Xenon-4 retweeted
24 hrs later and we are printing the first colored sheet with fine details 💪💪
Cartridge protocols are all mapped out. The ink counter is however not reprogrammable. But still, nice to know!
many such cases after the ad campaign
Replying to @TheHackersNews
I installed tailscale for the first time I estimate about an hour before tailworm announced. Tech equivalent of a 100x Bitmex fail
well GDPR is basically useless now …
training on personal data + chat control
this was kinda my only coping mechanism for tolerating communist europe and now it’s gone 👌
you did it to yourselves smh
Xenon-4 retweeted
Final version is out:
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/…
"Reservoir Computing for Pattern Recognition and Time-Series Prediction Based on Nanofluidic Negative Differential Resistance"
Xenon-4 retweeted
Printed the first "Hello world" from my open-source firmware 😁😁
It's reversed (pun intended), but we are close!
would be really funny if the constants used in elliptic curves and sha256 directly translated to be the most optimal setups for sub-exponential calculation 👌😭
Xenon-4 retweeted
This is actually somewhat scary
Suppose we detect such neurons in serious, no-bullshit near-frontier models like 1017. Then a worm gets into neoclouds they're hosted at, and modifies the weights. Some people will notice instantly. But with full-access agentic coding at 1500 tps…
oh, nice! max coverage + impact 👌
Announcing 3 Critical vulns for hundreds of millions of IoT, Firewalls, OT, and Military devices including: Palo Alto Networks, Comcast, D-Link, HP, Canon, Honeywell, GE, Oracle, Siemens, Rockwell, Digi, Lockheed Martin, Boeing...
The vulns are with GoAhead Web Server which is a backend library used by these devices. There's a patch available from GoAhead but that doesn't mean there's a patch available for the devices yet -- that's up to the manufacturer.
- TLS traffic over DHE ciphers have a 1-byte secret, "04", meaning anyone can decrypt connections to these devices and steal login credentials and session tokens if the client negotiated with DHE ciphers like the latest TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, which is extremely likely.
- LibreSSL mTLS has been completely bypassed, meaning anyone can connect over mTLS. If you have one of these devices listening on the internet and are expecting mTLS to protect it from attackers, take it offline or patch asap.
- OpenSSL Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are not enforced, meaning if a user device is stolen or compromised, and you revoke that mTLS cert, nothing actually happens. There are a lot of other attacks this can be used for.
These are critical because these types of devices run our world. Water systems, electricity, military, firewalls, critical infrastructure.
foxio.io/blog/choose-your-ba…
Xenon-4 retweeted
Feynman Path Integral
At a beer party at the Nassau Tavern in Princeton, a young Richard Feynman asked Herbert Jehle whether anyone had built Quantum Mechanics out of the action.
The next day Jehle showed him a paper by Dirac in the library. That led to Feynman's idea that a particle takes every possible path at once, and each path adds a little spinning arrow.
As more paths through these slits get added here, their arrows add up into the real interference pattern.
es pamazām būvēju wifi bāzētu mesh tīklu
pilnīgi nekādu legālu ierobežojumu jo tas ir standarta rūteris
max upside - pilsētas līmeņa pārklājums ar lokālu internetu dm
A developer left a standard Bluetooth Low Energy tracker sitting on a wooden post. It was running on a coin cell, broadcasting a tiny 6-milliwatt pulse (+8 dBm) through a cheap copper PCB trace. Then they drove 13 kilometers (8 miles) down the road.
You would assume Bluetooth has a ten-meter leash. I mean we build smart locks, car digital keys, and proximity badges around the quiet belief that Bluetooth dies at the front door. But radio waves do not understand room boundaries. They leave an antenna and expand across the horizon according to the inverse-square law, diluting into space.
Follow that packet across the countryside. Leaving the tag at 2.44 GHz, the signal loses 122.5 decibels of power by the time it travels 13 kilometers through open air. It arrives on a distant hillside as a microscopic whisper at roughly -115 dBm, buried deep under the thermal hiss of background atmospheric noise. A standard smartphone sitting on that hill is completely deaf to it.
The builder did not touch the transmitter. They left it completely stock and FCC-compliant. Instead, they solved the math on the receiving end.
They hauled a 24 dBi parabolic grid antenna onto a mast and aimed its narrow eight-degree beam directly back at the distant tag. That dish acts like a massive radio funnel, capturing faint wavefronts across its metallic grid and concentrating them into a 24-decibel passive boost.
Then they triggered Bluetooth 5 Coded PHY.
Standard Bluetooth blasts bits at 1 megabit per second, which requires a strong signal to decode before errors corrupt the frame. Coded PHY sacrifices speed for range. It slows throughput down to 125 kilobits per second, using forward error correction to encode every single bit of data across eight separate symbols. That mathematical trade lowers the receiver sensitivity floor down to -104 dBm.
On paper, the link budget gave a comfortable 13-decibel safety margin. Out in the field, the terrain fought back.
Radio energy does not travel in an infinitely thin laser line. Over 13 kilometers, the wave expands into an elliptical cylinder known as the first Fresnel zone, swelling to 20 meters (65 feet) wide at the midpoint. Every hilltop, tree canopy, and barn roof entering that 20-meter zone scattered the wave. Signals reflecting off the dirt arrived slightly out of phase with the direct beam, carving deep cancellation nulls.
Over a thirteen-minute listening window, the receiver caught exactly three intact packets.
Three packets every few minutes is useless for streaming audio or loading a webpage. But for physical surveillance, three packets is total visibility.
Apple Find My, Google Find My Device, Tile trackers, continuous glucose monitors, and car digital key fobs broadcast unsolicited advertisement beacons every second. An attacker sitting on a high-rise balcony or flying a drone with a directional grid antenna does not need to connect to your phone or crack an encryption handshake. They only need to listen.
Bluetooth is thirty-year-old technology, yet modern operating systems still treat its signal as proof of physical proximity. An antenna with passive gain proves that proximity was an illusion all along.
































