Blyss retweeted
Very good article on homomorphic encryption and Private Information Retrieval blintzbase.com/posts/pir-and…
This Valentine's Day, send that someone special something *truly* private ;)
Use homomorphic encryption to send a ~super secret~ valentine at valentine.blyss.dev!
Replying to @randhindi
Yeah we’ve taken a first stab at btc.usespiral.com. The dream is a full node that never learns what you query.
Instead of trying to hide IP’s, we can *cryptographically* hide the content of RPC calls!
We have some cool demos and a blog post: blintzbase.com/posts/pir-and…
The most recent relevant paper is probably eprint.iacr.org/2022/949.pdf, which also has citations to other recent work.
Replying to @liamzebedee @maxgillett
For IPFS, a ‘private Kademlia’ would be the goal. The underlying IP activity (which servers you ultimately bitswap with) is difficult to keep private, but we may at least be able to avoid broadcasting the desired content hash to random people in the network.
We're giving a talk on the practical challenges of FHE for private information retrieval tomorrow at 9am PDT!
Have you registered for tomorrow's Meetup? Samir Menon from @SpiralPrivacy will talk about "Real-world deployment of FHE-based private information retrieval".
🔗 All info here: meetup.com/fhe-org/events/28…
#HomomorphicEncryption #FHE
Replying to @cronokirby
There is cool FHE work being done to make private light clients more private and less costly. This paper has some interesting techniques for Zcash: eprint.iacr.org/2021/1256.pd…
It's kind of surprising that this kind of private retrieval is even possible!
We have a blog post with a high-level explanation of how it actually works:
blintzbase.com/posts/pir-and…
And there's an academic paper for the underlying scheme:
ia.cr/2022/368
If you want to try it...
sign up for our private beta: forms.gle/dk2So1ci9AM4n8iM6
and book time with us to chat about your use case: calendly.com/samirmenon/spir…
Under the hood, we use a new "private" key-value store, powered by homomorphic encryption. It's like a regular KV store, but the server can't learn *anything* about which items are read. It's a powerful new primitive for making privacy-preserving apps.
Your browser doesn't send anything past the # in the URL to our server; instead, the "# vitalik.eth" is used by JS on the page to homomorphically encrypt a query, and send this to the server. The server can 'magically' produce an encrypted response without learning vitalik.eth.
We just launched sprl.it, a .eth resolver that uses homomorphic encryption to cryptographically ensure privacy. No third party, not even our server, can see which .eth URLs you resolve.
Link to vitalik.eth as "sprl.it/#vitalik.eth"
Blyss retweeted
🎉🗓 The next Meetup is scheduled for Tuesday Oct 25th. Samir from @SpiralPrivacy will be talking about private information retrieval using FHE, including some real world use cases.
🔗 Join here: meetup.com/fhe-org/events/28…
#HomomorphicEncryption #FHE
Blyss retweeted
New @rust_blockchain newsletter dropped! Be sure to scroll down to the Rust in Bitcoin section! Kudos to @dr_orlovsky on BIP-372, and the new Spiral explorer project is so impressive, it made it as the 2nd Bitcoin project to be featured in the newsletter!
rustinblockchain.org/newslet…
Replying to @oscpacey @spiralbtc
Sure! Essentially, the client encrypts its query in a special way and sends this to the server. The server can evaluate the encrypted query on the database, and get an encrypted result, but can't learn anything about the query/result.
Blog post: blintzbase.com/posts/pir-and…
Diagram:

ALT Diagram of how private information retrieval using homomorphic encryption works. 1. Build a one-hot vector for the desired index "3" 2. Encrypt each bit using the secret key 3. Send the ciphertexts to the server 4. Homomorphically multiply each ciphertext by a database item 5. Homomorphically add all the ciphertexts 6. Send a ciphertext back to the client 7. Decrypt and obtain the desired item
New blog post explaining (from scratch) private information retrieval using homomorphic encryption
blintzbase.com/posts/pir-and…
Replying to @spiralbtc
Hey, we're the creators of btc.usespiral.com. We have an unfortunate name collision with @spiralbtc. The name was chosen a while before applying our work to BTC.
Happy to answer any questions ppl have!





