
The leading technology hub for training highly skilled cyber talents in Africa. Founder @codedjeff
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Joined July 2023
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KiLLERVMs retweeted
Have you seen? Microsoft just completely restructured their fundamental security guidance, and it's awesome! ✨
This guidance serves as a perfect starting point for those aiming to better protect their M365 tenants! As well as this, I've also written some guidance for you on how you can practically benchmark your tenant against secure and practical baselines, which serve as a fundamental building block to a strong security strategy!
Check it out here > ourcloudnetwork.com/how-to-a…
#Entra #Microsoft365 #Security
KiLLERVMs retweeted
To be fair, Microsoft may have already filed a dispute on this domain (and a bunch of others there), but whois doesn't reflect that currently
If you do find anyone impersonating your domains, you can file a dispute with ICANN too:
icann.org/en/contracted-part…
KiLLERVMs retweeted
Insane because Microsoft uses a tool like dnstwist to find lookalike domains in Defender for Office 365... but you have to pay for it
The good news is this tool is FREE, so everyone can and should monitor for lookalike domains:
dnstwist.it/
github.com/elceef/dnstwist
KiLLERVMs retweeted
Removing the Last Exchange Server is now FINALLY possible!
A new capability in Exchange Online now allows administrators to manage Exchange attributes for directory-synchronized users with mailboxes hosted in the cloud.
With this update, the Source of Authority (SOA) for Exchange-specific attributes can be transferred to the cloud, while the SOA for identity-related attributes remains under the control of the on-premises Active Directory.
After moving the SOA for Exchange attributes to the cloud, these details can be managed using EXO PowerShell, the Microsoft 365 Admin Center, or the Exchange Admin Center, whereas identity attributes are still modified through on-premises Active Directory only.
Read more: learn.microsoft.com/en-us/ex…
#Microsoft365 #ExchangeOnline #ExchangeServer #Hybrid #MicrosoftEntra #EntraID #ActiveDirectory #Microsoft
KiLLERVMs retweeted
ACTIVE DIRECTORY: RESET THE DSRM PASSWORD
Got the DSRM password for each DC documented somewhere? It's surprising how many folks we've encountered that are in a pickle and have no clue what the DSRM password is!
In an elevated CMD for a local DC:
ntdsutil
set dsrm password
reset password on server null
q
q
For a remote DC:
ntdsutil
set dsrm password
reset password on server SERVERNAME
q
q
Now that we've done that it's documented right? The Disaster Recovery Plan documentation is updated if the DSRM location isn't indicated?
Acronyms
DSRM = Directory Services Restore Mode
ACTIVE DIRECTORY RECOVERY: DSRM & NTDS.DIT CORRUPTION
Recovering Active Directory can sometimes be very tricky. Needing to recover from a corrupt database after one finds out the backups are no good is not a happy place to be in. So, here we are.
# ToDo Boot to DSRM on the a DC or PDCe
# ToDo NTDSUtil Check Files Locations
ntdsutil.exe
activate instance ntds
files
info
# Check Integrity
ESEntUtl /g "C:\windows\NTDS\ntds.dit"
# Repair with Logs
ESEntUtl /r "C:\windows\NTDS\ntds.dit"
# ! Delete the database log files (.log) from the WINDOWS\Ntds folder.
# ToDo Reboot
Restart -r -t 0 -f
NOTE: The above steps are kept in VSCode. We use Better Comments for annotations (characters after the # in PoSh) that help my dyslexic brain to "see" what's there. Colour for the win!
Acronyms
DSRM = Directory Services Restore Mode
Reference
learn.microsoft.com/en-us/tr…
KiLLERVMs retweeted
Let’s make Active Directory security education available to all!
List your favorite Active Directory security resources.
Plz share for reach!
KiLLERVMs retweeted
… or steal your credentials or extract tokens from processes that grant access to cloud services
Gamers express concern over anti-cheats and assert them to be spyware running as "root" on Windows.
Malware doesn't need to be ran at an elevated privilege (especially "root") to achieve it's objective of exfiltrating sensitive information or "spying" on you by watching what you're doing.
All of this can be achieved easily from user mode and can (usually) work even in restricted environments.
tl;dr these large game publishers don't need an anti-cheat to spy on you. They can do it easily from user mode.
KiLLERVMs retweeted
Remote Desktop Services RemoteApps RSS: The Seamless and Secure User Experience
RDS has a RSS Feed built-in (pic 1). That feed is virtually device agnostic meaning _any_ device with a RDS App can hook into them.
The RSS feed gets updated automatically at midnight every day. All app changes are sync'd with subscribers. If there's a need we can have the user manually update the feed for immediate access to the changes.
For users on-premises within Active Directory or Windows users who are not connected to AD the apps appear as a folder on the Start Menu (pic 2).
For on-premises subscribers, or Session Host Desktop users, RD Single Sign-On set up in Group Policy means that all the user needs to do is click on the RemoteApp on their Start Menu and the app starts with no prompt. After all, they're already authenticated right? ;-)
For all subscribed users the apps all behave like they are on the _local_ machine. To the user they're looking at a windowed, or maximized, app on their desktop.
Security for this setup is layered as it should be.
1: Active Directory - Delimits access to various RD Collections
2: Group Policy - Single Sign-On configured
3: ARR + URLReWrite - HTTPS Layer Protection
4: Router/Firewall - Incoming Rules Delimited
5: Data remains on-premises and backed up
6: Remote user's device loss can be replaced quickly
We've been using essentially dumb Windows Desktop operating system machines for over a decade since RemoteApps got introduced with Windows Server 2008.
All of our clients utilize them extensively especially accounting firms that need to be on-site for on-premises audits at their client sites.
OPINION: Any remote work where sensitive data is involved should be on-premises, not in the cloud, and delivered to remote users via RemoteApp.
1: AD and GPO Secured
2: RD Gateway Protected
3: DUO 2FA for _all_ RD Gateway connections
4: Router/Firewall rules to protect incoming
5: Data remains on-premises
6: Backed up and Disaster Recovery Covered!
And the bonus? No mystery cloud bills. ;-)
ACRONYMS
AD - Active Directory
ARR - Application Request Routing
GPO - Group Policy Object
RD - Remote Desktop
RDS - Remote Desktop Services
RSS - Really Simple Syndication
KiLLERVMs retweeted
Delegated permissions in Active Directory: silent but deadly 💩💨🤢
For example: Some random user with “FullControl” of the Domain Controllers OU
Nessus didn’t find it…
The IT team didn’t know it was there…
It wasn’t discovered on past pentests…
🧵I found it almost immediately...
KiLLERVMs retweeted
In the past, you had to:
phish a user, drop malware, escalate privileges, pivot to servers, evade EDR, dump creds, move laterally, exfiltrate quietly, clean up, leave a backdoor.
Today, you just:
phish a user, steal an OAuth token, access everything from anywhere.
Cloud breaches aren’t hacks. They’re logins.
We’re seeing a clear trend: attackers are bypassing the endpoint entirely. Not just avoiding traditional EDR-monitored systems by pivoting to embedded and edge devices, but now also operating purely in the cloud. No shell, no malware, no persistence on the endpoint. Just an OAuth token and full access to whatever’s in the victim’s Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, or AWS console.
It’s a complete inversion of how things used to be. The endpoint, once the weakest link, is now usually the most monitored, most policy-enforced part of the infrastructure. You’ve got EDRs, SIEM integration, automation, threat hunting - the full stack. But attackers don’t need to touch it anymore.
Instead, they go after the new soft spots:
- Cloud platforms, where logging is limited, expensive, or off by default
- Network devices and appliances, which are practically blind spots - obscure OSes, no EDRs, hard to monitor, hard to forensicate.
- Embedded systems and IoT junk that no one really knows how to secure, but that sit in critical network paths.
Cloud especially is a mess:
- Logging tiers cost extra and the good stuff is behind paywalls.
- Detection content is lacking, both from vendors and the community.
- You don’t get memory dumps or full control like you do on endpoints.
- You’re at the mercy of the provider when it comes to visibility and response.
And that’s the shift: attackers aren’t hacking computers anymore. They’re hacking trust relationships, identities, and APIs. The whole idea of detection and response needs to evolve with that. Otherwise, we’re securing the hell out of endpoints while attackers happily fish through mailboxes and cloud shares from halfway across the planet.
KiLLERVMs retweeted
New blog post: Easier managing account management modes for Windows LAPS
petervanderwoude.nl/post/eas…
#MSIntune #Intune #EMS #MDM #Windows11 #WindowsLAPS #AccountManagement
KiLLERVMs retweeted
Please ask all your admins to watch! Microsoft will be rolling out the policy as Microsoft Managed soon. This is not like AITM. It doesn't not matter if users have phishing resistant auth. Federation does not matter. This provides long term persistent access without MFA.
Device Code Auth is certainly a phish I could see myself falling for, as it blends in with a regular meeting invite and doesn't require entering my password. If you don't know what a Device Code Phish is, check out this video @odiesec and I did. youtu.be/Y8SSYLEq15Q
KiLLERVMs retweeted
Regarding the BlackBasta leaks: we haven't reviewed them in totality yet. It's quite a bit of messages in JSON format. It also has some Russian slang which makes it difficult to translate accurately. Thankfully there are some native Russian speakers who have made some interesting highlights.
1. Somewhere in the conversation BlackBasta members discuss Lockbit ransomware group. They believe he cannot be trusted.
2. In the conversation Dispossessor ransomware group is discussed. Dispossessor wants to join BlackBasta. One of the members "Hshsi Jdidi" says they believe Dispossessor has a "good resume" but think they only want to work with them because of their "fame". They also express concern that Dispossessor may be a law enforcement officer. They express concern with the takedowns from Lockbit, Conti, and others.
3. One of the BlackBasta affiliates is a minor. They are 17 years old.
4. They are EXTREMELY interested in VPN exploits. They go to great lengths to acquire, purchase, or find people, capable of delivering VPN exploits.
5. Someone is wanting to grant them access (or sell them access) to their private loader for the cost of $84,000/month
6. Following the success of Scattered Spider, BlackBasta has begun incorperating social engineering into their operations. They have a person named "Nur" who is responsible for identifying key personnel at organizations they want to target. Once a person of influence is identified (manager, HR, etc) they contact them via telephone call.
7. BlackBasta maintains a spreadsheet of victims they're trying to target. It is shared between members and they collaborate on it together. It has the person of interest, if they've tried social engineering them, and general strategy notes. They often identify multiple targets at companies.
8. The caller who contacts victims is tasked with having the employee install "Remote Monitoring and Management" from level-dot-io. Once the application is installed they begin work (eventually).
9. Targets are not selected randomly. BlackBasta has immense interest in Electrical companies, Industrial supply chain companies (Steel, wood, recycling, general supplies), and Tax and/or Financial management companies (companies which manage finances for other companies).
10. Their workflow is documented fairly well. However, because these leaks are from 2023 - 2024, they may be outdated. Here is the general idea:
Step 1: Get victim to execute malicious .HTA file. The .HTA file is delivered from either a masqueraded malicious download link, social engineering, or a masqueraded malicious e-mail
Step 2: The .HTA file drops a .BAT or .EXE file which contains commands to connect to their C2 server.
Step 3: The C2 server has a .JS file which can then deliver an actual payload file allowing either ransomware deployment, or tooling for remote access.
KiLLERVMs retweeted
To people who don't know M365:
Entra ID
Exchange Online + Protection
Defender Suite of tools (there are at least 10 different ones)
Teams
SharePoint
OneDrive
Purview (8 more tool suites with different functionalities)
Admin Center
Apps Admin Center
Intune
Power Platform
It takes an enormous amount of time to learn what buttons to push where, especially in defense because all of these apps are ALL CONNECTED in various ways.
Most people cannot understand the amount of effort involved.
KiLLERVMs retweeted
Windows Server Reminder: Always Set the Network Location Awareness Service to Automatic (Delayed).
That guarantees the service does not do its poll before the network stack is initialized putting the Windows Firewall into a limp lockdown mode with the Public Profile indicated.
KiLLERVMs retweeted
This is really big at the moment and you should absolutely be looking at your M365 logs to identify this activity.
speartip.com/fasthttp-used-i…
We're observing a large number of IPs involved after successful authentication, but a common IP is 113.23.43[.]76
CC:@HuntressLabs
KiLLERVMs retweeted
I came up with a great workaround for not getting TenantAdmin alerts unless you've activated eligible roles in PIM! 🔥
I love @merill's use of plus addressing on admin accounts so we get alerts sent to our regular accounts, but it only works when roles are active
So what do?
KiLLERVMs retweeted
I'm not sure who put this site together, but this PingCastle cheat sheet is awesome. If you're a PingCastle fan, definitely something to check out... pentesting.site/cheat-sheets…
If anyone knows who this site belongs to, let me know so I can give a proper shout out!
KiLLERVMs retweeted
A good reminder that Defender for Identity is NOT Defender for Active Directory or Domain Controllers.
It will help you protect your identities at multiple places.
If you are a Defender for Identity customer, please don't forget to install the agent to AD FS, Entra Connect and AD CS on top of your domain controllers. The coverage for Active Directory Certificate Services is especially valuable as it covers not only suspicious activities but will report on existing configuration issues.
In many AD environments a misconfigured certificate template can allow any domain user to enroll and authenticate with a certificate for a domain admin account - allowing complete domain dominance for an attacker in minutes. Weak certificate template ACL's are common too, allowing any user to manipulate them to achieve AD compromise.
Additional sensor deployments - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/de…
Example misconfiguration that will be detected - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/de…
KiLLERVMs retweeted
❗️❗️❗️Important notification for Endpoint Admins ❗️❗️❗️
Impacts both win32 apps and scripts in Intune.
Unfortunate timing combined with a very late notification - surely this could have been handled differently ...
#microsoft #intune































