I'm baffled with everyone in security or around it having a different understanding of what security is. I'm not just saying you have different Crown Jewels or threat vectors or attack surfaces. You all are coming at this from your biased angle (me too).
I think I've seen and heard about as many SSRFs this week as I have LiteLLM death sentences. Zip up your fly, tie your shoes. Security is about to get even more scrutiny than it does.
Btw, looking for a SWE unicorn that does security and manages everything still doesn't exist.
This slid pragmatic
Replying to @alanwells
More workflow details:
1: submit your defensive cyber application for @AnthropicAI / @OpenAI to get access to Mythos or Daybreak ASAP. I think these models are still likely ahead of abliterated open models being used by attackers in terms of ability to proactively identify exploits in your systems.
2: Setup your analysis environment (ideally dedicated local hardware or cloud based coding server, you want this to be able to run very long sessions) with read only access to everything (code, infrastructure, 3rd party integrations). Recommend a harness or meta-harness that lets you use different foundation models for cross model review (we use @opencode and T3 code by @theo)
Ideally also give this environment the ability to run and deploy to code/updates to a working version of your full app/stack in staging or sandbox so it can simulate & verify the effectiveness of patches.
Deploy coding server on separate accounts & machines (not shared with the products we are using it to build), and put it all behind @Tailscale so that you’re not fighting intrusions into the systems you are using for analysis/testing.
3: Start with the @Cloudflare security audit skill and run it in the environment you provisioned with Mythos/Daybreak - it will probably find a bunch of stuff you should fix. Also give it an explicit list of all the infra/repos/3rd party services you’ve given it access to.
4. Also point an agent at your public DNS records to identify legacy infra you may have forgotten about / aren’t monitoring. Add anything it finds within the scope of your security audit. The attackers are 100% doing this too so you want to get ahead of it.
5. Have your coding agent stack rank what Mythos/Daybreak finds in order of criticality/security risk, and cluster them into groups of things that are likely to touch the same files. Put them into your issue tracker of choice with a specific tag you can use to identify in next step.
6. Setup a loop in your coding server that plucks the top cluster off your list of tagged security issues, does cross-model root cause analysis for diversity of perspectives, builds a solution (or multiple solutions), does cross-model
Code review, and verifies the solution in the local or staging environment you gave it access to, opens a PR for you to review, and then automatically moves onto the next issue. See compound engineering skill by @every / @kieranklaassen for a good starting point on this workflow (fork and tune the LFG command for your SDLC)
7. Parallelize the loop above if you can for faster throughput through the process. The goal here is to feed in a stack of security issues as input and receive a stack of verified PRs as output as quickly as possible.
8. Start building up a library of user scenarios that you use to ensure that your security patches don’t break things for legit users. We use a collection of markdown files and macros (for fixture setup/teardown), executed by OpenCode + agent-browser as an automated QA agent. The scenario runner does end-to-end testing in the browser as a normal user would.
9. Merge PRs into a release candidate, re-validate the combined set of them together with your user scenarios in staging to prove it to yourself that the release is good to ship.
10) Release to prod then re-validate there with scenarios again to ensure nothing broke after deploy.
All production deploys are still gated behind human review in our workflow. But think a subset of lower risk issues could be safely auto-deployed after passing verification in staging.
Eric Freeman retweeted
Sometimes you get on here and everyone is shouting about things you know… They are friends, and people you respect, or with titles, etc, and when those opinions get numerous you begin to doubt yourself…
Don’t.
9 times out of 10, it’s hyperbole, groupthink, sensationalism, trolling, marketing, or grift.
Test your assumptions and expertise, pivot if things change, but if you are true expert or practitioner, stay strong and confident in your abilities and intuition. 🫶
They told us AI would automate us out of a job yet we keep finding more vulnerabilities that an agent can magically fix without breaking other things?
Eric Freeman retweeted
I've been working for a while on a site that helps answer one question:
"How much is AI actually affecting cybersecurity outcomes?"
I've got tons of data sources and analysis in here. If you're in this space, help me improve it!
vulnerabilitydata.io/
Eric Freeman retweeted
The best practitioner (not lab) AI evals for offensive cybersecurity I follow myself:
1) The @dreadnode dreadindex. Evals al the way down to the vuln category level, and refusals accounting
dreadnode.io/research/dreadi…
2) @AikidoSecurity white-box but i've confirmed that it extends to dynamic testing well
aikido.dev/aikido-arena
3) BArena by @mdp_sec focused on bounty-like black box bugs.
blackboxarena.ai/
4) @mindfort 's nexbench has info downto the config of a model including thinking or effort setting, and cost per finding, which many omit.
mindfort.ai/blog/introducing…
IDOR is still the most common vulnerability I find. Authorization has to check whether THIS user can perform THIS action on THIS object. Role checks can still miss ownership and tenant boundaries. Try creating two users with the same role and separate private records. Test whether either can read, edit, delete, or export the other’s records through the API. Repeat across tenants. Make these release blocking tests.
Known vulnerable packages are still getting shipped. This is so damn wild. Frontend inspection keeps turning up package versions associated with known vulnerabilities. This is something we should be catching before deployment. Try feeding the agent current vulnerability findings. Scan the resolved dependency tree, including transitive packages. Verify upgrades with a fresh scan, build, and tests. Check for both remaining and newly introduced vulnerabilities.
Every confirmed finding should become a regression test. When a flaw comes from a shared template or helper, fix it there too. The reality is that AI software factories are cranking out just as many plumbuses, dinglebops, and schleam as it is widgets that work.
youtube.com/watch?v=eMJk4y9N…
I went back through 18 months of vulnerability findings today, across apps I’ve pentested, companies I advise, and other environments. As vibe coding has spread so have the vulns 🧵
SSRF is showing up far too often. In a small Tenzai benchmark run in December 2025, all five coding agents introduced SSRF in a link-preview feature built without security guidance. You should inventory every feature that fetches a user-provided URL. Allowlist destinations where practical. Test redirects and DNS rebinding. Enforce network restrictions that block unnecessary access to internal services and cloud metadata. Defense in depth needs to show up in what the application can actually reach.
I built SignalDeck to pull @officiallyiru, @1password (Kolide), and @SentinelOne findings into one security dashboard.
Search vulnerabilities, see what each asset is exposed to and how to quickly fix the issue. Cached results keep an investigation moving.
Fewer tabs. Less reloading. More context.
(Demo data used)
Eric Freeman retweeted
People saying ai replaces and automates…
It literally doesn’t, it scales.
1% of people are completely automating or replacing .
People just have this weird fucking selective memory about how things happen because they love the feeling of the scale.
Brothers and sisters you literally re prompted those systems or had to re-architect them to change course several times. You had to review for hallucination. There was 100 small things you did to create that AI output at its final stage.
This is when we will start talking about physical security. I can't wait to hear about how the models are going to solve that problem with some insane dystopian fear mongering logic to scare us all.
We discovered a sophisticated recording device that was hidden inside one of our offices. We used our models to understand the device and where it had come from, identifying that a specific employee had planted it a few days earlier. We referred the matter to the FBI, and we’re grateful to the agents and prosecutors who moved quickly to make an arrest. The FBI’s investigation is ongoing and we will continue to support their work.
At this time, we have no indications of this individual inappropriately accessing or exfiltrating model weights, source code, or customer data. The employee was terminated.
We take protecting our technology, data, and people seriously, and as a matter of national importance. Our security program is designed to protect against a wide range of threat actors, from insider risks to cybercriminals to nation states, and this case is an example of how AI can help address these sophisticated security threats.
A few years back @rosshaleliuk argued that security issues come down to software bugs and configuration mistakes. I think there’s another question underneath both: why do we give software enough permission for one mistake to become a catastrophe? If this is the case, why do we continue to buy so many tools that tells us whats wrong rather than fixing the hard thing? Why does a reporting service have permission to delete production data? Why can a dependency read credentials it has no reason to touch? Why does finishing one task leave an account with permanent access?
We grant the access, then buy products to watch for someone using it. I think we’ve accepted that sequence far too easily. Least privilege is a great idea buried under a terrible user experience. It’s a bitch to configure, breaks things when you get it wrong, and needs constant maintenance. “Just do RBAC properly” is advice that comes with an undisclosed staffing requirement. So make narrow access the easiest way to get work done. Generate the permissions. Test that the work still succeeds. Enforce them. Expire the exceptions. Keep up when the application changes. There’s evidence this is possible. An AWS-authored study automatically removed 76% of allowed actions on average across 11 evaluated roles. Small study with a concrete result.
Least privilege won’t fix every bug or stop abuse of necessary access. But excess authority gives failures room to spread. If AI scales attacks, I don’t see how we keep up by generating more alerts for people to investigate. We need to make more of those actions impossible in the first place. Making least privilege usable should put some security products out of business. If your product exists to catch someone doing something they should never have been allowed to do, preventing that action should threaten your business. The industry should be trying to make that happen.
Dan is the fucking man. Also, Dan is 100% right: we are not measuring things right. This should help.
I created a new way to measure work done with AI called Deeds.
The idea is that PRs are no longer the best way to measure output because so much work is being done by individual developers now.
workdeeds.ai/










