/// Luke

The Islamic Republic is threatening to attack the cables and data centres that keep the Persian Gulf connected. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf announced that a new “Persian Gulf Data Authority” is coming and warned regional governments, investment funds and companies against supporting artificial-intelligence or data firms the regime accuses of assisting military operations. His threat was explicit: “No finance, equity, land or energy. Assist them and face our enforcement.” The Islamic Republic has no authority to dictate how other Persian Gulf countries allocate their money, territory or energy. Ghalibaf is not announcing a legitimate regional regulator. He is giving an official name to a campaign of coercion. The word that matters is “enforcement.” Only days earlier, senior regime figures threatened undersea internet cables, data centres and artificial-intelligence infrastructure across the Persian Gulf. Ghalibaf is now demanding that regional governments and companies follow the regime’s political conditions or face unspecified consequences. The message is unmistakable: obey the Islamic Republic or place the civilian infrastructure keeping your countries connected at risk. At least seven major undersea cable systems are concentrated around the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. They include the 25,000-kilometre AAE-1 system, the 10,300-kilometre FALCON network and the 5,270-kilometre Gulf Bridge International ring. These are not obscure pieces of equipment. Undersea cables carry approximately 99 percent of international data traffic. The systems around Hormuz connect Persian Gulf states to cloud services, banking networks, communications platforms and international markets. Most cables crossing the strait are routed through Omani waters rather than Iranian territory. But they remain geographically concentrated inside a narrow maritime corridor where disruption could affect several countries simultaneously. The threat extends beyond cables. Data-centre capacity across the GCC is projected to triple to more than three gigawatts over the next five years. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are expected to account for more than 80 percent of that expansion. The investments include the planned Stargate UAE artificial-intelligence campus in Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia’s HUMAIN network and the 1.5-gigawatt DataVolt project at NEOM Oxagon. Microsoft, Amazon, Nvidia, Oracle, OpenAI and regional sovereign investment funds are all connected to the broader build-out. This infrastructure represents the Persian Gulf’s attempt to move beyond oil and become a global centre for artificial intelligence, cloud computing and advanced technology. That is precisely why the Islamic Republic is threatening it. Senior regime official Mohsen Rezaei has claimed that the region’s cables, data centres and artificial-intelligence facilities represent more than $2 trillion in economic exposure. That figure has not been independently substantiated, but it reveals how the regime views these assets: not as civilian infrastructure, but as leverage. The Islamic Republic does not require sophisticated deep-ocean capabilities to make the threat credible. The Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz are relatively shallow, major cable routes are mapped and the IRGC Navy has spent decades developing asymmetric capabilities for operating in these waters. The regime could combine cyberattacks, strikes against exposed facilities, interference with cable infrastructure and deniable maritime sabotage. It could then prolong the economic damage by threatening the specialized ships required to repair affected cables. The objective would not be to disconnect the entire world. Most Europe-Asia data traffic does not pass through Hormuz. The immediate victims would be Persian Gulf countries and the civilians, businesses and financial institutions that depend on their digital infrastructure. Even limited disruption could cause internet outages, financial delays, cloud-service interruptions and severe uncertainty around billions of dollars in planned investment. That is the leverage the regime is trying to manufacture. The Islamic Republic has already weaponized oil routes, commercial shipping and proxy militias. It now wants internet connectivity, data centres and civilian communications to become additional hostages. The threat follows the regime’s established method. Officials identify critical infrastructure as a target. State-linked media publicize its vulnerabilities. Senior figures then manufacture a supposed legal or moral justification for attacking it. If sabotage follows, responsibility can be blurred through cyber proxies, unexplained maritime incidents or supposed accidents. It is the state equivalent of throwing the stone and hiding the hand behind its back. The hypocrisy is unmistakable. The Islamic Republic has repeatedly shut down Iran’s internet to suppress protests, conceal repression and prevent evidence from reaching the outside world. It is now threatening to export that digital darkness across the Persian Gulf. Ghalibaf calls it a “Data Authority.” It is not an authority. It has no jurisdiction, legitimacy or consent from the countries it claims the power to police. It is an ultimatum backed by the threat of sabotage. The Islamic Republic is not offering the region digital governance. It is demanding digital submission.