🅰️nton-13 | ORIGIN🅰️L 🟡$BEYOND 🟠 NFTARMY

I've been investigating the $6.3B @binance breach from October 29. and one detail keeps bothering me. the attacker managed to get valid signatures for transactions that Binance says were unauthorized. think about that. the blockchain accepted the signatures. but who actually authorized the instructions behind them? here's where @primus_labs gets interesting. Primus zkTLS can generate cryptographic proofs of specific HTTPS requests and responses. its verifiable-execution architecture also explores proving that required steps happened before accepting an outcome. which raises a question: what if Binance's signing infrastructure had required an independent zkTLS-backed authorization proof, bound to the exact transaction, before signing anything? could a Primus-style verification layer have interrupted the attack before the malicious EIP-7702 delegation was authorized? I'm not claiming Primus could have prevented this hack. The full attack path is still under investigation, and zkTLS alone doesn't secure a compromised signing system. but maybe the most important security question isn't whether a signature is valid. it's whether the instruction behind that signature was ever legitimately authorized. could cryptographic proof of the approval process become the missing security layer?