Holaaaaa 🐢 Soy Rami Me agradan los temas militares y políticos Estudiante de Ing. Sistemas

Joined January 2026
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Las comparaciones de armamento en Internet están mal - Parte 2: Maniobrabilidad ----------------------------------------- De las cosas que más se ve en redes es la comparación general entre armamento, no está mal para el entendimiento del público, pero omite muchas cosas.
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Replying to @riotruena
La Boba hp no se entero que los que no sirven pa una mierda son ellos.
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✅ Hicimos pija al Chelshit. ✅ El Gaganaited se va a ir a la B. ✅ Harry tiene llorando a todos. ✅ El Fleetwood elimino a la mayor mentira de Londres. ✅ Davito se la come. ESTOY EN UN SUEÑO Y NO QUIERO DESPERTAR NUNCA.
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La IA en la educación esta re satánizada por el mal uso de los estudiantes, y obviamente viendo esto faltara poco para que aquellos que estudien a la convencional se les forme un ego frente a aquellos que estudian con la IA de manera correcta
estudian con ia...
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Because the ukrainian offensive operation was very well planned, shaped, and executed by 3rd corps. Ofc not every unit/corps in Ukraine is able to do this, and other assaults or operations have gone much worse. A better question is why you believe Russia has "drone and artillery superiority" lmao. Russia still fires most shells, but both range and accuracy is inferior to what Ukraine has, so there's fire parity on many sectors of the front. As for drones, superiority ? Lmao. You should tell the russians your theories, see what they tell you in response.
I want to know why people think Russia lose more men than Ukraine despite having airpower, artillery and drone superiority, and also why "attacker lose more people than defender" logic does not applies to the Ukrainians when they were the one on the offensive
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I disagree with this analysis, which contradicts me, so I think it’s necessary to come back to it. The author opens with “all evidence available point to the opposite”, yet he doesn’t cite a single piece of evidence. 🔶Saying that the drop in Russian armored vehicle losses proves Russia is losing fewer men is not only wrong, it’s actually a lie. First, armor has been sidelined since early 2024, which explains the drop. Second, Mediazona’s data (which is nearly complete up to early 2024) shows that losses are lower during periods of mechanized assaults (autumn 2023) than during periods of limited armor use (summer 2024). Moreover, the author deliberately leaves out that while far fewer armored vehicles are being destroyed (because they’re used less), strikes on unarmored vehicles have exploded. We’re talking about 3,000 to 4,000 vehicles hit per week. These vehicles are barely counted, and they are struck daily 10, 20, 30 or even 50 km from the front. The human losses from these strikes are fairly high, since the vehicles are unprotected and can’t withstand drone attacks. To see this, you’d need to do a minimum of research and actually watch the videos. Strikes on unarmored vehicles also happen very far from the front: mid-range strikes alone have hit more than 2,000 confirmed vehicles since the start of the year, often more than 50 km from the front. The author will probably bring out his usual line that these strikes have no impact and that vehicles can easily be replaced by buying them on the famous big used-car market in Central Asia. That’s one more thing he deliberately leaves out: the cost of the vehicles hit, the goods, ammunition and soldiers that never reach the front, the wounded and killed in these strikes (judging by the videos, this happens very regularly), and the knock-on effect on Russian logistics, which is far from negligible. 🔶Claiming that Mediazona proves there are fewer losses is also wrong. Mediazona takes time to update its list of losses and holds back part of its data, so as not to reveal weaknesses in the Russian government that would push it to shut down the information channels being used. Mediazona’s data is broadly complete up to the end of 2023, and as we’ve seen, entries are still regularly being added for 2024, two years ago. The chart showing the year each entry was added makes it very clear how much longer it now takes to record losses. As for the claim that no OSINT data shows any change in losses: well, that’s easy to say when you don’t do any OSINT yourself, have no contacts on the ground, and therefore bring no additional data. 🔶The 2026 attrition ratio is not more favorable than 2025’s. That’s false, and there is no “more balanced attrition approach.” This ignores Ukraine’s advantage in drone strikes (the kill zone is deeper) and Russia’s manpower problems, which force it to concentrate the offensive on certain areas. The infiltration strategy itself proves that attrition is not under Russian control. Does Russia have the advantage in artillery? No. It fires more, but at shorter range and with less accuracy, against Ukrainians who move less and stay camouflaged in their positions. Losses from artillery are minimal. The Ukrainians fire less, but further and more accurately, against a larger number of Russian troops. The Russians do have the advantage in airstrikes, but losses are mainly caused by drones, not KABs. 🔶The next point is less problematic. The rest is mostly a change of subject: why bring up deep strikes (which I never disputed) when the topic was first and foremost the front? Fine, it does tie back to attrition, but in doing so the author quietly admits that Russia is failing on the front and is focusing on a deep-strike campaign in the hope of making Ukraine give in. I struggle to understand the author’s obsession with everything that’s negative for Ukraine and positive for Russia. For a “military theorist”, it’s a shame not to cover the whole picture, especially since he always finds a rational explanation for the Russian plan (“no, actually, if Russia isn’t advancing, it’s because it chose an attrition strategy”. Very funny 😊).
The “Russian losses increased” narrative is a fabrication, since all evidence available point to the opposite. Vehicle losses have decreased significantly compared to 2025, with armor down by a factor of 5 in average. (source: Oryx) Mediazona’s in-year 2026 personnel-loss count remains 50% below 2025, without a valid explanation. The claim that bodies are harder to retrieve is insufficient: the battlefield and grey zone remain as dangerous as in 2025. Russian courts process MIA-to-KIA cases at high rates, and a body is not required to file for procedure. There has also been no specific additional documented enforcement of obituaries concealment which could explain such a sharp decrease. Regardless, there are absolutely no OSINT data available supporting claims of increased total Russian (or Ukrainian) casualties in 2026. For all we know, it could be inferior, equivalent, higher... The 2026 attrition ratio is more favorable for Russia than in 2025. Progress has slowed but stays within 2024 ranges once the AFU Kursk advances are factored in. 2025 was peculiar: the Kursk pocket collapse and rout destabilized Ukrainian forces and enabled rapid Russian advances front wide for 6 months. All signs indicate that 2026 reflects a more balanced attrition approach after the extremely costly 2024 and the front-wide pressure of 2025 that leveraged the post-Kursk situation, but at high cost. Another myth is: “if attrition worked Russian advances should accelerate”. In attrition warfare theories, the principle is to cause collapse of the adversary to enable decisive gains; not that advances will gradually increase in a linear way, which is subject to both side’s respective effort at a given time. For instance, the weaker side could expend massive resources in a surge attempt, stabilising in apparence the front but collapsing 6 months later. In 2025, Ukrainian forces suffered a sector collapse in the Sudja pocket, which rendered an entire part of the army combat ineffective. Hence, advances ensued. Nevertheless, Ukraine has accelerated mobilization (aggressively) and alternative means to recover, and is nowhere near a collapse of its ground military forces for the time being. Though, with a mobilization ratio currently standing at around 18-20% of the remaining military aged male population, it may be nearing sensitive levels. The point is to separate military objectives: conquest of the 4 oblasts against which Moscow can measure military success, and political objectives: demilitarisation and neutrality of Ukraine, central to the strategic settlement Moscow continues to seek. (Ideally enforced by a favorable regime change) This matters because to achieve its strategic political goal, Russia needs to continue investing in its expensive ballistic and drone programs to collapse the economy at the rear, and make rational choices for expenditures. Losing 4,000 armor a year is not an option anymore. The ground offensive’s primary goal is therefore not military conquest but applying pressure on the entire Ukrainian economic and social apparatus, to support the achievement of the political ambition. Seizing Donbas is a secondary and corollary territorial objective, because the political goal naturally secures the territorial one. Understanding this principle is the basis of analysing this war correctly. Moscow’s objectives in this conflict have not changed, but the strategy adopted has been evolving regularly based on various factors, including setbacks. Kyiv has also been adapting continuously to prevent its success. In 2026, the military situation has somehow improved for Ukraine, but the social and economic ones deteriorated at an accelerated pace. There is however no way to tell whether the Kremlin’s plan will ultimately succeed, even partially. See an earlier analysis in reply to understand attrition warfare performance measurement methods. #UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy #Attrition
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Focus on : Macchi MC.202 Folgore 1:48 scale (kit num. 2840) 100% new moulds! All details on : italeri.com/en/product/3172 #italeri
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Pab, estas saliendo con un menor de edad, tu teniendo 19, y Max teniendo 16, no importa en que mundo estemos, eso ES grooming, esta mal, eso no es amor, es manipulación en su pura expresión. Eramos amigos, y yo te confiaba mi alma, pero tienes que aceptar que ESTO NO ESTA BIEN
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Ya cassssi, aguanten La demora es mas que nada pq me puse a hacer esto en semana de parciales xdd Para el viernes sale, asi que 👇🏿
Finalmente terminado, mañana lo grabo y vemos si de esta semana a 10 años lo subo Ojalá no me gane la pereza y ya inicie con el proyecto 🐌 Buenas noches a todos, que descansen
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En el punto
De esto se da mucho, internet esa lleno de hijos de puta que se meten con la gente, manipulan o tergiversan solo con la intencion de hacer daño. Luego depende de como afecte a cada persona y lo lleve cada uno. Yo por eso cuando me viene alguno me cago en su puta madre y luego lo bloqueo, mejor quedarse agusto que guardarselo dentro
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1. Ni sabías que estábamos en esa entidad. Tus derechos como gay están en la constitución, ahí nadie las moverá con circulares ni los perderás por salirse de asociaciones que no aportan nada. 2. Quitó un sombrero de un guerrillero. 3. ¿Qué pasa con la economía? 4. Hubo un sismo.
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RAMI retweeted
Yet, "most powerful countries" in the world can't force it to surrender, how peculiar. I know commies have negative IQ, but still
Ukrainians really believe they are a sovereign country lmfaooo
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Es caridad privada, genio.
Los fachos no consideran muy comunista la teletón???? Digo yo,,,,,
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JUST IN: 🇸🇦🇾🇪 Houthis claim attacks on 7 Saudi targets, including oil giant Aramco's facilities and East-West oil pipeline.
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Es chistoso ver como los "expertos" que hablan proponen las soluciones más culas posibles y no atacan el verdadero problema: que en Colombia no hay industria que pueda absorber el talento que egresa porque la burguesía tecnobananera prefiere vivir del estado y de las rentas
#Colombia | Se gradúan con la ilusión de construir un futuro, pero para muchos jóvenes el diploma no se traduce en un empleo. Buscan, envían hojas de vida, tocan puertas, mientras la experiencia se convierte en una de las principales barreras para conseguir una primera oportunidad. Las cifras del DANE muestran que el desempleo juvenil sigue siendo todo un desafío. ¿Qué está fallando entre la formación y las necesidades de las empresas? Le contamos cuál es el panorama. Siga la señal de Noticias Caracol en vivo 👉🏻 tinyurl.com/ywechn5j
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*taps the sign*
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