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I don’t buy stories. I buy cash flows, balance sheets, and mispriced assets. | Yes, I avoid trendy stocks. $SIRI $JD $PDD $TME $MELI $RKT $NU $VST $LULU $HHH

United States
Joined August 2015
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I've been blessed with all the interactions I had on X. And it's safe to say I've learned a lot from all the discussion and comments. Therefore, I want to take it one step further. I’ve been working on a Google Sheet to keep track of the companies I’m interested in researching, and figured I’d just share it for transparency. Part of what I’m trying to do with this account is be more transparent about the process — what I’m looking at, what I’m considering buying, and where my attention is going. One thing to clarify: this isn’t necessarily a list of every stock I own. For example, I’m very happy with my positions in PDD and TME right now, so I don’t really consider them “watchlist” names. I already own enough of them, I’m comfortable with the thesis, and I’d rather spend my research time digging into businesses I don’t own yet. The sheet will probably change a lot over time. Some names will get added, some will disappear, and some will probably sit there while I try to figure out whether I actually want to own them. And honestly, if you see something I’m missing, disagree with my thinking, or have a completely different view on a company, I’d genuinely like to hear it. I enjoy good investment discussions. I’d much rather have someone challenge my thesis than simply agree with me. Link: docs.google.com/spreadsheets… Current Watchlist: Sea Limited $SE Ally Financial $ALLY Deckers Outdoor $DECK Netflix $NFLX Sprouts Farmers Market $SFM RocketCompanies $RKT PG&E $PCG PepsiCo $PEP MercadoLibre $MELI Constellation Brands $STZ Alibaba $BABA SM Energy $SM NovaGold Resource $NG James River Group Holdings $JRVR First Solar $FSLR Ford Motor $F
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Maybe me sold out $PBR at $25.50 was a good decision. The oil / gold movement is very interesting…
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$BABA is really now sub-90…. Why are people so bearish about the name?
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Richard Liu had a pretty interesting 2018. Not the same scandal as Jensen Huang but definitely as sexual (if not more) But somehow the bigger lesson from $JD isn't about his personal life. It's corporate governance. Liu's super-voting sharing give him voting power far beyond his economic ownership, allowing him to retain effective control of $JD despite owning a much smaller percentage of the company economically. Meanwhile, Jensen Huang owns a meaningful stake in NVIDIA $NVDA but his voting control is no where close to Liu's. Listen, if you can't control your dick, at least control your board. My humble opinion, Jensen.
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$PDD - at $78 a share, market is pricing in a decent slowdown in my opinion. I am not forecasting the earning now. But if PDD can produce something like 7-10% growth + continued enormous cash generation / reserve + flat margin. I don't think then the current valuation looks particularly demanding. And that's before giving Temu much credit for what it could become. The bear case is also real. PDD is spending heavily to defend its market share and support the eco system, while Temu faces increasingly difficult international environment. The EU has introduced parcel duty. And there's continue regulatory pressure around TEMU. If its domestic online market business continues to grow slowly, and we don't see good numbers from TEMU. Then I'd have to reevaluate my thesis. I want Thursday's number to tell me whether I am buying a temporarily depressed high-quality compounder. Or a structurally lower-growth business whose historical performance metrics are being competed away. For those of you who like $PDD 's valuation, what stopped you from opening a position?
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$TME - Few more things after going into details. One thing I like about Tencent Music is its cash position. At September 30, 2026, TME reported RMB51.49 billion in cash, cash equivalents and term deposits. Total borrowings were approximately RMB11.73 billion, consisting of RMB5.88 billion in non-current borrowings and RMB5.86 billion in current borrowings. It also had RMB10.03 billion in notes payable. That puts total borrowings and notes payable at approximately RMB21.77 billion. Net cash is approximately RMB29.72 billion, before lease liabilities of RMB329 million. In other words, TME has a substantial financial cushion. Its reported cash and term-deposit balance is more than twice its borrowings and notes payable. There is an important qualification: TME issued $1 billion in senior unsecured notes during September, split between $500 million due in 2031 and $500 million due in 2036. So the increase in liquidity should not be interpreted as purely internally generated cash. The company has also raised debt. Still, I like having that kind of balance-sheet flexibility in a business that generates meaningful operating cash flow. But there are a few more red flags worth paying attention to. First, as mentioned in my earlier post, profitability isn't growing nearly as quickly as the headline revenue figures might suggest. Gross profit increased only 3.8%, while cost of revenue rose 7.0%. Operating expenses increased 16.9%, considerably faster than revenue. Operating profit was essentially flat, up just 0.4%, and IFRS net profit attributable to shareholders remained roughly unchanged at RMB2.15 billion. That's not the operating leverage I want to see from a scaled platform business. Second, social entertainment services and other revenue declined 15.7%. The transition toward music is strategically understandable, but the decline in the legacy business is still a headwind. I want to see the newer revenue streams replace that business with attractive incremental margins, not merely higher reported revenue. Third, Ximalaya deserves scrutiny. Goodwill increased from RMB20.52 billion at the end of 2025 to RMB29.77 billion at September 30, while intangible assets increased from RMB2.90 billion to RMB5.55 billion. Acquisitions can strengthen an ecosystem, but they also create a responsibility to earn an adequate return on the capital invested. I don't want to confuse a larger content catalogue with value creation. Fourth, the adjusted earnings deserve a closer look. Q3 non-IFRS net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB2.45 billion, versus IFRS net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB2.15 billion. The reconciliation includes acquisition-related amortization and stock-based compensation, among other adjustments. Those expenses don't disappear economically just because they are excluded from adjusted earnings. Finally, the buyback is encouraging, but I would not automatically call it accretive. TME's Q3 diluted weighted-average ADS count was approximately 1.58 billion, versus 1.56 billion a year earlier. Repurchases need to be assessed against acquisition-related issuance and employee compensation, not just the dollars spent. I don't think their SBC is that crazy. But it's worth mentioning. My final takeaway: I like TME's underlying business model, its subscription economics, its content distribution scale and especially its balance sheet. The roughly RMB29.7 billion net-cash position provides meaningful downside protection and strategic flexibility. The company is also generating substantial operating cash flow. But I want to see the operating numbers catch up with the strategic narrative. Revenue growth is respectable. Cash generation is strong. Yet gross margin is declining, operating expenses are growing quickly, and reported shareholder earnings are barely moving. The investment question isn't whether TME has a good music business. It does. The question is whether management can turn its expanding music and audio ecosystem into stronger per-share owner earnings while earning attractive returns on acquisitions. That's what I would be watching in the next few quarters. A strong balance sheet gives management options; it doesn't automatically make every capital-allocation decision a good one.
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A mob boss wanted to keep his money-laundering operation a secret, so he hired a deaf and mute accountant. Figured it was the safest arrangement. One day, $10 million went missing. The boss put a gun to the accountant’s head and turned to the interpreter. “Ask him where the money is. If he doesn’t tell me, I’m pulling the trigger.” The interpreter signed the question. The accountant immediately started panicking. He frantically signed: “Please don’t shoot! The money is in a black waterproof bag, buried under the stone sculpture next to the pond in my backyard!” The interpreter turned to the boss and calmly translated: “He says, ‘You’ve got the wrong guy. If you have the balls, go ahead and shoot.’” Turns out the accountant wasn’t the only one cooking the books.
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$TME Q3 was more interesting than the headline 5.6% revenue growth suggests. The part I like: the business is increasingly monetizing music IP rather than simply selling subscriptions. Music-related revenue grew 10.2% to RMB7.68B. Membership revenue grew 9.2% to RMB4.99B, while marketing/consumption revenue grew 12.1% to RMB2.70B. TME is increasingly monetizing artists through merchandise, concerts, offline performances and other IP experiences. Four stadium concerts for GAI alone attracted 120,000+ attendees, while TME continues expanding artist relationships, overseas performances and fan-centric products. At the same time, Ximalaya gives TME another large audio ecosystem to monetize. There is a real flywheel here: music → artists → fans → memberships → merchandise → concerts → broader audio/content → more engagement. And the balance sheet gives them plenty of room to execute. TME ended September with RMB 51.5B of cash, term deposits and short-term investments, against RMB 15.9B of borrowings and notes payable. Nine-month operating cash flow was RMB 10.4B, up from RMB 7.84B. The company also bought back 34.7M ADSs for $300M during Q3, an average of $8.60 per ADS. That is roughly where the story gets interesting for me. The stock was trading around $9–9.50 today, so management was buying back a meaningful amount of stock around current valuation levels. But I don't think investors should blindly celebrate the quarter. Gross margin declined to 42.8% from 43.5%. Operating expenses increased 16.9%, versus only 5.6% revenue growth, pushing operating expenses to 17.1% of revenue from 15.5%. IFRS net income attributable to shareholders was RMB2.15B — essentially flat YoY. A major reason is the Ximalaya consolidation, including amortization of acquired intangible assets. Q3 amortization of intangible assets increased to RMB463M from RMB317M. And the balance sheet tells you something else: goodwill jumped from RMB20.5B at year-end 2025 to RMB29.8B, while intangible assets increased from RMB2.9B to RMB5.6B. So I view Ximalaya as both an opportunity and a risk. If management can use the combined ecosystem to increase ARPPU, retention, content monetization and cross-platform engagement, the acquisition could look very attractive over time. If growth remains modest while acquired assets require substantial amortization and operating costs, the market will eventually demand evidence of returns on that capital. That's the number I care about. Not whether TME can grow revenue 5–10%. Can it turn its enormous user base, music IP and cash balance into sustainably higher FCF per ADS? That's ultimately what determines whether TME is a good company and a good investment. As of right now, I will continue to hold, and buy more if it drops below $9. Happy earnings day everyone.
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Berkshire $BRK.B cut $COF by approximately 62% in Q3, but left its 27 million-share $ALLY position untouched. I find that distinction more interesting than the sale itself. Both companies have roughly $92B in auto loans. But their businesses are very different. Capital One has another $276B in credit-card loans. Credit cards account for roughly 60% of its reported loan balances. Ally, meanwhile, is much more concentrated in auto finance and has built a meaningful retail deposit franchise. Here's where it gets interesting: Capital One's auto net charge-off rate was 1.59% in Q3, compared with 1.90% at Ally. So this doesn't look like a straightforward decision to retain the lender with better auto-credit performance. Valuation may be part of the explanation. At the November 16 closing prices, Capital One traded at approximately 1.88x tangible book value, while Ally traded at roughly 0.89x. But there is a trade-off: Capital One generated a higher reported return on tangible common equity — approximately 21.1%, versus Ally's 13.1% core return. Those figures aren't perfectly comparable because the companies use different methodologies. Capital One also has the added complexity of integrating Discover, while Ally offers a more focused auto-finance business funded substantially by customer deposits. My interpretation is that this may be less about Berkshire turning bearish on consumer credit and more about relative valuation, business mix, and the expected return on capital. One caveat: Berkshire had already reduced Ally from 29M shares to 27M in Q2. It simply made no further reduction in Q3. And a 13F doesn't tell us which investment manager made the decision or why. I wouldn't automatically call $ALLY the better business. Capital One currently earns higher returns. But at less than tangible book value, Ally presents a very different valuation proposition. The question I'd be asking is whether Ally can sustainably earn 13–15% on tangible common equity without taking materially more credit risk. My thesis on $ALLY remains the same as of now.
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Explain today's sell-off @grok
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$JD - I’d buy $JD regardless. But if you need some validation that you’re not completely crazy for liking it, take a look at what happened in Q3. Some pretty serious investors were adding. Point72 increased its position 177%. Two Sigma went from basically nothing to 3.8M shares. AllianceBernstein opened a new 3.0M-share position. Voloridge added 72%. Citadel increased its position more than 10x. Man Group added 103%. Qube increased its position more than 20x. And Grantham Mayo Van Otterloo increased its position 365%. That's not one investor making one weird bet. There was a pretty broad group of institutional buyers leaning into JD during Q3. Of course, plenty of investors sold too. D.E. Shaw cut 55%, Millennium cut 79%, GQG exited, and Franklin Templeton cut 40%. So I'm not saying "hedge funds bought it, therefore buy it." That's not investing. What I find interesting is that the buying lines up with what I'm seeing fundamentally. JD's TTM FCF has climbed to roughly RMB18.8B, while New Business losses have been falling materially. The core retail business is still highly profitable, logistics is growing, and the company is buying back stock while the valuation remains depressed. Revenue growth is still mediocre. CapEx is rising. And I still have questions about how much capital JD will ultimately put into Food Delivery and international expansion. But at ~$26–27, I'm not paying for a perfect turnaround. I'm paying for a massive retail and logistics platform that already generates cash, with several loss-making businesses that are finally becoming less of a drag. I'd buy JD even if none of these hedge funds owned it. But seeing Point72, Two Sigma, Citadel, Man Group, GMO and others building positions in the same quarter? I'll take the validation.
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I actually came away from $JD Q3 results more constructive than the stock reaction suggests. The headline wasn't great: revenue grew just 3.5% YoY, and JD Retail itself was only up ~3%. But I think the more important part of the quarter was happening underneath the revenue number. TTM FCF reached RMB 18.8B, up from RMB 12.6B a year ago. And New Business losses reportedly fell to roughly RMB 9.6B from RMB 15.7B. That second number matters. JD doesn't need Food Delivery or its other new businesses to become another Meituan for the stock to work. It just needs these businesses to stop consuming enormous amounts of capital. Meanwhile, JD Retail remains highly profitable, with ~RMB 15.1B of operating income in Q3. So I'm increasingly viewing JD as: a very large, mature retail business generating cash + a logistics business growing nicely + a collection of newer businesses whose losses are finally coming down. That's a much more interesting setup at a low valuation than the headline 3% revenue growth would suggest. There are still things I don't love. CapEx nearly doubled on a TTM basis to ~RMB20.9B, and management is still putting capital into Food Delivery, international expansion and the CECONOMY acquisition. That's where I think the real risk is. JD has plenty of ways to deploy capital. I'm more interested in whether those investments eventually earn attractive returns than whether they make the company look bigger. At ~$26–27, JD is roughly an ~8% TTM FCF yield based on current market value. I don't need a heroic growth story for that to work. I need modest revenue growth, stable Retail margins, continued FCF generation, and New Business losses to keep shrinking. Q3 didn't prove the whole thesis. But it did make the downside look more interesting to me. The turnaround isn't complete. It's just becoming visible in the cash flow statement. I plan on adding more later.
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Li Lu’s Himalaya Capital Q3 portfolio is interesting. Not because he made a ton of changes. Because he barely changed anything — and then doubled down on a couple of bets. $PDD +9% to 11.76M shares $TME +125% to 14.82M shares Meanwhile: $GOOGL = unchanged $GOOG = unchanged $BRK.B = unchanged $EWBC = unchanged $CROX = unchanged $AAPL = unchanged Alphabet alone is ~45% of the portfolio. PDD is another ~24%. And Berkshire is ~15%. So roughly 84% of the portfolio is concentrated in just four positions. What really catches my eye is TME. It was already a position, but he more than doubled it in Q3. That tells me the incremental capital isn’t being spread around. It’s going toward a few businesses where he appears to see a meaningful gap between price and intrinsic value. Just concentration. That’s probably the most Li Lu thing about this portfolio. The question I’m most interested in now: What does he see in PDD and Tencent Music that the market still isn’t fully pricing in? What do we think?
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Long River Holding retweeted
This, NVIDIA’s changing of methodology, and Huang’s desire to get chips to China, as alleged this morning in the WSJ shows both incentives and means were in place for unsavory actions.
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$BSP - Something tells me this is a Ted Weschler position. $BRK.B Based on the way he talks about furniture during that podcast, he is a man with taste for sure.
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Stanley Druckenmiller 13F update - My personal take: 1. The combined Seagate $STX common-share and call-option reported value is approximately $405.6 million. That is a substantial position. What I find interesting is the apparent preference for the infrastructure surrounding artificial intelligence rather than simply buying the most obvious semiconductor companies. Seagate and Western Digital are particularly interesting because artificial intelligence workloads create demand for storing enormous datasets, training information, model outputs, and other enterprise data. He may believe the artificial intelligence investment cycle is moving beyond the initial shortage of computing capacity and increasingly benefiting storage and other infrastructure suppliers. It could be a relative-value rotation within the technology supply chain. 2. He's making moves on Gold miners. $NEM $B I would pay attention to this combination. These are three established gold producers, rather than simply buying a gold exchange-traded fund. Gold miners offer exposure to the gold price, but also have operating leverage. For example, if the realized gold price rises while production costs remain relatively stable, the incremental revenue can translate into disproportionately higher operating profits. This creates a leveraged exposure to gold. This is consistent with a preference for hard assets and protection against monetary or geopolitical uncertainty. He also mentioned this in his interview with Morgan Stanley. 3. He still holds $EWZ and $SE and $YPF He may be seeking markets where valuations are less demanding than those of major United States growth companies. He may also be looking for companies that can benefit from structural economic changes, including digital commerce, energy exports, and domestic consumption. 4. He is moving away from semiconductor, airlines, homebuilders, industrial materials, and traditional technology names. He trimmed $TSM, exited $AMD, and all airline names. He also reduced exposure to several prominent semiconductor and technology companies while increasing storage, cloud, and electronics infrastructure exposure. Very interesting to see his moves. More to come later.
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$HTHT - Headline numbers were strong. Revenue is up 11.3% YoY M&F revenue is up 25.7% YoY Adjusted EBITDA is up 22.8% YoY Operating Income is up 25.7% YoY And operating margin is up 3.8% YoY Numbers are definitely encouraging. To be honest, it's much better than I think it'd be. I like the scalability they offer too. The China business alone had 13,906 hotels. More importantly, 13,430 of those were manachised or franchised. Across the entire group, 94% of rooms were under the M&F model, versus just 6% under leased-and-owned operations. During Q3, HWC opened 664 hotels and closed 175, adding 489 net hotels. Of the 664 openings, 660 were M&F. This is a powerful growth model. Each additional hotel can extend H World's distribution network, brand reach, loyalty ecosystem and purchasing scale without requiring the company to own the underlying real estate. I also like the pipeline of 2,806 unopened hotels. It gives the company a visible expansion opportunity. Same hotel performance is deteriorating a bit though. I am not surprised. They are operating in a pretty challenging operating environment. I don't think this invalidates the investment thesis. Approximately RMB ¥8B in TTM FCF is a very attractive level of cash generation. Approximately RMB ¥9.3B in conventional net cash provides a meaningful financial cushion. I find H World attractive as a hotel platform, not simply as a bet on a recovery in Chinese travel. Its scale, franchise economics and FCF generation are the reasons I would consider owning it. The market may be underestimating how much value can be created by an asset-light hotel network of this size.
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Terry Smith's latest 13F is worth spending some time on. A few changes stood out: $VEEV : +231% $YUM : +648% $V : +12% $MA : +17% $TJX : +44% On the other side: $MSFT : -50% $GOOGL : -45% $META : -42% $MAR : -47% $PG : -36% $GEV : -56% And $CLX was completely exited. (Given its recent rumor of being bought, interesting...) What I find particularly interesting is the increase in Veeva and Yum. Both were relatively small positions in Q2, and Fundsmith made them considerably larger in Q3. I also wouldn't interpret this as Terry Smith abandoning technology. TSMC was essentially unchanged, Nextpower increased, and he opened new positions in Rambus and Credo. This looks more like a reallocation of capital than a broad retreat from technology. One position change in Terry Smith's latest 13F caught my attention: $VEEV Fundsmith increased its Veeva Systems position from 816,785 shares to 2,705,345 shares in Q3. That's a 231% increase. The position's reported value increased from approximately $145M to $772M. Veeva is an interesting business because it sells industry-specific cloud software to life sciences companies. Its products are embedded in workflows involving clinical, regulatory and commercial operations. This is not simply another generic SaaS company. Customer workflows, regulatory requirements and the cost and complexity of switching systems can create meaningful competitive advantages. At the same time, a good business isn't automatically a good investment. Growth expectations, valuation, customer concentration and the economics of its transition to the Vault platform still deserve scrutiny. I'd be interested in understanding what Terry Smith sees in Veeva at this point in its development. A 6% portfolio position suggests this is no longer a peripheral idea. What change(s) in Terry's portfolio shock you the most?
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$BABA - Opened a tiny position today. I don't know if I plan on adding it aggressively if it falls. But this price is definitely tempting enough for me to scoop some shares. This feels like a regulatory-driven selloff ahead of earnings. Alibaba's cloud business is still strong. They are still making decent progress on the Qwen model. And their e-commerce business is still fundamentally a mature, enormous Chinese platform. Maybe I am catching a fall knife, who knows.
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