whom probably should be in jail. And now, yet another reason to examine Oregon’s election infrastructure. Oregonians deserve documented answers, not simply assurances that their elections are secure.

BREAKING NEWS: In a potentially serious security breach, Oregon's Secretary of State's office reportedly exposed an internal election-testing website to the public internet just days before the November 3rd election. According to reporting by YamCo News and @Oregonian, the website displayed simulated election results, including 59,331 ballots counted and 2.39% statewide turnout. The Secretary of State's office says these were test results, not actual votes. But here's the troubling part. According to The Oregonian, a system update caused the website to become accessible outside its protective firewall, allowing public search engines to discover information that was apparently intended only for internal election testing - not the public. Former state representative Julie Parrish (@hotcouponmama) reportedly discovered the exposure, and the state subsequently took the website offline. Here's where things get interesting. Oregon's Secretary of State explicitly assures voters that the state's ballot-counting equipment is NEVER connected to the internet, so that is a lie they have been telling the public for years. This particular website has been indexed by Google for 10 YEARS. Now, to be clear, a publicly accessible election-results testing website is not the same thing as internet-connected ballot-counting equipment. There is currently no evidence that the actual vote-tabulation machines were compromised. But the distinction raises an important question: If an election-related staging website could become publicly accessible because of a system update, what safeguards ensure that Oregon's actual ballot-counting equipment and production election systems remain completely isolated? Is this just an example of embarrassing incompetence from @ORSecretaryRead's office or something far more sinister? This raises several questions that Secretary of State Tobias Read should answer publicly: How did a system update inadvertently expose an internal election website? What security controls failed, and how long was the website publicly accessible? Was the staging environment completely isolated from production election systems? Was any unauthorized access detected? Has an independent cybersecurity assessment been conducted to determine whether other election-related systems were exposed? Tobias Read regularly repeats the mantra to voters that its elections are safe and secure. This proves this not the case. As the Trump Administration is ready to send election monitors ahead of the November 3rd election, Read will have some explaining to do. In many states, this might get the Secretary of State immediately fired. Then Read could say goodbye to his future political aspirations, including the governorship. Yet here we have an election-related website that reportedly became accessible to the public because of a configuration error, just days before an election. Oregonians deserve more than Read's assurances that the exposed information was harmless. They deserve documentation establishing what happened, what systems were affected, and what corrective measures have been taken. Secretary of State Tobias Read should address this incident publicly and provide the evidence supporting his office's conclusions. Election integrity requires verifiable safeguards, transparency, and accountability, not empty platitudes.