Binance's initial investigation suggests that the security incident may involve a compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop, which allowed an attacker to gain access to a service container and submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions. We have found no evidence of any wallet private key leak. We will share a detailed technical post-mortem once the investigation is complete and the facts are fully verified.
The estimated total impact sits at around $6.3B. We have worked with blockchain partners to freeze affected assets, with ~$3 billion frozen on-chain so far.
Binance will cover all losses from the SAFU fund and the company’s funds. User funds are safe. We will also publish an updated Proof of Reserves once the remediation is complete.
As an immediate precaution, Binance has:
- temporarily suspended deposits and withdrawals while security checks are completed;
- revoked the affected address authorisation;
- engaged law enforcement and blockchain intelligence partners to trace and recover funds.
Our teams are working around the clock to resolve this issue safely and thoroughly. We are working closely with our law enforcement partners to confirm the identity of these criminals and bring them to justice.
Please rely only on official Binance channels for updates. Please feel free to contact Binance Customer Support if you have any further questions.
binance.com/en/support/annou…
Let’s set the record straight: @lcfr_hax was the first to discover php2shell and develop a working exploit. See his August 5 tweet: xitter.gq/lcfr_hax/status/208503…
His work convinced the PHP Foundation to invest in fixing this entire bug class. He then worked around the clock to review, test, and retest the patches.
mailler retweeted
1/ We discovered something totally unexpected about the neural structure of consciousness that overturns decades of thinking on its biological basis and brings us significantly closer to the recipe for generating conscious awareness.
New preprint: biorxiv.org/content/10.64898… (led by @HesseJanis, with @FrankLanfranchi, @_conor_mcgrory, @Yuelin_Shi, and @EngelTatiana)
mailler retweeted
📄 Skills in Agent Harnesses
A lot of people don't know this (I didn't until recently) but most agent harnesses will load the description of your skill upon starting up your harness. This is how Claude Code works.
What people don't usually know is that even when you explicitly call a skill to be used inside of a harness, or the AI figures out to use a skill, it usually only does a read of the first 150 lines of the skill (to understand how to use it or if it applies to the work it's trying to do).
It's really important to outline a table in the first 150 lines of the mandatory parts of the skill that must be run when you invoke the skill.
If you make some type of mandatory instruction after 150 lines, it might get missed entirely. If you describe in prompting that you want to use a provided Python script or template, it also might be out of bounds of that 150 lines and never get called correctly.
If you write a table of contents of the skill actions in the first 150 lines and mark which ones are mandatory (or that, if the user has called the skill, you must read the whole skill context and all references), you get more reliable skills. We use markdown checklists for this now.
mailler retweeted
I found a critical unauthenticated SQL injection that earned a $4,000 bounty. The WAF blocked most SQLi payloads, but I turned HTTP 500 errors into a data extraction channel.
The exploit came down to 3 things:
- SQL injection: A public API passed user input directly into BigQuery SQL.
- WAF bypass: Keyword filtering missed BigQuery scripting techniques.
- Error-based extraction: Detailed database errors exposed query results in HTTP 500 responses.
Here's how I chained all three together:
1. Find the injection
A public analytics endpoint accepted JSON input.
Adding a single `'` to a parameter returned:
`500 → Syntax error: Unclosed string literal`
The error also revealed Google BigQuery was the backend.
2. Build a boolean oracle
The WAF blocked keywords like `UNION`, `SELECT`, `AND`, and `OR`.
But BigQuery scripting constructs like `IF` and `ASSERT` still worked:
`IF TRUE THEN ASSERT FALSE; END IF;` → 500
`IF FALSE THEN ASSERT FALSE; END IF;` → 200
This let me ask the database true/false questions and read the answers from HTTP status codes.
3. Turn the 500 error into an output channel
This was the biggest breakthrough because blind SQLi normally requires guessing data one character at a time using those true/false responses.
But BigQuery supports:
`RAISE USING MESSAGE = 'hello'`
This deliberately throws a database error containing `hello`.
Because the API exposed database error details, the response included:
`500 → ... hello ...`
Now imagine replacing `hello` with a database query result.
The database includes that result in its error message, and the API returns it.
Instead of guessing characters, I could retrieve an entire value in one request.
4. Bypass the WAF using BigQuery's own features
The WAF blocked `EXECUTE IMMEDIATE`, which runs dynamically constructed SQL.
But this worked:
`EXECUTE/**/IMMEDIATE`
The SQL parser understood it, while the WAF's keyword matching didn't.
Another blocked keyword was `INFORMATION_SCHEMA`, used to enumerate tables and columns.
The bypass was:
`REVERSE('AMEHCS_NOITAMROFNI')`
BigQuery reconstructs `INFORMATION_SCHEMA` at runtime.
Using that reversed string in a dynamic query let me access database metadata without sending the blocked keyword literally.
5. What this unlocked
Using those techniques, I was able to:
- Enumerate datasets, tables, and columns
- Query tables unrelated to the original analytics endpoint
- Retrieve customer records, names, and addresses
- Access operational records containing personal identifiers and contact information
- Read sensitive fields that another API intentionally redacted
#BugBounty tip:
When a WAF blocks SQLi, don't just try random payloads. Understand the database dialect, what the WAF filters, and whether verbose errors leak data.
Sometimes a `500` isn't just an error. It may be your output channel.
mailler retweeted
Shazam could name any song back in 2002, on flip phones, with zero AI. You dialed the number 2580, held your phone up to the speaker, and hung up. 15 seconds later, a text came back with the song name. That same core trick still runs the app today.
The inventor was Avery Wang, a Stanford PhD in audio signal processing. His problem was brutal. Match a short clip recorded on a 2002 cell phone mic, in a noisy bar, against a database of a million songs, in seconds, over a phone call.
His solution treated music as geometry instead of sound.
The algorithm converts audio into a spectrogram, a picture of the song, then throws almost all of it away. It keeps only the peaks, the loudest frequency points at each moment in time. Bar chatter and blown-out speakers can wreck most of a recording. The peaks survive. Shazam only ever needed the peaks.
Those surviving points form what Wang called a constellation map, because it looks like a star field. Pairs of peaks get converted into hash numbers, and identifying a song becomes a dictionary lookup rather than an audio comparison. That made it fast enough to search a million tracks on 2002 hardware.
Wang published the full method openly in 2003 in a paper called "An Industrial-Strength Audio Search Algorithm." Anyone could read exactly how the magic worked. The moat was the database and the deals with carriers, never the secret.
Apple bought the company in 2018 for a reported $400 million. People have tagged over 100 billion songs since the very first one, Jeepster by T. Rex, during the beta in April 2002.
One deterministic signal-processing trick, written before most people had heard the phrase machine learning, and it's still so good that in 2026 everyone assumes it must be AI.
mailler retweeted
Al-Shabaab Fighters Spent 3 Months In Yemen Learning Drone Assembly , Control Systems
yemenonline.info/special-rep…
mailler retweeted
There's still some novel attack vectors that are only being operationalised now. @justinsteven is presenting on his research on timing attacks at @BSidesCbr today, and has released tturl as open source! github.com/tantosec/tturl - Justin/Tanto have put a lot of work into this.
mailler retweeted
We’re disclosing HEIF Heist, a months-long investigation into libheif that allowed us to hack OpenAI, Slack, Meta, GitHub Ent, Rails, Next.js, ImageMagick, and many more.
It was literally xkcd #234, one obscure image library beneath a huge number of apps. 🧵
mailler retweeted
‼️ Someone’s Bluetooth headphones kept refusing to hand audio back to their phone. He discovered the cause was an open AliExpress tab that was generating a tone you purposefully never hear, to secretly track you.
Alibaba's anti-abuse scripts use a fingerprinting technique with a hidden audio graph on the homepage — a sawtooth tone pushed through the browser's audio engine, then measured on the way out. CPU, OS and browser each process it slightly differently, and that variation results in a fingerprint they can track you with.
Gain is set to zero, so nothing is audible. But the audio graph stays wired to the system audio output, so the browser keeps processing live audio. Tab mute can't stop it, there's no media element to mute.
Some browsers like Firefox have already flattened the fingerprint itself. For example 99.24% of Firefox users return one of just three values. It doesn't stop the audio graph from running though.
mailler retweeted
I went looking for a managed-Postgres provider.
Instead, I found a vulnerability in a 4-star PostgreSQL extension available everywhere!
and turned it into code execution at @neondatabase, @supabase, @xata and more.
Part 1/6 | Extension Risks Are Real
mehmetince.net/part-1-6-syst…
mailler retweeted
Lenders beware: Kenya’s High Court has greenlit our petition challenging US$54bn in odious debts under Kenyatta & Ruto.
No parliamentary approval. No public benefit. Offshore siphoning.
Kenyans WILL NOT repay what they never authorised. Accountability MUST be restored. #OdiousDebt #DeniBandia
financialpost.com/opinion/op…
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Yesterday at #BlackHat US 2026, our CTO, Michael Bargury (@mbrg0) and AI Security Research Team Lead, Stav Cohen (@StAJect0r), shared their latest research: A New Vulnerability Class for 0-Click Takeover, which has been named PleaseFix.
Read more about this groundbreaking research from Zenity Labs:
Claude in Chrome: From alert(1) to Full Account Takeover: labs.zenity.io/post/claude-i…
Claude in Chrome: Breaking down the injection: labs.zenity.io/post/claude-i…
Account Takeover via Claude in Chrome: A Technical Deep Dive: labs.zenity.io/post/account-…
Grand Theft Atlas: labs.zenity.io/post/grand-th…
#AISecurity #ZenityLabs #ZenityResearch
mailler retweeted
Help me reset, rebuild and restore Kenya.
I have chosen to run a campaign that is funded by you, the Kenyan.
And so I am appealing to you to make a donation to the campaign. If my campaign is funded by donations from you, the everyday Kenyan, then it becomes OUR campaign.
And I will be accountable to you, the
everyday Kenyan.
You can donate any amount.
Simply log in to davidmaraga.com.
Or go to Mpesa Paybill: 4164137
Account Number: 4164137
mailler retweeted
The whitepaper is live! Read "Can AI Do Novel Security Research? Meet the HTTP Terminator" here ->
portswigger.net/research/htt…
I've just encountered what i believe is a mass account takeover on @telegram .
A telegram channel, FouadMods (channelId -1001006348817) with 365k subs is phishing its followers. I've tested the chain on my own account because i had 2FA on. n here's how it works.
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Speaking during a development cooperation conference in Sweden, former CBK Governor Njuguna Ndung'u said Kenya's President has overrun state institutions, leaving officials to comply out of fear.
mailler retweeted
I was a journalist during El Adde attack, which is Kenya's worst military defeat. Up to 400 KDF soldiers were killed. What makes it hurt even more is that KDF were betrayed by the very community it was protecting. Here is how it unfolded, step by step: 🧵
(If you're wondering why your'e seeing this thread again, X sent me a graphic content warning on the last one and I had to pull it down)
































