observer14 retweeted
🧵A few takeaways from my fuller BBC Monitoring analysis on JNIM’s evolving relationship with the al-Qaeda brand 👇
Is JNIM in the Sahel moving away from the global al-Qaeda brand?
monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product…
observer14 retweeted
🧵My analysis for BBC Monitoring on 9/11 anniversary: monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product…
1/ Twenty-five years after 9/11, has global jihadism failed?
There's a strong case it has, at least as a political project. Neither al-Qaeda nor Islamic State (IS) - nor any other transnational jihadist group - has succeeded in taking control of an entire country. IS came closest, but ultimately lost its territorial “caliphate”.
Yet two Islamist groups have succeeded in taking power: the Taliban in Afghanistan and, more strikingly, HTS in Syria. Neither followed the transnational model championed by al-Qaeda and IS.
The style has also changed dramatically, the one prior was politically charged and thematically edgy. This current style is sermon-ish and very subdued. Feels like reading a print out of a pre-approved government Friday prayer sermon.
The editorial team behind IS’s al-Naba weekly really seems to be struggling for themes lately. The past five editorials, including today’s, have largely been dull, sermon-style pieces on morals, patience, perseverance, worship and other familiar religious themes.
Some carried underlying messages suggesting IS may be worried about morale, trying to rationalise setbacks or spur followers into action. But they’ve been wrapped in highly familiar religious rhetoric.
Today’s advice: focus more on prayer and worship than worldly distractions. As my Pakistani colleague put it: “My grandma could’ve given that advice for free. No editorial needed!”
observer14 retweeted
The editorial team behind IS’s al-Naba weekly really seems to be struggling for themes lately. The past five editorials, including today’s, have largely been dull, sermon-style pieces on morals, patience, perseverance, worship and other familiar religious themes.
Some carried underlying messages suggesting IS may be worried about morale, trying to rationalise setbacks or spur followers into action. But they’ve been wrapped in highly familiar religious rhetoric.
Today’s advice: focus more on prayer and worship than worldly distractions. As my Pakistani colleague put it: “My grandma could’ve given that advice for free. No editorial needed!”
🧵 Many analysts and terrorism experts are doubting that the Abu Bilal Al-Minuki was N.2 in ISIS. The majority don’t even offer any analytical reasoning for their skepticism.
I’m here to open a dialogue about this event and argue that Al-Minuki was most likely N.2
Now, if you put all of these things together+the grim assessment of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and the no doubt presence of the ISIS overall leader in Somalia, plus the millions of $ that the ISWAP and Sahel are bringing in from extortion and kidnapping, the picture becomes clear..
observer14 retweeted
For at least a year now, JNIM has been somewhat distancing itself from al-Qaeda's global jihadist agenda & rhetoric. They've stopped issuing joint statements with parent group AQIM (Al-Qaeda in North Africa), and their messaging has been focused on local Sahelian issues and grievances rather than broader Muslim concerns. This change seems aimed at appealing to local communities and placating external actors (by suggesting that JNIM has no ambitions beyond Sahel).
This doesn’t necessarily indicate a division or falling out with al-Qaeda; rather, it may reflect a mutual tactical adjustment aimed at maximising gains.
Since events/ regime changes in Afghanistan in 2021 and Syria in 2024, radical Islamist groups have been looking to capitalise on similar opportunities
تصحيح:
الاسم الحركي ليس ابو دجانة ولكن ابو حمزة البلجيكي. واسمه الحقيقي طارق جدعون، مغربي الأصل بلجيكي الجنسية. ظهر أولا في إصدار من ولاية نينوى بعنوان "فاسعوا إلى ذكر الله" و بعد إلقاء القبض عليه من طرف جهاز مكافحة الارهاب العراقي ظهر في شريط اعترافات نقلته قناة العربية.
#فيديو من #الموصل عام 2017
ابو دجانة البلجيكي
احد عناصر تنظيم الدولة (الأرهابي ) داعش ومسؤول معامل التصنيع والتطوير التابعة للتنظيم داخل الموصل يتحدث من داخل اسواق المدينة القديمة عن تطويرهم لمجموعة من الاسلحة والامكانيات التي استخدموها ضد القوات العراقية ومليشيات ايران والتحالف
في تلك المرحلة، حاول التنظيم إدخال مفاهيم جديدة إلى ساحة القتال، من بينها استخدام أنظمة بسيطة تشبه “الروبوتات الأرضية” أو المنصات المجنزرة التي يتم التحكم بها عن بُعد، سواء لحمل الأسلحة أو لتنفيذ مهام استطلاع وإسناد ناري داخل الأزقة الضيقة، وهي امتداد مباشر لفكرة الأسلحة التي تُدار عن بُعد دون تعريض المقاتل للخطر.
فخلال فترة سيطرة التنظيم على مناطق في العراق وسوريا التي امتدّت لأربع سنوات عمل على تطوير أسلحة يتم التحكم بها عن بُعد محليًا، وجرّبها بين عامي 2015 و2018 في العراق وسوريا، مع توثيق ما لا يقل عن 11 نموذجًا مختلفًا .
سأنشر شرح وصور عنها اسفل التغريدة #تابع
Another fantastic summary from the BBC monitoring. Hitting all major points in the IS leadership message.
🧵Key topics from IS's first leadership message in two years..
1/ ISIS/IS on 21 Feb released its first leadership message since Mar 2024, covering a wide range of mostly predictable themes. These included calls for jihad against the Syrian government and army, appeals for followers in the West to intensify attacks against "Christians and Jews", calls for sympathisers worldwide to migrate to IS branches, vague and non-committal remarks on IS-linked prisoners in Syria, and now customary tributes to IS's Africa branches, which it said had received foreign fighters.
observer14 retweeted
#AlHol In the latest issue of its weekly paper la-Naba, IS called on Muslims in Syria to come to the aid of women held in al-Hol camp and other detention facilities, invoking notions of honour and a religious "duty" towards Muslim women and prisoners more broadly.
The brief appeal offered no details and made no overt suggestion that IS itself had plans to assist the women or to storm al-Hol or other detention sites.
observer14 retweeted
🧵#AlHolCamp #Hasakah #ISIS #AlNaba
1/ Unlike its online supporters, who have openly called for militant action and practical assistance in support of women held at al-Hol camp and other IS-linked detainees in eastern Syria, IS, in its first comment on the issue (through its weekly paper al-Naba) adopted a more political and analytical tone and stopped short of issuing any explicit call to action.
It's unclear whether this reflected a deliberate attempt to keep operational guidance discreet.
observer14 retweeted
#سوريا لماذا انهارت مجدداً المفاوضات بين قسد ودمشق وما ماهية الاتهامات المتبادلة وأهمية ملف سجناء جماعة الدولة الإسلامية وعوائلهم بالنسبة للطرفين @France24_ar
observer14 retweeted
The shadowy group Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah has claimed responsibility for the Homs mosque attack, saying it was carried out “in cooperation with mujahidin from another group”, which it did not name.
Saraya may simply be a front for IS. The group also claimed responsibility for the Damascus church attack in June. In its statement, Saraya said the Homs attack was carried out using explosives planted at the site. The claim comes after a lengthy lull in attacks claimed by Saraya
IS supporters online are celebrating a deadly attack - during Friday prayers - on a mosque in Syria’s central Homs province, claiming it was a husseiniya (a Shia mosque). There's still uncertainty over the nature of the site - whether it was a Shia or Sunni mosque - and conflicting reports over the method of attack, with some suggesting either explosives planted at the location or a suicide bomber wearing an explosive vest.
In online discussions, IS supporters appear to assume the group was responsible, but some also acknowledge that if the target turns out to be a Sunni mosque, IS involvement would be unlikely. If the site is confirmed to be a Shia mosque or husseiniya, responsibility would most likely lie with IS or with the shadowy group Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, which may be a front for IS
