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free newjeans.

Joined July 2023
Photo by mia🦭(◕ᴥ◕) (@phamserotonin)Photo by mia🦭(◕ᴥ◕) (@phamserotonin)Photo by mia🦭(◕ᴥ◕) (@phamserotonin)Photo by mia🦭(◕ᴥ◕) (@phamserotonin)
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기분이 이래
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aejeans were actual sisterhood, unlike hybe groups
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많이 보고싶다 🍀🍀🍀🍀🍀
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超絶美形の造形ってある意味綺麗すぎて奇形なんだと改めて実感した
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통닭 차렷 통닭다리찢기
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한국 언론 너무 창피해요
Secret K-Pop Deals: The Times obtained the contracts signed by the group NewJeans. They show how record labels keep a tight grip on K-pop stars. nyti.ms/4eLmX6g
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I can't even blame MINJI, or any of the girls, if they actually fell in love with Hanni. BC if I'd heard Hanni sing (for the first time) I'd fall for her too. Oh wait..
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剥削与掌控:NewJeans秘密合同揭露K-pop阴暗面。长期以来,K-pop一直受到剥削艺人的指控。NewJeans与公司签署的秘密合同表明,尽管多年来业界不断承诺改革,政府也出手干预,但实际情况并没有多少改变。cn.nytimes.com/culture/20261…
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hanni: "there are differences between trainee and artist contracts.... but there's also something similar. it's that we're all humans. i think you're missing that part." THIS DIVA?!?!
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【重要】 NYTがNewJeansの搾取的な専属契約の問題点を報じた後、ADORがミン・ヒジン前代表を契約の主体として名指ししたことに対し、ミン前代表側は、専属契約の草案作成から最終承認まで、実質的な権限は親会社HYBEにあったとして、契約責任をミン前代表に転嫁したHYBE側の主張に真っ向から反論しました。 [ミン・ヒジン OOAK RECORDS代表の公式見解 全文] 1. 契約書の作成主体と最終承認権者 当時、ADORには独立した法務チームも、専属契約の主要条項を直接設計・検討する法律専門家もいませんでした。HYBEの運営システム上、レーベルの傘下組織を設置することができなかったためです。これは、HYBEがこれまで広く宣伝してきた「シェアード・ファンクション(Shared Function)」によるものでした。 NewJeansの専属契約書の草案は、HYBEの法務チームが作成しました。契約書の修正作業も、HYBEの法務チームを通じて行われました。ADORは、HYBEが作成した契約書をもとにアーティスト側と意思疎通を図り、保護者からの質問や修正要請をHYBEの法務チームに伝え、調整する役割を担っていました。 調整を除く説明や説得の過程については、HYBEの法務チームが専属契約書の作成を主導していたため、HYBEの法務チームの弁護士が直接説明し、対応しました。 これに対し、HYBEは、レーベルが契約相手と意思疎通を図りながら主要条件を決定したと説明しています。 実際の契約業務においても、ADOR代表取締役の決裁だけで契約が確定する仕組みではありませんでした。HYBE法務チーム、HYBE CFO、HYBE CEOによる合意・承認手続きが続き、さらにHYBE側の人物2名、ADOR代表取締役1名で構成される取締役会の承認も受ける必要がありました。HYBEの同意なしに契約を進めることはできませんでした。 これは単に法律的な助言を受けることとは異なります。主要な契約条項の作成と修正、そして最終承認の権限がどこにあったのかという問題です。 HYBEの「2022年持続可能経営報告書」56ページには、標準契約書の書式を用いた契約書の作成、法務部門による検討、関連する上位責任者の承認、および法務部門の合意を経て契約を確定するという、全社的な法務管理手続きが明記されています。 これは、HYBEがアーティストの専属契約に関して、単に参考用の契約書の書式を提供する役割にとどまらず、社内の契約承認手続きに直接関与するよう規定していたことを示しています。 このように、レーベルには専属契約書の主要条項を修正する権限がなかったため、ADORの元副代表は、ある保護者との会話の中で、次のようなメッセージまで伝えています。 「契約書はHYBE系列会社が共通して使用するものだと説明を受けており、そのため、ご要望いただいたすべての内容を修正することは難しい。最終決定の過程にHYBEが含まれているためだ。ただし、ミン・ヒジンが代表取締役なのだから、彼女が率いるADORとそのスタッフを信頼して任せてほしい」 ミン・ヒジン前代表は、保護者たちと交わしたこのような約束を守るため、在任期間を通じて、HYBEが作成した契約書の矛盾や盲点を現実的に改善しようと絶えず闘ってきました。 法務以外の事業・運営の領域に至るまで、ADOR唯一のアーティストであったNewJeansというチームのIPを守るため、親会社の構造的な不合理に異議を唱え、代案を提示してきました。しかし、最終的に返ってきたのは、途方もない濡れ衣と違法な監査の開始でした。 ⸻ 2. ADOR代表取締役による2024年の問題提起 2024年1月25日、当時ADOR代表だったミン・ヒジンは、パク・ジウォンHYBE代表との会議で、専属契約を含む重要な契約の締結権限を要求しました。 その後、2月16日には、関連する要求を盛り込んだ株主間契約の修正案をHYBEに提出しました。こうした要求と経緯は、当時のメディアでも報道されています。 HYBEが主張するように、ADORが専属契約の主要内容を独自に決定し、締結する権限を十分に持っていたのであれば、なぜ代表取締役が親会社に対して、その権限を別途要求する必要があったのでしょうか。 HYBEは2024年5月、メディアを通じて、こうした要求について自ら「拒否した」と堂々と明らかにしています。 当時の要求が、単に形式的な権限をさらに確保しようとする問題ではなかったことが、今回のHYBEの声明によって明確になりました。 そしてむしろ、ミン・ヒジン前代表が代表取締役として実際の業務を遂行する過程で、重要な契約業務を独立して決定できないという構造的な制約を経験したため、それを改善しようとしていたことが、如実に明らかになったにすぎません。 ⸻ 3. 一部の精算条件に関する決定 HYBEは、ADORの副代表がアーティスト側の費用負担を軽減できる案を拒否したと主張しています。しかし、この説明もまた、契約における実質的な意思決定構造を省略しています。 ADORが一部の精算条件や費用負担の方式について協議できたという事実と、HYBEが用意した専属契約の基本構造や主要な政策的条項を独自に変更する権限を持っていたということは、別の問題です。 実際、ADORは自ら決定できる範囲内で、アーティストの負担を軽減する選択をしました。NewJeansのメンバーがSOURCE MUSICからADORに移管された際、ミン・ヒジン前代表が率いていたADORは、以前の練習生時代に発生した費用を含む関連費用を、メンバーに負担させないことを決定しました。 当時、他のHYBE傘下レーベルでは、練習生時代の費用をデビュー後にアーティストに請求していたと把握していますが、ADORはメンバーにこれを請求しないことを決定しました。メンバーたちの従来のデビュープランが白紙になった経緯や、関連する約束が履行されなかった事情などを考慮した決定でした。 こうした経緯だけを見ても、ADORにはメンバーの費用負担について、可能な限りメンバーに配慮しようとしていた状況がうかがえます。 しかし、ADORが契約のすべての主要条項を自由に修正できたわけではありません。HYBEが主張する「費用負担案の拒否」についても、先に説明した実際の「意思決定過程」を考慮する必要があります。 当時の実務担当者の記憶によれば、HYBEの法務チームが形式的に複数の案を提示したとしても、実際の協議過程では、他のレーベルの事例やHYBE経営陣の政策的な方針が口頭で伝えられ、それを踏まえて調整が行われることもありました。 したがって、文書上で拒否したかどうかだけで、意思決定過程全体を判断することは困難です。文書には、これに関連するHYBE経営陣のコメントや、法務チームの実務レベルでのコメントが記載されていないためです。 文書上ではADORが提案された案を選択、あるいは拒否したという記録が残っていたとしても、それだけで当該決定がHYBEの政策的判断とは無関係に独立して行われたとはいえません。 特定の条項について選択あるいは拒否した記録を、契約全体に対する独立した決定権の証拠にまで拡大解釈してはなりません。 ⸻ 4. アーティストの顔と声に関する条項 HYBEは、契約終了後にアーティストの名前、肖像、声を活用する問題について、実際に活用する際には別途同意が必要であり、法律に違反する行為を行う予定はないと説明しました。 しかし、これは当該条項が誰によって、どのような目的で契約に盛り込まれたのかという問いへの回答にはなっていません。 当時、草案を作成し、それを保護者たちに説明して納得させようとしたのはHYBEの法務チームです。当時、ADORには独立した法務チームがありませんでした。 特に、契約終了後もアーティストの音声や肖像を活用する新規事業に関する権利構造は、通常の芸能マネジメント実務の範囲を超える、法律的・事業的な検討が必要な事項でした。 このような条項をADORが独自に設計したと説明するのは、常識的に考えて不自然です。 そして、問題の核心は、HYBEが今後その権利を濫用する計画があるかどうかではありません。そうした権利を契約に盛り込むことを決定した主体が誰であり、どのような承認過程を経たのかということです。 HYBEは、HYBEのCEOとHYBEの取締役が過半数を占めるADOR取締役会が、堂々と承認過程に存在していたことを思い出してください。 ⸻ 5. 保護者たちの署名と同意 HYBEは、契約締結までの約3か月間に、質疑応答、メールでのやり取り、弁護士による検討および修正に関する協議があったことを強調しています。これは、実際の契約過程であったことです。 しかし、そのような過程が存在したという事実と、契約の主要条項に対する実質的な決定権があったということは別です。 当時、ADORの副代表はHYBE法務チームが作成した契約書をもとに保護者たちと意思疎通を図り、関連する質問や要望をHYBE法務チームに伝えました。 メールは法務チームとコメントを調整しながら送付し、保護者たちとの電話で内容を説明して誤解を解消する過程もありました。また、HYBE法務チームとの追加協議を通じて、一部の表現を修正することもありました。 しかし、これは主に文言を明確にし、誤解を減らすための限定的な修正でした。HYBEが契約の核心的な条項を作成し、最終承認手続きにも関与するという構造そのものが変わったわけではありません。 保護者たちが最終的に契約に同意し、署名したということは、契約締結に関する事実関係です。 それだけで、契約の主要条項を誰が作成したのか、修正権限が誰にあったのか、そして当該条項が公正だったのかについての説明が済むわけではありません。 同様に、裁判所が契約の効力を認めたという事実も、HYBEとADORの間で実質的な契約の作成・承認権限がどのように配分されていたのかを、すべて説明するものではありません。 したがってHYBEは、契約過程にADORや保護者たちが参加していたという事実を繰り返すのではなく、実際に誰が主要条項を決定できたのかに答えるべきです。 ⸻ 6. HYBEのマルチレーベル体制 HYBEはマルチレーベル体制を運営する中で、法務機能と契約関連情報を中央で管理していました。レーベルはアーティストと意思疎通を図り、契約上の形式的な当事者となっていましたが、契約の基本構造や主要な法律上の条件を設計・検討する機能はHYBEに集中していました。特に、当時のADORには独立した法務機能がありませんでした。 HYBEの法務チームは、他のレーベルの契約事例やHYBEの政策的な方針に関する情報を保有しており、ADORはそうした情報をHYBEの法務チームを通じて受け取り、検討するしかありませんでした。このような構造では、レーベルが形式的に意見を提示できたという事実だけで、実質的な契約決定権を行使していたとは考えにくいでしょう。 また、NewJeansの専属契約当時、ADORの取締役会は社内取締役3名で構成されており、そのうちミン・ヒジン代表を除く2名はHYBE側の人物でした。 したがって、取締役会の議決が必要な事項については、HYBE側の人物が過半数を占めていたため、ADORの代表取締役がHYBE側の意向とは異なる決定を独自に貫くことは難しい構造でした。 さらに、HYBE法務チームとHYBE CEOの合意が含まれる決裁体制まで考慮すると、今回の声明でHYBEが強調しているレーベルの独自の決定権が、実際にはどの範囲まで存在していたのか疑問が生じます。 対外的には、ADORが専属契約の当事者であり、ADORの経営陣が保護者たちと協議したという点を強調することができます。 その結果、主要条項を設計し承認する権限は親会社に集中する一方で、その条項に関する対外的な責任は、契約当事者であるレーベルに集中するという構造的な問題が生じます。 今回のHYBEの釈明は、その構造において、実際に権限を行使した主体と対外的な責任を負う主体との間にある違いを説明していません。 このような説明の仕方は、結果的にHYBEが行使した実質的な権限を矮小化し、契約上の形式的な当事者であるADORに責任を集中させる効果をもたらします。 HYBEが自らの役割を、単なる契約書の書式提供と法律相談にすぎないと説明するのであれば、まずADORがHYBEの同意なしに主要条項を変更し、契約を確定できたのかどうかを明確にすべきです。 今必要な説明は、誰が契約に署名したのかではなく、契約の主要条項を実際に誰が作成し、変更できたのかということです。それこそが、HYBEの釈明から抜け落ちている最も重要な事実関係です。 HYBEは、専属契約の承認過程において、HYBE法務チームとHYBE CEOの承認だけでなく、HYBE側の人物が過半数を占めていたADOR取締役会の承認も必ず必要だったという点を思い出してください。 HYBE CEOが承認しなければ子会社の代表取締役が承認できない構造を設計しておきながら、責任を転嫁する相手を作り出して声明を発表したことは、自分の顔に唾を吐くようなものです。 ⸻ 契約構造を実質的に決定できる力がADORにあったのか、それともADORを支配するHYBEにあったのかは、あえて問うまでもなく明白だといえるでしょう。 真にK-pop産業の発展を願うのであれば、契約内容が外部に公開されたとしても、その作成・承認手続きや内容の合理性および公正性について、透明性をもって説明できなければなりません。 それこそが、真に責任ある企業の姿勢でしょう。 (終) n.news.naver.com/article/079…
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MHJ's full statement n.news.naver.com/article/079…
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This is so cunt
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this statement addresses every dumb question since the NYT piece dropped. tbh the people who get it already know, and the rest won't bother reading a word of this anyway. but still... if this on ur TL, please read it through.
▶ Official Statement Released by Min Hee-jin, CEO of OOAK Records, on the Afternoon of November 6: 1. Who Drafted the Contract and Who Held Final Approval Authority At the time, ADOR had neither an independent legal team nor legal professionals capable of directly drafting and reviewing the key provisions of exclusive artist contracts. This was because HYBE’s operating system did not allow its subsidiary labels to establish their own independent departments. This was a consequence of what HYBE had widely promoted as its “Shared Functions” system. The initial draft of NewJeans’ exclusive contract was prepared by HYBE’s Legal Team. Revisions to the contract were also handled through HYBE’s Legal Team. ADOR’s role was to communicate with the artists based on the contract drafted by HYBE, relay the parents’ questions and requests for revisions to HYBE’s Legal Team, and coordinate the discussions. Since HYBE’s Legal Team was leading the drafting of the exclusive contract, its lawyers personally handled the explanations, discussions, and persuasion process, apart from the coordination carried out by ADOR. HYBE, however, describes this as the label communicating with the contracting parties and determining the key terms. Even in the actual contract approval process, the CEO of ADOR could not finalize the contract through her approval alone. The process required subsequent agreement and approval from HYBE’s Legal Team, HYBE’s CFO, and HYBE’s CEO. Approval from ADOR’s board of directors was also required, and the board consisted of two HYBE representatives and one ADOR CEO. The contract could not proceed without HYBE’s consent. This is different from simply receiving legal advice. The issue is who held the authority to draft and revise the key contract provisions and grant final approval. Page 56 of HYBE’s 2022 Sustainability Report explicitly outlines the company-wide legal management procedures: drafting contracts using standard contract templates, review by the Legal Department, approval by the relevant senior authorities, and finalization of contracts through agreement with the Legal Department. This demonstrates that HYBE’s role in artists’ exclusive contracts was not limited to merely providing reference contract templates. Its internal procedures stipulated that HYBE would be directly involved in the contract approval process. Because the label did not have the authority to revise the key provisions of the exclusive contract, ADOR’s former vice president even sent the following message to one of the parents during their discussions: “I was informed that the contract is a standard one used across HYBE affiliates, so it is difficult to revise all the items you requested. This is because HYBE is involved in the final decision-making process. However, since Min Hee-jin is the CEO, please trust ADOR, which she leads, and its staff, and leave things in their hands.” Throughout her tenure, former CEO Min Hee-jin fought tirelessly to fulfill the promises she had made to the parents by seeking practical improvements to the contradictions and loopholes in the contracts drafted by HYBE. She raised objections and proposed alternatives to the structural problems within the parent company, not only in legal matters but also in business and operational areas, in order to protect the IP of NewJeans, ADOR’s only artist group. Yet, what ultimately came in return were absurd accusations and the initiation of an unlawful audit. 2. ADOR CEO’s Objections in 2024 On January 25, 2024, Min Hee-jin, then CEO of ADOR, requested authority to execute important contracts, including exclusive artist contracts, during a meeting with Park Ji-won, then CEO of HYBE. Subsequently, on February 16, she submitted a revised shareholder agreement to HYBE that included this request. These demands and the circumstances surrounding them were also reported in the media at the time. If ADOR had sufficient authority to independently determine and execute the key terms of exclusive contracts, as HYBE claims, why would its CEO have needed to separately request that authority from the parent company? In May 2024, HYBE itself openly confirmed through the media that it had “rejected” this request. HYBE’s recent statement has made it clear that the request at the time was not simply an attempt to obtain additional formal authority. Rather, it clearly demonstrates that former CEO Min Hee-jin had experienced structural limitations that prevented her from independently making decisions on important contracts while carrying out her actual duties as CEO, and that she sought to address those limitations. 3. Decisions Regarding Certain Settlement Terms HYBE claims that ADOR’s former vice president rejected a proposal that would have reduced the artists’ financial burden. However, this explanation also leaves out the actual decision-making structure behind the contracts. The fact that ADOR could negotiate certain settlement terms or methods of allocating costs is an entirely different matter from whether it had the authority to independently change the fundamental structure and key policy provisions of the exclusive contracts established by HYBE. In reality, within the scope of matters it could decide independently, ADOR chose options that reduced the artists’ financial burden. When the NewJeans members were transferred from Source Music to ADOR, the ADOR led by former CEO Min Hee-jin decided not to make the members bear any related expenses, including costs incurred during their previous trainee period. At the time, we understood that other HYBE labels charged artists for trainee expenses after their debut. However, ADOR decided not to charge the members for these costs. This decision took into consideration the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the members’ original debut plans and the failure to fulfill related promises. Even this process demonstrates that ADOR made every effort to be considerate of the members when determining their share of expenses. However, this does not mean that ADOR was free to revise every major provision of the contract. HYBE’s claim that a “cost-sharing proposal was rejected” must also be considered in light of the actual “decision-making process” explained above. According to the recollection of staff members who handled the matter at the time, even when HYBE’s Legal Team formally presented multiple options, examples from other labels or the policy direction of HYBE’s management were also communicated verbally and factored into the discussions. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the entire decision-making process based solely on whether a proposal was formally rejected in writing. The documents do not include comments from HYBE’s management or remarks made by the Legal Team staff handling the matter. Even if the documents indicate that ADOR selected or rejected a proposed option, this alone does not establish that the decision was made independently of HYBE’s policy judgments. A record of selecting or rejecting a particular provision should not be broadly interpreted as evidence that ADOR had independent decision-making authority over the entire contract. 4. Provisions Concerning the Artists’ Faces and Voices HYBE explained that the use of artists’ names, likenesses, and voices after the termination of their contracts would require separate consent for any actual use, and that it had no intention of engaging in activities that violate the law. However, this does not answer the question of who decided to include these provisions in the contract or for what purpose. It was HYBE’s Legal Team that prepared the initial draft and explained and justified its provisions to the parents. ADOR did not have an independent legal team at the time. In particular, the rights structure concerning new business ventures that would allow the use of artists’ voices or likenesses even after their contracts had ended involved matters requiring legal and business considerations beyond the scope of ordinary entertainment management practices. It is unreasonable to suggest that ADOR independently designed such provisions. Furthermore, the core issue is not whether HYBE intends to abuse these rights in the future. The issue is who decided to include such rights in the contract and what approval process they went through. HYBE should remember that its CEO and an ADOR board of directors dominated by HYBE-appointed directors were clearly part of the approval process. 5. The Parents’ Signatures and Consent HYBE emphasizes that there were approximately three months of discussions before the contracts were signed, including question-and-answer sessions, email correspondence, legal reviews, and negotiations over revisions. These things did take place during the actual contract process. However, the existence of such discussions is different from having actual decision-making authority over the key provisions of the contract. At the time, ADOR’s former vice president communicated with the parents based on the contract drafted by HYBE’s Legal Team and relayed their questions and requests to HYBE’s Legal Team. Emails were exchanged while coordinating comments with the Legal Team. There were also phone conversations with the parents to explain the provisions and resolve misunderstandings, and some wording was revised through subsequent discussions with HYBE’s Legal Team. However, these were primarily limited revisions intended to clarify the wording and reduce misunderstandings. They did not change the underlying structure in which HYBE established the key provisions of the contract and participated in the final approval process. The fact that the parents ultimately agreed to and signed the contracts is simply a matter of fact regarding the execution of the contracts. It does not, by itself, answer who drafted the key provisions, who had the authority to revise them, or whether those provisions were fair. Likewise, the fact that the court recognized the validity of the contracts does not fully explain how actual authority over drafting and approving the contracts was distributed between HYBE and ADOR. Therefore, rather than repeatedly emphasizing that ADOR and the parents participated in the contract process, HYBE should answer who actually had the authority to determine the key provisions. 6. HYBE’s Multi-Label Structure While operating its multi-label system, HYBE centrally managed legal functions and contract-related information. The labels communicated with the artists and became the formal contracting parties, but the functions responsible for designing and reviewing the fundamental structure and key legal terms of the contracts were concentrated at HYBE. In particular, ADOR did not have an independent legal function at the time. HYBE’s Legal Team had access to information about contract practices at other labels and HYBE’s policy direction. ADOR had no choice but to receive and review such information through HYBE’s Legal Team. Under this structure, the fact that a label could formally express its opinions does not mean that it exercised actual decision-making authority over the contracts. Furthermore, at the time NewJeans’ exclusive contracts were signed, ADOR’s board of directors consisted of three inside directors. Two of them, excluding CEO Min Hee-jin, were HYBE representatives. Therefore, in matters requiring board approval, HYBE representatives held a majority, making it difficult for ADOR’s CEO to independently push through decisions that differed from HYBE’s position. When this is considered alongside the approval system requiring agreement from HYBE’s Legal Team and HYBE’s CEO, questions arise as to the actual extent of the independent decision-making authority that HYBE now emphasizes in its statement. Externally, HYBE can emphasize that ADOR was the contracting party and that ADOR’s management negotiated with the parents. However, this creates a structural problem in which the authority to design and approve the key provisions is concentrated at the parent-company level, while external responsibility for those provisions is concentrated at the subsidiary level, which is the formal contracting party. HYBE’s recent explanation does not address the difference between the party that actually exercised authority within this structure and the party that bears external responsibility. This manner of explaining the situation ultimately has the effect of downplaying the actual authority exercised by HYBE while concentrating responsibility on ADOR, the formal contracting party. If HYBE intends to describe its role as nothing more than providing contract templates and legal advice, it must first clearly explain whether ADOR could have changed the key provisions and finalized the contracts without HYBE’s consent. What needs to be explained now is not who signed the contracts, but who actually had the authority to draft and change their key provisions. That is the most important factual issue missing from HYBE’s explanation. HYBE should remember that approval of NewJeans’ exclusive contracts required not only approval from HYBE’s Legal Team and HYBE’s CEO, but also approval from ADOR’s board of directors, in which HYBE representatives held the majority. After designing a structure in which a subsidiary’s CEO cannot grant approval without the approval of the parent company’s CEO, HYBE has now distributed a statement attempting to shift responsibility by creating someone to blame. This is essentially HYBE spitting in its own face. —- It should be self-evident, without even needing to ask, whether the actual power to determine the structure of the contracts rested with ADOR or with HYBE, the company that controlled ADOR. If HYBE genuinely wishes for the K-pop industry to develop, it should be able to transparently explain the drafting and approval procedures, as well as the reasonableness and fairness of the contract terms, even if those contracts are made public. That is what a truly responsible company should do. (End)
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▶ Official Statement Released by Min Hee-jin, CEO of OOAK Records, on the Afternoon of November 6: 1. Who Drafted the Contract and Who Held Final Approval Authority At the time, ADOR had neither an independent legal team nor legal professionals capable of directly drafting and reviewing the key provisions of exclusive artist contracts. This was because HYBE’s operating system did not allow its subsidiary labels to establish their own independent departments. This was a consequence of what HYBE had widely promoted as its “Shared Functions” system. The initial draft of NewJeans’ exclusive contract was prepared by HYBE’s Legal Team. Revisions to the contract were also handled through HYBE’s Legal Team. ADOR’s role was to communicate with the artists based on the contract drafted by HYBE, relay the parents’ questions and requests for revisions to HYBE’s Legal Team, and coordinate the discussions. Since HYBE’s Legal Team was leading the drafting of the exclusive contract, its lawyers personally handled the explanations, discussions, and persuasion process, apart from the coordination carried out by ADOR. HYBE, however, describes this as the label communicating with the contracting parties and determining the key terms. Even in the actual contract approval process, the CEO of ADOR could not finalize the contract through her approval alone. The process required subsequent agreement and approval from HYBE’s Legal Team, HYBE’s CFO, and HYBE’s CEO. Approval from ADOR’s board of directors was also required, and the board consisted of two HYBE representatives and one ADOR CEO. The contract could not proceed without HYBE’s consent. This is different from simply receiving legal advice. The issue is who held the authority to draft and revise the key contract provisions and grant final approval. Page 56 of HYBE’s 2022 Sustainability Report explicitly outlines the company-wide legal management procedures: drafting contracts using standard contract templates, review by the Legal Department, approval by the relevant senior authorities, and finalization of contracts through agreement with the Legal Department. This demonstrates that HYBE’s role in artists’ exclusive contracts was not limited to merely providing reference contract templates. Its internal procedures stipulated that HYBE would be directly involved in the contract approval process. Because the label did not have the authority to revise the key provisions of the exclusive contract, ADOR’s former vice president even sent the following message to one of the parents during their discussions: “I was informed that the contract is a standard one used across HYBE affiliates, so it is difficult to revise all the items you requested. This is because HYBE is involved in the final decision-making process. However, since Min Hee-jin is the CEO, please trust ADOR, which she leads, and its staff, and leave things in their hands.” Throughout her tenure, former CEO Min Hee-jin fought tirelessly to fulfill the promises she had made to the parents by seeking practical improvements to the contradictions and loopholes in the contracts drafted by HYBE. She raised objections and proposed alternatives to the structural problems within the parent company, not only in legal matters but also in business and operational areas, in order to protect the IP of NewJeans, ADOR’s only artist group. Yet, what ultimately came in return were absurd accusations and the initiation of an unlawful audit. 2. ADOR CEO’s Objections in 2024 On January 25, 2024, Min Hee-jin, then CEO of ADOR, requested authority to execute important contracts, including exclusive artist contracts, during a meeting with Park Ji-won, then CEO of HYBE. Subsequently, on February 16, she submitted a revised shareholder agreement to HYBE that included this request. These demands and the circumstances surrounding them were also reported in the media at the time. If ADOR had sufficient authority to independently determine and execute the key terms of exclusive contracts, as HYBE claims, why would its CEO have needed to separately request that authority from the parent company? In May 2024, HYBE itself openly confirmed through the media that it had “rejected” this request. HYBE’s recent statement has made it clear that the request at the time was not simply an attempt to obtain additional formal authority. Rather, it clearly demonstrates that former CEO Min Hee-jin had experienced structural limitations that prevented her from independently making decisions on important contracts while carrying out her actual duties as CEO, and that she sought to address those limitations. 3. Decisions Regarding Certain Settlement Terms HYBE claims that ADOR’s former vice president rejected a proposal that would have reduced the artists’ financial burden. However, this explanation also leaves out the actual decision-making structure behind the contracts. The fact that ADOR could negotiate certain settlement terms or methods of allocating costs is an entirely different matter from whether it had the authority to independently change the fundamental structure and key policy provisions of the exclusive contracts established by HYBE. In reality, within the scope of matters it could decide independently, ADOR chose options that reduced the artists’ financial burden. When the NewJeans members were transferred from Source Music to ADOR, the ADOR led by former CEO Min Hee-jin decided not to make the members bear any related expenses, including costs incurred during their previous trainee period. At the time, we understood that other HYBE labels charged artists for trainee expenses after their debut. However, ADOR decided not to charge the members for these costs. This decision took into consideration the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the members’ original debut plans and the failure to fulfill related promises. Even this process demonstrates that ADOR made every effort to be considerate of the members when determining their share of expenses. However, this does not mean that ADOR was free to revise every major provision of the contract. HYBE’s claim that a “cost-sharing proposal was rejected” must also be considered in light of the actual “decision-making process” explained above. According to the recollection of staff members who handled the matter at the time, even when HYBE’s Legal Team formally presented multiple options, examples from other labels or the policy direction of HYBE’s management were also communicated verbally and factored into the discussions. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the entire decision-making process based solely on whether a proposal was formally rejected in writing. The documents do not include comments from HYBE’s management or remarks made by the Legal Team staff handling the matter. Even if the documents indicate that ADOR selected or rejected a proposed option, this alone does not establish that the decision was made independently of HYBE’s policy judgments. A record of selecting or rejecting a particular provision should not be broadly interpreted as evidence that ADOR had independent decision-making authority over the entire contract. 4. Provisions Concerning the Artists’ Faces and Voices HYBE explained that the use of artists’ names, likenesses, and voices after the termination of their contracts would require separate consent for any actual use, and that it had no intention of engaging in activities that violate the law. However, this does not answer the question of who decided to include these provisions in the contract or for what purpose. It was HYBE’s Legal Team that prepared the initial draft and explained and justified its provisions to the parents. ADOR did not have an independent legal team at the time. In particular, the rights structure concerning new business ventures that would allow the use of artists’ voices or likenesses even after their contracts had ended involved matters requiring legal and business considerations beyond the scope of ordinary entertainment management practices. It is unreasonable to suggest that ADOR independently designed such provisions. Furthermore, the core issue is not whether HYBE intends to abuse these rights in the future. The issue is who decided to include such rights in the contract and what approval process they went through. HYBE should remember that its CEO and an ADOR board of directors dominated by HYBE-appointed directors were clearly part of the approval process. 5. The Parents’ Signatures and Consent HYBE emphasizes that there were approximately three months of discussions before the contracts were signed, including question-and-answer sessions, email correspondence, legal reviews, and negotiations over revisions. These things did take place during the actual contract process. However, the existence of such discussions is different from having actual decision-making authority over the key provisions of the contract. At the time, ADOR’s former vice president communicated with the parents based on the contract drafted by HYBE’s Legal Team and relayed their questions and requests to HYBE’s Legal Team. Emails were exchanged while coordinating comments with the Legal Team. There were also phone conversations with the parents to explain the provisions and resolve misunderstandings, and some wording was revised through subsequent discussions with HYBE’s Legal Team. However, these were primarily limited revisions intended to clarify the wording and reduce misunderstandings. They did not change the underlying structure in which HYBE established the key provisions of the contract and participated in the final approval process. The fact that the parents ultimately agreed to and signed the contracts is simply a matter of fact regarding the execution of the contracts. It does not, by itself, answer who drafted the key provisions, who had the authority to revise them, or whether those provisions were fair. Likewise, the fact that the court recognized the validity of the contracts does not fully explain how actual authority over drafting and approving the contracts was distributed between HYBE and ADOR. Therefore, rather than repeatedly emphasizing that ADOR and the parents participated in the contract process, HYBE should answer who actually had the authority to determine the key provisions. 6. HYBE’s Multi-Label Structure While operating its multi-label system, HYBE centrally managed legal functions and contract-related information. The labels communicated with the artists and became the formal contracting parties, but the functions responsible for designing and reviewing the fundamental structure and key legal terms of the contracts were concentrated at HYBE. In particular, ADOR did not have an independent legal function at the time. HYBE’s Legal Team had access to information about contract practices at other labels and HYBE’s policy direction. ADOR had no choice but to receive and review such information through HYBE’s Legal Team. Under this structure, the fact that a label could formally express its opinions does not mean that it exercised actual decision-making authority over the contracts. Furthermore, at the time NewJeans’ exclusive contracts were signed, ADOR’s board of directors consisted of three inside directors. Two of them, excluding CEO Min Hee-jin, were HYBE representatives. Therefore, in matters requiring board approval, HYBE representatives held a majority, making it difficult for ADOR’s CEO to independently push through decisions that differed from HYBE’s position. When this is considered alongside the approval system requiring agreement from HYBE’s Legal Team and HYBE’s CEO, questions arise as to the actual extent of the independent decision-making authority that HYBE now emphasizes in its statement. Externally, HYBE can emphasize that ADOR was the contracting party and that ADOR’s management negotiated with the parents. However, this creates a structural problem in which the authority to design and approve the key provisions is concentrated at the parent-company level, while external responsibility for those provisions is concentrated at the subsidiary level, which is the formal contracting party. HYBE’s recent explanation does not address the difference between the party that actually exercised authority within this structure and the party that bears external responsibility. This manner of explaining the situation ultimately has the effect of downplaying the actual authority exercised by HYBE while concentrating responsibility on ADOR, the formal contracting party. If HYBE intends to describe its role as nothing more than providing contract templates and legal advice, it must first clearly explain whether ADOR could have changed the key provisions and finalized the contracts without HYBE’s consent. What needs to be explained now is not who signed the contracts, but who actually had the authority to draft and change their key provisions. That is the most important factual issue missing from HYBE’s explanation. HYBE should remember that approval of NewJeans’ exclusive contracts required not only approval from HYBE’s Legal Team and HYBE’s CEO, but also approval from ADOR’s board of directors, in which HYBE representatives held the majority. After designing a structure in which a subsidiary’s CEO cannot grant approval without the approval of the parent company’s CEO, HYBE has now distributed a statement attempting to shift responsibility by creating someone to blame. This is essentially HYBE spitting in its own face. —- It should be self-evident, without even needing to ask, whether the actual power to determine the structure of the contracts rested with ADOR or with HYBE, the company that controlled ADOR. If HYBE genuinely wishes for the K-pop industry to develop, it should be able to transparently explain the drafting and approval procedures, as well as the reasonableness and fairness of the contract terms, even if those contracts are made public. That is what a truly responsible company should do. (End)
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If this is their response to the NYT article, HYBE is an unserious company. Being a “principal party” or “contracting party” to a contract simply means that the contract assigns legal rights and obligations to you. It does not mean that you negotiated and drafted the contract. Many people are “principal parties” to contracts that they had no power to negotiate. We are all “principal parties” to clickwrap contracts we agree to when we use online services, even though almost none of us read the terms and none of us have the power to negotiate those terms.
ADOR on New York Times Article: “We requested that the article explicitly state that Min Hee-jin was the principal party to the contract, but this request was not accepted.”
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※2024年の記事です HYBEは自身が法務業務を行なっているにも関わらず、ミンヒジン氏の問題にすり替えようとしていますが、むしろミン代表はあのような契約書からNewJeansを解放しようとしていたようです。 news.kbs.co.kr/news/mobile/v… ミン・ヒジン、代表単独での「NewJeans契約解除権」を要求…HYBEは「拒否」 HYBEとADORのミン・ヒジン代表との間で攻防が続く中、ミン代表側が今年、ADORの取締役会を経ずに、代表取締役が単独で「NewJeansの専属契約を解除できる権限」を要求していたことが明らかになった。 2日、関連業界によると、ミン代表側の法律事務所は今年2月、こうした内容を盛り込んだ株主間契約の修正案をHYBE側に送付したとされる。 これは昨年末、両者が「プットバックオプションの倍率30倍」や「追加された持分5%へのプットバックオプションの適用」などをめぐり、交渉を続けた後に出されたものだ。 芸能事務所の立場からすれば、所属歌手との専属契約に関する権利は、会社運営に必要な中核的資産とみなすことができる。 そのため、通常、主要なエンターテインメント企業では、専属契約について取締役会の同意を得ることとしている。 BTSやBLACKPINKなども、契約の成立について「専属契約の再契約締結に関する取締役会決議を完了した」(BTS)、「グループ専属契約締結の件について取締役会決議を完了した」といった形で公表したことがある。 しかし、ミン代表側の要求が受け入れられれば、NewJeansはADORの取締役会やHYBEの関与を経ることなく、ミン代表の意思だけで専属契約を終了できるようになる。 現行の株主間契約では、アーティストの専属契約解除について、一般的な芸能事務所と同様に、取締役会の承認を得ることになっていると伝えられている。 HYBEは、この提案は無理があると判断し、拒否する旨の回答を送ったとされる。 現在、ADORの取締役会は3人で構成されており、ミン代表本人と、側近であるシン某副代表、キム某取締役の計3人が議決権を持っているため、ミン代表が掌握している状態だ。 ただし、現在の仕組みでは、このような動きが察知された場合、ADORの株式80%を保有するHYBEが臨時株主総会を招集し、ADORの取締役を交代させることで、所属歌手の離脱を防ぐことができる。 ミン代表が要求したとおり、単独で専属契約を解除する権限を持つことになれば、HYBEは所属歌手であるNewJeansの離脱を防ぐ手段を失うことになる。 特に、ADORに所属する歌手はNewJeansの1組だけであるため、NewJeansが契約を解除すれば、会社にはスタッフだけが残ることになる。 HYBEは、ミン代表側によるこうした要求が、先月25日の監査中間結果で公開された「ADORは抜け殻になる」という会話記録と関連しているのではないかと疑っているとされる。 当時の監査中間結果によると、ミン代表の側近A氏は、以下のような案を提示していた。 ・2025年1月2日にプットオプションを行使してエグジット(投資回収・離脱) ・ADORは抜け殻になる ・財務的投資家を探す ・HYBEにADORの売却を勧める ・適正な価格で売却する ・ミン代表はADORの代表取締役を務めながら、キャッシュアウト(現金化)した資金でADORの株式を取得する これについてミン代表側は、「NewJeansのデビュー過程で生じた不合理な干渉を解消し、独立したレーベル運営を実現するための要求だった」と説明し、こうした要求を、いわゆる「経営権奪取疑惑」と結びつける見方を否定した。 ミン代表側の説明によると、ミン代表は1月25日、パク・ジウォンCEO(最高経営責任者)との対面会議で、外部委託業者の選定や専属契約を含む重要な契約の締結に関する事項を、代表取締役の権限で行えるようにすることを要求した。 そして翌月の2月16日、ミン代表とADORの要求事項を盛り込んだ株主間契約の修正版をHYBEに提出した。 ミン代表側は、 「HYBEは先日、『経営権奪取』だと『主張』する副代表のカカオトークの内容を公開した」 としたうえで、 「該当するカカオトークは4月4日のものであり、HYBEの主張に従ったとしても、時期が一致せず、関連性もない事項だ」 と指摘した。 実際、ミン代表側はこれまで、カカオトークに記載された案について「私的な雑談レベルのもの」だと主張してきた。 さらに、 「これは、HYBEが真実を歪曲し、都合よく切り貼りして世論戦を展開していることを、改めて示すものだ」と述べ、 「このように株主間契約の『交渉』内容を今後も公開し続けるつもりなら、改めて交渉を再開することを提案する」と付け加えた。 これに先立ち、ミン代表は先月25日の記者会見で、 「私は経営権の奪取などには関心がありません。経営権の奪取というものが、本当に何なのかも分かりません」と述べ、 「NewJeansのことを考えれば、当然(NewJeansのメンバーたちと)一緒にやっていかなければなりません」
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Anyone who followed Newjeans journey for the two years before this mess would remember how incredibly fair they were to the Newjeans members. They had long schedules due to demand but were given extended breaks after promotional periods, allowed to return to their families etc
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"The contract terms are not bad! But even if they are bad, we don't enforce them! And even if they are bad, it's Min Hee-jin's fault, actually!" So are they bad or not bad, HYBE? It's your contract. Why did you remove language protecting human rights?
어도어 "법원도 인정한 뉴진스 계약…주체는 민희진" [전문] #어도어 #하이브 #뉴진스 #계약 #민희진 #iMBC연예 6일 하이브와 어도어 측은 전날 미국 매체 뉴욕타임스(NYT)가 보도한 뉴진스 전속계약 관련 사안에 대해 사실관계를 설명하는 입장을 전했다. 하이브·어도어는 "하이브 산하 레이블들은 각 레이블 연습생과 국가 표준 청소년 부속합의서를 모두 체결하고 있다"며 "뉴진스 전속계약서에는 기본적 인권 보호 조항이 포함돼 있어, 국가표준 청소년 부속합의서가 보장하는 내용들을 포괄하고 있다"고 밝혔다. 해당 계약에 아티스트 측의 의견이 반영됐는지 여부에 관해선 "당시 계약은 법원 결정을 통해서도 인정됐다"고도 전했다. 이밖에도 "연습생과 아티스트 안전 보호 목적으로 공용공간에만 CCTV를 설치했으며, 아티스트의 학업에 대해선 당사자와 부모 의사를 존중하고 따른다는 확고한 원칙을 갖고 있다"고도 덧붙였다. 아울러 하이브·어도어는 "당시 뉴진스 계약은 당시 대표이사이던 민희진과 민희진이 임명한 부대표, 각 멤버와 부모들, 일부 멤버의 법률 대리인이 함께 문구를 조율하고 최종 서명했다"며 "뉴욕타임스 기사에도 민희진이 계약의 주체였다는 점을 명시해달라고 요청했으나 받아들여지지 않았다"고 밝혔다. 🔗enews.imbc.com/M/Detail/5238…
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