Co-founder & CTO @ @usemilgram • Author of bettercap, pwnagotchi, opensnitch, bleah, legba and a few other things.

Joined January 2009
Simone Margaritelli retweeted
I think we've discovered another critical vulnerability: CVE-2026-BURNOUT: AppSec Professional Exhaustion Severity: Critical (CVSS 10.0) Description: A vulnerability affecting security professionals exposed to a continuous stream of critical RCEs, zero-days, emergency patches, and Friday afternoon disclosures. Impact: Sleep deprivation, excessive caffeine consumption, and an inability to enjoy weekends. Attack vector: Reading security advisories. Affected versions: All AppSec professionals, regardless of experience. Mitigation: No known patch. Air-gapping may delay the inevitable. Total system collapse remains a possibility. 🔥
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
threat intel is really just an excuse to become a data hoarder
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
🛑 A filename is enough to trigger OS command execution in Python's widely used Pillow image library. CVE-2026-112900 abuses how Pillow passes EPS filenames to Ghostscript. What you need to know ↓ thehackernews.com/2026/10/cr…
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
quite the statement from Anthropic's head of security
Replying to @hinapansari
yes. it was always going to be this way. we tried to warn the world.
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
shut... the ... front... door... was JAVA feeling lonely and wanted to get into the party????? Oracle Security Alert Advisory - CVE-2026-91403 CVS 9.1 oracle.com/security-alerts/a… @uwu_underground
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
Reproduced the Brotli memory corruption bug (CVE-2026-111497) using a simple Node.js + Express app. Patched and unpatched versions produce different decompressed output, making it possible to remotely identify vulnerable servers.
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
wait, PHP was actually scanned by Anthropic’s Claude Mythos earlier this year. they also had access to OpenAI’s Daybreak Red for validating exploits. the PHP Foundation revealed this JUST yesterday. keeping frontier cyber models in the hands of a selected few doesn’t seem to be working well for the internet. thephp.foundation/blog/2026/…
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
Some more updates, github.com/GoldraK/php2shell… , implements chain_e, which was first reported from jackalsyn. This works on a lab for the patched releases. Verify on your end always under a lab env.
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
This week.
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
From the PHP Foundation on who found it first 👇
Calif and Wiz sniping over who found it first is lame.
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
Security called me at 6:12 AM today. "Patch every PHP server immediately." I asked what happened. "Two critical vulnerabilities. Remote code execution. No authentication required." Cool. How many PHP servers do we have? According to inventory: 12 According to reality: Nobody knows. We found one running WordPress. Three running old internal tools. One under someone's desk. Two inside vendor appliances. A forgotten employee directory from 2016. And a server named: PHP-OLD-DO-NOT-TOUCH Naturally, that one runs payroll exports. Then we found a PHP 5.6 box. I asked who owned it. The documentation said: BRIAN. Brian left in 2019. We called Brian. He said: "Oh wow, that's still running?" Excellent. By 8 AM, leadership joined the incident call. CEO: "Can hackers actually get in?" Security: "Potentially yes." CEO: "Without a password?" Security: "Yes." CEO: "Then why do WE need passwords?" Not the lesson. Finance asked if we could wait until the weekend to patch because downtime affects revenue. Security explained that the alternative was letting strangers execute code on our servers. Finance asked for a cost comparison. At 9:17, someone suggested temporarily taking the vulnerable websites offline. Marketing refused. "Our campaign is live." So for the next hour, the company officially decided maintaining a landing page for 20% off webinar registration was more important than preventing remote server takeover. We finally patched everything we could find. Then our scanner discovered another PHP server. Hostname: TEMP-PHP-2014 Uptime: 4,512 days. Nobody knows what it does. Nobody owns it. Nobody can shut it down. But every time we block network access, the warehouse stops printing shipping labels. Security has classified it as critical infrastructure. It is running PHP 5.4. The vulnerability has existed longer than half our employees. The emergency patch took four hours. Finding out what PHP actually runs took eleven. The internet isn't held together with code. It's held together with servers everyone is afraid to turn off.
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Global TLS Intermediate CA incident: We’ve updated our incident page with how it happened, who is affected (one US customer ecosystem), what’s not affected, and what we’re putting in place. We will publish the root cause once our investigation is complete. 👉emudhra.com/en/post/certific…
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
eMudhra minimizes the scope by claiming only "one US customer ecosystem" is affected. In reality, 8 of its CA certificates had catastrophically weak private keys (one being simply the number 4), allowing anyone to forge trusted HTTPS certificates for any website on the internet.blog.google/security/prote…
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
How in the world did these bozos earn enough trust to become a certificate authority? Their incident report is AI generated slop and completely avoids addressing the gigantic elephant in the room of how literally the number ‘4’ was used as a private key?
Global TLS Intermediate CA incident: We’ve updated our incident page with how it happened, who is affected (one US customer ecosystem), what’s not affected, and what we’re putting in place. We will publish the root cause once our investigation is complete. 👉emudhra.com/en/post/certific…
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
eMudhra minimizes the scope by claiming only "one US customer ecosystem" is affected. In reality, 8 of its CA certificates had catastrophically weak private keys (one being simply the number 4), allowing anyone to forge trusted HTTPS certificates for any website on the internet.blog.google/security/prote…
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Indian Cybersecurity Certificate holders be like
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
NOW THE DNS HAS RCE WHAT THE FUCK
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Simone Margaritelli retweeted
Let’s set the record straight: @lcfr_hax was the first to discover php2shell and develop a working exploit. See his August 5 tweet: xitter.cf/lcfr_hax/status/208503… His work convinced the PHP Foundation to invest in fixing this entire bug class. He then worked around the clock to review, test, and retest the patches.
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