Treebeard

Orbán is facing criticism from allies for undermining the Schengen area's security as Hungary's 'National Card' scheme provides Russians, Belarusians with easy access to Schengen visas and residency permits. However, this issue is just the tip of the iceberg. Read on...👇🧵 🚩First of all, Hungary's so-called National Card grants the right to stay in Hungary for more than 90 days within a 180-day period, but for no longer than two years. The National Card can be renewed for up to an additional three years each time. This scheme was initially introduced to facilitate the employment of Ukrainian and Serbian migrant workers – then, on July 9, 2024, Viktor Orbán suddenly opened this opportunity to citizens of a number of Balkans countries, plus Russia and Belarus. It all happened at a time when Russian hybrid attacks and sabotage operations were targeting Baltic countries, Poland, and a number of other EU allies one after another. Orbán's move was seen as a clear provocation by multiple MEPs, who called on the EU to suspend Hungary's Schengen area membership. EU Commissioner for Home Affairs @YlvaJohansson reacted to the Hungarian measure on X: "Russia is a security threat. We need more, not less vigilance. Giving potential Russian spies and saboteurs easy EU access would undermine the security of us all. Today in a letter I ask the Hungarian government to explain. If their easy access scheme is a risk, we will act." Hungary's government is defiant. Foreign minister Péter Szijjártó stressed that the inclusion of Russian and Belarusian citizens in the National Card program poses no security risk to the Schengen Area, claiming that "these individuals must still undergo thorough checks to enter and stay in Hungary... Any claims to the contrary are outright lies from our Northern European and Baltic colleagues, blinded by their pro-war stance." However, dozens of past examples clearly show that Hungary's government and local authorities are either unable or unwilling to protect the security of the Schengen area – especially when it comes to a large number of immigrants and Russian citizens with ties to intelligence. 🚩In April, the Hungarian government already proposed a law "to quickly meet the special labor needs" of companies involved in the construction of Rosatom's Paks 2 nuclear plant project and China's first Belt and Road Initiative project for Hungary, the Budapest-Belgrade railway reconstruction. Specifically for these two projects, workers from so-called third countries outside the EU could obtain work-related residence permits through a simplified procedure, valid for five years from the date of issuance (this also applies to family members). Neighboring countries see Rosatom's Paks 2 project as a hotbed of Russian espionage. These concerns are not unfounded, as "Russia has a history of leveraging state-owned enterprises like Rosatom to cloak its intelligence activities," former senior Hungarian counterintelligence officer @peter1buda told me. As I recently wrote, the number of Russian citizens “working” on the Rosatom project in Hungary is expected to rise from around 400 currently to above 1,000 by 2025, according to a source with direct knowledge of the plans. The Russian colony in the city of Paks is planned to gradually rise to 6,000, and above. (Paks 2 is Rosatom's last such nuclear power plant project in the EU after Finland shut down its own following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.) 🚩It’s not only Russians and Belarusians gaining access to Hungary, but also Chinese nationals –specifically Chinese police officers. After signing a security agreement with China earlier this year, the Hungarian government has allowed these officers to patrol alongside their Hungarian counterparts, policing Chinese citizens within Hungary. Chinese dissidents express concern that this could enable Chinese authorities to carry out covert missions in other European countries within the Schengen zone and arbitrarily detain dissidents. In response, they have launched a petition urging NATO to intervene. As I previously reported, the agreement secretly grants Chinese security personnel the authority to bring and use their surveillance equipment within Hungary – again, inside the Schengen zone. The security pact has drawn significant international criticism, but the Orbán government dismissed the concerns, much like it did regarding the National Card scheme for Russians and Belarusians. 🚩Now, let’s discuss how Hungary handles border security and law enforcement. Between early 2023 and June 2024, Hungary released 2,290 out of 2,544 convicted human traffickers of foreign nationality from prison. In a highly controversial move that angered neighboring countries, Orbán's government began releasing foreign nationals convicted of human trafficking, citing overcrowded prisons and the argument that Hungarian taxpayers should not bear the cost of feeding foreign criminals. However, this was done without proper consultation with neighboring states. Upon release, these traffickers are expected to return to their home countries to complete their sentences, but compliance is left largely to their discretion. Notably, 16 of these released traffickers were re-arrested in Hungary, providing clear evidence that the government’s “get out of jail” policy is fueling further crime. (These numbers were uncovered by opposition Momentum party chairman @MartonTompos.) 🚩There's more. In 2023, approximately 40,000 undocumented migrants entered Slovakia, triggering a migration crisis and sparking panic along the Hungarian-Slovak border. This situation played directly into the hands of Orbán ally Robert Fico’s Smer party, boosting their support just before Slovakia’s parliamentary election. Numerous reports indicated that migrants crossed the Hungarian-Slovak border with little resistance, and despite Slovakia’s request for assistance, Hungarian authorities essentially did nothing. After Fico’s victory, the migrant flow suddenly ceased. Slovak police chief Štefan Hamran claimed that at least two terrorists were identified among the migrants allowed through by Hungary. Hungary’s inaction – or, as some Slovak politicians suggest, complicity – in Slovakia's migration crisis led to the introduction of temporary border checks in the region by several countries, including at the Slovak-Polish border. This clearly demonstrated that Hungary either could not or did not want to enforce proper border controls, immigration regulations, and security measures, forcing its neighbors to step in. 🚩When discussing Hungary as a counterintelligence black hole within the Schengen area and NATO, one must highlight the Russian-led International Investment Bank (IIB), often dubbed the "Russian spy bank" by the media. In 2019, despite strong protests from major NATO allies, the bank relocated its headquarters from Moscow to Budapest. Orbán’s government granted the IIB extensive diplomatic immunities, making it an ideal cover for Russian espionage activities. It soon emerged that the IIB’s chairman, Nikolay Kosov, hails from a family with deep KGB ties. His mother was involved in stealing US nuclear secrets, while his father played a role in suppressing the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and later became the KGB’s chief of station in Budapest. Notably, when the IIB was scouting for its new headquarters in Budapest, they conveniently considered office spaces directly opposite the US Embassy in Budapest. For years, Orbán’s government ignored NATO allies' security concerns about the IIB being a vehicle for Russian influence and espionage, leading to US sanctions against the bank. These sanctions ultimately pressured Hungary into severing ties with the IIB. 🚩There’s also a well-known example that highlights how poorly Hungarian counterintelligence and immigration officers vet Russian applicants for visas and residency permits. In 2014, Orbán’s government launched its own golden visa scheme, which, as later uncovered by my colleagues at @direkt36, had the weakest security checks compared to other EU immigration programs. Through this scheme, not only did Putin’s allies and a notorious Russian mobster obtain Hungarian residency permits and Schengen visas, but so did Russian spy chief Sergey Naryshkin's son and his family. Adding to the absurdity, we later revealed – together with Ukrainian OSINT experts at @molfar_agency – that Naryshkin’s registered Hungarian address was listed as the luxury apartment of a Georgian-Israeli businessman, who happens to be an old friend of the Hungarian minister overseeing national security agencies (and who initiated the whole golden visa scheme). This not only suggests that Hungarian authorities are failing in their duties, but also points to possible political protection enabling such activities. 🚩Let’s now turn to the numerous instances of Russian diplomats conducting espionage in Hungary without facing any consequences. One prominent example is undercover GRU officer Anton Goriev, who infiltrated Hungarian far-right and far-left circles. Although Hungarian counterintelligence was well aware of him, there seemed to be no political will to take action. However, after being reassigned to Bratislava, Goriev was quickly expelled for espionage. By that time, he had already attracted the attention of Slovak authorities due to a drunk driving incident in which he hit a woman with his car in a parking lot. 🚩Last but not least, the real concern for EU and NATO allies is that Hungary has effectively become a logistics hub for Russian intelligence within the Schengen area. Unlike Vienna, often regarded as the region's Russian spy capital, Budapest and Hungary play a more passive yet crucial role. "Hungary’s role for Russian intelligence involves providing a base for couriers, operations staff, safe houses, and car rentals. It’s far more practical to manage these activities within the Schengen area than in the Balkans. While it’s impossible to determine exactly how many operations are conducted from Hungary, the volume is very high," a former Hungarian security officer told me already years ago. What does it mean for Budapest to be a logistics hub? The blowing up of the Vrbetice ammunition depot in the Czech Republic serves as a telling example. As @bellingcat's investigation revealed, "the operation involved at least two GRU officers who traveled under diplomatic cover to Budapest, a roughly five-hour drive from the munitions depot, shortly before the explosions." "For Russian intelligence, Budapest and the Russian Embassy are crucial primarily for their logistical and transit functions. Hungary’s geographic location makes it a gateway to both the West and the Carpathian Basin—strategically connecting to Ukraine, Romania (key countries for the U.S.), and the Balkans," a former chairman of the Hungarian parliament’s national security committee told me. 🔗For links and sources to these stories, check the connecting posts👇