FinCEN's order on MEXC Global takes effect December 10. From then, covered U.S. financial institutions can't send funds to or from MEXC.
Run an exchange, payment flow or on-ramp? Check your exposure now. SAR and OFAC obligations don't change.
federalregister.gov/document…
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This is a bill introduced November 13, not a final rule. Korean exchanges would have to confirm who owns a self-custody wallet they transact with, and could hold or return transfers when AML risk can't be mitigated.
policy.4pillars.io/news/3704… xitter.gq/BitcoinArchive/status/…
Deconflict.com retweeted
The FBI is warning cryptocurrency/web3 industry and open-source software maintainers about FaceStealer, a highly effective social engineering scheme used by North Korean cyber actors to steal cryptocurrency and target the software supply chain. Over the last 18 months, the scheme has resulted in the theft of more than $400 million. Learn how it works and how to protect yourself at ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf
The practical line in DOJ's update is for exchanges. The FBI asked VASPs to block transactions with, or derived from, the addresses being used to launder the Binance funds.
Direct matches are the easy part. "Derived from" means funds that already went through bridges, mixers or another exchange. Your team should decide now how far back it traces exposure, and write it down.
justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-d…
xitter.gq/sashahodler/status/212…
The DOJ and its private sector partners froze $2.7 BILLION tied to the Binance hack.
DOJ has court approval to seize or restrain over $1.2B of it.
North Korea is getting sloppy.
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Deconflict.com retweeted
Banks will tokenise their assets. Institutions will tokenise their assets. Companies will tokenise their assets. Investment funds will tokenise their assets. Asset managers will tokenise their assets. Private equity firms will tokenise their assets. Real estate firms will tokenise their properties. Governments will explore tokenising financial instruments.
Deconflict.com retweeted
SAFEGUARDING AMERICA'S FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE.
Since January 2026, the @SecretService has completed 70 fraud operations, recovering 694 skimmers and preventing an estimated $722.9 million in fraud loss.
Thanks to the efforts of the @WHFraudTF, the federal government has NEVER fought harder to protect the American taxpayer and bring scammers to justice.
🚨 $16 billion. That's the amount Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, US Treasury says moved through MEXC between May 2021 and May 2026, tied to Iranian, Russian, and North Korean sanctions evasion and cybercrime.
On November 6, Treasury used Section 9714 of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act to name MEXC a primary money laundering concern. Covered U.S. financial institutions will be prohibited from transmitting funds to or from the exchange, fiat or crypto, starting 30 days after Federal Register publication. Customer balances aren't frozen and trading continues. The practical effect is a cutoff from U.S. banking rails.
The order lays out roughly $1.5 billion linked to Russian sanctions evasion, including $232 million in direct transactions with sanctioned entities and continued dealings with Garantex and its successor Grinex as recently as June 2026. It also cites about $1 billion in direct transactions with more than 40 Iranian exchangers, and about $22 million benefiting the Central Bank of Iran and the IRGC Qods Force. FinCEN calls the AML and sanctions controls severely deficient at a platform operating without a VASP license in Seychelles.
I'm not surprised by any of this. Most investigators I talk to have watched scam, theft, and pig butchering proceeds land on MEXC and KuCoin Exchange for years, and requests from law enforcement to either one have gone largely unanswered. KuCoin pleaded guilty in 2025 and paid around $300 million, yet the same complaints from victims and tracers kept coming.
A national security case built over several years gets a Treasury order. A detective with one victim's funds sitting at that exchange gets silence. Those two things have always run on separate tracks, and the second track is where most of the victims are.
🚔 When agencies working separate cases find their trails ending at the same destination, that pattern is only visible if someone can compare notes. Deconflict is free for law enforcement.
learn more at deconflict.com
Deconflict.com retweeted
We’ve handed brand books to 50+ founders. Most end up in a folder.
Most of what companies ship now is made by founders and AI, not designers.
So we built BrandOS. One brand, two forms: a book for people, a system for AI.
Craft comes from people. Trust comes from consistency.
Deconflict.com retweeted
The FBI is releasing information advising the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) was responsible for the theft of more than $6 billion USD in virtual assets from cryptocurrency exchange, Binance, on or about October 29, 2026. The FBI refers to this specific North Korean malicious cyber activity as "TraderTraitor."
The FBI, together with partners at the USSS and IRS-CI, has observed TraderTraitor actors converting stolen assets primarily into Ethereum (ETH). It is expected these assets will then be further laundered by converting them using DeFi and instant swap services as they prepare them for further laundering stages.
How You Can Help:
FBI, USSS, and IRS-CI are urging private sector entities including THORNode operators, RPC node operators, instant exchanges, DeFi services, blockchain analytics firms, and other virtual asset service providers to block transactions with or derived from addresses TraderTraitor actors are using to launder these stolen assets.
A list of addresses associated with this activity is available here: fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/al…
Deconflict.com retweeted
US Law Enforcement agencies (FBI, USSS, IRS and more) provided vital help in this incident, including tracking, freezing, etc.
A tweet can’t fully express our gratitude. Many crypto bros may not realize, a lot of the "why bitcoin didn't drop more?" credit goes to them. 🙏
The FBI is releasing information advising the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) was responsible for the theft of more than $6 billion USD in virtual assets from cryptocurrency exchange, Binance, on or about October 29, 2026. The FBI refers to this specific North Korean malicious cyber activity as "TraderTraitor."
The FBI, together with partners at the USSS and IRS-CI, has observed TraderTraitor actors converting stolen assets primarily into Ethereum (ETH). It is expected these assets will then be further laundered by converting them using DeFi and instant swap services as they prepare them for further laundering stages.
How You Can Help:
FBI, USSS, and IRS-CI are urging private sector entities including THORNode operators, RPC node operators, instant exchanges, DeFi services, blockchain analytics firms, and other virtual asset service providers to block transactions with or derived from addresses TraderTraitor actors are using to launder these stolen assets.
A list of addresses associated with this activity is available here: fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/al…
Deconflict.com retweeted
The U.S. Secret Service continues to investigate the theft of more than $6 billion in cryptocurrency from Binance Global.
Within minutes of the incident on Thursday afternoon, Secret Service investigators worked with industry partners to identify and freeze a significant portion of stolen cryptocurrency. That work continues with the @FBI, @IRS_CI, the @USAO_DC and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California, DOJ CCIPS, and @DOJNatSec.
A list of addresses that are holding or have held assets from the theft can be found here: fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/al…
Deconflict.com retweeted
The FBI is releasing information advising the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) was responsible for the theft of more than $6 billion USD in virtual assets from cryptocurrency exchange, Binance, on or about October 29, 2026. The FBI refers to this specific North Korean malicious cyber activity as "TraderTraitor."
The FBI, together with partners at the USSS and IRS-CI, has observed TraderTraitor actors converting stolen assets primarily into Ethereum (ETH). It is expected these assets will then be further laundered by converting them using DeFi and instant swap services as they prepare them for further laundering stages.
How You Can Help:
FBI, USSS, and IRS-CI are urging private sector entities including THORNode operators, RPC node operators, instant exchanges, DeFi services, blockchain analytics firms, and other virtual asset service providers to block transactions with or derived from addresses TraderTraitor actors are using to launder these stolen assets.
A list of addresses associated with this activity is available here: fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/al…
Binance says roughly $6.3 billion was taken in Thursday’s attack. But the stolen funds aren’t the most important part of this story.
The bigger question is how the attacker got Binance’s own systems to authorize the transfers.
Some background first.
Exchanges use hot wallets to process customer withdrawals quickly. These wallets are connected to the internet. Think of them as operating accounts that keep funds available for everyday transactions.
Ethereum’s EIP-7702 lets a regular wallet delegate execution to smart contract code through a signed authorization. It gives wallets more flexibility. It also means that if someone gets a wallet to sign the wrong authorization, that wallet will run the attacker’s code.
That’s what happened on Ethereum.
The attacker submitted a transaction carrying 50 authorizations, all signed by a Binance hot wallet and all pointing it at the attacker’s contract. Each covered a different nonce, the counter Ethereum uses to sequence a wallet’s transactions. The wallet was busy processing withdrawals, so its nonce kept moving. Preparing 50 gave the attacker room for one to match when the transaction landed. One did.
Minutes later, a single transaction moved ETH and dozens of other tokens out of the wallet. And because Binance’s systems kept routing customer deposits into that wallet, the attacker kept sweeping them out. The malicious delegation stayed active for nearly four hours before it was revoked.
But Ethereum was only part of the theft.
Researchers tracking the funds counted unauthorized transfers across ten blockchains. Most of those networks don’t support EIP-7702. There, the funds left through ordinary transfers carrying valid Binance signatures.
That’s the real issue. Across every chain, the common thread is valid signatures from Binance-controlled wallets.
Binance’s preliminary findings point to a compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop that may have given the attacker access to an internal service container. The company says it has found no evidence that private keys leaked, and that it has since identified additional points of breach. The full attack path hasn’t been published.
An attacker may not need to steal a private key if they can compromise the system authorized to use it.
On the recovery side, Binance says it has set aside more than $6.34 billion of company funds to cover user losses. About $5 billion of that is already held in the exact tokens that were taken. The rest is being bought through market and OTC channels to match the affected assets, which will take longer for low-liquidity tokens.
Separately, about $3 billion has been frozen with help from industry partners, and Binance says it has begun recovering affected assets while working with law enforcement, issuers and blockchain intelligence firms to trace and freeze more. It also says user funds will ultimately be verified publicly through its Proof of Reserves.
That’s a serious response, and it matters. But frozen is not recovered. Getting those funds back is a separate legal process, and it takes time.
Takeaway: treating this as an EIP-7702 problem is too narrow.
The feature helped carry out the Ethereum theft. It doesn’t explain the transfers on the other chains. Blocking it alone would not have stopped what happened elsewhere.
Protecting private keys is essential. So is controlling who can request a signature, what they can authorize, and what independently stops a request that shouldn’t go through.
A valid signature proves a transaction was signed.
Kudos to the Binance security team and the stablecoin issuers who moved fast enough to freeze $3 billion within hours.
#binance
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Binance's initial investigation suggests that the security incident may involve a compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop, which allowed an attacker to gain access to a service container and submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions. We have found no evidence of any wallet private key leak. We will share a detailed technical post-mortem once the investigation is complete and the facts are fully verified.
The estimated total impact sits at around $6.3B. We have worked with blockchain partners to freeze affected assets, with ~$3 billion frozen on-chain so far.
Binance will cover all losses from the SAFU fund and the company’s funds. User funds are safe. We will also publish an updated Proof of Reserves once the remediation is complete.
As an immediate precaution, Binance has:
- temporarily suspended deposits and withdrawals while security checks are completed;
- revoked the affected address authorisation;
- engaged law enforcement and blockchain intelligence partners to trace and recover funds.
Our teams are working around the clock to resolve this issue safely and thoroughly. We are working closely with our law enforcement partners to confirm the identity of these criminals and bring them to justice.
Please rely only on official Binance channels for updates. Please feel free to contact Binance Customer Support if you have any further questions.
binance.com/en/support/annou…
Deconflict.com retweeted
🚨 JUST IN: Approximately $5.7 billion left Binance-linked wallets across the Ethereum, Bitcoin, and TRON networks in a suspected hack that the exchange is currently investigating.
Why a National Fraud Strategy Could Change How the U.S. Fights Financial Crime
TL;DR
Nasdaq CEO Adena Friedman has called for a U.S. National Fraud Strategy built around responsible public-private collaboration.
Banks, payment networks, telecom providers, technology companies, and law enforcement each hold different evidence of the same fraud network.
Existing models, including FS-ISAC, Section 314(b), and bank consortiums, show that trusted information sharing can expose patterns no single institution can see.
A useful framework must protect privacy, preserve agency and institutional control, and show the source and status of shared intelligence.
Deconflict adds verified law-enforcement context and controlled coordination to the wider financial-crime intelligence network.
Nasdaq CEO Adena Friedman is calling for a national framework that brings financial institutions, law enforcement, telecommunications companies, payment networks, and technology providers together. The important question is what that collaboration should look like in practice.
Financial crime increasingly operates as a network.
A victim may interact with a fraudulent website. A telecommunications provider may see the phone infrastructure behind the scam. One bank sees an outgoing payment. Another institution receives it. A cryptocurrency exchange may see the next movement of funds. Law enforcement may already be investigating one of the people, accounts, or identifiers involved.
Each organization sees something. Very few see everything.
That was the central problem Nasdaq Chair and CEO Adena Friedman addressed in remarks this week at the American Banker Most Powerful Women in Banking and Finance Conference. She called for the United States to develop a National Fraud Strategy designed around responsible intelligence sharing and collaboration among financial institutions, law enforcement, telecommunications providers, payment networks, technology companies, and other participants in the financial system.
Her argument deserves attention because it moves the financial-crime conversation beyond a familiar question: Which institution has the best fraud technology?
The harder question is becoming: How do institutions combine what they independently know without losing control of sensitive information?
Financial crime has outgrown institutional boundaries
The financial system has become more interconnected.
Payments settle faster. Consumers move between banks, fintechs, wallets, and payment applications with little friction. Digital assets introduce additional rails. Criminal organizations use the same connectivity to operate across institutions and jurisdictions.
Friedman described this as an "age of convergence," where AI, digital payments, tokenization, and always-on financial services are dissolving many of the boundaries that once separated different parts of the financial system. As those boundaries weaken, fraud and cybercrime can move through the system faster as well.
That creates a structural limitation for institution-by-institution fraud prevention.
A financial institution can have excellent transaction monitoring and still only see the transactions occurring within its environment. A telecommunications company can detect suspicious device or phone activity without knowing what happened at the bank. A bank can investigate an account without knowing another bank is reviewing related activity. And a financial institution may have no visibility into the fact that a law-enforcement agency is already investigating a relevant wallet, counterparty, or identifier.
Better analytics inside each organization matter. But they do not automatically create visibility across organizations.
Nasdaq is proposing collaboration, not another regulator
One of the more important parts of Friedman's proposal is what she did not call for.
She did not propose creating another regulator or another federal enforcement agency. She also did not frame the answer as simply adding another compliance obligation.
Instead, she proposed a National Fraud Strategy built around several practical ideas: responsible information sharing, common practices, broader participation across industries, legal protections that make organizations more comfortable collaborating, joint suspicious activity reporting, and a stronger feedback loop between financial institutions and law enforcement.
That distinction matters.
Financial institutions already generate enormous amounts of fraud and AML information. Law enforcement already generates investigative intelligence. Telecommunications companies have network intelligence. Payment companies have transaction data. Technology providers have their own signals.
The problem is not always that the information does not exist. Often, the problem is that relevant information exists in different places and cannot easily be connected at the moment it would be most useful.
We already know information sharing can work
A National Fraud Strategy would not need to begin from zero.
Friedman pointed to two existing models. The first is FS-ISAC, which gives financial institutions a trusted framework for sharing cyber-threat intelligence. The second is Section 314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act, which provides a legal framework through which eligible financial institutions can voluntarily share information related to suspected money laundering and terrorist financing.
Nasdaq has also demonstrated what cross-institution intelligence can reveal through Verafin. Friedman said Verafin's consortium encompasses roughly 2,800 banks and has supported more than 130,000 collaborative investigations. In one example she described, activity that initially appeared to involve a handful of unrelated fraud alerts ultimately connected more than 1,000 accounts across over 45 financial institutions.
No single institution had enough information to reconstruct the broader network on its own.
That is the point. The value of collaboration is not simply adding more data to an alert. It is revealing relationships that only become visible when different vantage points are connected.
But information sharing needs boundaries
More information sharing is not automatically better information sharing.
Financial institutions and law-enforcement agencies operate under legal, privacy, supervisory, and investigative constraints. Sensitive information cannot simply be pooled into a central repository because it might someday be useful.
Any serious national fraud-information framework therefore needs to answer some difficult operational questions.
Who contributed the intelligence?
How recently was it verified?
Who is permitted to see it?
What exactly is being disclosed?
Can an organization identify that another participant holds relevant information without seeing the underlying information itself?
Can the contributing organization decide whether additional information should be released?
Is there an attributable record of what was exchanged?
When intelligence comes from law enforcement, can the receiving institution establish that the agency and investigator are actually who they claim to be?
These are not secondary implementation details. They are what determine whether organizations will participate in the first place.
The architecture of information sharing matters as much as the amount of information being shared.
Law enforcement has a distinct role in the intelligence network
Much of the financial industry's existing information-sharing infrastructure connects financial institutions to other financial institutions. That is enormously valuable.
But law enforcement holds a different category of information.
An investigator may know that a wallet appears in an active investigation. Another agency may already be working the same subject. A prosecutor may have relevant legal process underway. An investigator may possess context that does not exist in transaction data, behavioral models, sanctions lists, or commercially available intelligence.
That information carries its own constraints. An investigative match is not proof that someone committed a crime. It should not automatically cause an account closure, transaction block, or other adverse decision.
But it can provide meaningful additional context.
For a financial institution already reviewing a wallet, account, or counterparty, knowing that relevant verified investigative intelligence exists may change how the institution prioritizes the review, documents the matter, or determines whether further investigation is appropriate.
For law enforcement, knowing that another verified agency is already investigating the same identifier can expose overlap before two agencies spend weeks working parallel cases without knowing the other exists.
Those are different problems, but they originate from the same structural issue: fragmented intelligence.
From information sharing to intelligence coordination
This is where the conversation around a National Fraud Strategy becomes especially important.
Sharing more information is useful. The larger opportunity is building an operating model where relevant intelligence can move between authorized organizations with provenance, permissions, and accountability attached.
That means moving beyond informal phone calls, disconnected email chains, and periodic information exchanges toward infrastructure capable of supporting persistent collaboration.
The model should allow institutions to:
identify relevant overlap without automatically exposing the underlying information;
understand where intelligence came from;
distinguish verified information from analytical inference;
communicate with authenticated counterparts when additional context is appropriate;
control what is disclosed and to whom;
preserve an auditable record of the interaction; and
continue using their existing investigation, compliance, and case-management systems.
This does not require every organization to use the same fraud platform. In fact, a useful national strategy should assume the opposite.
Banks will continue using different transaction-monitoring systems. Investigators will use different case-management platforms. Financial institutions will rely on different fraud, identity, blockchain, and sanctions providers.
The collaboration layer has to work across that diversity.
Where Deconflict fits
Deconflict was built around this information gap.
Participating law-enforcement agencies can identify potential investigative overlap without contributing raw case files or investigative narratives. Financial institutions can receive relevant Verified Intelligence alongside the compliance and investigative systems they already use. When further communication is appropriate, verified participants can coordinate through an attributable, auditable channel.
That is complementary to the infrastructure already operating across the financial system.
Blockchain analytics remains useful for understanding on-chain activity. Transaction monitoring evaluates financial behavior. Fraud platforms detect patterns. Consortiums can reveal activity across participating financial institutions.
Deconflict adds another vantage point: verified investigative intelligence originating from participating law-enforcement agencies and the ability to connect authorized parties when relevant overlap exists.
The institution still makes its own decision. Investigators retain control of their information. Legal process still applies.
The objective is not to centralize every piece of financial-crime information. It is to make the right piece of intelligence discoverable by the right authorized participant at the right time.
The next generation of financial-crime infrastructure will be collaborative
Friedman's proposal reflects a broader change already happening across financial crime.
The industry spent years improving detection inside individual institutions. That work continues. But the next challenge is increasingly about what happens between institutions.
Criminal networks already take advantage of fragmentation across banks, telecom providers, payment platforms, digital-asset companies, and jurisdictions. The institutions fighting those networks cannot afford to remain equally fragmented.
A National Fraud Strategy could help establish the legal frameworks, participation standards, and operating principles necessary to change that.
Technology will be part of the answer. But the larger shift is organizational.
The financial system is moving toward a model in which protecting one institution increasingly depends on what the broader network can see together.
That is a harder problem than building another fraud model. It may also be one of the most important financial-crime problems left to solve.
About Deconflict
Deconflict provides Verified Intelligence for Financial Crime.
Deconflict connects participating law-enforcement agencies and regulated financial institutions so authorized teams can identify relevant investigative overlap, add verified investigative context to existing workflows, and coordinate securely when appropriate.
Learn more at deconflict.com.
Source
Nasdaq, "Nasdaq Chair and CEO Adena Friedman Calls for Unified, Public-Private Collaboration to Combat the $579B Global Financial Fraud Epidemic," October 20, 2026.
Read Adena Friedman's full remarks on Nasdaq. nasdaq.com/newsroom/nasdaq-c…
Effective Immediately, all organizations using PHP for their systems are advised to be prepared for an update addressing two critical vulnerabilities. PHP is widely used for web applications. These vulnerabilities often provide a direct path to the server's file system or database. If an immediate update is not feasible, it is recommend that organizations take the system offline until it can be fully mitigated. NSA will follow up shortly with more specific guidance.
Deconflict.com retweeted
OPERATION BLACKOUT: Another massive blow to global scam empires targeting Americans.
Under President Trump’s leadership, this FBI and our partners delivered:
✅ 28 arrests in Ghana and Nigeria
✅ 350+ devices seized
✅ 3.7 MILLION scam-linked accounts, pages and groups taken down
✅ $11 MILLION+ in potentially freezable funds identified
✅ 120+ trafficked workers identified
To the criminals stealing Americans’ hard-earned money: Your borders won’t protect you. Your compounds won’t hide you.
-DKP🇺🇸
Napster Corp. taught the music industry what happens when real listeners take songs without paying. This week the U.S. Department of Justice sentenced a man for the reverse: listeners who never existed, collecting real money🎵
The charge is what DOJ calls its first-ever “super intelligence assisted” streaming fraud. Super intelligence... I guess regular AI got a promotion while the rest of us weren’t looking.
Michael Smith got 18 months and forfeited about $8.09 million. According to U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, he ran thousands of bot accounts from 2017 to 2024, at times as many as 10,000 at once, opened with fake emails and fraudulently obtained debit cards. They streamed hundreds of thousands of AI-generated songs billions of times. In April 2023, his bots played his catalog 80.9 million times on YouTube Music family plans, while Taylor Swift’s entire catalog got 9.3 million.
I never knew this aspect of it, streaming royalties actually come out of a shared pool, so every fake play took money from an artist whose song was actually heard. He also knew how to stay hidden. In his own email he said he needed “a TON of songs fast” to get around the platforms’ anti-fraud policies, and he spread the streams across thousands of tracks so no single song looked unusual. Plain version (i.e. cop version): he made the crime small everywhere anyone was looking.
Whatever name the technology gets, that pattern is one we work every day. Fraud gets cut into pieces small enough that each organization sees nothing worth escalating, and it only shows when someone lays the pieces side by side. The intelligence (even if it's "super") exists. The coordination doesn’t.
justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/nor…
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