Kim Wexler 

Russia appears to be using the Trump team’s initiatives to win an important round in the negotiations. The discussion about how to stop its aggression is turning into a bargaining process over how Europe should defend itself. The Russian delegation explicitly describes the Ukraine issue as part of a broader agreement covering the entire continent. By agreeing to link these issues, Kushner is legitimising the Kremlin’s demands. Until now, Washington has mainly pressured Kyiv to make concessions for the sake of a quick deal. Kushner is now bringing the Europeans into this bargaining process too. He has not yet published a specific list of concessions, but he is already proposing negotiations with Russia over their security. Europeans are having to defend their own military capabilities in talks that should be aimed at making Moscow end its aggression. According to the FT, the broader American proposal was not agreed with European capitals in advance. **Meanwhile, Moscow wants the war to continue.** On 10 November, Lavrov explicitly stated that Russia would not agree to an immediate ceasefire. He insists on the following sequence: first define the parameters of the future security system, then address a settlement of the war. He also rejected the deployment of European stabilisation forces after a ceasefire. Russia’s demand is clear: the West must first accept new rules, and only then will Moscow consider ending hostilities—with no certainty that it will agree to do so. For the Kremlin, negotiations and continued warfare complement each other. Russian strikes are intended to convince Ukraine and its partners that rejecting Moscow’s demands will become increasingly costly. Moscow demands concessions in exchange for the prospect of stopping those attacks. FT sources involved in back-channel contacts reported that Putin expects to weaken Ukraine through winter bombardments, while broadening the negotiations to encompass European security allows Moscow to drag out the process. According to those sources, he regards even Ukraine’s withdrawal from the remaining parts of Donbas merely as a precondition for a ceasefire. Further demands may follow. Russia’s objectives have long extended beyond Ukraine. As early as 14 June 2024, Putin called for the gradual withdrawal of the military presence of “external powers” from Eurasia and described dependence on the US as Europe’s main threat. Ryabkov now says that a future European security system can exist only as part of a Eurasian one, while Lavrov refers to a Russian position paper, mentioning the CSTO, CIS and SCO. Europe is being offered a place in an order in which Moscow will have a decisive say. Russia laid out its maximalist demands long ago. In December 2021, Moscow demanded that force and weapons deployments return to their May 1997 configuration, that NATO stop expanding, and that military activities in Ukraine and other countries in the region be restricted. Separate demands included returning American nuclear weapons to the US, dismantling the infrastructure used to deploy them abroad, and restricting military deployments, missiles, bomber flights and naval operations. A new structure modelled on the NATO–Russia Council could become a permanent forum for such pressure. The old council did not give Moscow the right to block Alliance decisions: Russia’s consent was required for joint activities, while NATO remained free to act independently. In any future arrangement, everything will depend on the new obligations. If strengthening defences requires every participant’s approval, or if Russia can demand that such measures be suspended as a threat to its own security, consultations will become a means of obstruction. In its 2021 draft, Moscow already proposed allowing exceptional deployments beyond the established limits only with the consent of all parties. Such a rule would effectively give it the power to decide whether allies can reinforce their defences. Washington has its own reasons to accept some of these demands. The 2026 US National Defense Strategy describes Russia as a persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern members and assumes that Moscow cannot establish dominance over Europe. Europeans are expected to take primary responsibility for conventional defence, while the US concentrates on defending its own territory and deterring China. This creates a temptation to strike a deal with Moscow to reduce American involvement. Kushner has political backing to advance this approach. Trump himself announced a broad agreement concerning Europe, while Rubio supports the negotiating team and discussions about the post-war order. There is no confirmation that a specific package of concessions has been agreed within the administration. There is also bipartisan opposition in Congress to easing pressure on Russia. But presidential support is enough to conduct negotiations, propose options and gradually get allies used to the idea that their defence, too, is negotiable. The most dangerous scenario is taking shape: weak guarantees for Ukraine are being negotiated alongside restrictions on European defence. Rubio is already saying that these guarantees must be acceptable to Russia; meanwhile, American officials are discussing shifting the financial burden onto Europe and gradually easing sanctions, with the option of reimposing them. In this arrangement, the West pays with concrete concessions in exchange for a promise to end the aggression, while Moscow strengthens its position and gains the ability to bargain over how its opponents defend themselves. The Trump administration’s effort to save money on its military presence weakens alliances—one of the main sources of American power. Declining trust in the US pushes European governments towards separate deals and undermines a common policy towards Russia. The Russian threat remains, while Washington loses the ability to confront it together with its allies.

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