$ Security Researcher // Cloud & Identity {HUmar Skyly // Professional Hogger Hunter} {Opinions are my Own}

Massillon, Ohio
Joined May 2014
Terrance DeJesus retweeted
flying back from montreal + almost ready to let agents use git + gh from inside the box without ever seeing a token in min. sealed grants + host keychain + audit trail. local first. github.com/gominimal/minimal
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Great work from @HuntressLabs regarding the token play activity. Validated we are seeing as well. They shared all the right observables and signals for detections/hunting. Reminder to check UAL too, not only Entra ID logs. ref: huntress.com/blog/token-repl…
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This is where detection is challenging. Benign everything outside the Android device itself. - app ID is first party - resource ID (Graph) - .default for Graph (delegated scopes for first party app) - legit UPN (authenticated user) - source ASN/IP is expected and matches user - device is likely compliant/enrolled in MDM because it's the users) enclave.ai/blog/authmask-we-…
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
The apps that are supposed to protect you are the best attack vectors. We pointed our agents at Microsoft Authenticator: We discovered any Android app with zero permissions could say “I’m Teams” and capture your tokens. Mail, files, calendar. Huge find by @ofekdavidlevin
We got Microsoft Authenticator to hand over account tokens to a fake Teams app. The app needed zero Android permissions. It just claimed to be Teams, and Authenticator never checked who was actually asking. The result: full delegated access to mailbox, files, and calendar through Microsoft Graph. Full write-up by @ofekdavidlevin with code and PoC: enclave.ai/blog/authmask-we-…
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
Microsoft patched this (CVE-2026-80097) in Authenticator v6.2606.4246+. It requires a malicious app already on the device. No exploitation reported at advisory time. Update via Google Play. enclave.ai/blog/authmask-… msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/v…
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
Sorry folks, we have a confirmed PHP compromise with post-exploit activity. Still not the widespread outbreak we all braced for, but it’s actively exploited in the wild. Updated threat brief: unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/…
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
Really proud of what we managed to capture and put together at Threat Hunting Labs around PHP2Shell in just a day of non-stop work. I'm tired but wanted to share this quickly with the community. We took real exploitation activity and turned it into something the whole community can benefit from. Raw logs, hunting queries, Sigma and Suricata rules, a PCAP, and a full investigation with our own analysis. We normally reserve the detailed researcher analysis for subscribers, but we've made everything free for this one. No gatekeeping here, this is free for everyone. Hope you find it useful! threathuntinglabs.com/leads/…
Yesterday, we promised free PHP2Shell hunting material. Today, we’ve created a Hunt Lead covering successful exploitation against a Linux system. Researcher analysis is normally subscriber-only. For this Hunt Lead, we’ve made the full analysis free to benefit the whole community. Here’s what you’ll get: • 14,838 normalized records covering EDR, auditd, Sysmon for Linux, authentication and system logs, plus Zeek HTTP, connection and file-analysis records. • 5 endpoint alerts and 145 Suricata records, with network rule matches distinguished from stream warnings. • 10 KQL hunting queries, 3 Sigma rules and 3 Suricata rules to review and adapt for your environment. • 5 investigation questions connecting the network activity with evidence from the host. • A downloadable PCAP and investigation guide so you can examine the exploitation traffic in Wireshark alongside the host evidence. The Hunt Lead also covers the vulnerabilities, affected versions and mitigation steps, with the information dated 22 October 2026. Linux is the first release. We haven’t seen a working Windows PoC or successful PHP2Shell exploitation against our Windows environments. So far, the Windows activity we’ve observed has been fingerprinting and reconnaissance. We’ll add verified Windows evidence to the same Hunt Lead when it becomes available. Investigate the lead, read the brief, inspect the findings, grab the Hunt pack and explore the detailed researcher analysis. Then use the queries and rules to start hunting in your own environment. All of it is free for everyone. threathuntinglabs.com/leads/…
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
People weren't joking... the eMudhra P-384 private keys were literally "4" 😂
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
Do you know who illustrated the comic on calif.io/php2shell? Her name is Stephanie Cortes. And her husband is the hacker who discovered php2shell: @lcfr_hax. This artist-hacker couple has the best story, stay tuned!
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Two critical PHP RCEs are patched: CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, both CVSS 9.2. • Fixed in 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, and 8.2.35. You can still focus on detection coverage today. Security Labs writeup (coverage + guidance): elastic.co/security-labs/thr… Most PHP RCEs converge on the same outcome, whatever the bug: a web server process (php-fpm, php-cgi, apache2, httpd) doing something a request-serving daemon almost never does legitimately. • a shell to confirm access: id, whoami, uname -a • a second stage pulled in: curl http://... | bash • a reverse shell: bash -i >& /dev/tcp// • a webshell written into the web root The bug class is public now: out-of-memory corruption, and stale state reused by the same worker. The behavior is what you detect. We recently ran a different PHP RCE end-to-end (wp2shell): apache2 spawning dash to run id; whoami; hostname fired the exact rules that we suspect to catch php2shell. Payload Execution by Web Server kills the shell on the endpoint. The Suspicious/Unusual Command, Child, and File Creation via Web Server rules stack on top. (PHP did confirm partial php.ini mitigations. session.upload_progress.enabled=0 blocks the confirmed session paths only. Patch is still the fix.) Patch to 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, or 8.2.35. Verify that the stack is enabled now. Guidance + every rule link below.
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The China state-aligned threat actor Storm-0940 used the agentic AI penetration testing framework ARTEX to automate attacks targeting hundreds of organizations globally across a broad range of industries. Microsoft Threat Intelligence assesses that Storm-0940 was responsible for the recently disclosed ConnectWise supply chain compromise of a multitenant application. msft.it/6018aakEE Our investigation found that Storm-0940's use of ARTEX accelerated the speed of compromised application abuse to authenticate to target environments through applications that had already been granted access, allowing the threat actor to operate without requiring an interactive user sign-in. AI-accelerated follow-on activity included reconnaissance, application credential changes, and attempts to modify privileges that could enable expanded or persistent access. Read our blog for a detailed analysis and indicators of compromise (IOCs), along with Microsoft Defender detections, protection recommendations, and guidance on investigating service principal sign-ins and unexpected application credential or privilege changes.
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
Two critical PHP vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619), a leak before the patch and millions of PHP servers on the Internet. We used VirusTotal Internet Scanning to measure who is exposed, what they run and how to cut the window: blog.virustotal.com/2026/10/…
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
... get it while its hot... 😈 > CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619 (pre-patch PHP 8.x) > session.upload_progress UAF > jackalsyn.com/posts/php-up-2… > Courtesy of Me, @acd421 & @Archknight23 #CyberSecurity #infosec #php2shell #php
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
If you want to detection which devices in your estate have PHP installed and are exposed to the internet using #XDR use this KQL CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
Regarding the connectwise supply chain, @ConnectWise just posted 2 new related ips!
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
private keys from 8 intermediate CA certs have been compromised (eMudhra) Happy "Update everything" day to all my pager-carrying friends emudhra.we-have-a-problem.co…
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
We're hiring a Principal Security Research Engineer (AI Security)! Looking for someone with a strong background in threat research, detection & offensive security, and a passion for detecting and preventing AI threats. Apply here: tinyurl.com/2pd2u8sr
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
Re: the ConnectWise incident. App Instance Lock is the default in Entra ID as of June 2026. It's a good idea to go back now make sure it is enabled for multi-tenant apps: learn.microsoft.com/en-us/en…
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
More #connectwise iocs
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Microsoft Threat Intelligence is tracking an active supply chain attack in which a threat actor compromised the trusted OAuth App of the backup application ConnectWise Cloud Backup (AppId: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae), formerly SkyKick Backup, to obtain access tokens across customer tenants. ConnectWise Cloud Backup is a multitenant vendor application; customers grant consent for the application to operate in their tenants. We assess that the threat actor likely abused permissions previously granted by customers to the application, including highly elevated permissions like Directory.ReadWrite.All. On October 15, 2026, we observed broad successful service principal authentication originating from the IP address 144.172.64[.]128. Follow-on activity included Microsoft Graph API reconnaissance and attempts to add additional credentials on the related service principal in target tenants to maintain direct access as a backdoor. Microsoft Defender detects post-exploitation activity with the following alerts: - Any alert related to "Suspicious sign-in" - Graph API activity from a Microsoft threat intelligence IP address - Verified Threat Actor IP Defenders should review service principal sign-ins from unrecognized IP addresses, app credential changes, and OAuth grant activity associated with this specific OAuth AppId. In addition, we recommend looking for Threat Intelligence alerts on matching of IP against the Graph API activity and service principal activities. We will continue to monitor this incident and will share updates as they become available. We encourage customers to check ConnectWise advisory for more information and additional guidance: msft.it/6013aQBvV. Indicators of compromise (IOCs): - App name: ConnectWise Cloud Backup - AppId: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae - Publisher name: SkyKick - Source IP: 144.172.64[.]128 - User agents: Python-urllib/3.12, python-requests/2.31, python-requests/2.34.2
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Terrance DeJesus retweeted
RAPID RESPONSE: Huntress has become aware of a widespread security incident involving ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick). We’ve confirmed that an unknown threat actor abused the access they obtained in SkyKick to pivot to access customers' Microsoft 365 environments. 🧵
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