Professor of Economics | Political Economy - Public Choice - History of Economic Thought - Austrian Economics
Murfreesboro, TN
Joined August 2014
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Daniel J. Smith retweeted
From me @NRO, with a frightening warning to voters:
A List of Things Democrats Might Do If They Retake Power
nationalreview.com/corner/a-…
Daniel J. Smith retweeted
🧵on the AI audit of Saez and Zucman and by implication Piketty (or PSZ together):
Since some are objecting to what the computer found, here's a list of biases in this trio's work that were found by humans over the last decade.
Daniel J. Smith retweeted
California serves as an example to Colorado, demonstrating why seemingly technical changes to fiscal rules can matter long after the political debate that produced them fades.
Read @thomas_savidge's latest for Civitas Outlook: civitasoutlook.pulse.ly/voka…
Another example of turn-taking in office (from Montesquieu). This would be an interesting case study to extend the literature (the States General of the Netherlands also provides another unstudied case).
See my paper here: link.springer.com/article/10…
Check out my brother’s video on pumpkin beer! @MackinacCenter
facebook.com/share/r/1DuJuKL…
Should democracies themselves determine how, by whom, for whom, and on what issues democracy should make decisions? (Montesquieu) This is a core concern of constitutional political economy. The corner solution of democracy, all the way down (like turtles), can lead to troubling outcomes if you care about other values, such as individual and political freedom, in addition to democracy.
I’m gradually working on granting Montesquieu’s favor. I’ve read sections, but never the whole book.
Unfortunately, both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party are retreating from economic liberty and embracing state economic control. reason.com/2026/10/28/the-mi…
Daniel J. Smith retweeted
Unfortunately, both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party are retreating from economic liberty and embracing state economic control. reason.com/2026/10/28/the-mi…
Daniel J. Smith retweeted
'Nazi-Communism' by @AXELKAISER demonstrates that Marx, Lenin, and Hitler were beasts of the same feather.
Read Juliana Geran Pilon's full review on Civitas Outlook: civitasoutlook.pulse.ly/ayqk…
“In a time of ignorance, one has no doubts even while doing the greatest evils; in an enlightened age, one trembles even while doing the greatest goods.” - Montesquieu
We know where the equilibrium of predatory politics leads—a point French economists should recognize with particular clarity given their country’s long arc from the Revolution to dirigisme. Yet conceptions of social justice remain alluring enough that some economists continue to advocate expansions of the political domain that invite such predation. A more proper and humble economics, by contrast, confines itself to the design of rules that keep politics within well-defined tasks, thereby preventing the predatory equilibrium.
James M. Buchanan:
Daniel J. Smith retweeted
Josh Rauh and Ben Jaros of Stanford's Hoover Institution work out that a founder who pays California's wealth tax by selling shares must sell about $1.59 for every $1 owed, because the sale itself triggers roughly 37% capital gains tax. The bill grows the moment you try to pay it.
Zuckerberg's fortune is mostly Meta shares, not cash in the bank. California's proposed wealth tax would take 5% of it, about $12bn, so the only way he can pay is by selling shares, which would cost him control of his own company. Meta has had to invent a new kind of share just to get around that. That's the liquidity problem Zucman says doesn't exist.
Daniel J. Smith retweeted
"For reference, $43 billion is just under double what NASA spent last year."
washingtonexaminer.com/news/…
What is the role of the economist? It depends on their assumptions about politicians' knowledge and incentives (and whether they care about doing relevant work).
It’s the equivalent of a high priest reading the entrails of a bird to declare that the gods favor the leader’s already-decided course.
Given how pervasive and pernicious the failure to understand the extent to which incentives matter in the design of institutions and policy, most economists do not spend enough time emphasizing it in economics classes and public intellectualism.
