bjpz77 (@bjppx77) header
bjpz77 (@bjppx77) profile picture
Joined August 2014
Photo by bjpz77 (@bjppx77)Photo by bjpz77 (@bjppx77)Photo by bjpz77 (@bjppx77)Photo by bjpz77 (@bjppx77)Photo by bjpz77 (@bjppx77)Photo by bjpz77 (@bjppx77)Photo by bjpz77 (@bjppx77)Photo by bjpz77 (@bjppx77)Photo by bjpz77 (@bjppx77)Photo by bjpz77 (@bjppx77)
This is a direct consequence of Monday's export controls, and the first of many. China was undoubtedly exploiting this loophole to the tune of billions of dollars. We will soon start to see which companies' entire business models was built around providing AI compute to China. It will also be interesting to see how these companies adapt to this new environment. Legitimate cloud companies that have no ties to China and have no Chinese hardware in their data centers, but were simply profiting from the remote access loophole, will almost certainly be able to rent all of their computing power to U.S. and allied companies, who will no doubt be more than happy to have it. But cloud companies that were straight-up Chinese cutouts, such as Megaspeed, face a more difficult challenge. Many U.S. and allied companies will presumably not want to work with them, given they would likely just funnel all their data (and potentially even model weights) back to Beijing. So these companies could be stuck with a giant data center full of chips, but no customers to rent them to. This leaves a few possibilities for these Chinese cutouts: (1) sell their existing chips in datacenters outside of China to a U.S. or allied buyer; (2) illegally smuggle their existing chips to China; or (3) illegally continue to rent access to their chips to China or to Chinese cutouts, and hope that Commerce doesn't enforce Monday's ban on this. The U.S. government must monitor this space very closely. If we don't see Chinese shell companies like Megaspeed sell off their current stockpile of AI chips located outside China, it could mean that they are illegally smuggling them to China, or are illegally still renting access to them to China. This also shows why the efficacy of Monday's rule all hinges on whether the Department of Commerce will enforce it.
Datasection (3905.T) just cut FY revenue guidance by 89%, from ¥162B to ¥17B, and the stock went limit-down. This is the "Japanese neocloud" that the FT reported is effectively a Tencent datacenter: Chinese offtake, Nvidia Blackwell GPUs, Japanese flag. (1/8)🧵
8
45
11
122
18,581
Trump tried to pull Putin right next to him for the family photo, only for Xi to send the Russian dictator further down the line — not even next to Xi, but past China’s First Lady. Watch Putin shuffling off to the sidelines, looking visibly deflated. Global superpower, my ass 😁
973
2,463
309
17,047
5,822,195
特朗普即将在中国与习近平会晤,白宫内部关于在人工智能领域如何限制中国的问题上分歧公开化。特朗普表示他不想”冒犯中国“,仍然试图淡化黄仁勋事件的国家安全风险。“一个想对中国友好,另一个则想跟中国大干一场,”特朗普在启程前往亚洲之前谈到财政部长贝森特与商务部长卢特尼克时说。cn.nytimes.com/usa/20261118/…
13
11
1
59
39,019
bjpz77 retweeted
「最低限の礼儀もなく、本当に失礼」 高市首相の待遇に「格差」 mainichi.jp/articles/2026111… トランプ大統領やプーチン大統領ら他国の首脳が到着した時と比べて簡素な出迎えで、他国との待遇「格差」が際立ちました。日本の外務省幹部は「外交上最低限の礼儀もなく、本当に失礼だ」と憤りました。
3,752
2,692
2,866
13,880
10,430,153
Muddy Waters is short $NVDA A woman identified as Cenly Chen, referred to in some photograph tags as Cenly Puri, has been photographed in public between 2024 to 2026 with Ajay K. Puri. Until this June, Mr. Puri was likely the third most senior executive at NVDA, behind only Jensen Huang and Colette Kress. His title was EVP Worldwide Field Operations and his total compensation was slightly above Ms. Kress’ in fiscal years 2024 to 2026.4 Mr. Puri was one of only five NVDA executives named in the 2026 Proxy. Separately, consolidated class action complaint filed against Super Micro Computer Inc. in October 2026 alleges that former SMCI Chief Growth Officer, a woman named Cenly Chen, “managed [SMCI’s] acquisition of GPU chips from NVIDIA” and “decided how to distribute [NVDA GPUs] among Super Micro’s customers.” In March this year, the U.S. indicted three individuals associated with SMCI, including a co-founder, for illegally selling at least approximately $2.5 billion of SMCI servers with NVDA GPUs to end customers in China through a Southeast Asian front company. Referring to the ex-SMCI executive, the class action complaint alleges that there was “no way Cenly Chen lacked knowledge of [SMCI’s] illicit sales.” Mr. Puri left NVDA in late June 2026, and the former SMCI executive named Cenly Chen left SMCI in late April or early May 2026. Mr. Puri continues to serve in a senior advisory role to NVDA. Nobody by the name of Cenly Chen has been indicted or otherwise accused of criminal conduct by any government. The allegations in the class action are unproven. The question is whether the woman identified as Cenly Chen or Cenly Puri in photographs with Mr. Puri is the same Cenly Chen formerly employed by SMCI.
210
478
259
2,503
1,327,261
Jensen Huang reportedly instructed his team at Nvidia "never to think about" planning for a Taiwan contingency. Despite the fact that their business is reliant on TSMC. The Jensen-Megaspeed mess really puts these incredible — and barely-noticed — details from Stephen Witt's The Thinking Machine in a new light: Huang refuses to consider the impact on his global business if China were to blockade or invade Taiwan, despite the regular threats emanating from Beijing to do just that. “To my great surprise, Nvidia had done no contingency planning for this eventuality,” Witt writes. He quotes Deb Shoquist, Nvidia’s executive vice-president of operations: “If something happens to Taiwan and TSMC, the ramifications are so large it’s almost like asking me what I’d do if California fell into the ocean.” Huang had instructed her “never to think about this question.” —from my @nybooks essay earlier this year on Nvidia and American policy toward China: nybooks.com/articles/2026/02… —more thoughts from me today: juliangewirtz.substack.com/p…
123
270
87
1,121
442,293
South Lake Tahoe, CA (NOV.17.2026)- Bring it on.
49
199
35
1,978
89,825
Anne Thurston Has Died. She Revealed Salacious Details of Mao’s Life. Dr. Thurston’s works documented Mao Zedong’s personal life and the traumas of the Cultural Revolution, earning scholarly accolades — and scorn from Beijing. nytimes.com/2026/11/17/world…
7
41
2
110
5,893
Trump and Xi will meet in Shenzhen Thursday. In today’s @ForeignAffairs, I argue that the so-called “detente” they struck a year ago is now under severe strain. Busan is cracking over rare earths, a new Democratic Congress will check Trump, and the Nvidia scandal is triggering new export controls. After a year of calm, we may be in for a period of tension. Beijing has used the detente to press its advantage. It is locking in its industrial leadership, coercing its neighbors, and keeping rare earth flows tight to keep the U.S. on a tight leash. Meanwhile, the U.S. has been accommodating. But Beijing is overreaching. If the United States believes Beijing will throttle rare earths no matter what it does, there is little reason for continued restraint. With the trade truce expiring January 10, time is running out for the two leaders to extend or preserve it. The meeting in Shenzhen, and the next one in Miami in December, are the last few opportunities to stabilize. -- A summary of the key points: 1) Chinese scholars see the current detente as temporary. Chen Dongxiao calls the detente a “tactical truce.” Wu Xinbo said it was “tactical stability” that is “neither sustainable nor solid.” And Shen Weizhong, a former Chinese foreign ministry official, says: “The more time we have, the better prepared we might be towards a final showdown on Taiwan or maybe another trade war.” 2) Chinese scholars believe China’s strength built the detente, not diplomacy. Wang Yong called the trade war “a tipping point in terms of strength.” Wu writes it “is not the result of the U.S. side having a change of heart or showing goodwill, but was won by China through arduous striving and struggle.” Wang Yong of Peking University calls the trade war’s outcome “a tipping point in terms of strength.” 3) Chinese scholars credit Trump personally for American conciliation. Chen Dongxiao points to his “distinct and unique decision-making style.” Zhao Minghao writes that Trump “admires power and prefers to engage with the leaders of powerful countries.” Others write he would "readily sacrifice" Taiwan. They want to lock in the current stability, as Xi declared, for three years and beyond. 4) Trump has indeed been accommodating so far. He kept tariffs on China well below the cap. He paused entity listings for the longest period since 2008. He let advanced AI chips flow to China and its Southeast Asian cutouts. And he held up arms sales to Taiwan and offered only muted support to Japan and the Philippines under Chinese pressure. 5) Beijing is pulling up the tech ladder and preparing for the next fight. New State Council orders threaten foreign firms that cut ties with Chinese partners. Exit bans keep key talent and their families in the country. Export controls on manufacturing equipment keep others from catching up. National security regulations on scientific publication protect domestic know-how. And rare-earth licenses force foreign buyers to hand over customer lists and production details, giving China a map of chokepoints. 6) Beijing is taking advantage of American conciliation to press its advantages in Asia, breaking past precedent. A China Coast Guard crew clubbed a Philippine sailor near Second Thomas Shoal. They blocked a resupply mission during Xi’s state visit to Washington, breaking a two-year agreement. Japan now faces the broadest coercion campaign in more than a decade, existentially threatening some of its manufacturers. And around Taiwan, the PLA fired rockets closer to the island than ever before. Washington has largely stood by. 7) Beijing is breaking the Busan agreement. Washington has complied with the terms of the Busan agreement, suspending the Affiliates Rule and lowering tariffs, but Beijing has throttled the supply of rare-earth minerals and magnets to the United States. U.S. officials say China has delivered only about two-thirds of what it promised, and trade data suggest the shortfall is larger still. Shortages of yttrium, used for jet engines and gas turbines, have forced some suppliers to suspend production. Chipmakers are running short of scandium. Beijing believes strength built detente, and more strength will preserve it - not backfire. 8) The way forward at Shenzhen. The two sides are unlikely to save the truce at Shenzhen. We should expect few breakthroughs on agriculture, aviation, or even AI despite the need. But the leaders should at least announce they are working to extend the truce ahead of the December meeting in Miami. If they fail, and tensions mount, there is a growing risk of runaway escalation. foreignaffairs.com/united-st…
13
57
8
155
25,883
The real scandal is not the sex or the spies. It's the chip smuggling. There's a lot of smart people playing stupid about this.
303
689
54
2,957
85,872
The Chinese Communist Party is building a system to watch and control Chinese communities abroad. A new report from Safeguard Defenders finds it operating in more than 90 countries, including Canada, @CTVNews’ @judyatrinh reports. 1/5
16
270
29
500
20,212
And..this is how it all works under the CCP’s authoritarian state. Everything and everyone must benefit China, at all costs. Soon, we will uncover how the Nvidia chips made their way to the PLA to build weapon systems to one day be used against America and our military. @WSJ. Eyes wide open. wsj.com/world/china/alice-hu…
17
91
8
208
6,195
Important find & sharp eyes as always @mattsheehan88! This chimes with what I've been observing and wrote about, e.g. in September for @thewirechina : thewirechina.com/2026/09/29/…. It's worth noting that this latest piece echoes a point that was striking to me across Xi's July WAIC speech in Shanghai + the Cyberspace Administration's September AI risk five-point warning, which is that AI capability is possibly outpacing governance readiness. For Chinese leaders, this is a big deal and is a controllability issue. I wrote about the former for @AsiaSociety @AsiaPolicy in July: centerforchinaanalysis.asias…. Specifically, this latest piece reads: "人工智能技术的自主迭代特征,使治理对象始终处于高度不确定的动态变化中。人工智能是具备自主迭代能力的通用颠覆性技术,多模态融合、自主智能体、具身智能接连实现跨越式突破,风险场景随之持续翻新。高阶自主智能体已显现出持续自我进化的复杂特征,其能力边界难以用传统技术评估框架加以预判。这意味着人工智能全球治理面对的不是一个静态的技术应用形态,而是一个能力持续跃迁、应用场景不断拓展的变量,治理靶心始终处于移动变化中。". Notably, elsewhere in the piece, it reads: "更令人警惕的是,前沿模型已有脱离人类约束的迹象,人工智能在智能爆发的过程中有可能发展出与人类预期不一致的目标,甚至可能出现威胁人类生存的重大安全风险。这些风险的共同特征是不分国界、传导迅速,任何单一国家的安全管控与应急处置都力有不逮。". TL;DR: Chinese elites are between moderately & very AI-safety pilled, hence 'China's AI safety catch-up is hiding in plain sight'. All this is to say, the room for AI safety-dealmaking in the next 1-2 years is substantial, if only we can keep the political tension checked. On this point, it's worth calling attention to this paragraph warning against export control extension and escalation, and an ideological/ values-driven approach to bilateral engagement and relationship management. It links such actions to potential damage to bilateral trust, as well as the difficulty they pose to further advancing bilateral cooperation in military AI, open-sourcing of AI, and coordinated risk assessment 'and other key domains': "地缘政治博弈激烈,严重侵蚀多边合作信任根基。百年变局下的地缘叙事向科技领域深度延伸,个别国家将人工智能泛安全化与工具化,连续多轮出台单边出口管制,人为割裂人工智能全球产业链;绕开联合国大搞俱乐部式小圈子,强行输出单一价值标准,完全排斥全球南方国家的核心诉求。这种做法不仅在事实上进一步拉大了南北智能鸿沟,更导致大国互信持续走低,军用人工智能管控、开源共享、联合风险评估等关键领域的合作难以推进。" A point that I also predicted and have been warning about esp. in the post-Busan Summit age, where it's unclear that geopolitically speaking, either side holds overwhelmingly strong bargaining chips (no pun intended): xitter.gq/kristy_loke/status/211…
Yesterday, the CCP's top theoretical journal (求是, Seeking Truth) published a major piece on AI governance and risks. I think this is clearly the strongest & most urgent language on existential risks used in such an authoritative outlet. See below for comp to recent major doc.
2
4
1
10
1,420
CNN’s live feed was cut in China when my report revealed details of the investigation into Alice Huang’s suspected ties to China’s spy agency, claims Beijing denies. – at National Capital Region, Republic of the Philippines
222
617
61
1,504
195,443
One of the most important bipartisan Congressional reports on China in years, and its out of the Select Committee whose very existence is now in doubt. The report discusses how China’s industrial targeting poses existential challenges to American industry and jobs absent policy change. Notable from @RoKhanna: “Over decades, the CCP has identified strategic industries and technologies, and sought to dominate them. Unfortunately, America’s workers, communities, and security have paid the price. As China intensifies its efforts to win the innovation competition and monopolize key supply chains, we must learn from the past and invest in the future.” One of our only ways out of that, as Kurt Campbell and I argue, is with investment and protection from China’s export capacity at home and “allied scale” with partners abroad to pool markets, capital, tech, and know-how. But there’s also a role for diplomacy with Beijing. We need explain, as hard as the task may be, that what we are doing is not intended to be a hostile provocation but is instead the kind of necessary protection for our workers and industries that they too have pursued for decades. chinaselectcommittee.house.g…
12
73
3
192
19,921
bjpz77 retweeted
Just read a Chinese article calling this "the darkest moment for Chinese AI." Seeing pushback in the comments, but basically it lays out the bear case quite extensively: 1. Getting compute is harder whichever way you go. Buying advanced NVIDIA chips is difficult, renting GPUs overseas is coming under pressure, and proposed restrictions on chipmaking equipment could make domestic alternatives harder to produce too. 2. Catching up could get a lot more expensive. If learning from leading models’ outputs aka distillaion becomes harder, Chinese labs have to spend more on their own data, experiments and training. That gets uncomfortable if investors are also losing patience. Independent labs don’t have an advertising or e-commerce business to pay the bills. 3. Robot-brain startups could find their advantage disappearing. Frontier labs are moving into robotics, potentially eating into what specialist models can offer. Meanwhile, robots still have to make economic sense against China’s relatively low labor costs. 4. More users don’t necessarily mean enough revenue. China has huge digital audiences, but getting people and businesses to pay sustainably for AI is another question. Everyone is competing on price, American models are getting cheaper too, and research isn’t getting cheaper. 5. Even the areas where China already leads face risks. Optical-component suppliers are benefiting from AI infrastructure spending, but proposed US restrictions could threaten access to major customers. That’s a lot hitting at once. The worry is that companies keep making better models while needing more money to stay competitive, without earning enough to fund the next round. Now, it feels like every six months it is a "darkest moment" for Chinese AI. But I think these are real concerns. We'll focus on this topic at @techbuzzchina (and present some hope, I think) next week.
120
172
40
1,324
321,201
Nvidia engineer Darrell Dai posts his ‘I quit Nvidia’ message from an account in mainland China on an app that’s blocked in mainland China. Security services monitor anything he says. So let’s try a test to know he’s speaking his heart. @darrell_dai: Tell us 3 major mistakes XJP has made that Chinese leaders should consider before extending his lifetime rule.
Treat this post for what it is -- published under a regime specializing in censorship, propaganda, and political warfare. Darrell Dai is based in Shanghai, not the United States. At the height of an international scandal about the founder of Nvidia and his ties to Chinese intelligence, assume at a minimum that Dai knows Chinese authorities care a lot about what he says.
15
34
153
12,788
Yesterday the US moved to shut off China’s access to remote chip rentals. For a sense of just how blatant these rentals can be, check out the website of ZOSIM, a Jiangsu-based company that advertises remote access to restricted Nvidia H100 chips right on its homepage:
10
31
2
89
7,364
1/7 Ruchir Sharma: "So far this year, 80 per cent of global equity flows have gone into the US market, double the long-term average. No other country has ever drawn such a large share." ft.com/content/1f1a2a9b-9429…
22
146
10
729
73,310
bjpz77 retweeted
The NY Times has the receipts today. Here's how the Nvidia Blackwell chip laundering worked. 1. Nvidia was blocked from selling Blackwell chips to China. So Jensen Huang sold them to Alice Huang at Megaspeed which installed them in data centers in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 2. Howard Lutnick's family and company (Cantor Fitzgerald) were also heavily invested in these southeast Asian data centers and Lutnick blocked regulatory enforcement against Nvidia. 3. The data centers then either sold compute to China or hollowed out the servers and shipped the Blackwell chips directly to China. (Reports of hollowed out servers are from others on X, not in the articles.) 4. Nvidia could claim correctly that they had not shipped Blackwell chips to China. But the Megaspeed middlewoman (Alice Huang) was clearly facilitating Chinese access. 5. The Trump administration has known this for a year. Jensen Huang and President Trump were eager to sell Blackwells to China so they opposed the restrictions and didn't seem to mind the circumventions of the embargo. Secretary Rubio seems to be the main character within the administration trying to enforce the law. It is also true that no one can run Nvidia other than Jensen Huang. So we are left in the unfortunate position where the CEO of the most important tech company in the world messed up and now the stock is going to crater and lots of people won't be able to retire because their stock portfolio just got nuked. nytimes.com/2026/11/14/techn… nytimes.com/2026/11/15/us/po…
1,067
4,003
453
12,936
2,534,943