Luigi (@grimmo78) header
Luigi (@grimmo78) profile picture

Dad,sysadmin,geek, homebaker. Not necessarily in this order. Follow me on infosec DOT exchange SLASH @grimmo

Milano, Pescara, Palermo
Joined August 2010
Photo by Luigi (@grimmo78)Photo by Luigi (@grimmo78)Photo by Luigi (@grimmo78)Photo by Luigi (@grimmo78)Photo by Luigi (@grimmo78)Photo by Luigi (@grimmo78)Photo by Luigi (@grimmo78)Photo by Luigi (@grimmo78)Photo by Luigi (@grimmo78)Photo by Luigi (@grimmo78)
Luigi retweeted
Conosco una tizia che è incinta da 6 mesi già e sul suo profilo instagram non ha mai pubblicato una storia, parlato o mostrato la sua gravidanza. Oggi due pattuglie e 6 poliziotti hanno fatto irruzione a casa sua per arrestarla.
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LibreOffice just had its biggest donation day ever… thanks to the Microsoft outage. The Document Foundation says it received "over 1,000 donations in a single day, setting a new record." Their explanation: "many people are reconsidering their reliance on a single cloud service provider for their documents."
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#colazione funny: Vissero infelici perché costava meno. Leo Longanesi #scritturebrevi
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Someone is hijacking Bitly URL shortening links for old McDonalds and Burger King posts. Because this is the Internet. And that’s the kind of thing that happens on the Internet.
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I found that Windows starts to collect your coding agent usage information. Windows 11 build 26200.9974 checks codex.exe, claude.exe, copilot.exe, cursor.exe, antigravity.exe, github.exe and agy.exe through MissionControlAggregator, then reports agent bitsets in ETW.
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This wins the internet today.
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I died. This has to be the best one yet
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Yo solo espero que los ingenieros de Microsoft estén en ese bucle de: "No puedo entrar en Authenticator porque Authenticator me pide un código que debe salirme en Authenticator y que no me sale porque no puedo entrar en la Authenticator". ¡Que sufran!
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Whoever made this is a genius 😂😂
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Luigi retweeted
Geniale rappresentazione del perché l’industria italiana stia miseramente fallendo.
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Palantir have paid huge sums to former Labour ministers to lobby for this. The NHS sees no convincing patient benefit. Like the US told Trump this week, we're done with big tech corporations taking over our democracy and public assets. Labour won't stand up to them. We will.
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🇹🇭🇮🇱 Thai residents take to the streets to protest outside the Israeli embassy over the behavior of Israeli tourists in Thailand. "Thailand is not and cannot be a safe haven for Israel soldiers, who have committed despicable crimes."
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Every 'smart' device is just a dumb device that learned to talk about you behind your back.
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ricordate quando ci raccontavano che #Anthropic si squarciava le vesti dalla disperazione che l'#IA fosse usata per la #guerra? Ecco chi sono: arruolano talenti per fare che cosa? Per vendere sistemi #IA al #DipartimentoDellaGuerra e #ServiziSegretiUSA job-boards.greenhouse.io/ant…
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Bypass Paywalls Clean new release v4.4.8.0 + The Economist v El Confidencial v Funke Medien v Gannett Group/USA Today v LaNacion-com-ar v Nw-de v The Columbian v The Daily Beast v The Diplomat & more Chrome: gitflic.ru/project/magnolia1… Firefox (delayed): gitflic.ru/project/magnolia1…
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Luigi retweeted
You can point an ultrasonic speaker at an iPhone from a few feet away, play an audio command that no human ear can hear, and the phone will wake up, open Safari, and dial a phone number. To everyone standing in the room, it sounds like dead silence. To the phone, it sounds like someone speaking directly into the microphone. Mobile operating systems use digital low-pass filters to delete all sound above 20,000 Hz, assuming inaudible frequencies can never reach the voice assistant. Yet this attack succeeds without exploiting a single line of software code. The flaw is not in the operating system. It is in the microscopic silicon plate inside the microphone itself. 1. The microscopic machine inside your microphone Inside modern smartphones, microphones are not miniature versions of studio microphones. They are micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) chips smaller than a grain of rice. Inside the chip package sits a flexible silicon diaphragm suspended barely two micrometers above a rigid metal backplate. The two plates form a variable capacitor. When sound waves hit the silicon diaphragm, it flexes inward and outward, changing the electrical capacitance. An onboard preamplifier converts that movement into an electrical voltage. At normal room volumes, the silicon plate moves evenly: double the sound pressure, and the plate flexes twice as far. 2. The non-linear spring catch The flaw appears when sound waves hit the microphone at high pressure (above 90 dB SPL). If you broadcast an ultrasound carrier wave (say, 28,000 Hz) that has an audio command modulated on top of it, the microphone front-end cannot move symmetrically. The mechanical spring resistance of the silicon, the electrical pull between the plates, and the preamplifier circuit all reach their limits. Instead of flexing smoothly, the silicon plate bends slightly more inward than outward. This asymmetry acts like an old crystal radio receiver. Mathematically, a non-linear response squares the incoming wave. That squaring action strips the silent 28,000 Hz carrier away and leaves behind the original human voice command in the audible 300 Hz to 3,500 Hz range. By the time the analog-to-digital converter reads the signal, the ultrasound is already gone. It has physically transformed into ordinary low-frequency sound inside the microphone chamber. The phone digital filter never triggers because the audio reaching the software is already normal human voice. 3. What researchers actually proved (DolphinAttack) In 2017, researchers at Zhejiang University published DolphinAttack, demonstrating this hardware flaw across Siri, Google Now, and Alexa. They successfully forced phones to initiate FaceTime calls, navigate to malicious websites, turn on airplane mode, and unlock smart doors paired to the device. Later research expanded this into attacking through solid tables, using the furniture itself as a physical acoustic conductor. 4. Why this fails in the wild (The physical friction) Demonstrating this in an acoustic laboratory is straightforward. Pulling it off in a crowded coffee shop runs into strict physical limits: First, air absorbs high-frequency sound rapidly. Bass travels through concrete walls, but 30,000 Hz ultrasound loses roughly 1 to 1.5 decibels of power per meter in normal room air. In the original DolphinAttack paper, the effective range was limited between a few centimeters and 1.75 meters. Reaching across an entire room requires a heavy array of high-voltage transducers. Second, ultrasonic emitters act like laser pointers. High-frequency sound travels in narrow beams of 15 to 20 degrees. If you fail to aim directly at the phone one-millimeter microphone port, sound pressure drops below the 90 dB threshold needed to bend the plate. Third, modern phones are waterproof. Devices with IP68 ratings place a hydrophobic Gore-Tex mesh over the microphone hole. The mesh lets air equalize while stopping water, but it acts like a dense acoustic muffler against ultrasonic frequencies, absorbing another 14 dB of signal strength. Finally, voice assistants use personal voice training. If Siri or Google Assistant is set to only respond to the device owner, a generic synthesized ultrasonic command is ignored unless the attacker models the owner vocal pitch. 5. How modern hardware catches it Defending against inaudible voice injection requires catching the acoustic mismatch before speech recognition executes: * Multi-microphone cross-checks: Modern smartphones carry three or four microphones positioned on the bottom, top, and camera bump. When a real human speaks, their voice reaches all microphones with natural arrival delays. A narrow ultrasonic beam hitting one microphone port creates an unnatural phase imbalance across the device. * Harmonic distortion analysis: When a microphone is driven into non-linear demodulation, it does not produce a clean voice recording. It leaves distinct distortion products and second-order harmonics. Software filters can analyze the spectrum and mute the assistant if they detect the signature of mechanical demodulation. * Acoustic damping barriers: Microphone manufacturers can install physical acoustic damping layers inside the chip housing that attenuate frequencies above 22,000 Hz before the sound wave ever reaches the silicon diaphragm. Inaudible voice injection works because digital security models assume analog sensors behave linearly. When sound waves push silicon past its linear limits, the hardware itself executes operations the operating system never authorized.
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Due to inflation I'm downgrading from ADHD to AD720p with ads
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Luigi retweeted
Can the 60k people being given the boot from Microsoft all get together and form a new company that builds a version of Windows and Office that doesn’t have AI, doesn’t use Sharepoint or OneDrive and doesn’t suck?
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Luigi retweeted
A developer left a standard Bluetooth Low Energy tracker sitting on a wooden post. It was running on a coin cell, broadcasting a tiny 6-milliwatt pulse (+8 dBm) through a cheap copper PCB trace. Then they drove 13 kilometers (8 miles) down the road. You would assume Bluetooth has a ten-meter leash. I mean we build smart locks, car digital keys, and proximity badges around the quiet belief that Bluetooth dies at the front door. But radio waves do not understand room boundaries. They leave an antenna and expand across the horizon according to the inverse-square law, diluting into space. Follow that packet across the countryside. Leaving the tag at 2.44 GHz, the signal loses 122.5 decibels of power by the time it travels 13 kilometers through open air. It arrives on a distant hillside as a microscopic whisper at roughly -115 dBm, buried deep under the thermal hiss of background atmospheric noise. A standard smartphone sitting on that hill is completely deaf to it. The builder did not touch the transmitter. They left it completely stock and FCC-compliant. Instead, they solved the math on the receiving end. They hauled a 24 dBi parabolic grid antenna onto a mast and aimed its narrow eight-degree beam directly back at the distant tag. That dish acts like a massive radio funnel, capturing faint wavefronts across its metallic grid and concentrating them into a 24-decibel passive boost. Then they triggered Bluetooth 5 Coded PHY. Standard Bluetooth blasts bits at 1 megabit per second, which requires a strong signal to decode before errors corrupt the frame. Coded PHY sacrifices speed for range. It slows throughput down to 125 kilobits per second, using forward error correction to encode every single bit of data across eight separate symbols. That mathematical trade lowers the receiver sensitivity floor down to -104 dBm. On paper, the link budget gave a comfortable 13-decibel safety margin. Out in the field, the terrain fought back. Radio energy does not travel in an infinitely thin laser line. Over 13 kilometers, the wave expands into an elliptical cylinder known as the first Fresnel zone, swelling to 20 meters (65 feet) wide at the midpoint. Every hilltop, tree canopy, and barn roof entering that 20-meter zone scattered the wave. Signals reflecting off the dirt arrived slightly out of phase with the direct beam, carving deep cancellation nulls. Over a thirteen-minute listening window, the receiver caught exactly three intact packets. Three packets every few minutes is useless for streaming audio or loading a webpage. But for physical surveillance, three packets is total visibility. Apple Find My, Google Find My Device, Tile trackers, continuous glucose monitors, and car digital key fobs broadcast unsolicited advertisement beacons every second. An attacker sitting on a high-rise balcony or flying a drone with a directional grid antenna does not need to connect to your phone or crack an encryption handshake. They only need to listen. Bluetooth is thirty-year-old technology, yet modern operating systems still treat its signal as proof of physical proximity. An antenna with passive gain proves that proximity was an illusion all along.
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‼️ ALERT - 2 New critical Wasmtime flaws (CVSS 9.9) could let malicious WebAssembly modules escape their sandbox. • CVE-2026-115889 Affects multiple architectures • CVE-2026-115893 ARM64-only, present since 2020 Embedded apps need rebuilding. Read ↓ thehackernews.com/2026/10/tw…
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