The Ideological Roots of the Houthi Movement: To understand the religious ideology that shaped the modern Houthi sect, it is necessary to begin with two figures: Badr al-Din al-Houthi and his son Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi. Badr al-Din al-Houthi was a senior Zaydi Shiʿi scholar from Saʿdah and the patriarch of the al-Houthi family. He was not merely the father of later Houthi leaders; he was one of the principal religious and ideological figures from whom the movement developed, and the root of today’s Houthi movement. His sons included Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, who became the principal founder and first major leader of the modern Houthi movement, and ʿAbd al-Malik al-Houthi, who later became its leader. The religious background of the al-Houthi family is important, they are Jarudi Zaydi's, not merley Zaydi's. Zaydism is itself a milder branch of Shiʿasm, but it has historically contained several different tendencies. Among them, the Jarudiyya whom adopted one of the harshest extreme positions toward the first three caliphs. More moderate Zaydis did not condemn Abu Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthman for failing to recognize ʿAli's claim, the historical Jarudi school condemned them far more severely. Thus it is important to point out that Houthis are not synonymous with Zaydism, and the Houthi movement should not be treated as representing every Zaydi. Zaydism is an old branch of Shiʿi Islam whose history extends more than a millennium before the emergence of the Houthi family. Historically, Zaydi doctrine differed substantially from Twelver Shiism, the dominant form of current Shiism, primarily in Iran and Iraq. In numerous areas of jurisprudence and theology, Zaydism developed positions considerably closer to Sunni Islam than those of the Twelver tradition. The following statements of the Houthi founders and leaders demonstrate how this hostility toward major Companions appears in material of Badr al-Din and, even more extensively, in the recorded teachings of Hussein al-Houthi. Badr al-Din al-Houthi 1. Badr al-Din al-Houthi explicitly affirmed takfir (excommunication from Islam) of Companions whom he believed had opposed the Messenger peace be upon him. Badr al-Din explicitly states: “I personally believe in declaring them unbelievers because they opposed the Messenger of Allah.” [1] 2. Badr al-Din defended severe criticism of the Companions and rejected the proposition that companionship itself prevented attacking a Companion's reliability. In his treatise, Badr al-Din argues that simply being a Companion does not prevent criticism of someone whom he believes has committed something damaging to his reliability. [2] Badr al-Din's son Hussein al-Houthi transformed these ideas into the ideological teaching of the movement that would ultimately bear his family's name. Hussein became the dominant figure within a faction of the Believing Youth (al-Shabāb al-Muʾmin) a Zaydi revivalist movement that had emerged in the 1990s. Armed conflict began in Saʿdah in 2004 after the Yemeni government attempted to arrest Hussein, who was then leading the movement. He was killed by government forces on September 9, 2004, but his followers continued the rebellion and subsequently became widely known as the Houthis. Hussein left behind a large collection of transcribed lectures known as his malāzim, or Durūs min Hady al-Qurʾān. These texts became central ideological material for the movement. 3. Hussein blamed the Caliphs of Islam; Abu Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthman (may Allah be pleased with them) for the suffering and corruption of the Muslim ummah. In Durūs min Hady al-Qurʾān, Sūrat al-Māʾidah, lesson one, Hussein claims that Muʿawiyah (r.a) was among the consequences of ʿUmar's (r.a) actions and proceeds to place responsibility for the oppression and suffering of the Muslim community upon Abu Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthman, singling out ʿUmar in particular. [3] This is significant because Hussein was not just simply saying that the first three caliphs had made isolated mistakes. He portrayed their accession to authority as the starting point of a historical disaster whose consequences continued throughout Islamic history. 4. Hussein described the bayʿah (formal oath or pledge of allegiance) of Abu Bakr as a calamity whose evil continued into his own time. Discussing Abu Bakr's accession following the death of the Prophet peace be upon him, Hussein said that its “evil remains until now” and portrayed the Muslim world's subsequent decline as a continuing consequence of that event, he follows by stating that “The evil of that bayʿah .. We Muslims continue to suffer from its effects until today. It was an extraordinary calamity; it was the cause of the problem” [4] 5. Hussein stated that even a small amount of walāyah toward Abu Bakr and ʿUmar prevents a person from attaining guidance. In Sūrat al-Māʾidah, Hussein states: “Whoever has an atom of walāyah for Abu Bakr and ʿUmar cannot be guided.” [5] 6. Hussein claimed that allegiance to Abu Bakr and ʿUmar places a person in opposition to the Qurʾān. Hussein stated that: “Merely giving walāyah to Abu Bakr and ʿUmar makes you stand against the Qurʾān.” [6] 7. Hussein stated that Abu Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthman had “opposed the Messenger” and therefore could not receive religious walāyah. Hussein states that walāyah cannot be given to the first three caliphs because, according to him, “they opposed the Messenger.” [7] He further says: “We do not give walāyah to Abu Bakr and ʿUmar.” [8] 8. Hussein commanded his followers to curse those Caliphs and companions whom he regarded as responsible for misleading the Muslim ummah. “Curse those who misled us.” [9] He instructs his followers to expose and disassociate themselves from such figures and asks Allah to disgrace those who follow their path. In related lectures, Hussein discusses historical figures revered under labels such as “the Companions” and “the righteous Salaf,” arguing that religious reverence should not protect anyone whom he believed had misled the Muslim community. 9. Hussein directly attacked the Sunni conception of “al-Salaf al-Sālih.” Hussein mocks the expression “the righteous Salaf” as applied to figures revered in Sunni historical memory. He names: Abu Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthman, Muʿawiyah, ʿĀʾishah (wife of the prophet), ʿAmr ibn al-ʿĀs and al-Mughīrah ibn Shuʿbah and accuses those he identifies with this historical legacy of establishing oppression and dividing the Muslim community. [10] This is particularly important when examining Hussein's attitude toward Ahl al-Sunnah, because reverence for the Sahābah and the early generations is foundational to Sunni religious identity. Hussein's criticism therefore directly not only confronts one of the central pillars of Sunni historical theology, but Islam itself. 10. Hussein criticized Sunni defenses of ʿUthman and questioned reports concerning his contribution to the expedition of Tabuk. While discussing the expedition of Tabuk, Hussein complained that Sunni presentations emphasized ʿUthman's financial contribution to the campaign. He then questioned whether the reported contribution had actually occurred, describing it as open to doubt. [11] 11. Hussein suggested that states spread false religious culture through scholars, including individuals among the Companions and Tābiʿīn. In another lecture, Hussein asks rhetorically who enables false religious culture to spread and answers that states accomplish this through scholars serving them, including, in his formulation, people from among the Companions, Tābiʿīn and later generations. [12] Hussein al-Houthi and the Formation of the Modern Houthi Movement The movement that became known as the Houthis did not suddenly appear in 2004. Its origins lie partly in the Zaydi revival of northern Yemen during the 1980s and 1990s. The Believing Youth (al-Shabāb al-Muʾmin) emerged during the 1990s as a Zaydi revivalist network. It organized religious education and summer camps partly in response to the increasing influence of Salafi and so-called "Wahhabi" preaching in traditionally Zaydi areas of Yemen, and the rapid conversions of Zaydi's to Sunnism/Salafism. One of the most important figures behind this expansion of Salafism was Imām Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadiʿi, himself originally a Zaydi religious teacher from the Zaydi religious environment of Saʿdah. who later converted to Sunnism and embraced Salafism after studying Islam more deeply, and becoming increasingly opposed to aspects of Zaydi doctrine. In 1979, Imām Muqbil Al-Wadiʿi established Dar al-Hadith in Dammaj, directly in Saʿdah, the historic heartland of Zaydism. Al-Wadiʿi became one of the most influential callers to Salafi Sunni Islam in Yemen, openly challenging Zaydi religious doctrines and authority and becoming widely regarded as the founder of the modern Salafi movement in Yemen. Imām Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādiʿī was praised and encouraged by numerous senior Salafī scholars, several of whom regarded him as a mujaddid (reviver) of Islam. Imām Ibn ʿUthaymīn (rahimahullāh) said, “Tell him that I regard him as a reviver of Islam,” while Imām Rabīʿ ibn Hādī (rahimahullāh) described him as “a reviver of Islam in the land of Yemen” and said that since ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī, no one had revived the daʿwah in Yemen like al-Wādiʿī. After his death, Shaykh Rabīʿ further said that he regarded him, inshāʾAllāh, “as a reviver in our time from the revivers of Islam,” praising his patience, zuhd, piety, and endurance in carrying the daʿwah. Imām al-Albānī (rahimahullāh) likewise defended Imām Muqbil as a scholar calling to the Qurʾān, Sunnah, and the methodology of the Salaf, and stated “Allāh has blessed him with ability which is probably unparalleled when compared to some of the other callers to Islām on the face of the earth today.” Dar al-Hadith grew far beyond a local religious school. Even Carnegie describes it as one of the most important religious centers in Yemen, attracting students not only from across the country but from Africa, the Americas, Indonesia, Western Europe, Egypt, Algeria and elsewhere in the Muslim world. Al-Wadiʿi's students subsequently established additional Salafi institutes throughout Yemen. The growth of Dar al-Hadith inside the Zaydi stronghold of Saʿdah generated considerable concern among traditional Zaydi authorities; al-Wadiʿi even required tribal guarantees for the institute's protection because of the opposition it faced. Academic research explicitly describe Dar al-Hadith's expansion as a threat to traditional Zaydi religious influence in Saʿdah. Shaykh Muqbil died in 2001, but Dar al-Hadith continued under his successors and students, and remained a major Salafi center. The growing conflict between the Houthis and the Salafis of Dammaj eventually became violent. Human Rights Watch admittedly records that Houthi forces placed Dar al-Hadith under siege in 2011 and reports that on 27 November 2011, Houthi rebels killed and wounded thousands of students in an attack on the Salafi institute. HRW also records that an 18 year old student was shot while playing football in the institute's courtyard earlier that month. The conflict intensified again in 2013. The Sanaʿa Center states that the Houthi military campaign in Dammaj specifically focused on Dar al-Hadith and its students, while the U.S. State Department reported that a Salafi mosque was bombed and that Houthi fighters besieged the institute. Months of fighting and blockade eventually forced the evacuation of non-local students and many Salafi residents from Dammaj in January 2014, effectively ending Dar al-Hadith's role as the international Salafi center that Muqbil al-Wadiʿi had established there. Hussein al-Houthi later entered into disagreement with some of the movement's earlier figures, and by approximately 2002 the organization divided between those following figures such as Muhammad ʿAzzan and those following Hussein. Hussein's faction increasingly used his own political-religious educational materials. When armed conflict erupted between Hussein's followers and the Yemeni government in 2004, the movement entered an entirely new phase. Hussein was killed in September 2004, but his death did not destroy the movement. Leadership eventually passed to his younger brother ʿAbd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and the organization developed into what is today officially known as Ansar Allah. The teachings above establish considerable religious and polemical hostility toward foundational Sunni historical beliefs, particularly Sunni reverence for Abu Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthman, ʿĀʾishah and the early generations. Badr al-Din himself wrote against "Wahhabi" and Salafi religious ideas. Hussein's lectures repeatedly attacked what he regarded as Sunni misrepresentation of early Islamic history and condemned Sunni religious attachment to the first caliphs. The broader Zaydi revival from which the movement emerged also developed partly as a reaction against expanding Salafi and Sunni influence in traditionally Zaydi areas. This ideological competition later intersected with armed conflict. There have been serious confrontations between the Houthi movement and Salafi communities in northern Yemen, most famously around Dammaj, where prominent Salafi institutes had operated in Saʿdah. The Saʿdah conflicts also contained political, tribal, territorial and state-related dimensions in addition to their religious component. 12. The hostility toward foundational Sunni beliefs did not end with Hussein al-Houthi. His brother Yaḥyā Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī later publicly refused to invoke Allah’s pleasure upon Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, stating: “I do not invoke Allah’s pleasure upon them.” When challenged further, he responded: “What do you think about the one who wronged Fāṭimah?” [13] 13. Yaḥyā also portrayed “Wahhabism” and its religious institutions as a threat to Yemen, declaring in one interview that “we must struggle, wage jihād and fight until our country is in our hands.” [14] 14. Under ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥūthī, this rhetoric increasingly accompanied military expansion. The movement routinely labeled Sunni opponents “takfīrīs,” and in 2015 Houthi forces called supporters to jihād in predominantly Shāfiʿī-Sunni areas such as Taiz and Aden. ʿAbd al-Malik himself described the ongoing fighting as a “sacred jihād.” [15] Zaydism has never been monolithic. Among its historical currents was the Jarudiyya, named after Abu al-Jarud Ziyad ibn al-Mundhir. The Jarudi current took a much harsher position concerning succession after Prophet Muhammad peacebe upon him. More moderate Zaydi tendencies held that ʿAli ibn Abi Talib was more deserving of leadership while stopping short of declaring Abu Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthman unbelievers merely because they assumed the caliphate. The Jarudiyya went significantly further. This is precisely why the Jarudi background of the al-Houthi family matters. - Abu Islām al-Salafī al-Misrī ______ Footnotes: [1] Abu Jaʿfar al-Mabkhut interview with Badr al-Din al-Houthi, originally published on the Shiʿi website al-Maʿṣūmūn al-Arbaʿat ʿAshar, as well as Shiʿi forum YaHosein. More sources: ʿAli al-Sadiq, Mādhā Taʿrif ʿan Ḥizb Allāh? - ʿAbdullah al-Sanʿani's al-Ḥarb fī Ṣaʿdah min Awwal Sayhah ilā Ākhir Talqah, p. 19. - ʿAdil Muhammad ʿAbd al-Qadir ʿAli, al-Ḥarakah al-Ḥūthiyyah: al-Nashʾah, al-ʿAqīdah, al-Muwājahah — Annual Journal of the Faculty of Islamic Daʿwah in Cairo, Al-Azhar University, no. 28, part 1, 2015, p. 258. DOI: 10.21608/BFDC.2015.26825." [2] Tahrīr al-Afkār by Badr al-Din al-Houthi, p. 480 [3] Durūs min Hady al-Qurʾān, Sūrat al-Māʾidah, lesson one, p. 2. [4] Durūs min Hady al-Qurʾān, Sūrat al-Māʾidah, Lesson One, pp. 2–3 [5] Sūrat al-Māʾidah, lesson one, p. 16. [6] al-Wahdah al-Īmāniyyah, p. 11. [7] Sūrat al-Māʾidah, lesson three, pp. 25–26, [8] Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, lesson two, p. 44. [9] Maʿrifat Allāh — Waʿduhu wa-Waʿīduhu, lesson nine, p. 6. [10] Durūs min Hady al-Qurʾān, Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, p. 14. [11] Hussein's Yawm al-Quds al-ʿĀlamī 1, p. 17. [12] Durūs min Hady al-Qurʾān — Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, p. 7. 13] Yaḥyā Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī on Abū Bakr and ʿUmar Nashwan News, “Transcript of Al-Mustaqillah Channel Episodes on the Houthis and Zaydism in Yemen (Episode Six, Part 2)”; the same episode is also cited in the Al-Azhar study. Nashwan News Nashwan News transcript [14] Yaḥyā al-Ḥūthī on “Wahhabism” and fighting Burhan Ahmed, “Houthi Propaganda Discourse in the Media: A Study in Ideological and Intellectual Warfare,” Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, June 10, 2024. Sana’a Center study [15] Later Houthi sectarian/jihād rhetoric under ʿAbd al-Malik Abdulkareem Ghanem, “Addressing Social Fragmentation in Yemen,” Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, March 1, 2019. The study states that the Houthi movement used “takfiri” as a derogatory term for Sunni Islamists and that in September 2015 Houthi forces called supporters to jihād in Taiz and Aden, framing the fighting as a holy war rather than a political battle. Sana’a Center study.