Dr. Rita Haley 🎗️

The United States appears to be clearing the battlefield for a larger military campaign against the Islamic Republic. In recent days, American forces have been systematically degrading the regime’s air-defence and missile belt along the Strait of Hormuz. These are not isolated retaliatory strikes. They constitute a sustained shaping operation against surface-to-air missile batteries, associated radars, anti-ship systems and mobile launchers across Qeshm, Larak, Sirik, Jask and the southern Iranian coast. President Trump confirmed that American forces recently destroyed a newly constructed Iranian anti-aircraft position on Qeshm Island within approximately five to 15 minutes. Similar explosions have been reported across the area for several consecutive nights. In military terms, the United States is conducting suppression and destruction of enemy air defences, known as SEAD and DEAD, alongside counter-force operations against missile launchers. The objective is to prevent the IRGC from rebuilding a coherent defensive and maritime-denial network around the Strait of Hormuz. American forces are also reportedly expanding their use of decoy drones. These systems are not merely distractions. They are tools for dismantling the enemy’s electronic order of battle. When a decoy enters defended airspace, Iranian radar operators face a choice. They can remain silent and allow an unidentified aircraft to approach, or activate their systems and attempt an interception. Once a radar begins transmitting, American intelligence assets can identify its position, operating frequency, detection range, reaction time and engagement procedure. If the battery fires, it expends a scarce interceptor and reveals the location of its launcher. That information immediately improves the American target bank. Repeated probes therefore force the regime to choose between remaining blind or exposing its defences to destruction. Each night produces more electronic intelligence, consumes additional Iranian resources and reduces the number of surviving systems available for a future confrontation. The geography is deliberate. Qeshm and Larak overlook the shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz. Sirik and Jask extend the regime’s surveillance, missile and naval reach into the Gulf of Oman. Systems positioned across this belt can threaten commercial shipping, American aircraft, naval vessels and regional bases. A larger American campaign against missile-production facilities, IRGC command centres, nuclear-related infrastructure or deeper military targets would require relatively secure approach corridors. Launching high-volume strike packages while the coastal integrated air-defence system remains intact would unnecessarily expose fighters, bombers, drones and cruise missiles to greater risk. It would also preserve the regime’s ability to retaliate against ships and disrupt the strait. The current operation is reducing that risk before any decision on broader action is executed. It is producing three essential military effects: ▪️ Physical degradation: Destroying launchers, radars and air-defence batteries before they can participate in a larger engagement. ▪️ Target development: Forcing surviving systems to reveal their locations and behaviour so they can be struck rapidly later. ▪️ Tempo control: Keeping the IRGC reactive while American tankers, carriers and strike assets maintain the initiative. The timing is also significant. American restraint during the midterm election period has ended. Limited strikes are now continuing while additional capabilities move into the region and the administration evaluates larger options. This does not prove that a major campaign has been ordered. Shaping operations can also be used to maintain deterrence and protect maritime movement without proceeding to full escalation. But the military logic is unmistakable. The United States is clearing the outer defensive layer, mapping what survives and keeping the southern threat envelope suppressed. If a larger campaign begins, the work required to open its air and maritime corridors is already underway.

The United States is building a land blockade around Iran to close the regime’s last supply routes and complete its economic strangulation. CENTCOM has established Task Force Iron Gate to extend the existing naval blockade to Iran’s land borders and Caspian Sea routes. The task force was ordered by CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper on November 7. It consists of approximately 20 civilian and military personnel based in Tampa who will coordinate with the Treasury, State Department, intelligence agencies and other American institutions. This is not a physical blockade involving American soldiers stationed along Iran’s borders. Iran has nearly 5,900 kilometres of land frontiers shared with seven countries, plus approximately 740 kilometres of Caspian coastline. Physically sealing that territory would be impossible. Iron Gate will instead use intelligence, satellite monitoring, financial tracking, sanctions and diplomatic pressure to disrupt the movement of weapons, dual-use technologies, sanctioned materials and illicit revenue. The task force is the next layer of the economic siege already being enforced at sea. CENTCOM says the naval blockade has prevented the Islamic Republic from exporting more than $25 billion in crude oil. Enforcement continues against vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports, while humanitarian shipments remain exempt. That blockade attacked the regime’s principal source of hard currency. Iron Gate targets the routes it began using to survive and rebuild. A Reuters investigation uncovered a covert network of more than 5,000 entities connected to Iran’s Defence Ministry. Since January 2025, the network imported at least $2 billion in explosives, rocket-fuel ingredients, titanium, precision machinery, aircraft components and heavy trucks capable of supporting missile operations. These supplies entered through several remaining corridors: ▪️ Russian-linked shipping across the Caspian Sea. ▪️ Truck routes through Iraq, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. ▪️ Air-cargo routes originating largely from China. Those imports allowed the Islamic Republic to replenish missile and drone inventories while American and Israeli strikes damaged its production facilities. Iron Gate is designed to make that military recovery slower, more expensive and less reliable. The operation could target trucking companies, shipping networks, banks, front companies and foreign intermediaries. Neighbouring governments may face sanctions or political pressure if their territory continues functioning as a supply corridor for the regime. Recent American pressure on Iraq to close all but two crossings with Iran demonstrates how the system could work. The United States does not require checkpoints on every road. It can pressure neighbouring governments to tighten borders, freeze payments and block the companies transporting sanctioned goods. The Caspian Sea will be the hardest route to restrict because it directly implicates Russia. Russian shipping and ports offer the regime a northern corridor that cannot be closed easily without confronting Moscow’s willingness to facilitate Iranian military procurement. The Islamic Republic will respond through shell companies, forged documents, bribery, covert flights and smuggling. Its borders are too extensive to seal completely. But complete closure is unnecessary. Every delayed shipment, sanctioned intermediary and restricted crossing raises the cost of rebuilding the regime’s military. The naval blockade deprives the Islamic Republic of revenue. Iron Gate targets what it can import with the money that remains. The objective is full-spectrum economic and military pressure without a ground invasion: deny the regime the oil revenue needed to finance terrorism and proxies, then deny it the materials required to rebuild its missiles, drones and weapons factories. The Islamic Republic survived the naval blockade by shifting its supply network inland. The United States is now moving to close the escape routes.