burger (@burger403) profile picture

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Joined June 2023
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burger retweeted
Bulletproof hosting doesn't run on its own. It depends on facilitators: IP address brokers, carriers, data centers. Remove the facilitators, and the operation stops working. In this blog, Threat Investigator Jonas Arnold looks at how we hold those facilitators accountable, and why an approach that's slow and methodical still beats one that's fast and shallow. A few things the data shows: ๐Ÿ‘‰๏ธ IPv4 address brokers are a critical chokepoint for bulletproof hosters ๐Ÿ‘‰๏ธ Carrier and broker responses to SBL listings reveal a lot about their intentions ๐Ÿ‘‰๏ธ Clustering internet badness at specific facilitators makes them attractive to law enforcement ๐Ÿ‘‰๏ธ Evasion tactics from miscreants signal that the pressure is actually working In case you missed it, read the full post here โคต๏ธ spamhaus.org/resource-hub/buโ€ฆ #BulletproofHosting #ThreatIntel #Cybercrime #HostingProviders
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burger retweeted
Something new is coming for abuse.ch contributors...๐Ÿ‘€ #WatchThisSpace #CommunityHub #SharingIsCaring ๐Ÿ˜ป๐Ÿฅ‡๐Ÿ’›
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Any known issues? @abuse_ch
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burger retweeted
Our platforms were recently targeted by a large-scale web scraping operation originating from devices that are apparently participating in residential proxy networks ๐Ÿ˜๏ธ ๐Ÿ–ฅ๏ธ . The vast majority of these requests were successfully blocked by our existing mitigations ๐Ÿ›‘ . However, the sheer volume of traffic caused temporary disruptions to both the MalwareBazaar and URLhaus platforms โš ๏ธ To put the scale into perspective, our web platforms typically handle approximately 1,500 requests per second (excluding traffic to our community API and commercial APIs). During this incident, the scraping operation leveraged more than 135,000 unique IP addresses, most of which could be identified as nodes in residential proxy networks ๐Ÿ” The offender attempted to remain undetected by sending very few requests (less than 5) per IP address to the platforms ๐Ÿ•ต Below are the top networks sourcing this traffic (by unique IPs): 2,961 AS25019 SAUDINETSTC ๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ฆ 1,995 AS206206 KNET ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ถ 1,984 AS9121 TTNet ๐Ÿ‡น๐Ÿ‡ท 1,954 AS3215 Orange ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท 1,871 AS12322 PROXAD ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท 1,550 AS5410 BOUYGTEL-ISP ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท 1,531 AS37705 TOPNET ๐Ÿ‡น๐Ÿ‡ณ 1,413 AS8193 BRM-AS ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฟ We are sharing details of the involved IPs, along with the relevant timestamps, here for your awareness โคต๏ธ raw.githubusercontent.com/abโ€ฆ
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๐ŸŽ‰ Weโ€™re proud to sponsor the 38th #FIRSTCon in Denver next month alongside our partner @abuse_ch! Some of the team will be there, joined by colleagues from The @spamhaus Project. ๐Ÿ‘€ Keep an eye out for a couple of presentations from the team - weโ€™ll share more details closer to the time...
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Honored to be a top contributor and a part of the Threat Intelligence Community. Glad to see @abuse_ch and @spamhaus recognizing the work done by volunteers :D
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