I agree with Orin. And from my vantage, there seems to be a growing divide between two camps in the academy. The first treats knowledge claims as a product and, so long as those claims are true and useful, the involvement of AI in their generation is largely immaterial. The second sees the value of knowledge claims as inseparable from provenance, with the worth of a claim inextricably bound up with its genesis. My (admittedly armchair) sense is that the divide centers roughly on determinacy, both within and beyond the legal academy. In determinate fields (or jurisprudential modalities), where the academy seeks objective, falsifiable findings, the first camp's norms dominate. For example, it makes little difference whether Copernicus or an AI proposes the heliocentric model of our solar system. The key is that it is correct, which carries meaningful implications for future knowledge discovery. In indeterminate fields, where the academic pursuit is instead driven by judgment, reasoning, and persuasion, the second camp's norms predominate. In these spaces, the "right answer" to an issue isn't discerned by acquiring some heretofore missing knowledge, but rather by "making the case" for the normatively optimal path forward given the (fully explicable) tradeoffs at issue. Within this framework, having AI craft an argument feels much more uncomfortable, as it involves outsourcing considerations of morality and equity to a synthetic machine. With apologies to Langdell, my sense is that most of the legal academy's work falls in the second camp, and I therefore expect that its norms will develop in an AI-skeptical direction as a result. At least for anything beyond ministerial tasks like cite-checking, proofreading, and editing.