The Western green transition is now almost entirely reliant on hardware manufactured by the same industrial giant it hoped to displace. China currently manufactures over 80% of the world’s solar panels, 75% to 80% of all EV batteries, 60% to 70% of core wind turbine components, and over 53% of global crude steel. According to the International Energy Agency, China controls over 80% of the manufacturing share across every key solar PV stage, surging past 95% for specific sub-components like solar wafers. In battery tech, it commands up to 85% of global capacity for specialised sub-components, including anodes and refined electrolytes. For wind power, its massive manufacturing base translates to nearly four-fifths of all new global turbine installations. Data from the World Steel Association confirms China produces more than half of the world's crude steel, hovering just over 1 billion metric tons annually. This staggering modern-day expansion represents the largest, quietest transfer of industrial power in human history. Today, China’s total manufacturing output is larger than that of the next 15 countries combined - exceeding the US, EU and Japan put together. To power this industrial machine, China continues to commission new state-of-the-art coal plants at a rate of 50 to 80 GW a year. It now operates over 1,200 coal plants totaling roughly 1,270 GW - more than half the world’s total capacity - backed by a domestic coal mining fleet four times larger than second-place India. As a result, China’s share of global manufacturing has surged from 6% to 30% since 2000. Over the same period, America’s share plunged from 25% to around 12%, while Europe’s collapsed from 25% to 14%. China uses abundant, reliable coal power, refuses to shackle its industrial base to unilateral net-zero mandates, and has leadership that treats heavy industry and manufacturing as fundamental national security assets. In geopolitical terms, this should be a glaring warning across the West.

Many of the onshore wind farms in the United Kingdom and Denmark have experienced drastic operating declines after only 10 to 15 years. This is far earlier than the 20 to 25-year operational lifespan claimed by the wind energy industry and backed by the UK Government. A major statistical analysis of historical UK and Danish datasets, led by Professor Gordon Hughes at the University of Edinburgh, revealed substantial performance decay across these early-generation fleets. Hughes concluded that turbine load factors—the actual electricity generated relative to maximum capacity—declined rapidly due to cumulative wear and tear. By year 10, the average UK onshore wind farm's output efficiency had dropped by roughly 33%. This degradation was largely driven by tangible engineering failures, including severe leading-edge blade erosion from precipitation, alongside chronic gearbox and bearing stress. As a result, many onshore turbines became acutely uneconomical after roughly 12 years due to soaring maintenance overheads and declining output. Rather than running for their full theoretical lifespan, these assets faced early economic retirement, leaving operators facing premature decommissioning costs or forced site transitions. While manufacturers maintain that a 25-year lifespan remains valid on paper, empirical data reveals a steep decline in long-term viability. To maintain output and secure ongoing financial returns, energy companies have increasingly turned to 'repowering'—dismantling prematurely aged hardware to replace them with larger, modern units long before the original turbines reach their nominal 25-year target. Source: The Performance of Wind Farms in the United Kingdom and Denmark, Professor Gordon Hughes, published by the Renewable Energy Foundation, 2012.