Replying to @vlatdd
The biggest lie is that governments primarily serve the public interest. In reality they expand their own power, shield elites and connected interests, and treat citizens as resources to tax, regulate, and manage. The costs fall on ordinary people through debt, inflation, and eroded freedoms. This pattern holds across most regimes and centuries.
I audited ARTEX's 2026 source code and Norma SDK v0.4.3 following reports of its use in cyberattacks.
I found a potential security flaw: ARTEX's AI agents don't all receive the same command-blocking protections.
Here's the evidence. 🧵1/6
This FBI Cyber advisory on ARTEX was released last Friday, 11/13. It is not a new announcement, and the FBI has not issued any additional warning since. The guidance in the advisory remains current.
We released this advisory last week because as we head to the end of the year, it’s important for Americans to protect themselves against criminals and state actors using SI to run familiar techniques at machine speed.
We’ve seen cyber actors use ARTEX to conduct campaigns targeting organizations globally across multiple sectors.
Organizations can close those security gaps and take away their advantage.
Take mitigation steps and report activity: ic3.gov.
We have and will continue to put out messaging as we have done for these last 21 months. xitter.gq/FBIDallas/status/21227…
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5/6
Why does this matter?
An autonomous agent operating with bypass permissions needs consistent enforcement.
A command blocked for the Worker may bypass ARTEX's broader interception rules when issued by another agent.
Norma's narrower hard-deny checks still apply.
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comments are brutal
JPMorganChase has experienced a temporary issue related to a software bug in on-premise hardware systems – there is no evidence this is cyber-related. It is taking longer than usual to service some customers.
Where we were party to a transaction involving other banks, those banks may have been impacted, but this is not a systemic issue.
Customers still have access to their accounts and funds.
We’re working diligently to resolve this by the end of the day today.
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Shilly Willy retweeted
📂Cybersec ops: Ohio
In Stark County Ohio, all schools have been shutdown because of a cyber attack.
Officials: "While we continue to work toward fully restoring our IT systems, some technology, including internet access, will be limited for a while.."
Shilly Willy retweeted
User reports indicate problems with Chase since 9:53 AM EST.
How is it affecting you? #ChaseDown
downdetector.com/status/chas…
community notes got 'em
The Packers are so locked in right now I deadass don’t see no team stopping our momentum anytime soon
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
The Packers’ momentum was in fact stopped- losing to the Vikings 30-10
nfl.com/games/vikings-…
16
Shilly Willy retweeted
🚨Cyber Alert ‼️
🇺🇸US: 𝗩𝗶𝘀𝗮 / 𝗠𝗮𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗰𝗮𝗿𝗱 / 𝗝𝗣𝗠𝗼𝗿𝗴𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲
The n0n hacking group claims to have stolen sensitive customer and marketing data from Visa, Mastercard, and JPMorgan Chase, threatening to publish it unless a settlement is reached. The allegedly compromised information includes cardholder profiles, personal contact details, premium travel and dining reservations, banking associations, and marketing campaign engagement records involving millions of interactions across multiple regions.
Threat actor: n0n
Sector: Financial
Data exposure (claimed): Not quantified
Data type: Cardmember profiles, personal contact information, reservation records, marketing campaign data
Observed: Nov 16, 2026
Status: Pending verification
ESIX©: 6.12
Full details and impact assessment on HackRisk.io
Shilly Willy retweeted
🚨 64,000 BITCOIN MINERS HIJACKED IN MASSIVE ATTACK
An estimated 64,000 Bitcoin miners representing 13 EH/s of hashrate were reportedly hijacked overnight, with their mining power redirected to OCEAN mining pool and payouts assigned to an attacker-controlled Bitcoin address.
The attack reportedly began around 8 PM CT on November 14.
OCEAN’s dashboard shows a sharp spike in hashrate, briefly approaching 50 EH/s before falling back toward 40 EH/s.
CoreX Hosting first raised the alarm, reporting that miners were being redirected without authorization.
One affected operator says their entire mining farm was hijacked and identified Luxor’s Commander mining management software as the source of the compromise.
Other operators reported similar unauthorized pool changes several days earlier, potentially pointing to a broader incident.
CoreX later reported that the attack appeared to be over, with the hijacked hashrate falling from 13 EH/s to approximately 100 PH/s.
The attackers reportedly failed to mine a Bitcoin block during the hijack, meaning no block rewards were collected.
However, affected miners permanently lost the opportunity to earn Bitcoin during the attack. That hashing time cannot be recovered.
The full scope of the breach and whether Luxor Commander was compromised have yet to be independently confirmed.
Just a heads up, there is a big miner hack going on as we speak. Miners are being pointed at @ocean_mining with BTC address bc1qphukp9rjfc4rcej7erpm9ae20xmtspw8pcddrr .
Shilly Willy retweeted
To give you guys a clearer visual of one of the key interactions I discussed, focus on GLzF, the Binance single-user deposit address serving as the central point of convergence.
AP4 directly transfers 664.2 SOL to AHvA, which subsequently conducts its own MIHAO liquidity operations. AHvA and 2BqT then deposit into that same Binance address just 69 seconds apart.
It’s not inferred. They are definitive links, established through precise transactions permanently recorded on-chain.
Throw on top of that the pool connection with counsilz, all the intersecting rewards and promotion and the defense wouldn’t even put on a case really. They’d have nothing to say. 😂
That is BEFORE any of the further connections have been made too, and there are plenty to be made. The securities violation is clearly made out on its own either way and it stands strongly and survives all variables.
I’ve never seen anything like it, 15+ years in law. Astonishing. The scale would be unbelievable, once someone paints that full picture.
Dear all,
I place these findings on the public record for the knowledge of traders exposed to these markets, and to place @Pumpfun co-founder @a1lon9 on formal notice of the matters raised. I’ll follow up further with @SECGov and @TheJusticeDept concerning the evidence set out below.
Any criminal culpability on the part of Baton Corporation’s controllers, or trading participants found to have knowingly acted in concert, is ultimately a matter for judicial determination.
The finding concerns the deliberate financing of selected holders’ exits during public promotion. Whoever supplies the buying liquidity chooses how much inventory their capital can absorb, at which prices and for how long.
A seller privy to that arrangement can plan a disposal around it, while the wider market sees apparently independent demand. $MIHAO provides a concrete example through which to extend that allegation. The findings catastrophically appear systemic on a broad view.
The trail begins at GLzFwgVKKRmDWXoHRY9EbcrnXd6u983DjFq1pewg9mvk, a Binance deposit address. The payments converge on what is one receiving customer account. Crucial note. Binance’s internal records can establish the account holder.n
All transactions are part of the immutable cryptographic record.
On 14 Nov at 14:42:52 UTC, AHvA8nfVpq3GdwBqns4VuC4p1akJ3xy2BLdPmzdMMPDv (AHvA) sent 615.28 SOL, virtually its entire balance, to GLzF after closing a liquidity position and selling the 638,015.358879 MIHAO it withdrew. Sixty-nine seconds later, at 14:44:01 UTC, another MIHAO liquidity operator, 2BqTvkdyMMXk1aFThvRa9VcSeFG9i3iP8GAj2F6azX1y (2BqT), sent 36 SOL to the same address. Both deposits were swept into Binance at 14:52:52 UTC. Both wallets had used that destination before MIHAO launched, alongside a third liquidity operator, AP4sFZs9irT3AjPrzCjREGez8uXxQ1HXPMHRex1LUem (AP4).
AP4’s relationship with AHvA is explicit in the transfers. On 11 Nov at 01:50:03 and 01:50:44 UTC, it sent AHvA 664.2 SOL, virtually emptying its wallet into a recipient that had held just 0.016 SOL. At 01:52:03 UTC, AHvA deployed 300 SOL into 2YoyVHuiqfrSwgDFgt2gei3j9zZkno3D2AAVvakSoto2 (2Yoy).
By 01:52:58 UTC, another 270 SOL had entered 92iqiEu5XADScMugFLSjaQUqS1uAKWeCsstNuJo35Cbs (92iq). Within 134 seconds of the larger transfer, 570 SOL of AP4’s capital was financing MIHAO bids under AHvA’s signature.
Both pools were created by the Pump.fun account councilz, associated with J92ubFnxcHhquMYQv9DRe1hKVsPhRTi1TXTh62iGhCh2. Councilz promoted MIHAO and supplied its own SOL to 92iq, where AP4 also provided liquidity. At 01:46:28 UTC on 11 Nov, minutes before the handoff, 2BqT sold into that same pool and added fresh SOL nineteen seconds later. All three depositors were therefore operating in a market created and funded by an account promoting the token.
On 14 Nov at 09:55:30 UTC, AHvA began deploying 620 SOL and no MIHAO into the 92iq position that led back to Binance. By its close, the position held approximately 130.27 SOL less and the 638,015.358879 MIHAO subsequently liquidated. The buying capital had absorbed token inventory as sellers received SOL. The bids had performed their economic function before AHvA made its own sale.
A separate execution places 2BqT immediately after an identifiable seller. On 10 Nov at 22:20:39 UTC, a limit order attributed to @Dior100x routed nearly 972,000 MIHAO into 9ViFN1A2FG2aL69Uu3dZwVMbcSdKuuMM5PLouZmguK2e (9ViFN), drawing 27.88 SOL from the pool. Four seconds later, at 22:20:43 UTC, 2BqT supplied 30.21 SOL to that same pool, placing fresh bids below the prices the order had traded through.
The mere use of other liquidity pools would otherwise be ordinary, if the evidence showing the coordination of market participants wasn’t so pronounced. Crucially, the timing of both sides is continuously condemning and final.
Councilz also created pools for $LEEROY and $UPDOG, while 2BqT supplied liquidity on $UPDOG and $PAWS, using a separate UPDOG pool.
Shilly Willy retweeted
Dear all,
I place these findings on the public record for the knowledge of traders exposed to these markets, and to place @Pumpfun co-founder @a1lon9 on formal notice of the matters raised. I’ll follow up further with @SECGov and @TheJusticeDept concerning the evidence set out below.
Any criminal culpability on the part of Baton Corporation’s controllers, or trading participants found to have knowingly acted in concert, is ultimately a matter for judicial determination.
The finding concerns the deliberate financing of selected holders’ exits during public promotion. Whoever supplies the buying liquidity chooses how much inventory their capital can absorb, at which prices and for how long.
A seller privy to that arrangement can plan a disposal around it, while the wider market sees apparently independent demand. $MIHAO provides a concrete example through which to extend that allegation. The findings catastrophically appear systemic on a broad view.
The trail begins at GLzFwgVKKRmDWXoHRY9EbcrnXd6u983DjFq1pewg9mvk, a Binance deposit address. The payments converge on what is one receiving customer account. Crucial note. Binance’s internal records can establish the account holder.n
All transactions are part of the immutable cryptographic record.
On 14 Nov at 14:42:52 UTC, AHvA8nfVpq3GdwBqns4VuC4p1akJ3xy2BLdPmzdMMPDv (AHvA) sent 615.28 SOL, virtually its entire balance, to GLzF after closing a liquidity position and selling the 638,015.358879 MIHAO it withdrew. Sixty-nine seconds later, at 14:44:01 UTC, another MIHAO liquidity operator, 2BqTvkdyMMXk1aFThvRa9VcSeFG9i3iP8GAj2F6azX1y (2BqT), sent 36 SOL to the same address. Both deposits were swept into Binance at 14:52:52 UTC. Both wallets had used that destination before MIHAO launched, alongside a third liquidity operator, AP4sFZs9irT3AjPrzCjREGez8uXxQ1HXPMHRex1LUem (AP4).
AP4’s relationship with AHvA is explicit in the transfers. On 11 Nov at 01:50:03 and 01:50:44 UTC, it sent AHvA 664.2 SOL, virtually emptying its wallet into a recipient that had held just 0.016 SOL. At 01:52:03 UTC, AHvA deployed 300 SOL into 2YoyVHuiqfrSwgDFgt2gei3j9zZkno3D2AAVvakSoto2 (2Yoy).
By 01:52:58 UTC, another 270 SOL had entered 92iqiEu5XADScMugFLSjaQUqS1uAKWeCsstNuJo35Cbs (92iq). Within 134 seconds of the larger transfer, 570 SOL of AP4’s capital was financing MIHAO bids under AHvA’s signature.
Both pools were created by the Pump.fun account councilz, associated with J92ubFnxcHhquMYQv9DRe1hKVsPhRTi1TXTh62iGhCh2. Councilz promoted MIHAO and supplied its own SOL to 92iq, where AP4 also provided liquidity. At 01:46:28 UTC on 11 Nov, minutes before the handoff, 2BqT sold into that same pool and added fresh SOL nineteen seconds later. All three depositors were therefore operating in a market created and funded by an account promoting the token.
On 14 Nov at 09:55:30 UTC, AHvA began deploying 620 SOL and no MIHAO into the 92iq position that led back to Binance. By its close, the position held approximately 130.27 SOL less and the 638,015.358879 MIHAO subsequently liquidated. The buying capital had absorbed token inventory as sellers received SOL. The bids had performed their economic function before AHvA made its own sale.
A separate execution places 2BqT immediately after an identifiable seller. On 10 Nov at 22:20:39 UTC, a limit order attributed to @Dior100x routed nearly 972,000 MIHAO into 9ViFN1A2FG2aL69Uu3dZwVMbcSdKuuMM5PLouZmguK2e (9ViFN), drawing 27.88 SOL from the pool. Four seconds later, at 22:20:43 UTC, 2BqT supplied 30.21 SOL to that same pool, placing fresh bids below the prices the order had traded through.
The mere use of other liquidity pools would otherwise be ordinary, if the evidence showing the coordination of market participants wasn’t so pronounced. Crucially, the timing of both sides is continuously condemning and final.
Councilz also created pools for $LEEROY and $UPDOG, while 2BqT supplied liquidity on $UPDOG and $PAWS, using a separate UPDOG pool.
Holder Rewards have undoubtedly been a success for community tokens & narratives on Pumpfun.
However, the increased optionality with fee settings for Custom Pairs between 0.01% - 3% led to unnecessary PVPs.
For example: when the dev didn't set a custom percentage, new tokens would launch with 0.05% Holder Rewards, gain traction, then subsequently be vamped by a Holder Rewards token with a higher percentage.
When shipping & iterating launchpad updates, it’s vital to allow new features to play out through multiple market cycles to get a clear picture of their long-term viability as a launchpad mechanism.
After monitoring usage of these fee settings, it became clear that less optionality is the way for more sustainability & certainty in runners - tokens shouldn’t PVP over fee settings.
Now, Holder Rewards on new, non-SOL/USDC tokens can be set between 0.3% - 1%. Existing tokens are unaffected.
We’ll continue to iterate at the launchpad layer based on data, user feedback & market dynamics.






















