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PJ Harvey - Good Fortune youtu.be/gDBZZ3uvimE
Zašto naš narod tužakate strancima, piculiću štrokaderu, to je sve NVO vidra koja svojim pipcima hoće da obuhvati sve štoe srbsko, ljudi neka neko alarmira Fukšu i dase ovo sutra raspravi na blokadi!
Хвала на подршци шефу Мисије ЕУ у Србији, његовој екселенцији, господину амбасадору Андреасу фон Бекерату
@vBeckerath
🇷🇸🇪🇺🇸🇪
TheGunslinger retweeted
Najveća banka u Srbiji.
Kakav salto mortale.
Ima tek da se pegla...reputacioni rizik.
Evo ljudi ovo je istina potpuna. Gospodin @VladimirLoNs je nazalost bio u pravu. Neće biti u gubitku niko ko ima novca u fondovima ali ćemo možda malo čekati na prinos koji je uzet. Nije uzeto svima i nije jednako.
TheGunslinger retweeted
svi se čude kako je bia prisluškivala tužioce TOK-a, niko ne pita dal su imali - a deluje da jesu, prema pisanju radara - formalno odobrenje višeg suda u beogradu, predsednik dragan milošević
TheGunslinger retweeted
Ok here we go, a long post, but I would say, a necessary one.
Journalism should maintain a cool-headed perspective, yes. But it must also maintain impartiality and some good old-fashioned research. Neither is present in this post (I cannot comment on the article itself, as I have not read it).
First, on research.
1. On EU accession and Kosovo normalisation talks.
Had the author actually bothered to read the statements made by the Student List's candidates over the past few days, he would have seen that they intend to continue both EU accession negotiations and normalisation talks with Pristina.
This makes Martens' entire argument about abandoning negotiations, returning to the pre-Brussels Agreement situation and reversing the progress made so far considerably less well-founded than he portrays it.
There is a difference between analysing what a political movement has actually said it intends to do and speculating about what it might do. Martens appears to have confused the two.
2. On the supposed threat implied by the phrase "fight for Kosovo".
I am not a candidate on the Student List, nor a representative of @studentblokade but I have followed its campaign in considerable detail. And at no point have I seen anything to suggest that the word "fight" refers to war, violence or any other form of aggression. It seems to me that one would have to be particularly ill-disposed towards the movement to insist on such an interpretation.
Instead, let me offer an alternative.
Perhaps the "fight for Kosovo" refers to fighting for the rights of Serbs living in northern Kosovo, whose rights have been systematically undermined by the government led by Prime Minister Albin Kurti. A government that has repeatedly made unilateral moves, violated commitments made during the normalisation process and contributed to making everyday life increasingly difficult for the Serbian population.
Given everything the student movement has said and done, I find it far more plausible that its commitment to "fighting for Kosovo" refers to fighting for the rights of the Serbs who live there to lead normal, dignified lives.
Why is this interpretation not even considered?
3. On sanctions against Russia.
It is by no means a secret that a considerable proportion of the Serbian population supports Putin and his actions in Ukraine. That is a reality, however uncomfortable it may be.
But had the journalist in question done his research, he would have discovered that the students' opposition to sanctions against Russia is not necessarily rooted in sympathy for Putin or support for his invasion of Ukraine. Rather, it reflects their stated opposition to sanctions as a political instrument.
Martens may dismiss this distinction as irrelevant. But doing so would mean overlooking something rather important: Serbia is a country that has experienced international sanctions and whose population still has a living memory of their consequences.
And what does that memory tell us?
That sanctions caused enormous suffering among ordinary Serbian citizens, while Slobodan Milošević and those surrounding him continued to live remarkably comfortable lives.
From that experience emerged an understanding that sanctions often inflict far greater suffering on ordinary people than on the political elites they are supposedly designed to pressure.
One does not have to agree with this position to recognise that, from the perspective of a Serbian political movement, it is neither irrational nor particularly difficult to understand.
The distinction between opposing sanctions because one supports Putin and opposing sanctions because one questions their effectiveness and humanitarian consequences is a rather significant one. And it is precisely the kind of distinction that serious journalism ought to explore.
4. On genocide, the legacy of the 1990s and the claim that the Student List's victory is bad news for the Balkans.
Here, I would simply invite Martens to look at the campaign itself.
The students have achieved a historic rapprochement with the students of Novi Pazar, overcoming divisions that have shaped Serbian politics for decades. For the first time in many electoral cycles, elections in Novi Pazar were not won by a minority party.
They also invited a war veteran to speak outside RTS, where he explicitly rejected the division between "us" and "them" and spoke about how the hateful ideology propagated by RTS during the 1990s had been rejected by the younger generation leading the protests.
Nor is it true that the students have remained silent on Serbian crimes committed during the 1990s.
When Minister Snežana Paunović stated that, had she been in Slobodan Milošević's position, she would have ethnically cleansed Kosovo in 1998, the students were quick and unequivocal in their condemnation:
"In a democratic society, there can be no justification for calling for ethnic cleansing, whether as a historical hypothetical, a political message or a personal opinion. Therefore, Minister Snežana Paunović's statement that, had she been in Slobodan Milošević's position, she would have 'ethnically cleansed Kosovo in 1998' is unacceptable and entirely contrary to the Constitution, human rights and the dignity of every human being."
That seems like a rather unambiguous rejection of ethnic cleansing to me.
Finally, after months of accusations that the protesters were Ustaše, that Croatia was behind the protests and that the entire movement was somehow an anti-Serbian conspiracy orchestrated by neighbouring countries, it was the Student List's lead candidate who publicly expressed his hope for better political relations with Croatia.
These are not insignificant developments.
Taken together, and alongside numerous other examples that I cannot possibly fit into a single post, they suggest to me that relations between Serbia and its neighbours stand a far better chance of improving under the Student List than under those who have governed Serbia for the past 14 years.
Of course, genuine reconciliation will also depend on the willingness of other countries in the region to engage constructively. Serbia cannot improve regional relations on its own.
But to portray the students' victory as inherently bad news for the Balkans, while overlooking what they have actually said and done, strikes me as a remarkably selective reading of the evidence.
Second, on impartiality.
Martens knows perfectly well that this election campaign was not about foreign policy.
He also understands that what the students have achieved is historic.
A movement that is not a conventional political party, operating under electoral conditions that were heavily stacked against it, managed to defeat a political machine that had maintained an extraordinarily tight grip on power for 14 years.
And it did so by focusing on issues that actually matter to Serbian citizens: corruption, accountability, the rule of law, institutions and the functioning of the state.
In other words, rather than organising its campaign around what other countries consider strategically important in their relations with Serbia, the Student List organised it around what Serbian citizens themselves considered important.
And they won in a landslide.
Yet rather than giving this extraordinary political achievement the attention it deserves, Martens chose to focus on one of the most historically complicated and politically sensitive issues facing Serbia, using it to cast the entire movement in a negative light.
And that is his prerogative.
But if this is the standard of scrutiny he wishes to apply, I would be interested in seeing considerably more of it elsewhere.
I would like to read more from Martens about the unilateral measures taken by Kurti's government, or about the fact that Kosovo has still not established the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities, an obligation undertaken as part of the Brussels Agreement.
I would also welcome the same level of critical attention to the growing public displays of sympathy for the Ustaše movement in Croatia and what these developments mean for reconciliation in the region.
And if we were to extend this argument beyond the Balkans, the inconsistencies would become even more apparent.
Consider, for example, Donald Trump's willingness to permit the import of Russian diesel when it suited his administration's interests. Where is the comparable moral outrage? Where is the same insistence on interpreting every political decision through the most damning possible lens?
These issues rarely seem to receive the same kind of attention in Martens' commentary.
My objection is not that journalists should refrain from scrutinising the Student List. Quite the opposite. They absolutely should, and there are legitimate questions to ask about its policies, its future direction and its ability to govern.
But scrutiny is not the same thing as selecting the most unfavourable interpretation of a political movement's positions while disregarding the evidence that might complicate that interpretation.
Nor is impartiality achieved simply by being critical of whoever happens to be in the spotlight.
It requires consistency, context and a willingness to apply the same standards to everyone.
Then again, perhaps I should not be entirely surprised by this particular interpretation.
After all, we are talking about a journalist who once asked what could be done to "kill more Russians".
Amidst all the understandable joy over the change of power in Serbia, journalism must maintain a cool-headed perspective, including on the Serbian student movement and its spectacular success. For Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, I had a closer look at the foreign policy program of the Serbian student movement. It is a disaster. A summary in 8⃣ points.
TheGunslinger retweeted
Evo nekoliko iskustava iz Makedonije i nekih mojih razmišljanja o tome šta nova Vlada Srbije ne bi trebalo da radi. Delimično su zasnovana na našem iskustvu u Makedoniji, kada je srušen režim Gruevskog.
1) Ne spajajte studentski pokret sa Vladom. Sačuvajte njihove odvojene identitete.
Ovo može postati jedna od najvažnijih inovacija srpske političke tranzicije. Studenti treba da sačuvaju svoju nezavisnost, uključujući i pravo da kritikuju Vladu kojoj su sami pomogli da dođe na vlast.
Vlada mora da vlada. Studenti moraju ostati slobodni da zahtevaju odgovornost i dobro je što nema studenata na izbornim listama. Ali ta podela mora biti stvarna.
Nema garancije da će nova Vlada biti dobra, ali ako ostane sačuvano jezgro nezavisnih mladih ljudi, uvek će postojati neko ko može da održi veru u bolje upravljanje Srbijom.
2)Ne dozvolite da spoljna politika dominira.
Posebno ne u prvoj godini vlasti. Rusija, Kina, Kosovo i evropske integracije zahtevaju ozbiljno upravljanje, ali izbegavajte nepotrebne diplomatske potrese dok se domaće institucije stabilizuju.
Ne otvarajte nove spoljnopolitičke frontove dok ne stabilizujete vlast kod kuće. Ne morate u prvoj godini da rešite geopolitički identitet Srbije.
Tako nećete dati ni povod da se nastavi kampanja da ste vlast nametnuta od strane centara moći iz inostranstva.
3) Ne obećavajte brzu pravdu, već reforme.
Ovo svakako već radite, ali morate biti svesni da će od danas nezadovoljstvo po ovom pitanju samo rasti.
Iz našeg iskustva u Makedoniji, ljudi će tražiti da svi završe u zatvoru. Nikada neće biti zadovoljni ni brojem uhapšenih ni time ko je uhapšen.
Tu postoji ozbiljna zamka. Ako se Vlada meša u rad pravosuđa da bi ispunila očekivanja javnosti, ponavlja praksu prethodnog režima. Ako se ne meša, deo javnosti će je optuživati da štiti ljude iz starog sistema.
Zato upravljajte očekivanjima. Objasnite precizno, korak po korak, šta će se dešavati, šta Vlada može da uradi i u kojim rokovima. Obećavajte reforme i konkretne institucionalne korake, a ne presude i zatvorske kazne.
4) Ne dozvolite da apstraktne reforme postanu jedina politika.
Ljudi će brzo zaboraviti revoluciju i vratiti se svakodnevnoj realnosti. A to znači da ćete, pored reformi, morati da isporučujete i konkretne rezultate u ekonomiji i javnim uslugama, posebno u ekonomiji.
Nemojte ponoviti grešku makedonske Vlade i celu prvu godinu govoriti samo o transparentnosti.
Građani moraju da osete da promena vlasti donosi nešto konkretno u njihov svakodnevni život. Reforme institucija su neophodne, ali same po sebi neće biti dovoljne da održe podršku javnosti.
5) Ne gubite vreme na velike dugoročne strategije.
Imajte dugoročnu viziju, ali vladajte kroz kratkoročne, merljive i ostvarive ciljeve.
Niste u situaciji da sada trošite vreme na velike državne strategije i ambiciozne planove čije ostvarenje zavisi od niza budućih reformi.
U prvoj, pa i u prve dve godine mandata, fokusirajte se na mali broj ključnih, potpuno ostvarivih projekata i reformi.
Obećajte samo ono što zaista možete da realizujete u uslovima kada je čitav državni aparat još uvek u velikoj meri pod uticajem prethodne vlasti.
6) Ne dozvolite da unutrašnje ideološke razlike ugroze većinu.
Studente je ujedinio jedan zajednički cilj: poraz Vučićevog političkog sistema. Ali to ne znači da imaju iste stavove o Kosovu, Rusiji, EU, poreskoj politici, socijalnim pitanjima ili ekonomskim reformama.
Te razlike će postati mnogo vidljivije kada budu morali da glasaju o konkretnim odlukama Vlade.
U ovoj fazi prvo dogovorite ograničen tranzicioni program Vlade i jasne mehanizme za rešavanje eventualnih međusobnih neslaganja.
Ne mora ova Vlada da reši sva pitanja. Ako se ja pitam, ne mora uopšte da se bavi nijednim pitanjem oko kojeg ne postoji konsenzus. Sva sporna pitanja koja mogu da čekaju, neka čekaju dok ne preuzmete stvarne poluge vlasti.
7) Ne dozvolite da se korupcija i arogancija pojave u novoj Vladi. Secite ih u korenu.
Najveći politički kapital studenata je njihov kredibilitet. To je brend koji morate da čuvate kao oči u glavi.
U Makedoniji Vlada imenuje oko 800 funkcionera na rukovodeće pozicije, u Srbiji verovatno mnogo više.
Nećete moći sve da ih kontrolišete. Pojaviće se i pohlepni i glupi ljudi, a biće i nesposobnih.
Od samog početka uvedite stroge standarde integriteta i jasne sankcije za one koji ih ne budu poštovali. Ne sme biti izuzetaka, čak ni za ljude koji su imali istaknutu ulogu u protestima.
Jedan korupcionaški skandal ili bahat funkcioner iz vaših redova može da napravi ogromnu štetu, upravo zato što su očekivanja od vas mnogo veća nego od prethodne vlasti.
8) Ne dozvolite da Vučić i dalje bude glavni lik srpske politike.
Ovo je posebno važno. Vučić je godinama gradio politički sistem u kojem se sve vrti oko njega. Nemojte mu dozvoliti da i iz opozicije nastavi da određuje političku agendu.
Ako svakodnevno budete odgovarali na njegove izjave, optužbe i provokacije, on će i dalje ostati u centru političkog života.
Naravno, morate se baviti nasleđem njegovog režima, odgovornošću i reformama. Ali nemojte dozvoliti da se čitav politički život i dalje svodi na Vučića.
Nova vlast koja svakog dana govori o Vučiću rizikuje da ostane opozicija Vučiću, iako je već na vlasti.
Vi morate da postavljate teme, a ne samo da odgovarate na njegove.
Za kraj, jedna preporuka iz mog iskustva u kriznom PR-u.
9) Ne tretirajte prvih šest meseci kao period normalnog vladanja. Vi ste u krizi.
Vlada mora da funkcioniše u režimu kriznog menadžmenta od prvog dana.
Uspostavite centralni krizni štab pod direktnom nadležnošću premijera, koji će raditi sedam dana u nedelji. Njegov zadatak biće da predviđa probleme, koordinira institucije i obezbeđuje brzo donošenje i sprovođenje odluka.
Vlada mora da ima jednu jasnu i usaglašenu komunikaciju, ali i da postavlja dominantan narativ u javnosti, kao što se to radi u kriznim situacijama.
Ako vi ne objasnite šta se dešava, neko drugi će to objasniti umesto vas.
Srećno, svi navijamo za vas!
TheGunslinger retweeted
European countries where the President's party lost the election because of Wallachian magic






































